European Politics and Society
Studies by Young Russian Scholars
Volume 1

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The volume contains papers from Russian PhD students presented at two first annual Summer Schools for Postgraduate Students “European Union Studies: Methodological Opportunities and Limits” in 2007 and 2008. The Schools were organized and conducted by the Centre for German and European Studies at St. Petersburg State University in co-operation with the Russian Branch of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and Centre for European Studies at the European University at St. Petersburg.

The presented articles are dedicated to different aspects of European politics and society, and can be of interest for everybody interested in these topics.
The volume contains papers from Russian PhD students presented at two first annual Summer Schools for Postgraduate Students “European Union Studies: Methodological Opportunities and Limits”. The Schools were organized and conducted by the Center for German and European Studies at St. Petersburg State University in co-operation with the Russian Branch of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and Center for European Studies at the European University at St. Petersburg. The first two Summer Schools took place in Strelna, a suburb of St. Petersburg, in September 2007 and in June 2008.

The Summer Schools are aimed at two of the main needs of PhD students working in European studies and some related topics in Russia: 1) insufficient knowledge in Russia about new developing theoretical concepts in European politics and governance and 2) the need of better understanding of research methodology for PhD students’ own research. Both of these needs (conceptual and methodological) were confirmed during the first Summer School. An answer to them proposed during the format of the School was recognized as appropriate both by the participating professors and students. Therefore, after the first successful experience, the Schools became annual and have attracted a large amount of interest.

The main goal of the Summer Schools was defined as: to give young Russian researchers theoretical and methodological background about European studies and to train their skills for use in social and political process analyses. To achieve this goal, the following forms of teaching were combined:

1. lectures by German and Russian political and social scientists on different theoretical and methodological approaches in European studies, including demonstrating research results and ways of using them for students’ studies;
2. methodological discussion of the papers and research plans presented by the participants.

Daily classes were divided into two parts: one theoretical and one practical. During the theoretical meetings, German and Russian professors presented the theoretical and methodological bases of European Union studies. The practical part of the classes was dedicated to applying this knowledge to participants’ scientific research programs and their papers through discussion of the student presentations. This was also supplemented by general discussions.

The idea for such a school came in 2005 from Ekaterina Altova, Anna Tarasenko, Andrey Starodubtsev, Alexandra Rombacheva and Elena Tsumarova, who were at the time graduates of Petrozavodsk State University, young political scientists who studied both European studies and Russian politics. They saw a large gap between studies of European integration and politics on the one hand and Russia’s transforming politics on the other hand. Various different theoretical approaches were developed for these two different research objects and were applied in separate and divergent ways. Therefore, a question was asked about whether these theories and theoretical approaches can help us to understand some of the other related research objects. More specifically, the question was stated as to whether European Studies can help in understanding Russian politics better and vice versa. The general idea of the School was thus from the beginning connected with recent discussions of tendencies for development of different theoretical approaches both in Europe and Russia, which can be applied both in and for European and Russian contexts. So, the idea of comparing European and Russian studies as well as applying them to various research objects was kept in mind all the time, although different topics and aspects were discussed on different days at the Schools.

The First Summer School was oriented mostly to European governance research, which was discussed both in its state of the art and with regard to prospects for the future of European Studies as a perspective, which has both opportunities and limits in Russian Studies. Approaches to European regionalism were especially interesting for many of the Russian students. European regionalism as a basis for European politics in the 21st century was then analysed in terms of its conceptual foundations, empirical phenomena and strategic consequences. Influence of the EU on Russian regionalism studies was also an interesting topic for discussion. Studies of European identity were considered on one of the working days as well. In this regard, especially such aspects as European amendments to identity conception and a comparision of European national identity concepts and Russian identity studies were at the center of the debate.

The Second Summer School, paid special attention, alongside of research methodology, to discussing problem-oriented teaching and research in European Studies. In the field of European Studies, the topics of nation states and citizenship as well as civic education were discussed for a whole working day. One day was dedicated to discussing issues connected with globalization studies and border studies in contemporary Europe and Russia, which are of special interst for PhD students, especially for those working in the North-Western region of Russia, which has a long common border with EU countries. Finally, the problems of contemporary federalism and regionalism studies in Europe and Russia attracted much interst for the students, a majority of whom work not in the center, but in the provincial regions of the Russian Federation.

During the preparations and conducting of the Schools, Dr. Maria Nozhenko (Center for European Studies, European University at St. Petersburg) and Dr. Markus Kaiser (Center for German and European Studies, DAAD Professor, St. Petersburg State University) not only delivered lectures, but actively participated in all School discussions and sessions. They moderated research seminars and gave detailed feedback to all participant papers.

During the two Summer Schools, many Russian and German professors gave lecturers and useful advices to the students. In this regard, many thanks go to Prof. Dr. Reinholdt Hedtke (Center for German and European Studies, University of Bielefeld), Prof. Dr. Martin Nettesheim (European Center for Federalism Studies, University of Tuebingen), Dr. Elena Nikiforova (Center for Independent Social Research, St. Petersburg), Prof. Dr. Berthold Rittberger, (University of
Preface

Elena Belokurova

This volume contains articles by young Russian scholars from several disciplines, with a common research object of European politics and societies. All of the texts are connected to dissertation topics defended or to be defended by students in various Russian universities and academic institutes. Such a broad distribution of topics, methodologies and theories shows in fact a very significant growing interest in Europe and European studies on the part of Russia’s academic community. Among other things, it reflects a general arousal of academic and political interest in Europe by Russian scholars, which can also be followed in the research literature in the last few years.

This situation is connected first of all with the political deepening and geographical widening of European integration, which has become a more and more important factor in foreign policy in relations with Russia. At the same time, the growing number of attempts by Russians to study Europe in many different aspects reflects the development of new academic disciplines and research institutions in Russia that have taken place in recent years. To understand the context of the contributions presented in this collection, a general overview of European studies in Russia is needed. At the same time, the aim of this introduction is not only to reflect on the presented papers, but also to think about certain gaps present in European studies in Russia, that may be fulfilled by scholars in future work, as well as by the next cohorts of Russian scholars of European studies.

It is necessary to bear in mind that, as a scholarly discipline, European studies, like other social sciences in the Soviet times, were poorly developed, although experts on Europe and various European countries worked toward foreign policy-oriented goals in several academic institutions. This includes the Institute for
World Economy and International Relations in the Russian Academy of Sciences, which has concentrated on different aspects of economic and political development in Europe, among other regions of the world. This and some other Moscow based central institutions had a monopoly over the topic, which was highly controlled by the state and Communist party authorities. In the 1990s, this monopoly gradually waned. First of all, starting in the 1990s, due to the growing interest of Russian post-Soviet foreign policy in Europe, a special research institute was established on the initiative of the then-president Boris Yeltsin. The Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences moved forward with European studies in Russia and created a basis for their development. It also encouraged the publication of many important monographs on European integration and EU politics and policies. In general, however, these books have not been enough for the whole Russia, especially for the teaching and learning process. Nevertheless, some of the researchers were also involved in teaching at some universities, especially the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), which is also an important centre of European studies in Russia.

These three mentioned institutions until now constitute the basis for European studies in Russia and they all are situated in Moscow. In the 1990s, however, other educational and research institutes outside of Moscow began to be established and developed. In the 1990s, the Association of European Studies was created, which has branches in most Russian regions. Their members are usually representatives of international relations or political sciences departments at regional universities. Many attempts have been made to develop European studies in other regional centres, for example, in St. Petersburg, Nizhni Novgorod, Petrozavodsk, Tomsk, Ekaterinburg, Kazan and some others, although they are still less important and advanced in comparison with Moscow-based institutes. This underdevelopment of regional research centres for European studies in Russia is one of the most important gaps in this field. Thus, one of the aims that contributes to closing this gap is the promotion of young scholars from various Russian regions, who may contribute their work to better developing European studies in the institutions they represent.

Other important gaps can be found when surveying the academic disciplines and topics represented by European studies in Russia. As for academic disciplines, the most successful developments are in the field of European law in the framework of legal studies. Here, some significant handbooks were published in the first years of the 21st century, which were prepared by well-known legal scientists. European law is required both by the state and local authorities as well as by businesses and other organizations in cooperation with their European partners. Moreover, much of the legal studies literature is connected with the Council of Europe and its European Court of Human Rights, with which Russia is a member.

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more deeply understanding this relationship and its regulations in Russia. In terms of research, European legal problems have been studied in most departments of law in Russia, and they are presented as cases and examples in virtually all universities.

The second main discipline that is interested in European topics in Russia is economics. Here scholars are especially interested in particular tendencies manifest in contemporary European economic development. Often this interest is especially connected with building a connected single market, as well as how this market does already and will continue to function in the future. Additionally, in recent times Europe’s economic and monetary union has gained much attention. From an economic point of view, interest in the transformation of economic and social models in EU member states is high, as well as in the reforms of socially-oriented market economies and of social policies in general.


As a whole, it can be concluded that in Russia the field of EU studies is dominated by lawyers and economists in comparison with political scientists, the latter whom are mostly interested in analysing internal Russian politics. This can be explained by the fact that knowledge about Europe is mainly requested by practitioners of economic cooperation, in particular by big business and the state.

Political science, which traditionally prevails in European studies, is also important in Russia, although in a different way than it is in Europe. The most widespread perspective here is international relations, which in Russia is separated institutionally from political science into a special academic discipline. The closest interests in Russia to Europe and the European Union (EU) are connected with formulating EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the so-called “second pillar”. In Russian academic literature, the main mechanisms, principles and institutions of decision making and implementation in the CFSP framework are described, as well as problems appearing in formulating common EU foreign strategies. Moreover, the major literature on European studies in Russia is devoted to analysing the relationship between the EU and Russia. It is interesting to note that when European studies crystallised as an academic field general works dominated, describing history as the state of the art. In recent years however, European studies have become more specific and practice-oriented; they are mostly devoted to specific problems and to possible factors of cooperation. In particular, discussions have intensified during times of conflict and competition between the EU and Russia, for example, during the EU enlargement in May 2004, when the EU vneshej politiki i politiki bezopasnosti ES [Main Instruments of the Common Foreign and Security Policy], in: Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija 11, 2005, p. 44-56.


Constitution draft ratification failed in 2005, and the crises in the autumn of 2004 and 2006. Now, the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia is commonly discussed because the process of preparing it requires interactions not only among politicians and negotiators, but also among a broad range of experts. These papers have an important political dimension and include detailed recommendations about how to further develop EU-Russia relations. At the same time, Russian researchers publishing their papers in Western journals and books have concentrated on explaining reasons for and consequences of Russian foreign policy towards the EU.

In recent years, papers on specific fields and directions of EU-Russia co-operation have also appeared. Primary attention is paid to the energy field because of its strategic importance. After adopting a strategy on four common EU-Russia spaces in 2003 and of detailing corresponding roadmaps in 2005, analysts have begun to evaluate various fields of cooperation, both in the present and for the future. Special attention is given of course to the common economic space between Russia and the EU. In such literature, current economic cooperation as well as future prospects and opportunities are evaluated in the framework of political mechanisms that have been accepted already for its promotion and implementation.

Traditionally, there is also much attention paid to the third space – external security, because cooperation in this area is a common responsibility and has a deep tradition of international relations.
Much of the research under the auspices of “European studies” in Russia is dedicated also to studies of cross-border and interregional cooperation in the North-Western region of Russia. It is here that the direct border between the EU and Russia is a particularly important factor. The Northern Dimension initiative and the Euroregions concept possess great attention, as well as with general issues such as Russian regionalism, which are partly a result of global and European influences.

18 Trenin D. (ed.). Rossija i osnovnye instituty bezopasnosti v Evrope: vstupaya v 21 vek [Russia and the Main Security Institutions in Europe: Entering the XXI Century], Moscow: Moskovskii Centr Karnegi, 2000; Voronov K. Evropa i Rossija posle Balkanskoi voiny 1999: dramatichnye uroki [Europe and Russia after the Balkan War 1999: Dramatic Lessons], in: Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija 4, 2000, p. 27-35; Arbatova N. Otoshenija Rossi i Zapada posle kosovskogo krizisa [Relations of Russia and the West after the Kosovo Crisis], in: Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otoshenija 6, 2000, p. 14-23.

19 Trenin D. (ed.). Rossija i osnovnye instituty bezopasnosti v Evrope: vstupaya v 21 vek [Russia and the Main Security Institutions in Europe: Entering the XXI Century], Moscow: Moskovskii Centr Karnegi, 2000; Voronov K. Evropa i Rossija posle Balkanskoi voiny 1999: dramatichnye uroki [Europe and Russia after the Balkan War 1999: Dramatic Lessons], in: Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otoshenija 4, 2000, p. 27-35; Arbatova N. Otoshenija Rossi i Zapada posle kosovskogo krizisa [Relations of Russia and the West after the Kosovo Crisis], in: Mirovaja ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otoshenija 6, 2000, p. 14-23.


Literature on the Kaliningrad area is especially worth naming. Due to its geopolitical position as an exclave for relations with Russia and as an enclave in relations with the EU, Kaliningrad has become an object of rapt attention from the point of view of politicians and researchers. Studies such as these are especially popular among scholars situated in related regions and the naturally concentrate their attention on local perspectives of EU-Russian relations.

The political science is in the last years better represented in Russian European studies, but it still is oriented mainly toward EU-Russian relations and is only in very limited way focussed on EU internal policies. Here, Russian political scientists are active mainly in studying EU regional policies, and in particular with the mechanisms of structural funds functioning. EU territorial structures and the special role of regions in the European landscape as a whole. In recent years, institutional reforms, especially in connection with the EU’s Eastern enlargement and with the deepening integration of the 2000s, began to attract attention of researchers. As a result, many papers have appeared in this problematic field. However, being just journal articles, they only briefly describe the specific aspects of political transformation in the EU, and do not always take into account the history and theories of European integration along with the economic and political contexts of these reforms.


So, to conclude with political science as an academic field, the most important gap is connected mainly with the limited amount of topics of interest to Russian scholars and also with the weak theoretical perspectives and foundations for the mainly policy- and practice-oriented studies.

As for sociological approaches, given the broad spectrum of social problems and topics in the EU, Russian researchers have paid most of their attention to immigration in the EU, and to themes such as adaptation and assimilation. This is probably connected with the special attention given to this problem in the EU itself, and with the rising roles of immigration and emigration in Russia. Sociologists are among the least represented scholars in European studies in Russia, which is another important gap. Of course, it is difficult for Russian scholars to carry out empirical studies, which primarily explains the underdevelopment of sociological perspectives in European studies. At the same time, concentration on Russian society has been until now the most important topic of sociological research. This situation is now changing because the new generation of scholars is already interested in carrying out research in Europe and comparing it with Russia. But still, such studies are rare. Thus, even in the volume presented here, the sociological perspective is underdeveloped and is presented mostly as a loose comparison or in regard solely to Russia.

As a conclusion of this overview of Russian literature on European studies, it can be said that there are a number of problems and that many important gaps remain to be filled. First, Russian studies of Europe are in general relatively weak. Second, European studies in Russia concentrate mainly on policy- and practice-oriented aspects of contemporary problems in EU-Russian relations. This is connected with the domination by lawyers, economists and international relations specialists in the field, i.e. those who are predominantly studying EU-Russia relations. This leads to the fact that European studies in Russia usually have only a short-term orientation and therefore a rather weak theoretical basis. As a consequence, European studies in Russia are generally not so well connected with European studies in the EU or around the world. As a result, they miss many perspectives that are nowadays relevant in international discussions of European politics.

The articles presented in this volume should to some extent contribute to filling these gaps. First, the collection gives an opportunity for Russian scholars from various regions to present their vision and the results of their studies. Among the authors are scholars from St. Petersburg, Voronezh, Yaroslavl, Kazan, Petrozavodsk, and of course, from Moscow. Second, the articles contribute to the development of different academic perspectives and disciplines within the field of European studies. In the volume, disciplines such as political science, history, sociology, cultural studies, linguistics are represented. Third, the volume is concentrated on topics that are usually not popular, but which we believe are important for understanding contemporary Europe. This includes, for example, such topics as Europe’s peacekeeping strategy, trust building, reflections of the history in the movies, EU institutions of public participation and interest coordination. Most of the articles still of course reflect Russia’s development as well, but they do this in various ways. Some of them try to compare Russian and European research themes like consultative bodies, trust structures and the use of adjectives in different languages, while others try to reflect on Europe in Russia’s identity and policies. Still others borrow European theories, methodologies and perspectives to analyse many kinds of empirical data. In general, the fourth gap, that of underdevelopment much less so in other Russian regions.
of the theoretical and methodological basis of social research in Russia is also partly filled in the volume because many of the presented articles pay attention to the theoretical foundations of their research and the conclusions reached.

The volume is thus divided into two parts: “European politics” and “European societies”, corresponding to the research topics and academic perspectives used in the research. The first part is composed of articles studying European politics. Starting with an historical article on empire building in Britain written by Ekaterina Kovaleva, it moves to contemporary European politics, meaning the period that involves the EU. We have articles oriented both toward the EU internal and external politics, on examples of consultative bodies in the policy-making process analysed by Anna Tarasenko and EU peace-keeping capacities studied by Vasily Khokhlov. Influences of EU policies on the national policies are considered in four articles. Ilja Ermolin analyses EU coordination that is reflected in the national system of an EU member state, with the example of Sweden. Another three articles consider the EU influence on non-member states, in particular Russia. Liubov Yaroshenko compares the cases of Russia and Ukraine in regard to the EU attempts to transmit European values to non-member states. European politics in the field of higher education in the framework of the Bologna process and its implementation in Russia is at the core of the research done by Elena Stepanova. The role of Europe and of the EU in Russia’s identity politics is studied in the contribution of Elena Tsumarova. In total, the political science part presented in the volume corresponds to some extent to the situation described above in regard to European studies in Russia, especially in terms of the special attention paid to Russia. But at the same time, it mainly presents a theoretically based analysis of European politics and its influence on the national policies, by using classical and new comparative politics theories and methodologies, and not only traditional international relations approaches to European studies in Russia.

The sociological part concentrating on European societies is relatively small, which again corresponds to the situation of the relative weakness of sociology for European studies in Russia. Sociology is actually only represented in a pure sense by two contributions, the first by Natalia Chusova which is oriented to studies of the ethnic component of intercultural communication, and the second by Timirkhan Alishev which is aimed at interpersonal trust research. Both try to identify some correspondence to Russia; the first in attempting to find Western theoretical approaches appropriate to analysing Russian society and the second through making a comparison of EU and Russian empirical data. The remaining two articles represent other academic disciplines in the field of social science related to the study of European societies. Tatiana Kovaleva-Reichenbaecher comes from a linguistics background and in her article shows similarities and differences of adjectives in the political discourse of Russia and Germany. Natalia Munina represents cultural studies and aims her research to understanding the reflection in American movies of the Second World War on European history.

In total, the collected articles presented in this volume contribute to European studies in Russia and to some extent reveal certain gaps and limitations in this academic field so far. At the same time, however, they also demonstrate new tendencies and trends in its development. This consists primarily in raising the interest of different disciplines to the prospect of European studies and bringing their perspectives, approaches, theories and methodologies into the field, which has been traditionally dominated by the international relations perspective in Russia. Since the contributions are prepared by young Russian scholars, this gives a hope for a long-term sustainability of the field, which actually can enrich European studies not just in Russia, but also globally.
The Concept of Empire in the Domestic Politics of Gladstone’s Cabinets in Britain in the 1880–1890s

Ekaterina Kovaleva

Imperial history has attracted much attention and is still a focus for scholars all over the world. The example of Britain given in this case seems to be especially interesting and provides a large scope of materials on which to base a profound analysis. Unprecedented economic and industrial growth and the development of political institutions along with a commitment to liberal values have made this period of European history very popular among the researchers.

However, colonial history itself is a complex and contested topic: what seemed to be logical and reasonable in the times of the imperial policy-makers does not look that way in modern approaches and the sources they have discovered for further research. Moreover, approaches elaborated in the 19th – 20th centuries need to be reconsidered if not fully, then nevertheless in some aspects regarding the dominant ideological values and methodological basis used in research by foreign and Russian historians.

Meanwhile, the study of motives and driving forces in the making of imperial policy and “building” the Empire can help us to understand the tendencies and peculiarities inherent in British imperial development and the process of the Empire’s transformation into the Commonwealth that took place in the 20th century. Such a study can also shed light on the formation, growth and collapse of empires as a phenomenon in general and reveal the cycles the states go through on the way of attaining imperial might and power.

The aim of my research work is to analyze the main principles of imperial policy within the Liberal Cabinet in the 1880–1890s.
This includes some of the factors that influenced it and changes in the attitude of British society, if any, to the transformative course of the British Empire in the late 19th century.

By the second half of the 19th century, Britain already owned vast overseas possessions. The Empire could be described in three components, consisting of self-governing colonies (Canada, Australia and New Zealand), India and the dependent colonies. The administrative structure of the colonies had already been formed and implemented. The proclaiming of Queen Victoria as the Empress of India in 1876 finished the formal process of Empire building. The title itself had an ideological value, proving the legitimacy of British imperial status and policy both within and outside the country.

However, the status of the colonies within the British Empire was not the same. By the end of the nineteenth century the “settler” or so called “white” colonies faced boosting growth; this fact combined with the protectionist tariffs imposed by these colonies, in addition to the growing ambitions of the political elite of these colonies served to weaken the position of the Mother country.

Facing mounting competition with American and European rivals, Britain turned its attention to the markets of its own colonies. Throughout the 19th century, Britain invested large sums of money in railway infrastructure and transport communications. These steps facilitated the growth of British export to the colonies, which by the year 1892 accounted for 27.8% of the country’s exports (80 millions pounds sterling).

The period 1873 – 1896 is known as a period of Great Depression; once the country’s economy bound itself to manufacturing it was doomed to face the industrial cycles of economic prosperity and decline. The factors that produced this depression could not be restricted to internal or external causes, but were of complex character. The growing industrial capacities of Germany, Russia and the United States of America as rivals made it clear that Britain was no longer the only beneficiary of its colonial might. Under these circumstances the political elite could not help focusing upon the overseas colonies and regarded them as a key to reinvigorating the British economy and retaining its imperial status. Such an interpretation of the situation was strong both within the Conservative and Liberal parties, although the approaches to tackling the problem were different even within the same party.

It should be noted, that the Borough Franchise Bill of 1867 increased the electorate. It urged both parties competing for votes to take into consideration and to reflect the needs and concerns of working class citizens in their election programmes. The scholar J. Parry remarks in his work that since 1867, the “power to select and dismiss ministries moved from Westminster to the Constituencies.” Moreover, the vote of one single person could cost the party a seat in the parliament. The Conservative Prime Minister Lord Salisbury calculated that “the Conservatives could have won “the elections in 1867” had a mere 200 electors across the country voted differently”. The Liberal party and its strategy faced certain difficulties in the second half of the 19th century. On the one hand, traditional Liberal notions gained popularity and attracted the support of the electorate, which made it possible for William Ewart Gladstone, the leader of Liberals, to form four Liberal Cabinets (1868–1874, 1880–1885, 1886 and 1892–1894). On the other hand, the policies pursued by the Liberals were adjusted to the


5 Quot. by: Parry J., op. cit., p. 221.
political and economic conditions in the late 19th century. The necessity to bind together the liberal values of past times with contemporary popular sentiment was a kind of leitmotif for the policy of the Liberals throughout the course of the Empire.

Some changes, though mainly insignificant, were undertaken in the party structure in order to make it more efficient and to strengthen the role of local communities. The views of party members were not necessarily the same, but mostly miscellaneous. The majority of the Liberal party could be divided into two parts: supporters of orthodox liberalism, who mostly belonged to the right wing of the party and radicals, who expressed extreme views on party policy and the concept of Empire and were in opposition within the Liberal party. These two groups influenced the political course pursued by the Liberal Cabinet, though they represented extremes. The determining role was for the moderates, the so-called party of the “centre” or “golden middle”, whose leader Gladstone began a rallying cry for the Liberal party that helped for a time to overcome sectionalism within the party.

The Liberals were often criticized for taking an inconsistent approach to the development of the colonies and of the Empire itself. Some scholars even contended that the policy pursued by the Liberals lacked independence and was just a continuation of policies suggested and undertaken by the Conservatives in the 1870s.

The military initiative planned as a routine measure turned out to provoke a clash of opinions in Parliament and brought accusations that the Liberals were allegedly supposing to surrender the Empire. Debates over liberal imperial policy became even more intense once the issue of “home rule” in Ireland arose. The peculiarity of the situation boiled down to the fact that despite being nominally European in race and geographical location it was England’s first colony. While most “settler” colonies were on their way to obtaining or already gained self-government institutions, Irish claims for the same were considered as a kind of wound by the majority in British society of the time. Conservative Prime Minister Lord Salisbury compared the Irish to “races like the Hottentots, and even Hindoos, incapable of self-government. He would not

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place confidence in people who had acquired the habit of using guns and slugs”. 9

The results of three Cabinets of Gladstone (1868–1874, 1880–1885 and 1886) were to meet the mounting concerns of the British society with further development of the colonies within the Empire. The steps undertaken by the government made according to liberal traditions and aimed at strengthening the Empire were nevertheless considered still by contemporaries of the time as inconsistent attempts to ruin the Empire.

Discussions over the future of the colonies and the need for reconsidering the structure and principles of imperial intervention resumed in the 1880s. In 1884, the Imperial Federation League was established, and an Imperial conference following in 1887 provoked debates over the prospects of an Imperial Federation and its feasibility in the years ahead. The necessity of retaining Empire seemed indisputable. The question was raised, however, about the practicability of keeping ties between the Mother country and the colonies in a way like they existed before. In this regard it is essential to note, that discussions over the colonies and possible changes in their administration concerned only one category of British colonies, namely self-governing colonies of North America, Australasia and New Zealand.

In the Parliament, in the Colonial Society, and on the pages of British newspapers there was an ongoing discussion about the scheme of the Imperial Federation.

Most of the authors agreed that “there can be no empire without subject dependencies” 10. But the understanding of the scheme to be applied was quite different. Some representatives were quite skeptical, once the issue was concerned about the Imperial Federation. The very term “Imperial Federation” provoked serious discussion. Mr. Thring, a contemporary of the events, quite fairly remarked in an article (1886) that “an Empire supposes a nation, the essential condition of which is that one of the component states is dominant. A Federation, or federated nation, is the exact converse: it is an aggregate of states which, claiming to be equal, and being unwilling to yield the pre-eminence to any one of their members, agrees to create, by representation, a fictitious nation as it were”. 11 The author continued, that “to call a Federation ‘Imperial’ is then a contradiction in terms. In so far as an institution is Imperial it cannot be Federal, and vice versa”. 12 This was not the only opinion expressed about the Imperial Federation. Despite these mostly fair pieces of criticism, however, the scheme of the Imperial Federation was considered by its contemporaries to be a great endeavor. Taken in this regard, the role of the political elite in the colonies could not be belittled. The fact that the Colonies were not satisfied with how matters were at the time, along with the growing economic prosperity made cries for more self-governing rights more effective. The president of a national club in Montreal stated, that “Our position is a dependent one, and we are not only subjects of the Queen, but we are subjects of the Queen’s subjects, and for my own part I shall never feel comfortable while such a state of things exists”. 13

The plans suggested by politicians also focussed on the Irish issue. As Liberal M.P. Mr. Morley contended, “[…] you cannot have liberalism in England without liberalism in Ireland”. 14 This view coincided first with the views of moderate Liberals. Thus, the scheme of the Imperial Federation Parliament implied a separate Parliament of two Houses for Ireland and Scotland, which was for their advantage, as it should “admit colonists to

equal rights with Englishmen, [...] distribute and equalize the burden of national defense and of other Imperial expenditure”.

However radical the schemes of Home Rule seemed to people at the time, very few members in the Liberal party could realistically consider their possibility. As Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, a representative of the Liberal Party stated: “I am desirous of seeing at the earliest possible moment a large extension of local self-government in Ireland, but I would give no countenance to the schemes of those who seek to injure this country, as they would assuredly ruin their own, by separation under one name or another”.

Liberal policy on the whole was based on a traditional notion of the colonies being an inalienable part of the Empire and also on the moral aspect of retaining ties between the Mother country and its colonies. Regardless of these views, the concept of “Empire” within the Liberal party could not remain unchanged. The rapid development of Britain’s rivals along with social changes happening inside the metropolis made policy adjustment necessary.

The Liberals neither intended to surrender the Empire, nor to ruin its connections with the colonies. They were loyal supporters of imperial values throughout the course of the nineteenth century. Even if proposals about Home Rule to Ireland or self-government to the colonies sounded radical, the Liberals consistently followed the strategy of defending national interests. Measures undertaken by Liberal cabinets in the 19th century and those which were not implemented, even if discussed widely like the scheme for the Imperial Federation and the Imperial Parliament, formed a basis for further transformation of imperial institutions.

The Role of Consultative Bodies in the Policy-Making Process: Cases of Russia and the European Union

Anna Tarasenko

This article is dedicated to an analysis of the activities of consultative bodies in Russia and the European Union (EU). The study is focused in particular on their functions, conditions and reasons for their establishment, as well as on characteristics of their membership. For selected cases, there are some similar starting points like weak parliaments and the need to provide some additional channels for legitimation of political decisions. At the same time, there is a crucial difference in the system of checks and balances embedded in both political systems. Also, there are some particularities of membership in both advisory bodies which can affect member roles in the decision-making process. These important factors are at the center of the analysis.

A common feature which unites these different cases are the conditions which facilitated creation of the consultative bodies. Weakness of the parliament in both political systems has a different character, but produces such consequences as the problem of political accountability and the legitimacy of executive power. As a result, citizens’ interests are not properly taken into account in the decision-making process because the main representative branch of power is not strong enough to counterbalance the executive branch. To increase public involvement in both cases some additional channels for interest representation such as consultative bodies, working groups etc. have been created.

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1 This article was written in the frame of the Research Line “Understanding European Governance in the Russian Northwestern Region” with the financial encourage of the Centre for Germany and European Studies (St. Petersburg State University).

2 The notion “organized interests group” is used to define NGO to highlight its ability to act as interest group defending own interest in decision-making process. The notion “interest representation” allows to describe the process and of defending interest in the frame of particular institutions or public forums.
Consultative bodies as institutional forms of interest inclusion in the decision-making process have a particular status in political systems. There is no other forum that provides such a regular institutional form of interest representation and that gives opportunities for deep and active involvement in the political decision-making process. These bodies have quite a limited impact, however, because all recommendations they make have an advisory status and can be ignored in the decision-making process. On the one hand, this position in the political system opens up possibilities for informal lobbyists and some pressure groups. The activities of organized interests group depend on their links and accountability to the social group they represent. On the other hand, politicians and officials are interested in successful public participation only if they depend on effective decision-making in the framework of a competitive political system. There are thus both “external” and “internal” factors which facilitate either active or passive involvement of consultative bodies in the decision-making process.

In this paper, I compare two empirical cases: The Public Chamber (PC) of the Russian Federation and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) in the EU. The analysis focuses on the functions of consultative bodies, characteristics of their membership and level of competitiveness in both political systems. The aim is to define differences in the two cases and explain their influence on the role of consultative bodies in the decision-making process. Finally, some conclusions are made on the possibilities and limitations of mechanisms of interest representation as well as to understand perspectives for their further development.

Vulnerability of the European Parliament in the Political System of the European Union

Development of the EU first as an economic union has to a high extent predetermined the particularities of its political institutions. The main goal of this system is to take into account member states’ interests while elaborating a common European policy. As a result, there are two dominant institutions in the decision-making process – the European Commission (EC), which upholds interests of the whole European community, and the Council of the European Union, which represents member states.

The Council of the EU consists of corresponding ministers of all member states and makes the most important decisions. The Council shapes agendas in such significant areas as common foreign affairs and security policy, justice and criminal law and can veto decisions in almost all policy areas. At the same time, the EC plays the key role in agenda setting in almost all areas. This institution, which consists mainly of European bureaucrats, is responsible for the coordination of decision-making processes as soon as there are many interest groups involved in it. Together with the Council, the EC is the most important political institution in the EU.

The European Parliament has always had a marginal role in the EU policy-making process because of its limited political power and the low turnout in European elections. But in the 1980–1990s, the situation changed. In spite of the absent function of initiating laws its legislative power was strengthened. The European Parliament (EP) now shares legislative power with the Council of the EU. Interaction of these institutions with the legislation process varies across different procedures.

Members of the EP discuss law drafts during parliament hearings, but this form of legislative process differs from the traditional one and depends on particular procedures. Consultation procedures are used to submit proposals to the Council and to apply for policies (agricultural, immigration, etc.). Under the terms of cooperative procedure Parliament reconciles its recommendations with the Council. Deputies can ask for a “second reading” to review legislation and to suggest further amendments. According to the assent procedure, the EP gives an approval to just the draft law as a whole and cannot propose amendments. Most of the legislation falls under

co-decision procedures. In this case, the EP and the Council have to submit a joint decision on the law draft. This procedure gives the EP the right to veto any legislation, though the Council has the right to make the final decision.

In addition to these procedures, the EP has the right to inquire about some details concerning law drafts by asking the Council and the EC, which must respond to these requests. In spite of this, legislative procedures restrict parliamentary power and don’t let representative power take part in it properly controlling the decision-making process. It means that the legislative branch can’t significantly influence decisions made by executive powers. Thus, the European Parliament is a weak political institution and can’t serve as an effective channel for interest representation (e.g. “effective channel to represent public interests”). In spite of that, there are other institutions which accomplish parliamentary functions, serving to counterbalance executive power and to represent civil society interests.

It has already been mentioned that there are two main political institutions in Europe, the Council and the EC, which play key roles in European governance. They can be regarded as a kind of “executive power” since these institutions consist of European and national officials and are supported by national and European civil services. They uphold different kind of interests (national and European) and this division of interests determines the particular kind of system of checks and balance in decision-making processes.

The Council exercises control of the activity of the EC by appointing heads of its institutional units – Directorates-General (who act as a traditional government). Also the Council created a committee system (i.e. comitology) where national experts and representatives of interest groups work. The goal of these committees is to reach expert conclusions on decisions and to oversee decisions implemented by the EC. Depending on the type of committee (advisory, management or regulatory) its decisions have different power. Advisory committees give opinions which must be taken into account by the EC. Management and Regulatory committees should approve the decision; if they don’t do it, it will be referred to the Council which can overcome the committees’ position by a qualified majority. So, the committee system is essentially included in the decision-making process and has a strong influence on the Council. This means that the Council is responsible to the bureaucratic system, which is not accountable to the citizens. As Simon Hix stresses, all of these procedures of coordinating state interests destroy the system of separation of powers because the main state control is implemented by a particular committee system which is not accountable to the citizens.

Thus, at the level of the EU we can see a particular system of checks and balances. This is not built on interactions between executive and representative powers as it is in traditional democracies. Instead, this system operates because of the need to coordinate national interests and supranational positions among two strong political institutions. That is why weak parliamentary power in the state decision-making process doesn’t lead to a concentration of power in one hand. Moreover, this system can provide effective outcomes.

The decision-making process in the EU is a time-consuming and complicated procedure which consists of several stages. The committee system allows the EU to take into account the interests of member states by engaging national experts. Also, there is a large number of pressure groups which also seek to take part in regulation discussions. To give them an opportunity to express their opinion the EC creates working groups and consultative bodies which also have various powers depending on the policy area and procedure. So, equally with such representative institutions as the European Parliament and the Council there

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are “other non-national actors which are competing for the position of legitimate interest representative”.6

From the one side, this complicated system of interest coordination between national experts, European officials, businesses and non-government organisation (NGO) representatives, allows for the provision of effective governance. This is a particular ability of the European political system to promote “output legitimacy”. From the other side, such tangled procedures and the crucial role of a bureaucratic institution in the decision-making process makes it non-transparent. This leads, among other things, to unclear accountability in the multi-level system, which is difficult to oversee, even with the help of such a traditional institution as a parliament.7

To resolve the problem of decision-making transparency and weak parliamentary control of executive policy-making, the EC adopted “A White Paper on European Governance”8 in the year 2000. In this paper, European officials suggested the development of more intensive interaction with the EESC and the EP. This document also stipulates making a system of forums and consultations with interests groups more transparent and based on clearer procedures. Thus, institutionalized deliberation (e.g. comitology) and functional representation (EESC), along with enforcing representative power is seen to play an important role in increasing the democratic element in decision-making processes.

**The Presidential Political System as a Factor of a Weak State Duma**
The reasons for weakness in both the national parliament in Russia and the EP are connected with the institutional features of the corresponding political systems design. Certainly, there are some differences in the nature of these similar situations. There is a particular system of checks and balances between the Council and the EC in the EU, which doesn’t allow the EP to interfere considerably into the legislative process. The Russian Parliament also has quite modest competencies compared with the Presidential power. The recent political situation in Russia serves to enhance the existing power gap between state institutions of the President and the Parliament. The dominance of the “power party” – United Russia – in the national Parliament provides the basis for supporting all executive decisions. At the same time, however, this situation reduces the potential of the representative branch to serve as an effective counterbalance for it that takes into account different kinds of under-represented interests.

The particular power division in Russia’s political system gives the Russian President almost unlimited power to compose the Government and to run a common national policy. The Legislature is also engaged in shaping the Government by adjusting the head of the Government. But this right is limited by the President’s ability to dismiss the Parliament if it rejects the Presidential candidates three times in succession. In addition to this, the State Duma does not have enough official power to remove a President. The procedure of impeachment is so complicated that it is almost impossible to exercise. So, the Presidency in Russia has definite advantages in comparison with the executive and representative authority. These institutional particularities of the Russian political system have led some scientists to define it as a super-presidential system.9

The contemporary political processes in Russia facilitate the enforcement of presidential control over both the executive and legislative powers. The United Russia Party won the most recent

national elections in 2007 and now has a majority in the State Duma. According to the program adopted in 2001, the first priority of the party is “a strong Presidential power as a guarantee of political stability and firmness of the constitutional system”. This statement is embodied in Russian policy: all Presidential suggestions are adopted by the Parliament. In the frame of a super-presidential political system, the ruling party’s power contributes to an even more pronounced decrease in the political role of the national Parliament in the decision-making process. This political transformation is only one part of an overall strategy to adopt authoritarian tendencies at the federal and regional levels in Russia. This strategy is demonstrated when conducting unfair and non-competitive elections, suppressing independent mass media and persecuting non-state financial aid for advocating NGOs with Western funds. Unlike in the EU case, the weakness of the Russian national Parliament means a break in the system of checks and balances. Thus, Presidential power dominates in Russia, which prejudices both the legislative branch and democratic principles.

The increasing control of the federal authority over decision-making processes in recent years is accompanied by attempts to demonstrate Government openness to citizens’ interests and therefore to obtain public support for running its policies. For example, in 2001 the Kremlin initiated a Civic Forum in order to show support for citizens making inputs and contributions in the national and local decision-making process. This project was ineffective and in 2004 President Putin initiated the formation of a Council for Assisting with the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights and the Public Chamber at the same moment when he suggested revoking the direct elections of regional governors. Taking into account the overall weakening of democratic institutions in Russia, the creation of particular public and private forums for deliberation about social interests and also so-called non-profit sector organizations are considered to be an attempt to substitute real political participation for the incorporation of interest groups.

This analysis confirms that the executive power is the main source for conducting policies, both in the EU and in Russia, which shows that the representative power does not so heavily influence executive activity. This configuration of political powers entails a reproach to democratic deficit because citizens’ interests are not taken into account in decision-making processes that ultimately affect their lives as citizens. In these conditions, executive power has to involve additional support for its policies by creating particular mechanisms such as consultative bodies, deliberative forums etc. for public involvement in legislative discussions and implementing laws.

There are also some distinguishing features that contribute to different reasons for creating consultative bodies. In the case of the EU, there is a particular system of checks and balances between national and supra-national institutions which prevents concentration of power in one institution. In spite of the insufficient participation of the European Parliament in the legislative process, the European political system is effective in elaborating and implementing European policies. European governance effectiveness to some extent justifies the non-transparent character of its decision-making process and entails the legitimacy of its “output”. Thus, the main reason to involve civil society organizations into policy discussions is to obtain “input” legitimacy as long as these organizations represent particular social groups.

The Russian case differs from the EU due to the existence of one prevailing actor – the President – who doesn’t face oppositions to his policies. Representative power can rarely


interfere in executive activity and therefore there is little need
to reconcile different interests and to promote effective policy-
making. This means that the reason for NGO involvement
is hardly connected with attempting to make representative
interests more effective and useful during legislative discus-
sion; since the strong national Parliament doesn’t manage
this function. Thus, the Public Chamber is considered more
as playing its role in public-opinion formation rather than as
a channel for citizenry participation.

These particularities of the European and Russian political
systems influence the activities of consultative bodies: the Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Public
Chamber. The European political system is more oriented to-
ward effectiveness and its consultative bodies can therefore help
to achieve this goal by representing the interests of the most im-
portant social groups. Presidential power in Russia is dedicated
to policy legitimation and consultative bodies may contribute
to attract public support. The thesis presented here of different
priorities in consultative bodies’ activity in Russia and the EU
has also been confirmed by the various ways of shaping their
membership. If in the European case EESC includes advanced,
professional interest groups, then in Russia the President tends
to involve celebrities who is supposed to raise the prestige of the
PC and loyal representatives, who are not necessary able to ex-
press their independent opinions and to contribute to the policy-
making process as experts.

Consultative Bodies at the European Level

The EESC is an advisory body of the EU. It was established in
1957 under the Treaty of Rome. The EESC represents employ-
ers, trade unions, farmers, consumers and other interest groups
in the decision-making process by delivering opinions to the EP,

the Council of the EU and the EC. The role of organized civil
society is to act as an intermediary between public authorities
and citizens. This can be implemented several possible ways:
1. the Committee has to be consulted by the Commission or
Council (compulsory consultation);
2. the EC, the Council and the EP can ask the opinion of the
EESC when they consider it appropriate (optional consulta-
tion);
3. the EESC has the right to issue its own initiative opinion to
the Commission or Council, especially at early stages of the
decision-making process.

The particularities of the policy-making process define the role
of all participants. Strategic decisions connected with revision
of the treaties are resolved by the Council. The enlargement pro-
cess and financial policies are under the EC’s jurisdiction. The
influence of non-governmental actors concerns the meso- and
micro-level of the decision-making process: elaborating and im-
plementing social, ecological and health programs. The EESC
works in various areas and each of them is discussed in the frame
of a particular section:

1. Single Market, Production and Consumption;
2. Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society;
3. Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment;
4. Economic and Monetary Union, Economic and Social Co-
hesion;
5. Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship;
6. External Relations.

The EESC thus has quite a wide range of opportunities to ex-
press the interests they represent. The only one limitation is that

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13 The official Internet-site of the European Economic and Social Committee.

14 The official Internet-site of the European Economic and Social Committee.

15 Smismans S. The European Economic and Social Committee: Towards Deliberative De-
mocracy via a Functional Assembly, in: European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 4 (12), 2000.
eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-012a.htm.

16 Nugent N., Paterson W. Political System of the European Union, in: Hayward J. and
the EESC’s opinions have only an advisory status. There is also one more challenge – membership particularities – that makes the decision-making process within this representative body quite complicated.

Under the terms of the Treaty of Nice (2000), the EESC consists of representatives of the various economic and social components of organized civil society. There are 222 members from 27 member states of the EU and they are appointed by the Council of Ministers on the basis of lists drawn up by national governments for a renewable four-year term. The procedure of candidate selection varies in different countries. Some national governments (e.g. France, Greece) ask concerned groups to propose potential EESC members. In other states, government departments (e.g. Italy, Spain) suggest candidates from the groups they are in contact with but the national government remains responsible for the final decision. And in some countries, national social and economic committees propose candidates which the government generally approves (e.g. Belgium, Netherlands). In spite of selection procedure differs in different countries, member states therefore play a key role in the Committee’s formation. Taking into account the important place of national governments in European political system, it is acceptable to suppose that consultative bodies have serious support and legitimacy from the states. The EESC can thus be regarded as one more channel for the representation of national interests.

The representative nominations of member states correspond to the proportional distribution of the population in each country. There are 24 representatives from Germany, the UK, France and Italy, which contain the largest populations. The smallest number of representatives comes from Luxemburg, Cyprus and Malta (5–6 members). There are typically large, experienced organizations which have a widespread network of sub-units in different European countries. Such umbrella associations have a strong connection with their member organizations. This is strongly requested in order to provide for the representativeness of various interest groups and to help bridge the European level with national and local levels by providing urgent information about European initiatives and enabling feedback concerning policy implementation. Thus, the consultative body also acts as a channel for communication between civil society organizations and EU institutions and therefore impacts on the European legislative process.

The EESC consists of organizations that represent producers, consumers, workers, farmers, carriers, dealers, craftsmen, and their general interest. The assembly is divided into three groups:

1. Employers (public and private sectors of industry, commerce, large companies etc);
2. Employees (trade union confederations);
3. Various interests (consumers, farmers, craftsmen, small and medium size enterprises, social and environmental NGOs, professionals, etc).

Looking at the membership of the EESC, it is easy to notice that the consultative bodies provide functional representation of national interests. These institutions combine a wide variety of pressure groups that hold quite opposite interests and possess unequal resources. Taking into account that advisory bodies should elaborate on common opinions regarding certain legislation or issues, it becomes obvious that these institutions provide cross-sectoral agreement in order to support European policies.

The Committee traditionally has nine plenary sessions per year, each with six sections that generally meet between one and three times. The EESC provides expertise in search of consensus through dialogue. The goal is to elaborate common coordinated opinions on particular issues which are proposed by the main policy-makers – the EC, the Council and

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17 Smismans S., op. cit.
18 Wallace H., op. cit., p. 49-92.
the EP. The Committee not only represents different interests, moreover, it coordinates various opinions and suggests actions which would be the most appropriate for all stakeholders. This means that consultative bodies are more useful as a forum for interest coordination, than as lobbyist activity. This is crucially important for the EC which seeks for the support of the common European policy.

The EC has made efforts to create various European civil society organizations. EU financial contributions to European programs facilitate the consolidation of national associations in the form of creating European associations. Such associations as CONCORD, the European Public Health Alliance, the Green Group of Eight and others were initially supported by the EC. On the one hand, these associations include enough organizations to represent all sectors: ecology, education, health, etc. On the other hand, these organizations protect the interests of all areas of EU member states. The involvement of such EU-oriented actors in the policy-shaping process is extremely important in order to defend the EC position in its deliberative process, especially where state interests are represented by national experts and play crucial role in the frame of comitology system.

As the EESC has limited power in the decision-making process (because of its advisory status), interests groups also tend to arrange direct links with the EC and the Council. There are three kinds of institutionalized forums for civil society participation: large open meetings, consisting of large numbers of association representatives, various committees and forums and consultative bodies. Annual meetings are usually organized by the Directorates that involve associations of NGOs. As an example, there are regular meetings of the Platform of European Social NGOs with officials from the EC. The aim of these forums is to discuss strategic points of interaction between the EC and NGO associations. Some experts consider that such meetings contribute to resolving the democracy-deficit dilemma.20 Advisory committees here differ from the annual meeting in applying a more systematic intermediation process with EU officials. Informal consultations are one of the most widespread forms of interaction with NGO associations. Normally they take a shape in the form of ad hoc meetings. All of these forms of intermediation are used to inform third sector representatives about European initiatives and programs and also to get feedback from civil society.

There are thus different kinds of channels for interested representatives at the EU level. They differ depending on the level of institutionalization and with respect to the sources of political support. The EESC is considered to be one of the most institutionalized European structures and it provides functional representation for its citizens. The national governments undoubtedly play a key role in its shaping. Its goal, however, is to elaborate on the common opinion of European citizens regarding the particular issues of the executive and representative branches of government. Interest group participation in the frame of consultative bodies is regarded as limited and indirect, whereas the EESC’s decisions have consultative status. In spite of this, participation of civil society organizations in decision-making processes raise the support of current policies.21

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discussed in details”. This advisory body should accomplish several tasks:
1. to provide intermediation for Russian citizens with the federal, regional and local authorities,
2. to take into account citizens’ needs and interests and also to protect the rights and freedoms of citizens;
3. to implement public control over federal, regional and local activities.

In accordance with the Law of the Public Chamber, there are three stages of its formation. At the first stage, the President of the Russian Federation selects one third of the members (the first 42 members). Then, those members pick another one third from candidates nominated by national NGOs (the second 42 members). At the last stage, the 84 members selected during the first two rounds select the remaining one-third of the participants from candidates proposed by regional and local NGOs. So there are many actors involved: the federal and regional authorities, as well as national and local NGOs. In spite of this, observers have considered that the process of the member selection is under the control of federal authorities.

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The first members of the Public Chamber (2006–2008) did not include any representative of the prominent human-rights protection organizations. Its members were mostly “very successful and well-known individuals who may pride themselves on a degree of credibility in the eyes of the average citizens of the country”. This corresponds with the recent Russian policy towards NGOs: to place pressure on strong civic rights protection organizations and to increase financial support to socially-oriented programs. It seems obvious that a small number of opposition organizations that are financially independent among the consultative body members who represent such organizations would negatively affect the outcomes.

The Public Chamber acts mainly at the stage of legislative discussions. Under terms of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation’s Public Chamber, this consultative body is delegated the right to offer conclusions regarding law violations, to examine draft legislation and to run public hearings on social problems. All of the decisions adopted by the Public Chamber have consultative status just like EESC in the EU case. Taking into account the characteristics of membership and policy towards independent human rights organizations it is obvious that the consultative body has limited possibilities to improve legislation and its implementation.

The most abundant activity of the Public Chamber is to provide information about difficult legal cases and about violations of citizens’ rights. There have been some famous cases investigated by Chamber members; e.g. the conflict among citizens and local Moscow authorities in South Butovo and the “Sychev Case”. The Public Chamber then attracted public attention to the problems and provided financial and legal support in each case. But attempts to change federal legislation or executive procedures by Public Chamber in these significant cases have failed. On the basis of this situation, experts consider the consultative body as a means of “letting off steam”.

23 The official Internet-site of the Public Chamber, URL: www.oprf.ru/publications/documents/2.
26 Ibid.
Public Chamber members have the opportunity to take part in meetings of the executive power, but only the federal government can decide how policies are to be implemented. Moreover, if interaction between Chamber members and federal officials even exists, it is quite difficult to assess the outcomes as there is not yet a transparent process of negotiations in place. Instead, the Public Chamber can be seen as a good channel to lobby certain interests which are often quiet difficult to assess.

Thus, the Public Chamber as a platform for protecting citizens’ interests, once those interests are publically expressed is not realistic at this time. This is because first, the Russian political system is currently not very sensitive to citizens’ needs, and second, almost all the important executive powers are concentrated in the hands of the President. In the frame of such institutional conditions, there is no need for effective governance though this does not exclude the possibility of good governance based on the expedition of policies due to a significant concentration of power in the hands of a single decision maker. In spite of this, we believe that any successfully functioning political system should in principle enlist the support of the public in order to conduct policy. A consultative body with significant social capital and prestigious members, such as the Public Chamber in Russia, can potentially manage very well with such a goal.

As the European case shows, under more mature democratic conditions, political competition, an independent mass media and the activities of strong citizen associations, functioning as consultative bodies, can provide public feedback and represent collective and individual social interests. But role of consultative body in decision-making processes is restricted by the consultative status. If a mechanism is built-in to the closed political system with a non-competitive decision-shaping process, there is little hope of encouraging more successful public participation in federal politics.

**Conclusion**

This analysis of two empirical cases helps outline the reasoning behind and the political interest in creating public consultative bodies. As it has been shown, the activity of such bodies considerably depends on the separation of power in the specific political system. Political competition is deemed to be an essential condition for proper functioning of independent consultative body activities. This is what Russian case shows. Even if such conditions exist, consultative status of representative body considerably restricts its possibilities to influence decision-making process. This conclusion is supported by case of the EESC.

Competition exists between the EC and the Council even under terms of a weak EP. This is important for gaining additional support from public and private interest groups in the political landscape at the EU. In Russia, on the other hand, there is currently no political institution that is interested in citizens’ involvement in the decision-making process. The main political actor – the Russian President – rules without taking into account parliament and public discussions. As mentioned above, even the most remarkable issues investigated by Public Chamber did not make any affect in state policy. The authorities thus in both cases are interested in public support and turn to a consultative body to help provide it.

Political conditions inevitably influence the membership of respective consultative bodies. In more competitive and accountable political systems, a strong and significant representation by NGOs fulfills its role. In the Russian case, the governing authority is interested in a loyal and obedient consultative body and therefore it interferes in the process of membership selection.27 The characteristics of members in the Public Chamber, that is, to their allegiances to local or regional associations, contribute to the role of this consultative body especially by means of the interests it represents.

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27 Ibid.
To sum up, consultative bodies in both cases are dependent on the specific political system involved and its level of competitiveness. The European experience of public involvement demonstrates that direct participation is more appropriate to reach an NGO’s goal to effectively contribute to the decision-making process. But even in favorable conditions such bodies have limited power to represent peoples’ interests and to influence policy-making.

European Peace-Keeping Potential: A Look Back at European Involvement in the Bosnian War

Vasily Khokhlov

On December 9, 2008 the European Union Rule of Law mission (EULEX) in Kosovo implemented its mandate. Comments and opinions expressed about it have been full of optimism and enthusiasm. It is in fact a new test for Europe, its ability to defend its values and its peace-keeping potential. The whole situation and even the rhetoric used strongly remind the situation of 1991 which was infamously pronounced by Jacques Poos the foreign minister of Luxembourg at that time “the hour of Europe”. The situation when the most brutal war on the continent since World War II with massive casualties had started.

This paper does not aim to analyse the current EU in Kosovo or to give any forecast on how the situation will develop but rather tries to contribute to such analysis by taking a short look back at European involvement in a similar situation in the same region 17 years ago. It is never difficult to judge someone’s action with the benefit of hindsight and some benevolence must always be shown to those who were not fortunate enough to have this advantage.

There are clashing opinions on whether humanitarian intervention in crises likes the one in the former Yugoslavia should take place at all. I am not going to investigate this debate deeply, and will accept and reinforce the position that in the case of a massive humanitarian crisis the international community has no right to stand aside and should, on the contrary, use all possible means to prevent disasters from happening at all, or, at least, to impede their escalation. In the case of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia there was surprisingly little doubt about whether the international community ought to get involved or not. From the
very beginning this case was considered by the main European states and institutions, as well as by the United Nations, as very important and demanding full effort towards its prevention and overcoming its possible outcomes. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the crisis was so terrifying that it is simply impossible to believe that the acts of those who were involved in the process were not mistaken and wrong.

To investigate what exactly was done wrong and what could and should have been done better, I will look at three main problems: recognition of the former Yugoslav republics; participants of the international community involved in the actual peacekeeping operation, where I will predominantly focus on Europe’s unwillingness to allow larger international participation; and efforts made in order to achieve peace and justice in the former Yugoslavia.

One of the first questions is whether the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia should have been recognized by the international community. There is no mutual agreement about this issue. Many insisted that “once force was used against Slovenia and Croatia, there was no real prospect of their being able to accept re-integration into a Yugoslav state”.1 A similar position is expressed in Simms’ “Unfinest Hour”: “While the Bosnian government was still genuinely trying to work out a new Yugoslav federal framework in 1991, the Bosnian Serbs were already setting up their own – illegal – autonomous regions, stockpiling arms and drawing up lists of Muslim community leaders for murder or deportation”.2 Another argument that supports the point of view that recognising the two republics was a right decision is that in case of future Belgrade’s attempts to use force against them, it would be an act of aggression of one sovereign state against another sovereign state.

At the same time the fast recognition of the two republics possibly had a negative influence. The history of hatred between Serbs and Croats should not have been underestimated. It is true that after the Second World War all nations were able to coexist peacefully in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) under Tito’s rule and many Yugoslavs thought of themselves as Yugoslavs and not in ethnic terms and intermarriage was frequent, especially amongst the educated and urban populations. But we should also take into consideration the fact that for the 45 years of the existence of the SFRY the new nation could not be created and memories of mutual cruelty towards each other could not be forgotten. Besides, political leaders of constituent republics actively gathered public support by exploiting nationalist rhetoric and symbols. Croatian president Tudjman, for example, restored Ustaša symbols and in spite of being himself former anti-Ustaša partisan suggested to turn the Jasenovac concentration camp run by Ustaša forces into a memorial for Croatian war victims.3 Bosnian leader Izebegovich organised a Muslim party and although his rhetoric of that period was far less exclusive, the Serbian population of Bosnia was likely to remember that he was once imprisoned for promoting the idea of Bosnia being part of a Muslim world and its role in counterstanding Christianity. All these factors created a fear in the Serbian population of both Croatia and Bosnia, but this seemed to be ignored by promoters of recognition for those republics. Indeed, the fact that Germany was the main advocate of recognition could have played a negative role and raised suspicion not only among Serbs, but also among its European partners most notably Britain and Russia. Simms, for example, insists that “it was not true that Germany had precipitated the war in Bosnia by forcing through the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as part

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of a broader hegemonic design”, admits that “the German move influenced the timing of genocide, which was long planned”. It is, of course, impossible to know for sure what would have happened if Europe continued attempts to preserve the Yugoslav federation, but it seems quite evident that the long-term consequences of recognition were hardly thought through. The credibility of Germany’s approach depended ultimately on the ability and willingness of European states to use military force. Yet none of them, least of all Germany, was ready to protect new independent states by military means. Not surprisingly the internationalisation of the Yugoslav crisis could not prevent violence unless major actors were prepared to guarantee territorial integrity by force.

More importantly, as James Gow interestingly notes the Serbs disquietude with their safety in Bosnia promoted the idea of ethnic territories or cantons. “Understood by the EC negotiators as a means to propitiate the Serbs to avoid war”, he notes, “it was in reality a charter for ‘ethnic cleansing’: ethnically designed cantons created the basis for ethnically pure territories”. On top of everything, there were obvious differences of opinion among the parties involved in the process on whether the republics should be recognised or not, which gave an unclear signal to Belgrade.

It is hard to tell now whether the recognition of two republics did trigger the war or not, but it seems quite obvious that after secession of Slovenia and Croatia there was no way for Bosnia to stay in the Yugoslav federation. It was hardly possible to imagine that a Bosnian republic with the majority of Muslim population could coexist in one state with three Christian Orthodox republics. This caused a situation where the vast majority of the Muslim population of Bosnia supported independence whilst the vast majority of Bosnian Serbs stood against it. At this point there could hardly be much hope that the situation could be solved peacefully.

The other moment that enabled the crisis to grow into a full-scale disaster was possibly the lack of a strong and clear position of the international community towards the Yugoslav crisis. There were several reasons why the position of the international community remained vague. First, in spite of all the differences of opinion and contradictory interests, European states for many members of the EC it was important to work out a united position. In fact, as Simms argues, “British preoccupation was with international unity on policy towards Bosnia, rather than the content of that policy”. That was the time of Euro-enthusiasm. As Thomas Halverson notes “Washington happily ceded the Yugoslav crisis to the EC and viewed it as a test case for the Community’s budding foreign policy. Yugoslavia was seen as a localised ‘European’ problem which affected the European allies directly and which they themselves should try to resolve”.

The decision to treat the Yugoslav problem as an internal European problem had crucial outcomes. First of all, this resulted in denial to Russia’s attempts to contribute to the solution of the crisis. “Russia’s initiatives were, in effect, dismissed and it’s willingness to back Western initiatives was taken for granted or ignored, and both resulted in a Russian retreat from open co-operation”. This could have been a serious blunder considering traditional Russian-Serbian relations. If Europe would have succeeded in working out strong united position Serbia perhaps would have been far less assured. More importantly, European actors did not manage to reach agreement with the United States. This was crucial be-

4 Simms B., op. cit., p. 18.
5 Ibid, p. 48.
7 Ibid.
11 Gow J., op. cit., p. 323.
cause without the US involvement sizable military intervention was hardly possible.

The US unwillingness to get involved into the Yugoslav conflict largely hindered its successful solution. For more then three years Washington responded to the war in Bosnia by handling the problem off to the Europeans. Even Bill Clinton, who largely criticised George Bush’s policy on this question during his election campaign, already as president abstained from taking an active role in the conflict.

Uncertainty of the position of the international community predetermined perhaps one of the most crucial mistakes of the peacekeeping efforts: one side of the conflict received an enormous military advantage over the others. The arms embargo in practice created a situation where Serbs enjoyed impunity from both Bosnians and Croats unable to protect themselves under the condition of the arms embargo on one side and poorly equipped and restrictively mandated by UNPROFOR troops. The establishment of “safe areas” could not solve the problem (if not made it worse, and the inequality of military strength resulted in tremendous amount of victims.

Bosnian Serbs with the support of Belgrade effectively exploited the unwillingness of the international community to get involved in a full-scale military operation. In 1993, they controlled over 70% of the Bosnian territory. No surprise they rejected all proposed peace plans that presupposed any territorial reduction. With all respect to those who sacrificed their lives in completing the UNPROFOR peace-keeping mission trying to minimise the suffering of the war victims we have to admit that in general the mission was a failure. It is hard to believe that several of the militarily most powerful states were not able to offer anything better then rather limited in number and mandate contingent consisting of troops from 39 states. This can only be explained by unwillingness to take responsibility for the possible outcomes and losses. Till the very end they tried to remain neutral refusing to use force against the aggressors. As a result not only they were not able to protect civilians but sometimes contributed to their suffering as during the infamous tragedy in Srebrenica. Practically defenceless they often became hostages used as a shield against air-strikes.

Interestingly enough, as practice has shown, alacrity to use force can not only achieve better political results but also enables to minimise casualties among own troops. “No one has been killed in action since November 1995”.

One of the saddest parts of the story is that if only international community was ready for a full humanitarian intervention the end to the war could have been put in 1993 by the signing of the Vance-Owen plan. Not only is it sad that between 1993 and 1995, when the Dayton accords were signed, thousands and thousand innocent people were killed, wounded, raped and expelled from their houses, but also because it would have been a much more civilised way to solve the Bosnian crisis. The Vance-Owen plan, unlike the Dayton agreement, presupposed the maintenance of the Bosnian state as a multinational state without ethnically pure cantons and with a democratic system guaranteeing equal rights to all members of ethnic communities. The fact that two years after the Vance-Owen plan was rejected because of the “lack of will” of the international community, a much less ambitious agreement was achieved by means that Vance-Owen plan could have been achieved with, no doubt demonstrates a failure.

Summarising this review, we can conclude that many of the actions taken were too late, uncertain and erratic. Unwillingness to take responsibility and to make certain sacrifices resulted in

The “Free-Rider” Problem as a Reflection on the Transformation of the Swedish Model of a Liberal Political System

Ilja Ermolin

The “free-rider” problem is one of the most important in any policy system. Sweden is no exclusion. The country entered the European Union in 1995 and immediately encountered “free-rider” problem in the process of EU coordination issues.

The Swedish policy system is characterized with a duality principle, which means that ministries are planning actors that express the core of Swedish policy (e.g. including administrative actors). Governmental agencies, on the other hand, are responsible for implementing the decision-making policies. This system produces significant results, including the involvement of groups of experts at an earlier stage of the ministers’ Joint Drafting Procedure by ministers, which served before as “incremental tools” for governmental agencies; the creation of drafting and reference groups (berednings- och referensgrupper) that largely consist of governmental agency representatives and interest organizations, which causes the appearance of new coalition building formation. This serves as an incentive for adapting innovations into the policy system and at the same time contributes to the broadening of co-

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1 The author thanks Th. Larue, a member of the Swedish Constitutional Chamber (Parliament of Sweden) for his support of this research and for useful information related to the topic of the article. See the Russian version of the article in: Lebedeva M. (ed.). Mirovaja politika: novye problemy i napravlenija [World Politics: New Challenges and Directions]. Moscow: MGIMO, 2009, p. 37-60.


3 The expert groups gave the expert information to governmental agencies which allowed them to have advantages in the coordination process in comparison with ministers. The involvement of expert groups at an earlier stage of the JDP allows reducing the ministers’ advantage.
operation among spheres within society, which is especially interesting for Russia’s scientific community.

The Problem under Consideration
The “free-rider” problem of collective action in the framework of “coalition membership formation and maintenance” still remains a significant and theoretically unsolved question in studies of policy process. In a large amount of cases, the “free-rider” problem stems from problems of collective action and can be considered as a correlation between specificity and commonality. This problem is generally considered in the context of different assumptions about game theory, including a majority of cooperation states, including large-N studies. Nevertheless, in this article the author uses policy subsystems as a basis for “free-rider” problem analysis.

We should thus first of all consider the “free-rider” problem in the context of intercoalitional collaboration. This suggests that “each participant gains from the sacrifices made by others but prefers not to make the sacrifices himself, and yet prefers full sacrifice (by everyone, including himself) to complete noncompliance”. This broad definition of the “free-rider” problem is to see as Elinor Ostrom notes, that “the temptation to cheat always exists… No amount of monitoring (by increasing the actors’ responsibility) and sanctioning reduces the temptation to zero”. In this sense, responsibility comes from monitoring elements in participants’ actions by the actors themselves (i.e. self-monitoring), and, therefore, lack of such an element brings up questions of cooperation and realizing intended aims.

The Theoretical Model
In political science, there are growing doubts regarding the opportunity for rational policy-making. This is connected with an assumption about the socially constructed nature of knowledge itself, which provides incentives to study a new generation of policy thoughts, namely those of technocrats and technical experts. Here it is possible to find sources in the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). In this article, I analyze three ACF’s rationales in order to present a solution to the “free-rider” problem.

Paul Sabatier has underlined these three rationales for such a solution in the following way:

“First, the transaction costs of participating in a coalition are relative low compared with other forms of collective behavior because of shared belief systems, high trust, and willingness to distribute costs fairly.

Second, the perceived benefits of participating in a coalition are exaggerated, especially when policy participants experience the “devil shift” in high conflict situations. When it happens, the policy participants exaggerate the power and maliciousness of their political opponents, which amplifies the severity of losses to a rival coalition and boosts the benefits of coordinating with coalition allies. To defend against a powerful political foe, the “devil shift” will make it more likely that policy participants will seek out like-minded allies to pool their resources and maintain those alliances over time. At the same time, the “devil shift” will make it less likely that policy participants will interact with opponents because of the value conflicts, distrust, and suspicion.

Third, the level of coordination within a coalition varies from strong (e.g., developing a common plan and implementing that plan) to weak (e.g., monitoring ally activities and responding

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with complementary strategies). Weak coordination has lower costs than strong, reducing the threat of free riding. Weak coordination will probably be an important strategy for coalitions in which organizational membership faces legal impediments that limit formalized alliances.8

In order to bring the above mentioned rationales into a broader context, it is necessary to use the concept of “coalition behavior” that results from connections between interdependency and belief systems, the so-called “organizational interdependencies and belief congruence model”, suggested first by Paul Sabatier and Matthew Zafonte and developed later by Menno Fenger and Peter-Jan Klok.9 First, I will review the main features of organizational interdependencies and beliefs systems, and then try to elaborate on the model of “informational funnel” suggested by the author in order to explain the influence of information on coalition cooperation in the context of the “free-rider” problem.

Thus, according to Fenger and Klok, there exist nine conditions of interdependencies and belief systems in interactions between actors. First, there is a condition of strong coordination with two elements defining the situation of interaction between actors. This is symbiotic interdependency, which is possible when “different actors possess different resources and the exchange of resources enables them to perform the actions that make them achieve their goals”10 and congruent belief system. Second, is “a coalition of convenience”, wherein the actors combine indifferent beliefs with symbiotic interdependency. Because a driving force from their beliefs is absent, we would expect the actors to form a rather “loose coalition” in line with their symbiotic interdependency. In terms of the ACF, such a coalition could be labeled as a “coalition of convenience”, which is primarily based on shared interests, not on shared beliefs”.11 Coalitions would take a material benefit as the best variant for their behavior. Third, a more difficult type of cooperation can be seen when there is a condition of symbiotic interdependency and divergent belief systems in the interaction process of the coalition’s actors. In such a situation instability and conflict can be observed in the policy subsystem12 and “the primacy of beliefs in driving actors in coalitions would lead us to the expectation that the actors are members of conflicting coalitions; however, these coalitions would face severe collective action problems, for their members are symbiotically interdependent with actors from the opposite coalition. One way of coping with this situation would be a strategy of depolitization, where actors stick to their divergent beliefs, but develop some sort of general compromise that enables them to work together with the actors from the other coalition. Another way of coping would be for actors to adjust their belief systems in order to reduce tension between them”.13 Fourth, a condition of weak coordination, wherein neutral interdependency and a congruent belief system will prevail, which corresponds to a small functional overlapping according to Sabatier and Zafonte. Fifth is a condition characterized by neutral interdependency and indifferent belief systems, where no coalition type can be built. Here is a situation when the actors are not active. The process of weak coordination defines the sixth situation, wherein the elements of divergent belief systems and neutral interdependency are united under one roof. The seventh condition reflects the contradictory sides of a situational development, wherein competitive interde-

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10 Fenger M., Klok P. J., op. cit., p. 162.

11 Ibid, p. 165.

12 According to ACF, policy subsystem is “the interaction of actors from different institutions interested in a policy area”. Policy subsystem is devided in mature and nascent (or constructing) subsystems. In given paper the Swedish policy subsystem is considered as a nascent one because a nascent subsystem is not characterized by an extended period of existence (over a decade or more) and therefore does not make major policy change very difficult.

pendency overlaps with congruent belief systems, which leads to serious problems in the sphere of collective interaction. This is because competitive interdependency does not allow actors to promote their own strategies in a significant way, although as I mentioned before, belief systems can be considered as a driving force in coalition building. Under the eighth condition the actors combine indifferent beliefs with competitive interdependency. Again, no strong coalitions are expected to develop; however, due to their conflicting interests, the actors are expected to align in conflicting groups.

Whether these groups could be called “coalitions” per se depends on the coordination of their activities, which in turn depends on their ability to solve collective action problems. We refer to this type of situation as one of “weak conflicts”. The last, ninth condition – the condition of the strongest conflict – is a radical form of divergent belief systems and competitive interdependency. Both belief systems and the interdependency between them divide the actors in competitive coalitions with high levels of conflict, where no compromise prevails.

A correlation between different types of interdependencies and belief systems allows us to evaluate the degree both of inter- and intra-coalition interaction in the policy subsystem. This classification serves as an especially useful tool for solutions of the “free-rider” problem in networks.

The influence of information is also acutely tense when we seek a solution to the “free-rider” problem in the policy process. In order to analyze the importance of informational streams for coalition building in the context of solving the “free-rider” problem, I suggest the model of an “informational funnel”, which serves as an incremental tool for ACF rationales. It should be taken into account that the distribution of information inside and outside of coalitions has not been developed enough by proponents of the ACF.

When analyzing information, careful attention must be paid to the so-called “informational funnel”, which here means an informational stream with the beginnings and ends of it designating information exits and entrances from/to one of the coalitions. In every funnel we usually have both squeezing and stretching processes related to the informational stream, which exert influence on the construction of policies. The term “informational funnel” includes different types of information: laws and normative documents, as well as oral information and expert assessments. In the process of political pressure the informational stream will be reduced and actors from opposite coalitions will not be able to receive sufficient information to analyse the external environment. As a result of this situation the actors of opposite coalition would loose in the struggle on the core issues. I implied to study the policy process with the model of “informational funnel” where of course we have loosers and winners as I emphasized. The information is a main source of political changes here and such situation leads to the result of the process (the end of the process).

At this point I will analyze the first two rationales suggested by Fenger and Klock using the model of an “informational funnel”. Although a “mature” policy subsystem serves as an empirical example in this article, nevertheless, the analysis touches the transformation process of subsystem. Hence, the “constructing” (nascent) subsystem should also be the subject of our consideration. However, the application of an “informational model” for a “mature” policy subsystem does not exclude the opportunity for such interactive challenges inside the policy making community.

As I have already asserted, strong coordination usually leads to high transaction costs with both intracoalition and intercoalition cooperation (third rationale). Two elements can be generally included into typologies of strong coordination. They are: sym-

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14 In accordance with Fenger and Klok, competitive interdependency usually happens when the action of one actor interferes with another actor’s ability to take action or achieve his goals.
biotic interdependency and congruent beliefs system. Symbiotic interdependency implies that actors cooperate with each other in a field of tension. Due to this fact there is a reduction of external influences, and an increase in internal influences recognized when it comes to policy beliefs, which play the most important role in basic changes in policies. Congruency of beliefs only strengthens the interaction between actors and this contributes to the process of interdependency, which leads to responsibility for the more or less equitable redistribution of expenses by all participating actors. It is normal that lower degrees of coordination lead to an equally gradual reduction of transaction costs, which leads to the zero transaction costs \( G_k = 0 \), where \( G_k \) is a reduction of transaction costs. This in turn makes compromise into some kind of exclusion and thus gives the appearance of such a person becoming a new “external to network” free-rider.

As I mentioned above, dominant actors will be led by profit away from participating in a coalition. Nevertheless, the second rationale asserts that situations of strong conflict will prevail and that actors will avoid all types of compromise or interdependency, but that transaction costs will also be reduced to zero. In this article I’m more interested in analysing weak coordination, where such rationale is more appropriate.

The second rationale pays close attention to the “devil shift” effect. A coalition is more successful as a collective unit in opposing this effect than are the actors themselves. The coalition would also profit the actors. The appearance of a “strong rival” allows all actors to concentrate on the continual search for allied coalitions “in order to unite all their resources and to maintain these allied coalitions”. It becomes obvious that neutral interdependency and indifference to belief system brings in less benefit to coalition’ actors, with respect to such an element as interest, which is directly connected with actors’ beliefs systems. But, as I have already mentioned, more narrow frameworks would disappear. There would be inactive coordination mechanisms in the conditions mentioned, where the search for allied actors would have no incentives from the other coalition and the informational stream would be in one direction.

Thus, I can talk about competitive interdependency and the congruency of belief systems as the condition that is most influenced by the “devil shift” effect. The serious problems of collective interaction, caused by competitive interdependency, can be solved by creating an enemy image, a political rival which would in turn push actors to search for a new coalition of allies. Artificially broadening the informational stream (e.g. using a “disillusion method”, creates the wrong image of a rival in an opposite coalition), generated by the “devil shift” effect is a tool for this effect’s influence.

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nance Ministry has also points of view on the use of the EU budget, so that the long term budget is not jeopardized”.18

Formal procedures entail the following steps: “each of the proposals from the Commission is forwarded to the UD-EU unit through the permanent representation in Brussels and subsequently sent to all ministries. The concerned ministries then proceed to the actual coordination and drafting of a common Swedish position on proposals for which they have primary responsibility. This should (in theory and according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ own memorandum, cf. UD PM 1999) always be done in a joint drafting session together with the UD-EU unit, the Prime Minister’ Office and the Fi/BA, irrespective of how many ministries are needed to prepare a position memorandum and irrespective of policy fields”.19 In accordance with the above, there are three main actors involved in the JDP: the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance.

The JDP, however, has an informal character too. One the Prime Minister’s officials paid special attention to this fact in an interview with Th. Larue: “the principle of Joint Drafting Procedure is generally valid under all circumstances, but I doubt that it is followed in practice. Maybe there is no need to be so formal especially on lower levels […] no [when Th. Larue asked whether common drafting includes all three, UD-EU, Prime Minister’ Office, and Fi/BA], I would say that we coordinate our drafting foremost with the Ministry of Finance, then the Foreign Ministry and to some extent with the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications […] but the Prime Minister’s Office is usually only involved when there are major problems between ministries in views and positions”.20 Thus, the Foreign Ministry’s directives are related to the formal drafting procedure for European Commission issues and are not the only source of coordination.

As mentioned before, the JDP and internal consultations are examples of an old tradition in the Swedish policy system. However, the conditions of ministry work and their workload have changed in due course. The procedure, used now for internal organizational consultations, is entitled “silent procedure”.

**“Silent Procedure”**

The “silent procedure” (tyst procedur, tyst delning)21 means the reaction of ministries is defined only by their silence as a response to EU coordination issues related to ministry competences.

The general rule for this procedure is “that at least five whole workdays must be left for the receiving ministry to handle the matter and, at various times, some ministries have used this procedure”.

In his report on possible measures that the Prime Minister’s Office can improve in its work, J. Landhal argues that the “silent procedure” has no obvious frameworks and therefore creates a problem for actors involved in the JDP. As a result, the JDP’s actors use the “silent procedure” too often and this especially applies to the Prime Minister’s Office (by the way, internal organizational consultations are an obligatory stage in consideration of proposals from Brussels).23 Landahl at the same time asserts, however, that only the Prime Minister’s Office can be involved in solving inter-ministry disputes, which actors at lower levels can not solve themselves.24

The other problem with the “silent procedure”, Larue argues, is a lack of resources. “There is a risk that the silent proce-

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20 Larue Th., op. cit., p. 144.
21 Also I assume my own name as an ignoring procedure.
22 Ibid, p. 144.
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... procedure might result in a misleading situation where silence from ministerial units might actually not indicate agreement. This would be catastrophic in our case, the worst-case scenario being an ‘approved’ national instruction sent to the PR, but one who’s ‘approval’ was really the result of a misinterpreted silent procedure”.

The Participation of Secondary Actors in the JDP

Interest organizations and other similar actors (e.g. central governmental agencies, which demand that ministries conduct their expertise on given questions) can influence the JDP. For effective societal influence, the Swedish government set up special frameworks with so-called drafting and reference groups (berednings- och referensgrupper). The main aim of the reference groups is “to allow ministries to consult and share information with interest organizations having vital interests in the specific policy field – from labor organizations and employers’ associations to local and regional governments’ associations”.

The drafting groups consist of “central agency personnel and ministry officials with expert knowledge in defined policy areas. These groups are supposed to enhance the efficiency of the joint drafting procedures of EU issues”. Halvarson counted the number of drafting and reference groups. In 1997 there were approx. 100 drafting and reference groups although the number of groups has changed from time to time. The circulation of EU coordination specifies that “just because a position has been discussed and drafted within the framework of a drafting group does not mean that it automatically fulfils the requirements prescribed by the joint drafting procedure in dealing with EU issues”. The UD-EU unit, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance’s budget division must receive prior notification and summon every drafting group meeting as well as eventual memoranda from the proceedings’. Here Larue emphasizes the fact that “each ministry is free to decide how it will consult and inform interest organizations and to choose the practices for its drafting groups”. However, some restrictions apply. As Halvarson, Lundmark and Staberg suggest, “First, the groups’ proceedings are regulated by the Official Secrets Act’s [sekretesslagen] section on relations with foreign powers. This means that the members of drafting and reference groups are sworn to secrecy in relation to what is said in those groups. Second, the ministries must report to the UD-EU unit information about EU drafting and reference groups they have set up within their field, including the name of the chairperson and the contact person of the respective group”.

Thus, it is necessary to underline the fact that secondary actors are largely involved in the JDP, which represent the interests of different social groups and industry. As far as they are dependent on ministries and drafting and reference groups, these actors can not use all their power to pressure the decision-making process. However, societal control has gradually been broadening since the Prime Minister’s Office became a head of the EU coordination process.

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25 Larue Th., op. cit., p. 144.
26 Ibid, p. 137.
27 Ibid, p. 137.
29 Larue Th., op. cit., p. 137.
30 UD–PM Cirkulär, op. cit., p. 48.
31 Larue Th., op. cit., p. 137.
32 Halvarson, A. et al., op. cit., p. 125.
Defining the “Free-Rider” Problem in the JDP

In order to analyze three rationales suggested by ACF, we need at the outset to outline the connections between actors in the JDP. After this it will be possible to define the so-called “free riders” in the JDP.

As I mentioned above, the connections between actors have changed in the adaptation process of coordinating mechanisms of the Swedish policy system to EU coordination issues. It is possible to outline several situations where we can speak about the “free-rider” problem and about the opportunity for coalition-building. It is necessary to underline that the difficult questions are defined by the level of their discussion. Therefore, as I will show further, the Prime Minister’s Office enters into discussion only on questions that are impossible to solve at a lower level of coordination. Thus, considering the first situation of the “free-rider” problem we should analyze financial and budget questions where the Fi/BA is considered as the main actor with its function to monitor financial interactions between Sweden and the EU. The second actor that plays an important role through drafting is the Prime Minister’s Office. The Fi/BA and the Prime Minister’s Office have significant groups of experts to help make conclusions on various questions. These groups of experts provide an analytical basis for actors, but unfortunately they can not help actors avoid the “free-rider” problem. The Prime Minister’s Office uses the “silent procedure” in discussions of difficult financial and budget questions and in such a way becoming the “free-rider” in the JDP and generating a range of questions regarding EU policy. The similar role of the Prime-Minister’s Office can be seen when the actors hold discussion on questions of EU external policy and the Swedish position related to this policy. During discussions on EU Common and Foreign Security Policy, Fi/BA is replaced by the UD–EU unit. Actually, I need to make a qualification here. The “free-rider” problem appears when there exist important and difficult questions, sent by the European Commission directly to the Swedish political system, namely, one can talk about issues that are possible to solve only with the Prime Minister’s participation. The “medium problems” are solved directly by the Swedish ministers and by permanent representatives in Brussels through their informal connections. The “ignore procedure” thus takes a special place in this range of procedures and, as I mentioned above, it concerns all ministers.

The “silent procedure” is not a source of the “free-rider” problem itself. This procedure assigns primary importance to the consensual principle of conflict management (see above). The abstention of the Prime Minister’s Office and other ministers in the JDP, attempts to solve all problems with the assistance of the “ignore procedure” at the necessary stage of internal organizational consultations – all of this allows actors to profit from the European Commission by not making special efforts. Remarkably, the appearance of the “free-riders” happens within the legal frameworks of actors’ inter-participation. Neither the Prime Minister’s Office nor ministers themselves can control the process of avoiding responsibility; therefore the JDP’s legal instruments are weak.

The Rationales of the “Free-Rider” Problem in the Context of JDP Evaluation

Before starting an evaluative analysis of three rationales of the “free-rider” problem, it is necessary to define coordination-type actions within the JDP.

Consensus is the main element in the interaction process, which becomes the value of a belief system and the basis for cooperation between actors. Thus, consensus is a fundamental element of belief system (according to Fenger and Klok, a belief system is the driving force of cooperation within coalitions

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33 In this article I do not consider the connections between actors in Brussels, representing Swedish interests (first of all, permanent representatives, COREPER and working groups) and internal actors of the Swedish policy system. This analysis would be the subject of special research.

34 Fenger M., Klok P. J., op. cit., p. 162.
and in coalition development) and defines the congruent belief system in the JDP. Interest is another element that defines the existence of congruent belief systems.

In the JDP all actors are purposive groups. This means that the main aim of these actors is to achieve their tasks and after that to maximize their influence on the distribution of roles. Thus, as Joanne Sobeck pointed out, interests become a once only occurrence, but they do not substitute for the notion of a belief system itself. Rather, interests serve as an incremental tool for congruent belief systems. Purposive groups are more inclined to cooperative action strategies and as consequence to the congruence of belief system. Therefore interests do not have an individual meaning as such in situations that combine with material groups. These two elements are proposed also for the creation of suitable systems of interdependency in the political.

Among actors participating in the JDP a kind of symbiotic interdependency prevails. As I mentioned above in the theoretical part of article, this interdependency defines “actions where one actor’s actions contribute to another actor’s actions or goal achievement”. The Prime Minister’s Office is seen here as an initiator of such symbiotic interdependency by entering the discussion of some issue on the side of one of the actors. It prefers not to interfere among actors with questions of little importance.

Hence, the congruent belief system and symbiotic interdependency create a situation that can be characterized as a strong type of coordination. This strong type of coordination contains two similar elements balancing the distribution of influence in the network and defining the fluctuation of informational streams.

Actors have an opportunity to form coalitions at the stage of internal organizational consultations when individual ministers and departments can exert an influence on suggestions from Brussels which belong to their area of competence. Making an analysis the “free-rider” problem allows us to pay special attention to the “silent procedure”, which serves as the most important source of this problem. Branch ministers artificially avoid discussion of the main problems, when difficult suggestions come from the European Commission. They usually put all responsibility for consideration on the shoulders of the main actors of the JDP. The Prime Minister’s Office serves as a source of “ignorance” even more often here by pushing the other ministers to do variants of such actions. It is no wonder that “silent procedure” effects are reduced every time that one can speak about a “free-rider”.

Ministers prefer not to create coalitions with other ministers or expert groups, and also not involve the drafting and reference groups at the stage of internal organizational consultations. In this context we can analyze our first rationale in the JDP.

First, I would like to repeat the initial rationale. “The transaction costs of participating in a coalition are relatively low in comparison with the other forms of collective behavior because of shared belief system, high level of trust, and willingness to distribute costs fairly”.

The analysis of actors’ actions in the JDP leads to a conclusion about the “mature” Swedish policy subsystem. Sweden entered the EU in 1995. Since that time, the role of actors in the JDP has essentially changed. When the country had just entered the EU, the main actor of “constructing” the policy subsystem was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely the UD–EU unit. The transactions costs were low in “constructing” the policy subsystem and the actors’ coalitions were built not so often and because of this a weak type of coordination prevailed. In September 1998, Goeran Persson became Prime Minister. Since then, we can speak about the beginnings of a “mature” policy subsystem, which is characterized by a strong type of coordination. This strong coordination does not allow us

36 Fenger M., Klok P. J., op. cit., p. 162.
37 Sabatier P., Jenkins-Smith H., op. cit., p. 137.
to judge the reduction of transaction costs. The Prime Minister’s Office has strongly broadened both by scale and by function; all of these changes allowed the Prime Minister’s Office to exert more influence in the JDP. The ministers reacted by slowly processing expert evaluations of Brussels’ questions, thus producing the incentive for the “free-rider” problem to thrive.

The reforms of 2004 made one more step towards the dominant role of the Prime Minister’s Office in its competition with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These reforms consolidated the soil for the “ignore procedure” to become more utilized by the Prime Minister’s Office. The dependency of the main JDP actors (EU Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden (UD–EU unit), the Prime Minister’s Office, and Fi/BA on the Prime Minister’s decisions has increased as never before. Consensus would become the stopper in developing actors’ cooperation to overcome the “free-rider” problem and except for the reduction of transaction costs, such coalition building would bring benefits for all sides of coordination. Taking into account the second rationale, we need to outline that the “devil shift” effect is not obligatory for the JDP. Strong coordination does not create prerequisites for such actors’ behavior. Nevertheless, the benefits of such coalitions are obvious. The participation of the drafting and reference groups at the stage of internal organizational consultations contribute to reducing inter-ministerial struggle. At the same time, coalition mediation of given groups, except for when interest organizations and governmental agencies are also involved, can lead to a reduction of the Prime Minister’s role regarding questions that are considered by ministers or by the Prime Minister’s Office by using the “silent procedure”.

Conclusions
The basic conclusions are the following:
1. A type of strong coordination is the main feature of actors’ cooperation in the JDP, where congruent belief systems overlap with symbiotic interdependency. The strong type of coordination can be defined through analysis of a coalition’s belief system, where the main elements are consensus and interest. Consensus emerges as a basic rudiment of ontological belief subsystem and interdependency. As far as we consider belief systems as a driving force of cooperation within coalitions, consensus is a defining factor of the JDP actors’ congruent or divergent belief systems. Interest as an element of advocating coalition belief systems suggests that actors participating in the JDP are purposeful actors, therefore their main aim is to achieve labeled tasks and to maximize the influence of distribution of roles for reaching aims. Purposeful actors are more prone to cooperating their actions and accepting congruent belief systems and interests do not have the same individual meaning as with situations involving material groups. Consensus and interest, which prevail among purposive groups of actors, define the creation of an interdependency system in a network. Symbiotic interdependency is prevailed among actors participating in the JDP on EU issues, when one actor’s activity contributes to another actor’s aim realization. Thus, a strong type of coordination leads to higher transaction costs.

2. An analysis of actors’ activities in the JDP leads to the conclusion that the Swedish coordination system is a “mature” policy subsystem. Sweden entered the EU in 1995. Since then the role of actors participating in the JDP has considerably changed. In the beginning, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prevailed and it was in charge of “constructing” the policy subsystem. The transaction costs in such “constructing” policy subsystem are low and actor coalitions are rarely built. This fact is defined by a weak type of coordination. In September 1998, when G. Persson became Prime Minister of Sweden, the Prime Minister’s Office began playing the main role in the JDP. Since then, the policy subsystem has become “mature”, which can be characterized by a strong type of coordination. The reaction of the ministries was to slow down consideration of EU issues by expert groups, thereby contributing to the “free rider” problem. The 2004 re-
forms made one more step in defining the dominant role of the Prime Minister’s Office in the context of JDP implementation. These reforms made a solid basis for the “ignore procedure”, which is the main source of the “free-rider” problem. As far as interdependency between the main actors participating in the JDP has increased, a consensus became an obstacle in order to overcome the “free-rider” problem.

Thus, a reduction of transaction costs can possibly be carried out when a recommendation from reference groups is involved in the process of internal consultations (i.e. at the earliest stage of problem drafting); both governmental agencies and interest organizations seek this in order to receive powerful backing from most the authorities and a type of legitimacy from society in a situation of weak coordination. This allows an increased degree of trust in the policy subsystem and, thus, would be seen as addition to congruent belief systems.

3. Informational richness could be achieved by artificially broadening the information stream with the assistance of all sides of a coalition where belief system elements are considered as incremental tools. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice have an experienced staff of experts in their field of competence. The JDP for EU issues gives an opportunity for expert assessment to be used by ministries in order to promote their own interests in the context of questions from Brussels. For this purpose one needs to broaden the number of actors that can be involved in the JDP. Therefore an artificial broadening of the information stream would help us to reach informational richness.

4. The involvement of interest organizations in the process of drafting procedures is considered the most important advantage of actor participation in coalitions in the frameworks of the JDP. Thus, a stronger connection with societal structures can be set up and the degree of democratic society control increased.

EU Policies to Non-Member States: Limits of Success in Transmitting European Values (Cases of Russia and Ukraine)

Liubov Yaroshenko

With the establishment of the Russian Federation and Ukraine as independent political bodies, the EU is faced with the necessity of settling its diplomatic relations with these countries. The key question accompanying recognition of the newly emerged states is: How to effectively influence the transformation of politico-economic systems in these countries into liberal democratic entities? The next issue is whether EU influence will ever be accepted by the new sovereign states, and if so, in what spheres and to what degree? The latter question arises since neither the Russia Federation nor Ukraine has been offered full EU membership. In the absence of such an incentive, how amenable will Russia and Ukraine be to EU interference in their domestic affairs?

The goal of this article is to analyze the strategies applied by the EU to approximate the political norms and values of Russia and Ukraine in comparison to EU standards. The main research question is as follows: What conditions enable the EU to successfully intervene in the development of political systems in countries that are not (yet) granted the prospect of full EU membership?

The management of political transformation in non-member states is a rather new issue for the EU. For the first time in the European Union Treaty, promoting democracy along with consolidating democratic regimes was set as one of the EU’s foreign policy goals. The Copenhagen criteria includes adherence to what are called “EU values”: democratic norms, rule of law and human rights. This was formulated a year later in 1993 to distinguish democratic Western Europe from communist East-
ern Europe. Still it seems, transmitting “European norms and values” to states with no prospect for accession presents a real challenge for the EU. In such a situation, the EU cannot link an object of its policy to its greatest “carrot”, namely full EU membership. For countries with membership aspirations, like Ukraine and Georgia, any substitutions for this reward appear insufficient. Other countries like Russia, however, are simply not seeking deep integration with the EU, especially at the price of making specific externally mandated political reforms.

EU 27: Starting to Reassess Policies for Non-Member States or Following the Old Path?

The most recent wave of EU enlargement marked an important stage in the economic, political and cultural development of Europe. The full membership of seven Central Eastern European countries and three Baltic States in the EU ought to prove their achievement of democratization. At the same time, following the geographical expansion of EU borders the issue of faster approximating “values and norms” became one of the key priorities in the agenda towards both new-direct neighbors and former neighboring countries.

The reasons for re-thinking EU policies in the post-Soviet space were quite pragmatic. Firstly, getting much closer to the EU, states such as Ukraine, Russia and Moldova were considered to be the source of soft–security threats; i.e. illegal migration, criminal activities, drug or arms smuggling. The “managed” or “electoral democratic” regimes that did not accept so-called “EU norms and values” could hardly cope with these problems according to the opinion of EU elites. At the same, however, the EU has always positioned itself as a strong normative center, and the success of democratization in its new neighborhood would create an excellent opportunity to support this idea. As some have suggested, “The newly enlarged European Union [should] be surrounded by a “ring of friends”.

The question of the content and effectiveness of EU strategies to transform the political systems of non-member states is therefore still at the top of the agenda. Logically, answering this question should always take into consideration two things: geopolitics, specifically the importance of the geographical region that the non-member countries cover in relation to the EU, and, their stated desire to join the EU in the future or not.

Regarding both factors, the post-Soviet space presents an interesting case. Firstly, the former USSR countries are remarkable for their long absence of democratic “experience” and culture. Also, in terms of the current top agenda of International Relations and the EU, post-Soviet space is either the source of energy resources or a meaningful transit route for supplying gas or oil. The EU is therefore interested in adjusting these countries to into its normative system as much as possible in order to make cooperation with them easier and more predictable.

Secondly, one of the most important conditions for political transformation in non-EU states remains the desire to join the EU and readiness of the EU to grant this opportunity. In such cases, a comparative analysis of EU policies to transfer its norms and values to Russia and Ukraine is of a great interest. Both countries are important in terms of their role in EU energy policy and represent typical states of post-Soviet space characterized by the predominance of procedural democracy.

Both Russian and Ukraine have enjoyed special treatment among other former USSR states. These two nations were the first to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU. Furthermore, most of the aid offered by the TACIS program

launched in 1991 was channeled by the EU to the Russian Federation and Ukraine. These were also the first states on which the EU tested its Common Strategy as an instrument for realizing EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The differences lie in their attitude towards EU membership.

Does the EU in its normative approach take into consideration the absence of a desire to join the EU by Russia in contrast to the aspiration to join it by Ukraine? Do the conditions of successful intervention remain the same in both cases, namely a readiness by domestic forces to undergo reforms? Does the possible granting of full membership play a crucial role in the case of countries that want to become EU members? And what are the reliable and effective incentives for countries that are far from the idea of becoming an EU member? In order to answer these questions, one needs to look at the relationships between the EU and Russia and Ukraine in historical retrospective. In the development of the relationship, not only changes in the attitude of the national elites (i.e. both Russian and Ukrainian ones) to the EU were taken into consideration, but also transformations within the EU as well.

**Norms and Values Approximated within the Europeanization Framework**

In the present article, the EU’s impact on approximate political norms and values in Russia and Ukraine is considered to be part of the Europeanization framework and is evaluated within “the logics of consequence”. The essence of this theoretical approach consists in an assumption that an international institution, namely the EU, applies “democratic conditionality” to a third or “outside” country backed by a number of material and non-material rewards, the highest among them being “full membership” in the EU. Geoffrey Pridham, who investigated the causal impact of international institutions, namely the EU upon democratization and political and economic norms transfers in Eastern Europe, asserted: “it is the EU that has come to be most associated with democratic conditionality since the prize is no less than eventual membership for new democracies”.

Thus, the external pressure of the EU present in a number of political conditions seems to carry its weight only if the final prize of meeting the suggested democratic criteria by non-member states is their full membership in EU institutions. In essence, full EU membership appears to be the source of extraordinary economic, political and security benefits. Therefore, the clear sign of possibility becoming a full member is the most effective instrument for making candidate states comply with the formal and informal norms and rules suggested by the EU. Furthermore, the clarity of the type of reward, the exactness of the promise to deliver this reward and the threat to withhold the reward in case of non-compliance are the set of factors that constitute the basic principles for the success of conditionality.

This first basic principle for the success of a conditionality strategy was named by Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier as the “credibility of conditionality”. The other important principles formulated by the same authors are the “determinacy of conditions”, “veto players and adoption costs in a country implementing the suggested conditions” and “the size and speed of rewards”. As for the “credibility of conditionality”

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and “veto players and adoption costs”, it is important to note that these two variables are often regarded in the literature on European integration as being in deep correlation with each other, especially if the case of Eastern Europe is considered. Accordingly, Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel claimed that even “if credibility of rewards is high, rule adoption will depend on the size of governmental adoption costs”.  

As a result, if one wants to explain norm and value approximations in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and the contribution of the EU towards these processes within a “logic of consequence”, actually, a rationalist bargaining model, the following factors are to be assessed: 1) the determinacy and clarity of democratic conditions of implementation; 2) the mechanisms to enforce the implementation; and 3) the feedback from the government/ruling political elite of the specific country.

The Core of EU Policies towards Russia and Ukraine: 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) became the first legal documents to establish the basis for cooperation between the EU, Russia and Ukraine. These early documents shared a lot of similarities: both were legally binding and reciprocal by nature. At least in principle, the EU managed to persuade the Russian Federation and Ukraine to implement EU norms and values and induced them to modify their legislation to conform to EU standards. Article 2 (in the “General Principles” section) obviously reflects the EU’s desire to direct the development of democratic political systems in both Russia and Ukraine. The EU’s democratization strategies started with the inclusion of this article in the initial documents. Article 2 states that:

[R]espect for the democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, as well as the principles of market economy included those […] in the documents of the CSCE Bonn Conference, underpin the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitute an essential element of the partnership of this Agreement”.

What consequences did the incorporation of this article into the PCAs imply for the Russian Federation and Ukraine? First of all, the EU referred to the content of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Thus, the democratic conditions in Article 2 became quite clear. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe emphasized key features of democratic governance, like free and fair elections, accountability to the electorate and impartially administered justice. The EU intended to contribute to the transition of former communist states into a kind of “procedural democracy”.

As the scholar Rolf Schuette has argued, “[I]t is…fair to say that the EU expected all post-Soviet states, including the Russian Federation, to develop into full-fledged democracies and market economies with the assistance of the E.U.” Still, Article 2 was more re-active than it was pro-active. It gave neither Russia nor Ukraine specific guidelines on how to ensure judicial accountability or transparency of elections. The so-called “democratic conditionality” set forth in the PCAs therefore was lacking in determinacy.

Secondly, EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine relations at the time were accompanied by negative “democratic conditionality”. With regard to “the essential element of a partnership”, Article 2

10 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States and Ukraine, 16 June 1994
stipulated that certain democratic principles had to be upheld as a condition for the preservation of the PCA. As Hillion has asserted, “[T]he concept of ‘essential element’ implies that its violation by any of the Parties constitutes a ‘case of material breach of the Agreement’ and in turn a ‘case of special urgency’ […] allows the Party injured to suspend unilaterally the implementation of the Agreement”. 13 One wonders, however, whether this threat of PCA suspension could ever have been regarded as truly credible by the Russian Federation or Ukraine. As Schimmelfennig has argued, the mechanism of Europeanization, namely its membership conditionality, will work only if the provider of the conditions is able to reward or withhold benefits according to the quality of implementing suggested conditions. 14

Regarding the scope and essence of the “positive” rewards provided, no differentiation was implied between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The rewards offered varied from technical and financial aid to the possibility of creating a Free Trade Area conditioned upon the accession of Russia and Ukraine to the WTO.

Therefore, EU democratization strategies towards the Russian Federation and Ukraine were truly a reflection of the EU itself and its policies towards former Soviet Union states at the time. The PCA was focused on economic provisions and a limited amount of financial and technical assistance through the TACIS programme. 15 Thus, the PCA truly reflected the first pillar of the EU; the second and third pillars were still in the design phase then. 16 As for the incorporation of Article 2 into the PCA, it was an alternative to the Copenhagen criteria applied to Central European states that sought full EU membership. The reason for the substitution was that the EU did not plan to offer prospective membership to either Russia or Ukraine at that point in time. Therefore, it did not bother to provide detailed, step-by-step guidelines on how to construct a liberal democratic state and then to monitor the progress achieved by various countries. In addition, the EU lacked expertise in the state of affairs in Russia and Ukraine and thus needed time to acquire it.

The political elites of both countries accepted the fact that their internal policies had become the objects of EU interference. It was quite a bold decision to recognize this if one considers that truly adopting liberal democratic rules and values might have threatened “the bases of political power” in Russia and Ukraine and aroused “the government’s [frequent] fear that it will lead to a loss of office”. 17

The choices by elites proved to be absolutely pragmatic for both Russia and Ukraine and advantageous for the exertion of the EU’s impact. In the early 1990s, Russia’s foreign policy thinking was dominated by two ideas: 1) fostering “solidarity among democratic states” with which Russia desired to cooperatively interact, and 2) “the creation of favorable international conditions for the building of democracy inside the country”. 18

By signing the PCA, Russia was able to present the image of a “European country”. 19 As for Ukraine, the second parliamentary

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16 By three pillars of the EU three main areas of divided EU policies are understood. The first pillar: ‘Community’ pillar deals with economic, social and environmental policies. The second pillar concerns foreign policy and military matters. The third pillar is about the cooperation in the struggle against organized crime.
17 Schimmelfennig F., Sedelmeier U., op. cit., p. 663.
election was held in March-April 1994 at a time of deep economic crisis. The period was characterized by an 80% decline in living standards since the country had achieved independence and an unemployment rate of 40% (or higher with the inclusion of those on unpaid leave). Ukraine also hoped that the EU would help it to integrate into the world economy and also to break with the former command administrative economic system in the most painless way possible. It was rather obvious that Russia and Ukraine, like many other formerly communist states, or like any sovereign nation around the world, would try to reap as many benefits as possible from their relations with the EU.

*The Amsterdam Treaty: a New EU Approach to Russia and Ukraine?*

The next stage in elaborating the EU democratization strategy was connected with testing EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Amsterdam Treaty envisaged a new instrument, a “common strategy”, which was supposed to define the EU’s overall policy guidelines toward a third country. It was quite logical for the EU to insert democratic priorities into this document as a means of adding credibility to its democratization approach both for Russia and Ukraine.

Again, the two documents shared many similarities. Firstly, the regulations of the Common Strategies were not enforceable for either Russia or Ukraine. Instead, they merely reflected the EU’s expectations and proposed obligations with respect to these two states. Moreover, the principles and instruments for promoting democracy outlined in the documents appeared to be nearly identical for both countries. For the first time, the EU’s top strategic goal concerned the transformation of both Russian and Ukrainian political systems into stable, open and pluralistic democratic regimes.

As Smith has argued, the “priorities moved away from more traditional Cold War concerns about military security and nuclear weapons, with the limited aim of rudimentary political and economic stability, towards establishing the rule of law”.

However, the meaning of the second strategic goal with respect to Russia and Ukraine implied that both countries were considered to be essential elements in providing security for Europe and for fighting common threats on the whole continent.

One can see in this instance a real duality in the EU’s overall approach to Russia and Ukraine. On the one hand, the Common Strategies were meant to promote adherence to democratic values that guide the internal politics of EU member states. On the other hand, they emphasize the mutual necessity of addressing common challenges on the continent. Moreover, the EU intends to build and to strengthen its strategic partnership with both countries. The essence of this concept has not been elaborated very much, but again, the importance of democratic values as the basis for partnership was reaffirmed. However, the fact that the concept of strategic partnership was present in both Common Strategies implied that no preferential treatment was suggested for Russia at the expense of Ukraine. In other words, strategic partnership as a new format of relationship between the EU and Russia cannot be considered as a special carrot given in exchange for excepting EU standards and norms.

In the end, the Common Strategies approach partially proved the expectations of Russian and Ukrainian political elites regarding their assessment of cooperation with the EU.

With respect to Russia, the EU “welcome[d] its return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, cooperation, fair accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared values enshrined in the common heritage of...”

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European civilization”. In saying this, it seemed that the EU had accepted the changes that were going on in Russian foreign policy thinking at the end of the 1990s when the country had tried to continue along its course of selecting partnerships. The Common Strategy on Russia said that the EU “recognize[s] that the main responsibility for Russia’s future lies with Russia itself”, though “[t]he [European] Union remains firmly committed to working with Russia, at federal, regional and local levels, to support a successful political and economic transformation in Russia”.

Ukraine also finally received a similar and hoped-for confirmation of its European ambitions. For the first time, “[T]he EU acknowledge[d] Ukraine’s European aspirations and welcome[d] Ukraine’s pro-European choice”. But the document also noted that “[T]he full implementation of the PCA is a pre-requisite for Ukraine’s successful integration”. 

Real differentiation in the EU approach to democratization can be seen in terms of how specifically it developed steps that had to be undertaken by the governments of Russia and Ukraine in order to foster democracy.

In the Russian case, it seemed that determining specific measures to establish a liberal democratic regime was still vague and incoherent, especially in comparison with the Common Strategy for Ukraine. The EU distinguished several areas in the Russian political system that needed development, adjustment or improvement, such as public institutions, police work, and regional and local administrations. Still, the mechanisms and instruments for implementing the strategic goals and principal objectives were not identified. As Rolf Schuette has argued, “[T]he whole CS was turned into a collection of more or less specific goals and objectives, codified in a largely incoherent nine-page document”. This means that Russia was left alone in terms of the recommendations of how to achieve the declared goals in the best possible way. The EU was not interested in elaborating the most appropriate for Russia instruments of consolidating a democratic political regime.

In terms of guidelines for promoting democracy, however (and isn’t this finally indicating a significant difference between the Russian and Ukrainian cases?), the EU approach towards Ukraine seemed different. The EU did not explicitly make reference to “democratic conditionality” in the document. Instead, it linked partnership with Ukraine to meeting the democratic conditions of the other European institutions to which Ukraine was already bound. The EU “urge[d] Ukraine to fulfill its commitments to adapt its legislation to meet the norms and standards of the Council of Europe, in particular its obligations to which Ukraine signed up on its accession to the Council of Europe in 1995”. In addition, the EU called on Ukraine “to implement the second Optional Protocol of the United Nations Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the sixth Additional Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights as well as the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees”.

Kubicek has argued that, “While the document is often high on rhetoric and short on detail, it does list some specific democratization efforts, including supporting Ukraine’s efforts to sign and observe international human rights obligations, encouraging an ombudsman-institution in Ukraine, and contributing to the development of free media in the country”. This goes to show that the EU was following the Ukrainian success in terms of democracy con-
solidation, and probably was ready to provided a better “carrot” depending on the result achieved.

Still, the main drawback of the Common Strategies for both Russia and Ukraine was their recommendatory nature; the fulfillment of the stated provisions was absolutely at the discretion of governing elites in both countries.

Medium-Term Strategy for Russia’s Relations with the EU and the Ukrainian Approach to Cooperating with the EU (Before the “Four Common Spaces” and the ENP)

The reaction of elites both in Russia and Ukraine to the respective Common Strategies followed immediately. Especially interesting was the Medium-Term Strategy for Russia’s Relations with the EU. This document constituted a dividing line in the relationship between the Russian Federation and the EU. In it, Russia firmly stated that it would reject any approach that dictated the implementation of certain recommendations for its internal and external policies. The concept of “strategic partnership” was defined by Russia through “equality of both sides” and the “existence of common interests”. The sphere of “common interests” was restricted to issues such as trade intensification, economic cooperation and creating an effective system of collective security. No references were made to the ideas of “shared values” conceptualized by the EU in terms of adherence to democracy, rule of law, good governance and human rights protection. Moreover, it was only in the sphere of economic cooperation that Russia hinted at the possibility of approximating EU economic legislation and technical standards. At the same time, it was emphasized that “convergence cannot be a one-sided process”. The Medium-Term Strategy marked the end of favorable conditions for the EU to exercise its principled influence on both the political and economic dimensions. Russia had categorically declared that it would no longer accept the EU approach of the early 1990s.

The Ukrainian case was a little bit different. If the Russian political elite simply did not want to be integrated into Europe under the unilateral conditions suggested by the EU and thus lose its sovereign right to define the type of political and economic system in its country, the governing elite in Ukraine was not ready to pay the price for the proclaimed European aspirations. The whole political regime seemed to oppose the consolidation of liberal democracy in Ukraine. All of the political power was vested in the executive branch, consisting of President Kuchma and his administration. As Sherr has asserted, “Ukraine’s political leaders have sometimes acted as if they could achieve integration by declaration, or simply by joining and participating in international organizational and political clubs rather than by undertaking concrete structural changes”.

The European Neighborhood Policy for Ukraine and the “Four Common Spaces” for Russia

The latest phase in developing EU democratization strategies aimed at non-member states was marked by the design of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). This stage represents an actual differentiation in EU “democracy-promotion” policies towards the two countries. For Ukraine, “the transportation of EU legislation into domestic law, the restructuring of domestic institutions according to EU rules, or the change of domestic political practices according to EU standards” was emphasized. The notion of the EU’s democratic conditionality was clearly reflected in the ENP Action Plan for Ukraine. Russia effectively

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35 Schimmelfennig F., Sedelmeier U., op. cit., p. 662.
withdrew from the ENP since it did not want to accept the status of being considered an “equal among others”.

Russia continued the approach taken towards the EU at the end of the 1990s, namely with the demand to be treated as an equal by the EU. As James Hughes argued in one of his papers, current interaction between Russia and the EU focuses on the management of economic cooperation at the expense of normative issues.36 Russia’s “Four Common Spaces”, adopted in 2003 and 2005, became an alternative to the ENP approach. There is no trace of democratic conditionality in any of the Four Common Spaces. There are, however, several references to the idea that the EU and Russia already share “common values” or “democratic norms” in the Common Spaces of 1) Freedom, 2) Justice and Security, 3) External Security and, 4) Education and Research. There were no specific recommendations on how to conduct the State Duma elections in 2007 or the Presidential elections in 2008, which would at least ensure the functioning of a “procedural democracy”. It seems that in terms of adherence to “common values” and promoting democracy, the Four Common Spaces is an absolute antipode of the ENP Action Plans created by the EU for countries within the ENP. The current debate about what role “common values” should play in any new document regulating EU-Russia relations dominates the agenda of both Russian and EU epistemic communities. The PCA expired in 2007 and the time to reconsider and to update the legal basis for cooperation in a way that is respectful of the development of both Russia and the EU has come.

Contrary to the Four Common Spaces, the ENP Action Plan for Ukraine prioritized political objectives, most notably including respect for “human rights and democratic principles”.37 Promoting democracy in Ukraine thus appeared in the top three of 14 key “priorities for action”, which were enumerated at the beginning of the ENP Action Plan. In comparison with the PCA, the “democratic conditionality” of the ENP Action Plan presented itself as a qualitative shift in the interests of the EU with respect to democratic performance in Ukraine. It proved that the EU is eager to exert influence not only upon the establishment of “formal democracy” in Ukraine, but also upon the country’s democratic consolidation.

The problem was that even though the content of “democratic conditionality” was broader than in the previous legal document, it still failed to fulfill the criteria of clear precision. Rather than putting forth concrete suggestions, the ENP Action Plan left open to further elaboration the various steps that could be undertaken to attain the suggested democratic conditions. The vagueness of its priorities for action together with the amorphic contours of a future enhanced cooperation agreement (as an incentive to implement political reforms) may, however, actually become one of the best strategic ways for the EU to keep Ukraine in the European orbit without “full membership”. Scholars in the field of “democratization” and “Europeanization” like Michael McFaul,38 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Geoffrey Pridham39 agree that the credible promise of full EU membership has accelerated the process of democratic transition and consolidation in many cases, and has thus become an effective tool for promoting democracy. Unfortunately, this was not the case with Ukraine.

Conclusions
The goal of this article was to assess the content and effectiveness of EU strategies to transform the political systems of Russia and Ukraine during the period of 1994 to 2007. The main question was to distinguish the conditions under which the EU could successfully intervene in the formation of a political regime in a

36 Hughes J., op. cit.
37 Smith K., op. cit., p. 765.
country with long-term aspirations to become a full EU member in contrast a country without any desire for membership. The findings show that at least at the beginning, no differentiation was applied by the EU in terms of content, mechanisms of influence and overall approach to Russia and Ukraine. In the political sphere, both states became the objects of a limited Europeanization model.

The EU thus tried to apply an alternative version of the Copenhagen criteria to Russia and Ukraine. The main drawback of this approach was that the EU offered the states rather meagre rewards in exchange for a wide and rather vague list of expected political reforms. The insufficiency of incentives made the process of implementing reform too costly for the state that at least rhetorically claimed to aspire to join the EU, that is, Ukraine. The overly strict democratic conditionality became an irritating burden for the other state, Russia, which was more interested in settling the issues of “hard” and “soft security”, including a visa-free regime and deeper economic cooperation, etc.

The conditions for implementing the limited Europeanization scheme were favorable only at the very beginning of the EU-Russia and EU-Ukraine relationships. At the time, both states and the EU had high and unbiased expectations about cooperation, and Russia and Ukraine sought recognition from the West. We can now see how the expectations were unrealistic and the desire for flexibility and rapid change was overestimated.

Both empirical cases prove that there are at least three factors that determine the success or failure of EU intervention policies. First, the declared expectations of political elites should be considered. Next, it seems irrational to suggest legally binding and obligatory “democratic conditionality” for a state that constantly reaffirms its sovereignty in internal policies and has enough resources to carry out an independent diversified external policy. And third, demanding the inclusion of any sort of “democratic conditionality” in an agreement with such a state as Russia may only hinder cooperation in other spheres.

On the contrary, if a state firmly intends to become a full member of the EU and full membership is truly its top foreign policy goal, there is a chance for the EU to successfully impact political transformation in such a country. In this case there are two other variables that shape the degree and quality of EU influence: 1) the constellation of domestic political forces, and 2) the political will of the EU to provide better incentives (rewards) if a country adheres to a democratic course or to withhold rewards as punishment for a state that fails to fulfill its political obligations.

The case of Ukraine has proved these assumptions. The EU’s strategic interests towards Ukraine have shaped the character of the democratic conditions it set as well as determined the size of the rewards. The fact that the EU is not yet ready to integrate Ukraine into its institutions explains the relative vagueness of democratic conditions it suggests and also the meagre scope of political incentives it has offered to Ukraine. Nevertheless, even providing “negative” democratic conditionality for Ukraine in the early stages of the relationship, the EU hardly intended to dissolve its cooperation and to leave Ukraine out of the European orbit even if Ukraine violates democratic provisions. If this had been the case, the EU, for example would have paid more serious attention to the murder of journalist Gyorgy Gongadze.

The Gongadze case could have become a real precedent for punishing states that publicly aspire to join the EU but at the same time seriously violate human rights. The EU did not really try to investigate the case properly and make a concerted effort to bring to justice attacks on the free an independent media of a country that wanted to become EU member. If the investigation had shown that that was the political authorities to be blamed for the murder, the EU could have punished Ukraine for not fulfilling the conditionality, and that would have been a sign of the credible treatment from the side of the EU. Secondly, after the Orange Revolution of December 2004, the shift in the political regime that took place in Ukraine proved that a pro-democratic
government that truly desires joining the EU could start implementing political reforms of the ENP Action Plan even under imprecise conditions and despite insufficient rewards being offered from the EU side. In this case, integration incentives made at that particular moment in Ukraine’s history might have contributed to the stability of the new Ukrainian government’s democratic initiatives.

Does the Ukrainian situation show that there are no channels through which the EU can exert influence on a state that rejects the very idea of being the object of EU policies, even if that state striving for EU membership makes very slow progress in political reforms? The current debates on the present and future legal basis of Russia-EU relations aim at answering this question. The dilemma for the EU is whether it is genuinely ready to stress the normative dimension in future agreements and to present a coordinated approach towards Russia even at the expense of economic interests with some of its member states.

Success at Implementing the Bologna Process in Russia: Experts’ Views

Elena Stepanova

This article is devoted to the problem of introducing the Bologna Process into the system of Russian education and makes an attempt to understand the “spirit” and the “letter” of the Bologna Process in Russia. The Bologna Process deals with the integration of European higher education.

The Bologna initiative is analyzed in several contexts: the dynamics of development of Bologna ideas in Europe and Russia, the character and measure of innovations entering into the Russian system of higher education, their correlation with pressing problems of Russian education reforms, adequacy of the Bologna organizational format to the specifics of Russia’s educational system, and arguments for and against the significance of the Bologna transformations.

Education is a huge development resource in the modern world. The real growth of value-added products and services in knowledge-based industries has consistently outpaced overall growth rates in many OECD member countries over the past two decades. The globalization process accelerates these tendencies.

The European Union constantly underlines the role of the educational factor in forming a new Europe. In 1999, at a meeting in Bologna (Italy), the Ministers of Education of 29 European states signed what was called the Bologna Declaration, defining the beginning of a new era in creating uniform higher education area in Europe. The basic reference points for this program are to improve the status of European education around the world,

and to increase the professional mobility of European students and professors.

Russia has aspired to find a place in the European educational area and joined the Bologna Process, having signed the Bologna Declaration in 2003 at a ministry meeting in Berlin. By signing this document, the Russian government accepted a number of basic obligations toward reforming Russian education and reform of higher education started in Russia at that time. With an active policy of innovations promoted by the federal government, the order of day was questions about the readiness for reforms, insistency upon regular and deep studies of reforms, and the accompanying scale and consistency of policy actions conducted for reforms.

Finally the question of success resulting from the Bologna Process in Russia is brought up, in particular concerning the achieved results, the social costs and benefits of these reforms, the need for considering the adequacy of reforms specific to Russian education, and the prospects of solving those actual problems of Russian education, which are not defined by the Bologna reforms.

**Perspectives on Reform Analysis**

The fifth year of Russia’s participating in the Bologna Process has passed and I have tried to examine the situation. This analysis has allowed me to mark out some genres of numerous publications and materials on the question, including the descriptions of key positions in the Bologna Process, statements and speeches of the Russian Minister of Education and Science, Andrey Fursenko, and also representatives of the profile Committee of the State Duma and rectors of leading universities, and others, along with diverse attempts of journalists to draw attention to problems the Bologna process reforming.

Basic attention is given to two main subjects of reforms. One is introducing two main cycles into Russian higher education and the other is introducing a Unified State Examination in order to evaluate levels of knowledge. Among the attitudes to reforming, there is clearly a party for and a party against. The majority of universities (i.e. at least all public ones) are in a dependent position on the government.

In this text, I have allocated four viewpoints for studying the problem. These four viewpoints are: 1) to compare educational problems in European countries and problems that are solved by the Bologna Process; 2) to compare the tasks of the Bologna Process for European education and the tasks which have been selected in Russia; for reforms within the framework of the Bologna Process; 3) to correlate problems within the framework of Russia’s Bologna Process with the pressing challenges of modernizing Russian education; 4) to analyze arguments for and against Russia’s educational transformations in the light of the Bologna Process.

**The Bologna Process in the Context of European Education**

It is proposed that there exist two essentially different discourses concerning European education. One of them concerns higher education in Europe and a considerable part of it is now focused on the Bologna reform. This is a discourse about an elite part of European education and its aspiration to align all the European universities of all European countries (46 countries have already joined the Bologna process). The second group of discussions involve problems of the economic and social situation of developed and developing countries, which aim to solve questions of education in different countries, the existence of social inequality and problems with availability of education, the existence of illiteracy, social groups that drop out of public education, social exclusion, etc.

I study in the this section two materials – 1) the advance of ideas in the Bologna process in Europe, including the results fixed at the last meeting of Ministers of Education in the London communiqué; 2) the problems of higher education in the light of the Bologna process as presented in recent issues of
It is obviously important to understand three components of the Bologna process: (a) the missions and problems of the Bologna process, (b) the main educational formats introduced by it, and, (c) the organizational structures responsible for realizing it.

The meetings of European Ministers of Education are held every second year and the course of reform and the forthcoming purposes and problems are discussed there. As a result, since 1999, five meetings have taken place: 1999 Bologna, 2001 – Prague, 2003 – Berlin, 2005 – Bergen, and 2007 – London. The result of each meeting has been the adoption of a new declaration. Accordingly, at present five “Bologna” declarations have been signed. The more recent meeting has just taken place in Leuven in May, 2009.

In the adopted declarations, the priority purposes for the next two years are proclaimed, and the country which will take the chair of the European Secretary concerning the Bologna process for the next two years is assigned. Realization of the outlined problems and preparation for the next meeting is assigned to a newly formed Bologna Follow-Up Group (BFUG). Noting the democratic character of managing the Bologna process, it is necessary to state, however, a certain doubt; as it is currently represented, the absence of a constant structure in the Bologna process reduces the cumulative effect.

If we look attentively at the London meeting (2007), the eight-year period was summed up there and directions for the closing stages were defined. At this meeting the Communiqué “Towards the European Higher Education Area: responding to challenges in a globalized world” was adopted and the following priorities for the concluding stage were stated: developing a the three-cycle degree system in higher education; improving recognition of higher education qualifications and periods of study; promoting the mobility of students and staff by overcoming obstacles to the portability of grants and loans; improving employability in relation to each of these cycles; and clarifying the contexts for life-long learning.

In this document, almost every issue of the Bologna reform was mentioned. Thus, both the advances made in solving problems and an insistency on further development was identified. However, no task of the Bologna reform was named as completely solved. It was definitely mentioned that reforms will not come to an end by the year 2010 and that building a European higher education area will be prolonged beyond the framework of 2010.

Noting the advances made in realizing this massive project, I draw attention to the absence of vital information that would allow us to understand the successes and failures of the project. For example, there is no regular analysis of the concrete course of reforms, the results reached are not concretized by individual countries, and the difficulties and problems of reform in Europe in general and that the separate countries face are not documented.

The most important source for presenting and deepening understanding of problems of European education is the journal “Higher Education in Europe”. In it are published articles by the organs of government and experts in an education sphere at the European and world levels. This is a huge information resource, with up to 60 articles published annually.

The issue titled “Growing Legitimacy and Recognition: Trends and Developments in Private Higher Education in Europe” is devoted to the problem of private universities which are becoming an integral part of higher education systems in different countries. These schools offer new forms and technologies, achieve high efficiency and are making a competition with traditional education (volume 31–1, 2006).
The issue “Entrepreneurial Universities in Europe: Legacies, Realities and Aspirations” considers the development of intellectual entrepreneurship in universities, including analyses of paradigms and practices of an enterprise approach to education in conditions of a market economy (volume 31–2, 2006).

The issue “Complex Realities: Contractual Regulations and Institutional Employment Practices for Academic Staff” analyzes the processes of revising the status of staff and researchers in universities, re-structuring of academic work in current conditions and problems of educational quality, etc. (volume 31–3, 2006).

In summary, one can notice more deeply through acquaintance with the journals’ materials some of the realities of transformation in Russian higher education, since many of the issues facing higher education reform in Europe are also present in Russia.

**Russian Higher Education Joining the Bologna Process**

As a retrospective analysis shows, reforms in Russian higher education of the last 15-20 years were practically unanticipated by significant investigations, their tasks and prospects were not discussed with the general public and problems were essentially solved by administrative methods. The same thing characterizes the present situation with Bologna reforms in Russia. Currently, two interrelated processes are being developed in Russia: 1. actively introducing universities that follow the formats of the Bologna process (happening intensively) and 2. comprehending the corresponding social realities (happening extremely poorly).

In the processes of integrating European higher education, individual countries can allocate as paramount different focuses and themes and establish different sequences and paces to solve them.

For 2005–2010, the following agenda was approved in Russia:

1. Developing the higher education system based on two main cycles (Bachelor’s degree and Master’s degree);
2. Studying and introducing the European credit transfer system (from 2008);
3. Introducing a Diploma Supplement compatible with Europe (from 2008);
4. Creating and functional maintaining a comparable system of recognizing foreign higher education documents in Russia and standardizing Russian documents so that they will be recognized in Bologna process member-states.
5. Working out a comparable methodology and criteria for quality evaluations of higher education and, thereby, maintaining the harmonization of Russia’s quality assurance of its higher education system with European systems, including the separate conditions for Russia’s entry to the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA).
6. Developing the mobility students and academic staff, including a system of institutional and individual grants (2006–2008).

Integration into the world system of higher education should occur under conditions that preserve the achievements and traditions of Russia’s higher education system as a guiding principle of state policy embodied in the federal law.

We may notice that behind these frameworks there is a set of basic requirements to form the European higher education area, such as interconnecting education and research, long-life learning, including students as players that can help to regulate the Bologna process, offering postgraduate study as an obligatory third cycle of higher education, etc.

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According to my analysis of the actual situation in the Russian Bologna process, there is no clear concept of “reform” and there is no particular Russian committee which is central to fulfilling the Bologna reforms that bears responsibility for its realization; there is no centre where the results of research, involving criticism of reforms can be accumulated. President of the All-Russia fund of education Sergey Komkov remarked as follows: “During the administrative reform when all governmental commissions were liquidated, we also lost the commission which led the discussions with European colleagues in the framework of the Bologna process. Today a uniform body which would supervise integration of the European [higher education] system into Russia simply does not exist, and there is also no uniform position on this matter”.5

One can see that shortly after signing the Bologna declaration there was an active reaction and a splash of interest by experts to the problematics of the Bologna process in Russia. In 2003–2004 there were a lot of publications about it. Most of the publications were small, only 1–3 pages representing reactions, judgments, and comments on separate aspects of the Bologna process, stated by representatives of different educational structures.

In Russian speeches three genres of estimations prevail: 1) the Bologna process is a prospective issue, offering many potential gains; 2) the Bologna process will result in a serious loss of advantages in Russian higher education; 3) the Bologna process is a big loss for Russia, but there is no possibility to escape it.

In Russia, a kind of “late modernization” of education has started to be vigorously carried out since the signing of the Bologna declaration. Despite the unpersuasive results of trial experiments, strong objections of leading universities, including critical performances by competent experts and the Russian education management system, is proposing inevitable transfers of the Russian higher education system into Bologna formats. At present, two basic ideas have been realized: introduction of the two-cycle system and implementation of quality assurance standards through introduction of state standards and the Unified State Examination.

Regular analyses of performances and innovations of the Bologna process in Russia shows that the problematics of educational contents is not mentioned anywhere. The results of education should be defined not only by forms, but also by the content of educational courses and the quality of the educational methods.

The Bologna Problems and Russian Higher Education

The set of diverse internal problems of Russian higher education has been hidden by the Bologna discourse and reform since 2003. “The concept of modernizing Russian education for the period till 2010”, prepared by the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia and accepted in February 2002, can be used to show that Russia’s education problems existed before signing the Bologna Declaration. In article 1.3 of that document: “The condition of the Russian education system and its necessary modernization” is formulated as follows: “the out-of-date and overloaded content of the school education not providing fundamental knowledge; the vocational training not capable to solve the problem of ‘human resources hunger’; the aggravation of deficits in the education system due to unequal access to quality education depending on family incomes”.6

For a deeper understanding, it is necessary to mention that a whole series of social research studies that have focused on secondary schools are saturated with diverse examples of troubles

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in the educational situation: selection of children at schools, elitism in schools, excluding children from schools, a growing number of children who are not getting secondary education, a decrease in the educational parameters in certain sectors of society – among workers, peasants, etc. The significant attention of researchers is concentrated on the analyses of social-structural factors of differentiation.\(^7\)

According to materials of the Institute of social-political research of the Russian Academy of Sciences,\(^8\) the availability of paid forms of education for many young people in 2005 was outside of their financial possibilities. Paid education was mentioned as completely available to only by 12.7 % of youth and was deemed inaccessible for 44.8 %.

With the support of the Independent Institute of Social Policy, 16 research projects on higher education were conducted in 2003–2004.\(^9\) Some of the problems mentioned in the projects include: unfair practices for entering to universities (informal payment for entering universities, use of social capital, tutoring, etc.), payment for education in universities (informal payments of students, additional paid educational services for students), informal practices for passing the Unified State Examination, etc.

It is possible to find many facts of this sort that paint a picture of trouble in the Russian education system. Does the society realize the complexity of the developing situation and the discrepancy between the official position and the actual facts, whether the position of accepting the ideas of educational reform offered in Russia is unequivocal? As my analysis shows, there exists some kind of “Bologna opposition”, with two poles of relations to Russian education transformation in the frames of the Bologna process. Hereafter, the comparison of key positions of the opponents to the Bologna process is conducted.

**Russian Teams: “Pro” and “Contra”**

With the inclusion of Russia to the Bologna process, journalists and experts have begun to penetrate into the essence of the situation and to state their evaluations. Two obvious positions are designated: for and against the Bologna process in Russia. Mikhail Shchelgunov, a professor from Kazan State University has spoken about this situation: “The academic educational community carefully watches the idea of modernization of Russian education by the Bologna model. This community is conditionally divided into those who are pro – ‘eurooptimists’, and on those who are contra, – so-called ‘eurosceptics’.\(^{10}\)

**The Team PRO**

The basic thesis here can be formulated as: The Bologna process is a prospective thing.

Team pro, undoubtedly, is led by the Minister of Education and Science, Andrey Fursenko, by the Ministry itself and by some other structures. The Ministry of Education and Science introduces and promotes Bologna reform in Russia (however the concrete subsystem responsible for reform is not named).

About new education formats and introduction rates

According to Andrey Fursenko, Russia is on schedule in accepting the Bologna process; without being in advance of it, but also not lagging behind it. Since 2008 the country has passed to a two-cycle system of education in universities – a Bachelor’s degree and a Master’s degree. By 2010, says Fursenko, the Russian system of higher education should have adopted the European system in many respects. This assumes that the introduction of a two-cycle system is necessary to achieve a mutual recognition of diplomas and uniform standards of quality. Basically, according to the assurances of the Minister, all three systems will exist. First, a 3–4-year Bachelor degree, and then a 1–2-year Master’s degree. There will also exist in parallel the third, system which is traditional in Russia – “speciality”. All three levels will be independent, with their own state standards and final attestation. Licensing, certification and state accreditation of such universities will take place separately. According to the Minister’s estimates, within three years Russia will complete all the actions within the frames of the Bologna process, and students will acquire the right to continue their education at universities of the European countries that was begun in Russia.

The estimations of the Bologna process and its results

According to Fursenko, “the Bologna process bears some risks, but it will be even worse, if we do nothing [...] This process is difficult in all countries”. “It is a question, first of all, of improvement of quality of education of the Russian students and increasing the level of trust in Russian diplomas abroad, that is, to their convertibility”. Fursenko states that “Standardization of Russian higher education with European education will positively affect the employment of graduates of universities”.

Thus, according to Fursenko, it turns out that the core realization of the Bologna process is the transition to a two-cycle system of higher education. As a consequence, students will acquire a right (and even the possibility) to continue their education begun in Russia at universities in Europe. There are, however, problems with public opinion with respect to recognizing the two-cycle system.

One more category in the pro team is represented by a number of prestigious universities which have already started to master the European format of education. Among them are the Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs, the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, the State University – Higher School of Economics, and others.

The vice-rector of the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, Alexander Efremov, mentions the advantages of the Bologna system: “The Bologna system can be compared with road regulations. In all Europe they are identical, which allows easy movement from country to country. General rules of education will promote the mobility of students. Having started education in Russia, they can enter a Master’s program in England, France or Italy.”

The opinion of the deputy chief of the department of international contacts of the State University – Higher School of Education...
nomics, Boris Zhelezov, is the following: “The main plus of the European standards is in their rationality. The quantity of general subjects is reduced, but the basic emphasis is put on professional skills”. Zhelezov articulates also the pro argument, saying “The parameters of quality assurance of education are transparent and strictly regulated. Students are evaluated by universal criteria and students give characteristic evaluations of the lecturers and by that directly influence the professorial structure”. In other words, some of the positive aspects of the Bologna process entering Russia include higher relevance for professional development and the empowerment of students to become involved in their learning process by encouraging an evaluation process wherein lecturers’ accountability is established.

_The Team CONTRA_

The basic thesis of the team contra can be formulated as: The Bologna process threatens a serious loss of advantages for Russian higher education.

In the team contra there are several players, including a number of the leading universities of the country, the Committee on Education and Science of the State Duma, experts, and students and so on. My research shows that there is a basic mismatch of positions between the Government of Russia on behalf of the Ministry of Education and Science and that of the Committee of the State Duma. This can be seen in the presentations given by representatives of the Committee, suggesting that no regular analysis of the situation is carried out in Russia and that there is no strategic concept of developing education and science and no regular public consideration of the Bologna process.

Alexei Tchernyshev, the vice-president of Committee on Education and Science of the State Duma states: “We have neither analysis, nor a forecast for the future. We do not know where we are coming from, where we are going and with what we are going”. Oleg Smolin, the first vice-president of the same Committee: “Having read the government paper ‘The domestic education prospects’, the clear view of the situation about the prospects will not be received neither by parents, nor by pupil, neither by students, nor by the educational community and the society as a whole”.

Undoubtedly, the leader of the opposition movement totally against the Bologna reforms in Russian education is the rector of the leading universities of Russia, the Moscow State University, and President of the Union of Rectors of Russia, Victor Sadovnichy.

First of all, Sadovnichy insists on the parity status of Russia in Bologna negotiations: “We are achieving and will achieve at first as much as possible of a worthy format of negotiations on the Bologna process, and then the most possible pragmatic integration of world and national experience in the sphere of education within the precincts of Moscow State University. Such an approach, in my opinion, will as a result favour to becoming of our graduates competitive in any world markets”.

Professor Sadovnichy is convinced that Russia has something to offer to European higher education, that the country has resources for parity exchanges. He articulates the advantages of Russian higher education and is self-assured in the achievements of Moscow State University and of some other universities: “The basis of our model is fundamental science. Moscow State University and Bauman University [the Moscow State Technical University n.a. N.E. Bauman] are responsible for maintaining the educational level. Bauman University is responsible for the engineering education standard and Moscow State University is responsible for fundamental science and education. The future of

19 Vlasova I., Okuneva D., op. cit., p. 7.
21 Perehod na Bolonskuyu sistemy., op. cit.
22 Vlasova I., Okuneva D., op. cit., p. 7.
our society is in the fundamental approaches, both in education and science”. 24 He evaluates the total transition to paid education as a disaster: “If we reduce the country to the situation that every family pays for education, we commit a terrible crime”; 25 “Students are now rather geared up on survival, than on fundamental science”. 26 He queries the categorical aversion to imposed formats of education. His arguments against the two-cycle system of higher education: “We will lower the educational level if we blindly, without thinking follow this two-cycle system...If we destroy the basis of specialist training, the situation which we have received by destroying primary and secondary professional education will be repeated. Bachelor’s degrees are a complete failure in the modern Russian labor market, and we, nevertheless, systematically prolong the production of half-educated persons”. 27

Sadovnichy expresses a particular preoccupation with the destiny of producing Russian doctors of science: “If we introduce the two-cycle system, we will lose the system of producing doctors of science. I would name the loss of the system of doctors as a tragedy for science, education, and Russia”. 28 Concerning the Unified State Examination, Sadovnichy is confident that it will not solve the corruption problem in education. 29 He notes the consolidation on the principle questions of reforms with other strong partners, in particular with Bauman University. 30

The vice-rector of Moscow State University, Professor Vladimir Mironov, has stated the position of rigidly renouncing from participation in the Bologna reforms on the basis of conditions offered from outside. 31 The article he wrote on this theme contains a set of deep and qualified judgments about the characteristics of Russian higher education and about the problems of Russia’s participation in the Bologna process. Mironov is worried that introducing the European educational environment to Russia will be accompanied by a number of the internal measures changing all system of higher education, e.g. from selection of entrants (the Unified State Examination) and targeted financing of students through State registered financial obligations or through educational loans, to changing the entire system of state standards and administrative structure of universities. He gives this diagnosis: “The Bologna process is a type of integration of the higher educational area, which instead of synthesizing the best qualities of the national traditions of education inevitably simplifies and levels higher education”. 32 The author underlines that Russian education has been always based on fundamental science which was is conducted by means of consecutive training of students to the discipline. This approach is not offered by the mosaic system of modules used in many European countries.

Professor Mironov comes to this conclusion: “At issue is the typical technological mindset of solving a problem, on the basis of which there is a belief that all problems can be decided technologically, that is without understanding the essence of the reform process, whether it is economy, policy, education or medicine”. 33 Here a remark can be added that not in any documents concerning the development of

24 Sadovnichy V. Ya nikogda ne byl v vostorge ot togo, chto prinimayutcya eti zakony [I Never was Delighted that these Laws Were Passed], in: Russky Journal 27.12.2007, p. 11.
26 Sadovnichy V., op. cit., p. 11.
27 Sycheva L., op. cit., p. 17.
the Bologna process in Russia has the idea been mentioned that the content of what we are going to reform is essential.

**Execute not Pardon: Students and Universities in the Reforms**

A large sector in the Russian education system – universities – are the main object of manipulation for realizing the tasks of the Bologna reforms in Russia. The universities are already targeted for reconstruction. They have no voice of their own and their attitudes interest nobody. Neither academic staff, nor students, nor administration, nor even the rectors of the best universities are represented among significant player at the discussions of domestic educational reform. All reforms are now front-office handled and off-the-shelf with a stamp “to immediate execution”.

Many students are dissatisfied with the forthcoming reform. Sergey Komkov, president of the All-Russia Fund of Education states: “The student should choose: to be a bachelor, without having the possibility to realize himself in the labor market or to plunk down rather big money for a Master’s”. Innovation will hit their education. A student of Moscow State University, Anastasia Makarova says: “Yet I see only inconvenience in a two-cycle education system. After we studied for three years and graduated with a bachelor’s degree, we were sent to a Master’s admission committee as a common basis [...] Not everybody was admitted, and we had to continue the educational process in absolutely different groups”.

Though the Bologna reform is advocated by some of the advanced Russian universities, even their students are not especially optimistic in their estimations of their prospects. One student of Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs, Roman Dmitriev says: “The possibility to continue education abroad, to study in several countries within the framework of one educational program is often named among the advantages of the Bologna system. But even with the discounts the travel sum is excessive for the average student. The average cost of an exchange program is 15–20 thousand dollars [per year]”.

The opinion of the rector of Moscow State University Victor Sadovnichy, states: “Having accepted the western style of education, Russia will start ‘to prepare laboratory assistants for the West’. In Russia, there are few universities which can do this for three years without reducing the quality of education for the qualified experts”.

So, I can make some general evaluations. On the one hand, the team contra brings to a focus serious and reasoned estimations, regularly speaks in public, and has the viewpoint of many mass-media and experts in its favor. On the other hand, the team pro has a huge administrative resource at its disposal, though it is not especially anxious to convince the public with presentations. The administrative resources in the hands of the Minister of Education and Science, Andrey Fursenko, affords him the opportunity during a time of “Russian democratization” to ignore completely the arguments and attitudes of the chief executives of Russian education. The Bologna reform in Russia was started at full capacity in spite of the convincing arguments of the opponents. The reforms that have already begun are likewise disputable.

**Conclusion**

In recent years, one major action of Russian policy has been the modernization of the Russian education pursued within the framework of Russia’s participation in the Bologna process. Russian higher education is being intensively transferred into formats of the European system. The Bologna reform mentions all levels of Russian education and proposes profound changes to them.

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Bologna process modernization was started in Russia without regular research, public discussions or sound judgments about expected results. The participation of Russia in the Bologna process is therefore not provided with appropriate organizational structure, and is not accompanied by the necessary regulatory documents. Despite the considerable and reasoned opposition on the part of Russian politicians, heads of leading universities, inconclusive experiments, doubts of students and lecturers the higher educational reforms in Russia by the forces of functionaries inexorably progresses.

It is possible to characterize this situation by expressing the following statement of the rector of the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences, Teodor Shanin: “The theme of big state intentions is always relevant for Russia as a historical leader in the field of radical state projects. In state management ‘high modernism’ still reins, that is, the aspiration to introduce patterns recklessly to the ‘material’ culture, ways of life, traditions, and social skills of the population”. 38

The Bologna process, though it stimulates activity, nevertheless withdraws the transformation of Russian education from the majority of its essential problems. Due to the reforming and modernizing trajectory there are whole sectors of Russian education and its most serious problems that remain untouched, i.e. problems of rural schools, poor quality of higher education, social discrimination in the education sphere, corruption, transferring onto families the financial burden of children’s education, and many other things.

Despite the abundance of organizational innovations introduced, one of the principle questions for modern Russian education has not been mentioned – the character of educational programs and their adequacy for the requirements of the contemporary age, the social and economic development of the country, and the needs of the modern person.


Identity Politics in Russia: Europe in Russian Political Discourse

Elena Tsumarova

The period from 1995 to 2006 witnessed a considerable expansion of the length of borders between the Russian Federation and the European Union. This quality change in the neighborhood provided some new opportunities and intensified political discussions of those issues. Russia’s proximity to the EU raised the relevancy of not only relationships between Russia and the EU, but also of Russia’s position in the world in general and its “Europeanness” in particular.

Various political forces express opposing views on the Europeanness of Russia and of its geopolitical position. Moreover, the recent EU Eastern enlargement has become a “catalyst” for such discussions and has impressed Russian politicians to look for a new perception of Russia. As a result, some new practical and theoretical questions arise about the current transformation of Russian political discourse, especially in regard to Europe. In this article, I will show how the relationship between Russia and the European Union is reflected in Russian political discourse and how it has become embodied in identity politics.

Studies of Russian Identity

The topic of shaping a new identity in Russia attracts many domestic and foreign scientists. The interest is formed by certain aspects of a possible new identity, for example, as with those

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1 The present article deals with the results of the study carried out with support of the Centre for German and European Studies at St. Petersburg State University within the research line “Understanding European Governance in the Russian North-Western Region”.
related to Russia’s territory or to shaping federal relations. Russian national identity is now of course a general feature of the Russian self-consciousness as well. However, there have been works focused on the Russian political elite and on its influence on identity formation. For instance, Izkhar Brudny, analyzing performances of the liberal, nationalist and governing representatives, came to the conclusion that a non-democratic and anti-Western understanding of national identity still dominates on the elite level. Valery Solovej, in the meantime, insists that “the way [the] post-communist Russia has built [its] identity of a new political society, remains soviet-like in its essence”.

There is also a special interest in identity-building among Russian researchers in the field of international relations. As Andrey Tsygankov and Pavel Tsygankov demonstrate, one of the major issues in present-day international relations theories in Russia is the problem of the geopolitical role played by the state and the matter of “how Russia sees itself in the world community”. In their opinion, “only through a dialogue with the outside world and a free discussion of the existing concepts on the national level will Russia be able to acquire a new identity”. In other words, according to this view, international relations studies have especially close relevance to building Russia’s new identity as they often deal with the juxtaposition between Russia and the outside world.

However, it is necessary to admit that in most cases researchers simply describe the current state of Russian identity in their conclusions instead of analyzing and explaining its origins. This can partly be explained by the fact that the process of identity building is still incomplete. Yet, as Vladimir Gelman and Evgenia Popova pointed out, “the logics of the research […] calls for something different than giving answers to the simple questions ‘what?’ and ‘how?’ but also for at least putting forward the question ‘why?’”. The present article is an attempt to partly compensate for the lack of such vision in Russian research by also posing the “why?” question.

**Theoretical Background for Identity Studies**

Research on identity has primarily been carried out within psychology and sociology, where the emphasis is on building individual subjective concepts reflecting their own personalities and elements of society. Historians, sociologists, and political scientists have turned to the concept of “identity” while studying issues of ethnicity, nations and nationalism. Constructivist approaches to studying nations and nationalism see nations as political communities and thus defines national identity as the connections made or existing between individuals through such a community. According to this paradigm, identity is defined as a political and social construct, a product of discourse practices of political elites. Since the goal of the current research is to analyse how Russian iden-

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5 Brudny I. Politika identichnosti i postcommunisticheskij vybor Rossii [Identity Politics and Post-Communist Choice of Russia], in: Politicheskie issledovaniya 1, 2002, p. 87-104.


8 Ibid, p. 33.
Identity is being built, it is appropriate to turn now to what sort of theoretical background we are supporting.

Analyses of existing theoretical literature allows us to assume that political and cultural identities are built by means of 1) the establishment of appropriate boundaries between “we” and “other”; 2) unification or disunification processes and conditions; 3) the building of a common living context and access to common information; 4) cultivating a sense of prestige.11

(1) The establishment of appropriate boundaries is one of the fundamentals of a person’s self-identification as a member of various communities. The mechanism of establishing those boundaries between “we” and “other” has been thoroughly described within sociology, anthropology and political philosophy. In sociology, this mechanism was defined by Georg Simmel and Alfred Schutz in their works which have the title “Alien” (“Der Fremde”).12 The alien for Zimmel is a wanderer who comes to the group from without or as an outsider. In this way he crosses the spatial boundaries of the group (which are the clearest and most protected ones) and remains as an alien no matter how long he stays in it. All the time there are boundaries between himself and the group; these boundaries could lessen when an alien (or stranger) communicates with many group members or increase, for example, in the case that an alien’s behavior does not meet the expectations of the inside group. Even so, Simmel mentions that the boundaries, as a rule, never disappear completely.

In political philosophy, the process of forming a “Meaningful Alien” was developed by Carl Schmitt. In his opinion, the specific feature of political life is distinguishing between a friend and an enemy and establishing clear boundaries between them. Here, the category of a foe is not identified with the notion of a competitor or an opponent. He or she “is exactly different, he [sic] is an alien, stranger, it’s enough for his essence to be something different and alien in some intense manner”.13 The relation “friend – foe” means public, real struggle without any personal preference. The foe is not a concrete individual but “a community of people opposing an equal community”. Political life is thus said to consist in the ability of people to distinguish between a friend and a foe, and to establish boundaries between them. As soon as a society or people lose “the ability or will to this distinguishing”, says Schmitt, then “it no longer exists politically”.14 Schmitt was one of the pioneers in pointing out the special role of the state in the process of foe-determination by marking the latter in communicative space.

In the second half of the 20th century, Fredrik Barth created the concept of “ethnic boundaries”, which acquired a number of followers.15 According to Barth, ethnic groups exist in the base- ment of cultural content, within borders they outline for themselves. Correspondingly, ethnic borders describe ethnic groups not as an administrative-territorial formation but first of all as a cultural, social, and psychological community of people. Here, it should be highlighted that ethnic borders not always equal to administrative ones, which can be plotted on a simple map. The latter reflect the type of borders ethnic groups have settled in during particular periods in history.16

As Barth mentions, ethnic borders result from the internal social building of cultural and psychological similarities and differences under conditions of constant interaction between mem-

11 For a more detailed description of this model see Nozhenko M., Yargmoskaja N. V poiskah novogo regional’nogo soobščestva: vosmozhnosti perspektivna rasnozrenija federal’nyh okrugov [In Search for New Regional Community: Possible Perspective of Federal District Studies], in: Politicheskaja nauka, 3, 2005, p. 119-141.
16 Barth F., op. cit., p. 15.
bers of one particular group with other groups.¹⁷ In other words, 
etnic borders reflect the inner ideas of a group about the limits 
of its cultural uniqueness, similarities and differences with oth-
ers, and about the freedom to be themselves. Once these ideas 
take hold in one’s mind, they demonstrate both the distance be-
tween ethnic groups and within those groups as well. Such ideas 
are implemented in interethnic relations practices. In short, eth-
nic borders appear to be a real embodiment of the “friend or foe” 
division principle.

Some issues with Barth’s concept were later developed by 
Eric Hobsbaum. Analyzing decolonization processes and new 
nation-state formations in the countries of Eastern Europe, Hob-
sbaum comes to the conclusion that the context of ethnic borders 
research has changed. According to Hobsbaum, the main problem 
which ethnic groups faced in the second half of the 20th century, 
was adaptation to living in a polyethnic society. “First of all”, 
he writes, “it is the ability to ‘bargain’ for an appropriate part of 
public goods for the group (in concurrence with other groups), 
the ability to protect it from discrimination… [and] nationalism, 
in a sense of claims of an independent state establishment or lin-
guistic autonomy is inconsequent”.¹⁸ Hobsbaum states that “ur-
baniization and industrialization, presupposing mass migrations 
and varied movement of people, devoid of sense is one more 
fundamental precondition of nationalism”. This is, he suggests, 
“a thesis about [the] existence of territories with economically, 
culturally and linguistically homogeneous populations”.¹⁹ In 
other words, ethnic groups and communities within contempo-
rary states coexist with the mainstream in a way that leads to the 
emergence of polylinguism and cultural differentiation.

In general, the main points of boundary theory are the follow-
ing: Firstly, establishing a dichotomy between “we” and “other” 
is possible only through permanent or regular contacts between 
representatives of different communities. In fact, in creating 
an image of “the other”, a large role is played both by “real” 
contacts (physical travel of people) as well as “virtual” ones. 
The latter are possible through exchanges of information about 
communities through mass media or public speeches of political 
or cultural representatives from various communities. In such 
information exchange actions, one can find an indication that 
beyond the boundaries of a certain community there exist other 
communities, which pursue their own goals that sometimes 
differ from or even contradict “our” interests. Thus, political elites 
articulate the existence of a “Significant Other” which is con-
trasted with “ours”.

Secondly, the boundaries between “we” and “other” are es-

established both from within and from the outside. As Maria No-
zehenko and Natalia Yargomskaya show, the main ways of con-
structing the boundaries from the “outside” are “those political 
decisions leading to establishing the borders marked on a map”. 
This is mainly about demarcation and title-establishment (“the 
oficial naming of the territory which exists within the demarcat-
ed borders”).²⁰ Establishing the boundaries from “within” takes 
place by implementing an identity policy, which is aimed at “es-

tablishing and institutionalizing the image of community”. One 
of the main mechanisms to promote this is “map-as-a-logo”, “a 
symbolic representation in colour of the territory, which becomes 
‘attached’ to a certain community due to the demarcation”.²¹

(2) “Unification” means a unified apparatus of power. Antony 
Giddens stresses the importance of having a unified adminis-
trative system for political community building. In his opinion, 
a nation exists only “when the state has unified administration 
which functions over all the territory declared sovereign”.²² In

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 15.
¹⁸ Hobsbaum E. Natsii i Natsionalism posle 1780 [Nations and Nationalism after 1780], St. 
²⁰ Nozhenko M., Yargmoskaja N. op. cit, p. 130.
²¹ Ibid, p. 131.
²² Giddens A. The Nation as Power-Container, in: Hunchinson J. and A. Smith (eds.). Na-
other words, Giddens believes that nation emerges only when a state of a special type appears, that is a national one. Correspondingly, one could not exist without the other, and the nation-state possesses the monopolistic right to set up the rules, laws and rights on its territory.23

(3) The third element of the mechanism for identity building is closely connected with the two previous issues of establishing the boundaries between “we” and “other” and unification. This element is successful communication, which in the view of Karl Deutsch depends not so much on knowledge of a particular spoken or written language as it does on the common living context. Deutsch was the first who analyzed communication as one of the primary characteristics of national identity.24 Under a common living context certain “common knowledge” is understood, which is distributed throughout the territory. Local and mass media play an important part in disseminating this “common” information. In the case of establishing boundaries between “we” and “other”, individuals are differentiated into groups of those who belong to the “we-community” and those who do not. But the common living context brings together all smaller communities into a larger “ours”. In other words, a common living context is a summary of all concepts and values contained the “we-community”. Undoubtedly, positive views of self-description then dominate in the masses of people with these representations of a larger common living context as it becomes the basis for a “sense of prestige”.

(4) The first sociologist who described the connection between a sense of prestige and the identification of a certain community was Max Weber.25 He paid attention to cultivating the self-significance of a “community” by means of cultivating its definitive characteristics.26 People would want to identify themselves with a certain community, he thought, if belonging to this community is considered prestigious. Alternatively, if identifying oneself with a certain community is not “profitable”, an alternative identity will be required.

A number of authors following Weber stressed the problem of connections between a sense of prestige and building one’s political and cultural identity. Patriotism was defined as the main vehicle for developing the sense of prestige. Patriotism can therefore be seen as one of the major prerequisites for the stable existence of a political community. This patriotism is “introduced” into mass-national consciousness through the creation of common myths, symbols, a shared history, etc. Now, like before, a significant part in this is played by political elites who broadcast “common” information about the so-called “myths”, “legends”, etc.27

As has already been mentioned, in this paper specific attention is paid to the issue of identity-building through the contrasting of “we” and “other”. Europe in this case is seen as a “Significant Other” in comparison to the identity being built in post-Soviet Russia. The main research method to test this is discourse analyses of political texts. Elements analysed are Presidential Addresses to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation28 in 1994 – 2006 and records of some State Duma plenary sessions.29

23 Ibid, p. 35.
26 Ibid, p. 25.
27 For a more detailed account of how patriotic feelings are developed see Hobsbaum E., op. cit.
28 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly is a special annual speech of the RF President addressing members of the State Duma and the Council of Federation. In this address the president analyses the results of the previous activities and determines the prospects of the domestic and foreign policy for the next year. The Presidential Address is broadcast live on the national television and is covered in printed mass media; thus, it becomes an important subject of the public discussion both within the political elite and the society.
29 First of all, the records of those plenary sessions are analysed, that concerned the relationship between Russia and the EU, as for instance, the record of the discussion on the EU Eastern enlargement on January 24, 2003.
Identity in Russia

The end of the Cold War forced the Russian authorities to rethink their foreign policy in general and the new Russia’s role in the international community in particular. The breakup of the bipolar world once again led to the issue of re-defining “friends” and “enemies”. One of the vital problems that the leaders of new Russia had to respond to was determining Russia’s place on the global scene as well as Russia’s “Europeanness”. As stated by Sergey Karaganov, the “relationship with Europe will continue to define Russia’s self-identity”. Therefore, the discussion on Russia’s belonging in or ties to Europe is one of the central issues of identity policy that Russia pursues.

However, it is necessary to mention that the very concept of “Europe”, considered in the Russian context, is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, Europe is seen by international political actors as a certain cultural unity, in which Russia is an essential part. Thus, in 1987 while developing the concept of the “Common European house”, Mikhail Gorbachov declared: “We are Europeans”. Ten years later, President Boris Yeltsin said that “without Russia and, particularly, in spite of it, no one in Europe has been able to establish an effective system of common security”. This perception of Russia has also more recently been underlined by Igor Ivanov, who at the time held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs: “For us, being part of Europe, the common fates of Russia and Europe, and the necessity of the closest possible partnership with the European countries are axiomatic”. Finally, President Vladimir Putin, while speaking during St. Petersburg’s 300-yr. anniversary festivities, said: “It is here in St. Petersburg that we can clearly see that Russia – both historically and culturally – is an essential part of Europe”.

On the other hand, representatives of the political elite often make references to the geographic position of Russia, which makes it a part of Europe (thus, the Ural Mountains become an important symbol that separates European Russia from its Eastern part with Europe being referenced as a geographic category). As Alexey Arbatov states, “a ‘peculiarity’ of Russia is not in its being a mysterious mixture of Europe and Asia, nor in its historical role of being either a bridge or a barrier between the two civilizations. In contrast, the unique national qualities [of Russia]… are mainly the product of its historical development as a European nation and state, situated in a particular way”.

Finally, the same speeches with which the Russian Federation interacts define Europe as a political unit. The important part to highlight here is the role played by differences and similarities between Europe and the West. Russia is perceived as a part of the European world, but not of a Western one.

As shown by Vjacheslav Morozov, “The West represents some sort of a destructive force, which is permanently trying to upset the European balance”, which leads to the case when “the West is seen as an active source, while Europe is seen as something passive, a ‘playground’ for diplomatic struggle and armed opposition”. In Russian foreign policy, this difference between Europe and the West can be traced when analyzing the relation-
ship between Russia and the EU, and also NATO, which are presented accordingly as “we” and “other”. Here is a typical example from a speech of Yeltsin which illustrates this idea: “It is worrisome that certain forces in the West are trying to re-group the influences in the Euro-Atlantic region, which might lead to Russia’s isolation”. 38 Besides, as noted by Arbatov, “We need to understand that under the present situation in the European continent every possible development in relationships between Russia and the European Union (not just economic and political ones, but also military at some point) is the main and most important alternative to NATO as well as the basis for new European security and the major obstacle for NATO’s further expansion to the East”. 39

In general, the process of constructing national and personal identity in post-Soviet Russia can be contingently divided into two stages, and for each of these some kind of discourse towards Europe is typical. The first one is the discourse of partnership, which dominated during Yeltin’s presidency. Partnership was seen as a “key characteristic[s] of the relationship between Russia and other countries” 40 and this was understood as making efforts to dialogue and co-operation between equal actors. On the level of discourse, Russia was treated as an inherent part of Europe, of historical European civilization, which gave it a right to pursue its domestic and international policies based on partnership and co-operation. “It is in Russia’s vital interest to see a flourishing big Europe without any borderlines — old and new […] The first summit of the ‘European

Three’ including Russia, Germany, and France gave a new impulse towards a unified Europe”. 41 In addition to this, Russia has been pictured as an equal partner in all official diplomatic processes in Europe, and to the international community which considers Russia to be a cultural unity and geographical category, to be included in its borders.

The discourse of partnership was officially secured and adopted through signing a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in June 1994. It was signed by the heads of states and governments of the EU members, the Head of the European Commission and the President of Russia. It came into force on December 1, 1997 and was foreseen for a ten year period with a possible prolongation. 42 The Agreement officially declared Russia and the EU as strategic partners (Article 1) acting in the interests of international concord and security and pursuing such goals as strengthening the political, economic, commercial and cultural ties (Paragraphs 2–0 of the Agreement). Besides that, the Agreement institutionalized the mechanisms of dialogue between Russia and the EU: a permanent Partnership Council at the ministerial level for discussing specific issues, a Committee of Parliamentary Co-operation at the level of legislatures, as well as Summits of Heads of States and Governments, which take place twice a year.

The signing of the Agreement in 1994 was seen by politicians and experts, on the one hand, as a serious step towards true integration of Russia and Europe, and as a turn “towards brand new relations between former enemies in the Cold War”. 43 Indeed, the

38 Poslanie Presidenta Rossijskoj Federatsii Federal’nomu Sobraniju Rossijskoj Federatsii [Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly], in: Rossijskaja gazeta 24.02.1996.


41 Yeltzin B. Poslanie Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federatsii Borisа Yeltzina Federal’nomu Sobraniju Rossijskoj Federatsii [Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly], in: Rossijskaja gazeta 11.03.1999.

42 In April 2004 it was resolved to include the ten new members of the EU into the Agreement, and in June 2006 a decision on prolongation was made up till the signing of a new Agreement.

43 Conceptija modernizatsii Soglashenaja o Partnerstve i Sotrudnichestve mezhdu Rossieй i ES i sakluchenaja Soglashenija o prodvinutom partnerstve, uchrezhdajushem asotsiatsiju [Conception of modernization of Agreement on partnership and cooperation and conclusion and agreement on advanced partnership established associations].

Agreement defines the basic principles and goals of partnership between Russia and the EU, as well as the spheres in which active co-operation takes place. Giving his evaluation of the signing, President Yeltsin said that Russia had signed “a unique in terms of width and depth the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union”. Further, every presidential speech connected with relations between Russia and the EU mentions a mutually beneficial basis for the relationship. When discussing the signing of the Agreement, State Duma members stressed its significance: “The general sense of this step is that it takes us on the same level of relations that exists within Europe”. As noted by Vekselberg, vice-president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, “The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement from the very beginning served its goal of developing closer ties between Russia and the EU giving an opportunity to improve our economic co-operation”.

Another significant achievement of the Agreement was the establishment of special partnership institutions, which allow for the coordination of diverse viewpoints of the parties involved and to achieve agreement in the major issues of co-operation. However, the experts often point out the fact that the existing institutions do not carry out their main function, which was given to them at the moment of the Agreement signing; that is, to speed up the process of integration between Russia and Europe.

Thus, in general, the Agreement raises many questions and often causes dissatisfaction rather than approval. It is often stressed that by signing the document Russia made a number of concessions in favour of the EU; in particular Article 15 of the Agreement, which stipulates that Russian legislation be brought in accordance with EU norms. Besides this, some of the wording of the Agreement caused an ambiguous reaction. The preamble of the Agreement several times defines Russia as a “country with a transitional economic system”, which is on its way towards completing “political and economic reforms”. At the same time, the EU is pictured as a sort of “Big Brother”, which is ready to “provide […] technical assistance in carrying out economic reforms in Russia”. We have to admit now that there is discontent with such a perception of Russia, which became visible only in the 2000s. Until that time, members of parliament paid closer attention to the political and economic aspects of the ratified Agreement. Thus, Russian liberal “Yabloko” party representative Vladimir Lukin noted that “as a result of the Agreement ratification, our trade and economic ties with Europe have reached a better level than those with the USA. That is the essence of the Agreement”. But ten years later, when discussing the prospects of signing a new Agreement, Andrey Klimov, Head of the Subcommittee on European Co-operation of the State Duma Committee of International Affairs, titled his article “Europe is Our


47 Soglashenie o partnerstve i sotrudnichestve, uchrezhdajush’ee partnerstvo mezhdu Rossijskoj Federatsijey, s odnoj storony, i Evropejskimi soobshhestvami i ih gosudarstvami-chlenami, s drugoj storony [Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Establishing a Partnership between the European Communities and Their Member States, on the One Part, and the Russian Federation, on the Other Part], www.delrus.ccc.eu.int/rp/p. 318.htm.
49 Stenogramma zasedanija..., 18.10.1996, op. cit.
Partner – Not a Mentor”, with the latter concept more compatible with the prevailing mood in the mid-1990s.

However, one must admit that until the 2000s the relationship between Russia and Europe was inconsistent, notwithstanding the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. As experts insist, “Despite the multi-fold increase of contacts on the individual level among citizens and economic subjects, a qualitative rapprochement has never taken place”.

Thus, some of the reasons for turning to a partnership discourse between Russia and the EU in the mid-1990s seem obvious. As noted before, Russian leadership had to review the definitions, as did many other countries, of “friends” and “enemies”, after the end of the bi-polar Cold War stand-off. As well, Russia had to adjust its foreign policy in a situation when its superpower status had been lost. This combined with a serious crisis inside the country, which affected the lives of all Russians in the first decade of this new stage of independence. As noted by Alexey Bogaturov, “On the international scene he [Yeltsin] had a certain ‘inferiority complex’ of someone who is unable to conduct an equal dialogue with the more successful leaders of other countries. Hence, his impromptu speeches, an overly familiar behavior towards his negotiations and summits partners as well as a seeming lack of motives in his concessions and the declarative nature of his foreign policy”.

In other words, the open door to a partnership discourse allowed Russian leaders to compensate for problems in both foreign and domestic policies, as well as to “justify” the signed agreements and treaties.

Certain changes in the relationship between Russia and the EU appeared with Vladimir Putin’s entrance to political power in 2000. On the one hand, it was only then that Russia’s approach – EU summits, as foreseen in the Agreement, began to function. On the other hand, experts on both sides began to notice a growing tension in relations, which can be traced both in failures to carry out accepted obligations, as well as in a lack of understanding of the strategic goals of this particular partnership. The very concept of that “strategic partnership” nowadays is seen as dubious or at least as hopelessly ambiguous.

The shift in the relationship between Russia and the EU in the early 2000s led to changes in identity discourse in Russia. The discourse of “partnership” was gradually substituted for the discourse of “pragmatism”: relations with the EU have become based on coordination of mutual economic and political interests. As President Putin says, “Russia must pursue its foreign policy based on a clear definition of its national priorities, pragmatism and economic benefit”. When discussing the possible benefits and drawbacks of the EU’s Eastern enlargement plans, State Duma members came to a conclusion that, “we have gotten used to being passionately opposed to NATO enlargement while simultaneously welcoming the enlargement of the EU without clearly realizing that it is EU enlargement that is going to have a direct influence on Russian economic interests and will affect them negatively”.

The first indication of the shift in discourse to pragmatism can be traced in the Russian government’s “Strategy for Development of the Russian Federation’s Relations with the European Union from a Mid-Term Perspective (2000–2010)”.

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50 Klimov A. Evropa – nash partner, a ne uchitel’. Vazhno, chtoby eto ponimali ne tol’ko v Rossii [Europe is Our Partner, Not a Mentor. It Is Important to Be Understood Not Only in Russia]. www.russia-today.ru/2006/no_22/22_Europe.htm.
51 Rossija i Evropa..., op. cit.
55 Stenogramma zasedanija..., 24.01.2003, op. cit.
56 Russian Strategy towards the EU was a sort of a response to the 1999 EU Strategy towards Russia, which was criticized in Russia because it did not take into account Russia’s interests and needs.
goals of the Strategy were defined as “protecting the national interests and prestige of Russia in Europe and the rest of the world through establishing a solid all-European system of collective security, which brings in the Russian context of economic and managerial experience of the European Union in order to assist in the development of Russia’s socially-oriented market economy”.

The document stresses that “as a world power which lies on two continents, Russia has to secure the freedom of defining and pursuing its foreign and domestic policy, its status and the advantages of being a Euro-Asian country and the biggest CIS state, and the independence of its position and activities within international organizations”. Thus, the Strategy clearly defines Russia’s ambition for maximum utilization of EU facilities while simultaneously pursuing its own domestic and foreign policy aims.

It is also important to point out that unlike in the previous phase Russia no longer positions itself as an integral part of a “united Europe”. On the contrary, the discourse space more and more has started to stress marking out Russia’s existing borders. Russia is defined as an independent and self-reliant state with unique values, norms and traditions: “For quite a while we have been choosing whether to rely on foreign advice, assistance and credits, or to move forward relying on ourselves. The only true choice for Russia is the choice for a strong country, strong and confident in its own strength. Strong, not despite the international community, not opposed to other powerful states, but alongside of them”. Partly, this shift in discourse can be explained by the transformation of Russia’s identity policy, in which Europe is now defined not as part of a “we-community”, but as a “significant other”. In his 2004 Presidential Address, Putin noted that “Russia and the EU now have common borders. We have to strive for the EU enlargement to bring us closer together not just geographically, but also economically”.

Simultaneously, the perception of Europe has changed as well. Unlike in the previous period, Europe is now defined not as a cultural unity, but as a geographic category limited by the borders of its member states, as well as its political mission. Europe is seen as one of Russia’s “neighbours”, in the same manner as its “neighbours” to the East. The relations with the EU and its member states are therefore now based on the simple necessity of making economic and political agreements with “neighbours”; that is, on pragmatic principles. And this is the essential difference of the period from the previous one, in which Russia was considered as an integral part of Europe, as geographically coherent unit, not highlighting the existing political borders. Besides, the Euro-Asian position of Russia is now seen as an advantage, a reason for distancing itself from “European civilization”: “The civilizing mission of the Russian nation on the Euro-Asian continent has to be continued... so that democratic values multiplied with national interests enrich and strengthen our historical community”.

The Eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 called for a review of EU policies towards its neighbouring states. The new concept of EU foreign policy was named “Wider Europe”, or “Neighbourhood Policy”. On how it is applied to Russia, it was stressed that the “neighbourhood policy” would be just one aspect of a partnership. But this approach caused discontent with the Russian authorities.

58 Ibid.
as it put Russia on the same level as all other former Soviet states. Specifically, it has repeatedly been said that in its foreign policy Russia is not going to refer mainly to the European Union, but also to the USA, China and other countries. This state of affairs was consolidated in all major documents on Russia’s foreign policy during Putin’s presidential period. And it was reproduced in the concept of foreign policy that was approved on July 12th, 2008. This document particularly states that the distinctive feature of Russian foreign policy is “its balanced and multi-vector character. It is predetermined by the geopolitical position of Russia as one of the largest Eurasian states with a status as one of the leading states in the world”.

The St. Petersburg EU-Russian summit in May 2003 marked the transfer to selective co-operation based on several spheres of interaction. A decision was made to define four common spaces, within which co-operation would be most intensive and effective. Besides this, the participants agreed developing so-called “roadmaps” for these four spaces, which would reflect the major spheres and mechanisms of co-operation. The processing of the documents took two years, and it was only in May 2005 during the Moscow EU-Russian summit, when a document package was signed under the common title “Roadmaps for Four Common Spaces”. “Roadmaps” consists of four independent documents, in which each of them defines a certain sphere of co-operation.

The first roadmap deals with common economic space, where the goal of co-operation is defined as establishing an open, integrated market between Russia and the EU, which includes demolishing barriers which prevent the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor force. The second roadmap is devoted to the common space of freedom, security and justice and is based upon the principle of equality between partners and respect towards international legal norms and human rights. The main mechanisms for this road-

map are defined as co-operation in the legal sphere and observance of all ratified international conventions, as well as close interaction among law enforcement bodies. The common space of external security is the subject of the third roadmap. It is aimed at promoting co-operation in the spheres of foreign policy and international security that would assist in dealing with international crises and in helping to prevent conflicts. Finally, the fourth roadmap deals with the spheres of research, education and culture. Its main goal to develop closer ties in the sphere of scientific research, education and cultural contacts through the implementation of exchange programs that promote common values and serve to strengthen the competitive abilities of both the Russian and EU economies.

The ratification of the roadmaps met with an ambiguous attitude on the part of Russian analysts. On the one hand, it was stated that the roadmaps have brought the relations between Russia and the EU to a new level. As described by Jury Borko, “There is much criticism towards the roadmaps from those calling them a “declaration of intentions”, and nothing more. I cannot agree with that. In my opinion, this is the most important document signed by Russia and the EU since signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. It partly compensates for that outdated agreement”.

On the other hand, a large number of publications in the Russian mass media contain a negative view of these documents. “The declared goal of specifying the concept of ‘common spaces’ has never been achieved”, writes Danilov. “Basically, Russia and the EU have just listed the already existing or potentially possible co-operation projects. From that point of view, these documents represent a declaration of intentions”. The roadmaps “have neither practical nor legal

62 Konceptcija vneshnej politiki Rossi [Conception of Russian Foreign Policy], 12.07.2008. www.ln.mid.ru/ru-osn/doc/10e10272be4a2420743256c630042d1aa/d48737161a0be944-c32574870048d817.


64 Danilov D. Dorozhnye karty, vedush’ie v nikuda [Road Maps Leading Nowhere], in: Nezavisimaja gazeta 24.05.2005.
significance”. Karaganov claims. Indeed, it is worth noticing that none of the roadmaps defines specific mechanisms or means of fulfilling the stated goals. At this moment, there is no document that specifies and clarifies the propositions stated there. Thus, the obligations accepted by the parties have a purely declarative character.

Signing the “roadmaps” affected the identity policies conducted in Russia. As has already been mentioned, this period is the beginning for Europe being interpreted as one of Russia’s partners, along with its Asian partners. Moreover, Russia is positioned as an equal participant in bilateral relations, having its own interests: “the partnership is possible only on a basement of rights equality, without any attempts of dividing roles in into ‘leader – follower’ scheme [...] The main condition is that all natural, absolutely clear and legitimate interests of Russia, resulting from its history and geography, must be respected”. Remarkably, the geographical position of Russia becomes an important factor, legitimizing the ambition of Russia to widen the zone of its influence. “In the world of today, Russia should objectively integrate parts of the world, first of all, the post-Soviet space, and then ‘the world of nationals’ around it and its project of future”.

As of yet, we have to admit that the relations between Russia and the EU are still in a state of uncertainty. None of the involved parties is capable of defining the goals of positive co-operation clearly. The only principle that has been transmitted for the past 15 years is a lack of ambition for Russia to enter the EU: “in spite of its belonging to European civilization, merely joining Russia to the integrated European project of the EU is objectively impossible”. Nevertheless, both parties have expressed their desire for further co-operation, and to establish effective mechanisms of integration, simultaneously emphasizing just four major spheres (mentioned above).

At the same time, the identity policy pursued by the Russian authority is characterized today with the dominant principle of pragmatism, which is also based on stressing the priority of national interests in its foreign policy. The current state of affairs can partly be explained by the stabilizing situation inside the country and the recovery of Russia’s international status. As shown by Bogaturov, President Putin in his foreign policy “displays restraint and tries to build his own model of conduct playing the part of a ‘quiet determined person’. He never openly challenges [...] but takes the necessary steps, in his point of view, without considering a possible protest on the part of countries in the West”. Accession to power of the new President Dmitry Medvedev has not changed Russia’s identity policy considerably, but has rather maintained its adherence to a pragmatic approach.

The shifting configuration of nation-states on the international scene has turned out to be an important factor, which is converts relationships into a new models of partnership as well. On one hand, the enlargement of the EU has forced a revision of the existing mechanisms of making partnerships with Russia. The problem of security provision has become more significant in how the two actors are correlated. On the other hand, the strengthening of Russia’s position in the world due to its participation in the Anti-Terrorist Coalition, the Group of Eight national summits, the Middle-East Quartet and the Six Nations, has led to further integration with
parts of the world that it had little contact during the Cold War. Russia has chosen a strategy of partnership with some EU countries in its foreign policy, rather than with the structures of the EU themselves, and adopted this mechanism in asserting its geo-political position.

**Conclusion**
Research conducted has shown that relations between Russia and the European Union affect the identity policies pursued by the governing Russian political elite. Meanwhile, the model of correlation between the two actors depends mostly on the situation inside Russia. Thus, during the 1990s when Russia needed to continue adjusting to its new status in the international community and to gain support from strategically important states, the discourse of partnerships has allowed some smoothing over of existing problems and disagreements through the declaration of equality and unity. In the early 2000s with the state’s strengthening, however, Russia’s foreign policy towards the EU has changed. As a consequence, the discourse of identity has changed as well. Pragmatism has been assigned the primary importance for Russia’s national interests and it emphasizes Russia’s existing boundaries.

From this day forward, Europe ceases to be part of a “we-community” and has begun acting the part of a “Significant Other”. Identity policies in contemporary Russia are being built based on comparing and contrasting it with Europe.
Interpersonal Trust as Following the Rule: Methodological Contingencies and Some Empirical Evidences from Russia and the EU

Timirkhan Alishev

Trust is a popular research subject within various disciplines of the social sciences. In most of them it is studied as a normative phenomenon that exists as far as a given society has strictly defined its system of norms and values. Moreover, little difference is made between trust as a verbally manifested attitude of an actor (i.e. human person) and the practice of nonreflexive trust in everyday activities. I argue that the reformulation of the concept of trust is in demand as it will lead to its reoperationization for empirical researches. Trust should not be approached as if it is based on some kind of norm. Instead, trust should be seen as an everyday collective practice that is grounded in past experiences and embedded in the ongoing and frequently unreflective episodes of social and physical interaction.

In the article I analyze some of the theoretical problems and methodological contingencies with which contemporary studies of trust are faced and tested to learn some empirical and phenomenological implications. The article begins with a description of the normative approach to social action, which quite often serves as a point of departure for a variety of interpretations of trust when considered as a cultural phenomenon. This tradition is criticized as being ill-suited for capturing the essence of human agency. After that I introduce another approach which is not based on an understanding of social action as normatively determined or defined, but which considers action as pragmatic.

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1 The main parts of the article were written while I was a PhD student at Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara. I am grateful to Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window Programme that provided financing for my study as well as to METU sociology department that created really auspicious atmosphere for fruitful research.
and relative to improvisation and manipulation with discursive meanings. I discuss at considerable length the pragmatic practice of constructing behavioural narratives, which facilitates sense-making and legitimization of social action. This understanding of social action is utilized to reconceptualise trust as a meta-practice. In what follows, I examine both approaches as well as their methodological implications using examples from empirical studies of trust from Russia and the EU. In these areas, trust nowadays is frequently mentioned as being a significant phenomenon, potentially able to influence the rise of overall social performance and governance efficiency.

**Normative Theory of Trust**

Over the past thirty years, a growing interest in trust as an aspect of social reality can be observed in different disciplines within the social sciences. Trust is a topic of value for social psychologists who study the formation and functioning of small groups, as well as actor’s subjective orientations at the micro-level. Philosophers also address trust. For them it is a relevant ethical and existential notion. Trust is studied by economists as either the result of rational calculation of risks and commitments, or as lubrication, which makes it easier to overcome what economists call “market failures”. Political scientists are carried away by the term “trust” and approach it as an important component of political culture: it is assumed that the presence of trust leads to wider political participation and improved democratic control over governmental activities. Though trust is emphasized in many disciplines, the pace for studies of trust is undoubtedly set by sociologists, which is quite understandable. The study of trust for them is analogous to an attempt to justify the very existence of their subject and to answer the question “How is society possible?”

The variation in approaches to trust can be explained by at least two reasons. First, the presence of a variety of social scientific disciplines is more due to academic division of labour than it is to observable differences in social reality. Therefore, researchers quite often share interests in similar aspects of human behaviour; they simply consider it with slightly different perspectives. Secondly, trust is a social phenomenon, but at the same time it is a part of the private lives of individuals, including their intimate experiences. And this assertion is true as well for the researchers whose theories about trust are greatly influenced by their own personal perceptions of everyday life and social reality.

Despite the apparent subjectivity and situational specificity of trust, there is in sociology a number of attempts currently underway to depict it as a social phenomenon which can be studied using scientific terms. I will therefore start with a brief discussion of some basic elements of trust and will mention some of its typical definitions.

There are three main components of trust. The role of each of them varies depending on the context within which interaction featuring trust is taking its course. The cognitive component includes perception of the self, perception of other participants in trusting interaction and its circumstances, as well as expectations of a certain type of behaviour from the partner. The emotional component offers an affective assessment of the interacting parties and of the process of interaction itself. The behavioural component involves individual practices and actions, in which trust is manifested, conducted in respect of him- or herself or in respect of their relationship partners.

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2 Simmel laid down this question in terms of modern social science though its hallmarks can be traced to the Hobbesian problem of social order and the Kantian system of ethical imperatives, Simmel G. How is Society Possible? in: The American Journal of Sociology 16 (3), 1910, p. 372-391.

3 However, scholars of some social scientific disciplines have long been trying to draw a demarcation line between the “spheres” of social reality. For example, economics in its classical tradition has long ignored the existence of some obvious and even trivial characteristics of everyday social interactions.

The majority of authors taking upon themselves the challenging task of formulating a definition of trust try in varying degrees to include in it references to all three of these components. Here is an example of one typical definition of trust: “Trust is an expectancy of positive (or nonnegative) outcomes that one can receive based on the expected action of another party in an interaction characterized by uncertainty”. This description of trust embraces a reference to the emotional component associated with hope for a positive or “good” outcome. One will also notice a behavioural aspect manifested in the acceptance or anticipation of a certain course of action. The role of the cognitive component here is the largest: the term “expectancy” implies the existence of information upon which an actor can make some conclusions about the intentions of an action partner. The term “uncertainty” introduces the idea of fundamental scarcity of food or resources or the lack of properly functioning human cognitive capabilities. It is this very scarcity that ultimately makes trust one of the most essential elements of day-to-day interactions and also one of the most difficult to pin down.

The characteristic feature of nearly all sociological definitions is highlighting the cognitive component of trusting relations as the most essential one. Thus, Diego Gambetta in his definition, which has already become classical, insisted that trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) “is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action”. In light of such a view, the phrase “level of subjective probability” is one that implicitly assumes the capability of trusting individuals to accomplish rather intelligent cognitive analyses of their current circumstances and to make rather conscious subjectively rational decisions.

Francis Fukuyama’s popular definition of trust refers to normativity, that is, to its dependence on concrete rules of conduct that are prevalent in a society. He accounts for trust as an expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperatively behaving people, based on shared norms. The normativity of trust implies cognitive capacities in no less degree than pragmatic calculation. To solve the conflict of norms, the interpretation of rules and their adaptation to the current context of interaction requires some serious heuristic endeavours from an actor. Fukuyama argues that “norms can be about deep ‘value’ questions like the nature of God or justice, but they also encompass secular norms like professional standards and codes of behaviour”.

Thus, Fukuyama suggests approaching trust as a distinctive feature inherent in interactions that emerge in circumscribed types of societies. This characteristic is present in most interactions among actors, including their shared values and similar normative representations with some kind of “local knowledge”. Eventually, trust becomes an institutionalized element of culture.

In an institutional context and in the sense of functionality for the whole social system, trust becomes more than just a personal attitude. Rather, it is an orientation typical for a community that is being socially objectified and which exerts pressure on the conduct of social actors. Such a type of trust can be called “cultural” or, in Durkheim’s terms, a “social fact” that, because it is trusted, affects individual behaviour. It is important to mention that in this account, the question of the degree of an actor’s prag-


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Matism in trusting behaviour is being overshadowed, or rather, it is being well integrated into a corresponding theoretical framework. The very idea of rationality can always be attributed to normative systems because actors subjectively recognize the fact that trust is a rational and justified strategy while making evaluations. Almost any decision to trust or not to trust that is embedded in social arrangements and individuals' day-to-day interactions, is therefore due to following a rule which states that certain types of trust schemes be enacted.

Piotr Sztompka suggests the concept of a "trust culture" embraces the conditions under which, regardless of any rational calculation or psychological characteristics, individuals are not only predisposed but also culturally influenced to trust their community, their regime, formal or informal organizations, institutions, fellow citizens, as well as to show optimism concerning their own life chances and opportunities. A "trust culture" is defined by Sztompka as one of the crucial factors of democratizing formal institutional systems and practices of everyday life. Thus, its presence will presumably lead to the successful development of society both socially and economically.

A similar guess is made by Robert Putnam, while he is pointing to the key role of trust in the process of establishing voluntary associations. It is assumed that voluntary participation, at least in theory, has a great impact on the democratization of political and civic space and as a result contributes to the production of even more trust. What remains to be seen is how trust is actualised comparatively in and between associations and those that are not voluntary, but rather part of the economy of wages and salaries. How much can we trust volunteers in comparison to paid workers?

Such an interpretation of trust, of course, is extremely convenient because it allows for a functional, comparative and systems analysis to be performed at the level of political and social structures of large societies. If trust is interrelated with various elements of one's "cultural value system" then it allows us to make theoretical conclusions about specific socio-political trends and lets us explain particular events and developments of social processes simply by referring to changes in the correlation or regression models. It is worth noting that such a treatment of trust completely corresponds to conventional methods of empirical research: polls and interviews.

Unfortunately, methodological conveniences have nothing to do with the connection between research results and the real features of people's everyday social interactions. Very frequent bias to the ungrounded simplification of trust is attributed to the widely shared scientific representation and theoretical conceptualization of individual action in sociology. In the next section we will briefly describe the traditional approach to social action which is widespread in sociology.

**Traditional Interpretation of Social Action**

Every social theory, as a generalization of social facts, includes a series of assumptions concerning the nature and mechanisms of realizing social action. This is due to the fact that any macro-level conception becomes meaningless and loses its scientific value if it does not include statements about micro-events of social reality.

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12 Sometimes this approach is mentioned just as the peculiarity of "methodological individualism", although in my view it should not be considered as approach at all, rather it is principle which should be inherent in entirely all social theories. See Elster J. Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 13.
demic tradition to count human-social action as rational and reasonable, and to not that it is associated with conscious and deliberate activities performed by actors who seek to reach intended goals and effectively use existing resources. The means and goals that are chosen by actors are different and may be subject to the influence of ongoing changes in social and cultural contexts. However, the very model of interpreting human activity is quite the same: at first an actor fixes the desired result; then he or she looks for the available means which are appropriate to achieve it.

One of the most prominent examples of speculating about social action in such a way is by Talcott Parsons, for example, in his “Structure of Social Action”. The basic category of theorizing for Parsons is a “unit act” which is a fact, i.e., existing if and only if there is a minimum number of terms that can be applied to it. In his model there are agents, who are actors themselves; an end – a future state of affairs toward which the process of action is oriented; a situation which consists of conditions, over which the actor has no control; and the means over which he has powers. And there is also an actor’s normative orientation – which entails a certain mode of relationship between all these elements.

In Parsons’ scheme, the meaning of “action” is contained in an actor’s normative orientation, which is defined as an existing sentiment that something simply is an end in itself, i.e. “regardless of its status as a means to any other end”. Cultural values appear to be ultimate orientations towards which many actions strive. The potential destinations of these cultural orientations are the main guides of activity in many cases. But despite the seeming importance of value systems taken together as a theoretical framework, including current culturally defined sets of meanings and ends, Parsons described them overly abstractly. He did not operationalize them, using specific indicators that could help subsequent researchers to fix some precise ideologies or doctrines as legitimate sets of values. Values for Parsons are globally immanent and inherent in each cultural system (as well as in all social actions). Eventually, values determine why people choose their goals, and why they act in one way toward them rather than another.

In this way traditional value systems do not themselves appear to be subjects for scientific consideration. They receive some attention from researchers only to the extent that they somehow affect social action. The objectivity and stability of circumscribed systems of values and norms are assumed as a matter of course.

Pursuant to Parsons, the subjective individual scheme of an action, besides being enacted, has to be verbalized or at least formulated and understood before an activity’s initiation. This means that for action to be identified as social and consequently as a matter of sociological analysis, an actor is obliged to draw up a verbal and/or mental model of an act before its implementation in which the goals are defined, the most effective means are described, and controllable and uncontrollable situational factors are determined. Moreover, the actor has to be able to elaborate those norms and values a priori in accordance with how he is acting at the moment, while also acknowledging their influence on the process of defining the means and goals of the behaviour being performed. As a result, “in terms of a given conceptual scheme there is no such thing as action except as an effort to conform to norms”.

Robert Merton later developed a more detailed conceptual nexus between values as ideal cultural objectives and means to ends as institutionalized norms of conduct. He tried to eliminate

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13 Conventional understanding of rationality assumes that the goals of rational actors are purely materialistic. As a matter of fact, however, they can be quite different: beginning with acquiring someone’s friendship, continuing with achieving academic recognition, and ending with receiving approval or similarly avoiding ostracism from an established community.


15 Ibid, p. 75.

16 Parsons T., op. cit., p. 76.
the inconsistencies of Parsons’ approach to analysing social action by elaborating on five, well-known, diverse, adaptive strategies. However, difficulties were rather exacerbated than resolved by this. In particular, Merton did not explain why an actor chooses specific strategies to adapt, over again, thus embedding the value orientations into his or her compulsory cultural patterns. “[T]he prevailing goals comprise a frame of aspirational reference”, according to Merton. “They are the things ‘worth striving for’.”

It follows that culture shapes action and determines individual wishes. This is perhaps the essence of the traditional approach: it is not interested in an individual’s concrete actions, but rather in his or her normative orientations, that is in their norms and goals. However, it should be recognized that such an approach imposes upon actors these certain values and norms rather than necessarily advancing towards a better understanding of social behaviour. It is such values, that functionalism defines as goals, which become very apt for retrospective explanations or mere glosses of an actor’s behaviour. This is done by means of creating a meaningful semantic narrative for oneself, which is convenient for constructing one’s self-conception of a coherent Weltanschaung, an appropriate identity and a consistent idea of action. As a result of this approach, trust drifts away from the domain of agency to a domain of articulated narrative, since it is a phenomenon with connotations rigidly fixed in commonsense, which is used by actors to legitimize their conduct a posteriori using the elements of moral and normative discourse.

Social Action as Practice

Another approach to human action can be more fruitfully applied to the study of trust practices, implying a rejection that social action is grounded in a mythical “unit act” or conforms to a farfetched rule or norm. An individual’s actions are actually composed of much more complicated long-term strategies (in the sense of a way of organizing action rather than of consciously devising a plan to attain goals), often with vague and undetermined goals. Cultural factors affect these assemblages of actions not by defining goals, but rather by offering various opportunities and options for behavioural activity, from which strategies are designed. Actors rarely begin their actions from a “blank sheet” and thus make unitary efforts in which they use effective means for advancing toward identified goals. Often they just arrange a sequence of operations and initially construct and interpret some of the nexuses of practicing with a very general idea of the effects and results that are going to be achieved.

As Ann Swidler claims, culture consists of diverse and frequently conflicting myths, rituals, stories and practices. Culture is not a unified system of meanings which direct human action one way or another. It is a toolkit of instruments or a repertoire of variants of practices which are used by individuals in their everyday lives. Moreover, practices and modes of action are often more stable elements of culture than are verbally articulated goals.

In this context, goals and means that are conjectured to be elements in the structure of social action are exposed to fundamental reinterpretation. It can be argued that they are no more

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17 Namely these strategies are: conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion. See Merton R. Social Structure and Anomie, in: American Sociological Review 3 (5), 1938, p. 672-82.
20 The term “effective” is used herein in the sense of rational technological effectiveness (pragmatic interest) as well as in the sense effectiveness as reasonableness and intelligence (cultural norms). The question, what kind of efficiency is dominant in the process of human activity, in fact, has little scientific value because, eventually, none of the allegations giving preference to any of the senses can be either proved or disproved.
than discursively formulated entities that can exist as verbalized explanations of human actions consistent with individual perceptions of reality or as constructs that are created and operated by observers (scientists). These intellectual glosses created post factum usually tell us more about the content and normativity of common sense rather than about the real aspects of human practices and their conformity with the rules. Here, norms and values that are often invoked by actors and scientists to explain and account for goals and means of action are merely discursive elements of practices.

What we mean under the term “practice” can be described as the collective activity of individuals, a set of doings and sayings organized by a teleaffective structure. “Teleaffectivity” is the category used here following Theodore Schatzki.22 Practice is teleological because it is oriented toward some particular effects. Namely this orientation makes practices intrinsically coherent by the common logic of activity or social action. However, practices are not only pragmatic, but also affective to the extent in which they are exposed to the influence of emotions.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty occurs when someone is trying to explain the essence of relations between human activities and the idea of rules or norms prevailing in a given society. The tension arises among the taken for granted conception of certain regularities existing in social reality and the humanistic treatment of individual behaviour as something special and unique. Practices are indeed collective and shared in the sense that similar repertoires of activities are possessed and implemented by large number of people. Nearly all of us sit on a chair, drive a car, keep a pen in hand, walk on the streets and perform other types of activities in a very similar way. But at the same time, each of us is free to improvise and to create original, inimitable nuances of behaviour, so that we can never find two absolutely resembling handwritings or unmistakably recognize the gait which belongs to our nearest and dearest.

A similar toolkit of actions is thus utilized by large numbers of individuals because throughout their lives they are tutored and trained to perform specific types of practices in certain social arrangements and circumstances. Day after day in the ordinary regime of normal life people repeat after others and then themselves again and again reiterate ways of doing certain things by conducting bodily and discursive practices. And the kernel point is that individuals do not initially acquire some tacit knowledge expressed in rules and regulations, uttered or non-verbalized at all, which are further interpreted and enacted in social reality.

In most cases people act first and then only after that do they account for their actions by referring to meanings contained in institutions and common sense.

Training to perform certain practices and to learn tacit or explicit rules often appears in the form of narrative, but of its fulfilment is not the same thing. Using Michael Polanyi’s famous example it can be argued that being aware of the rules that explain how to ride a bicycle does not make an individual automatically able to ride a bicycle.23 However, once having been trained to ride it a posteriori an individual will be able to verbally articulate a lot of the rules that allegedly “helped” him or her and that can “help” others too. In addition, individuals are rarely able to describe the specific factors and conditions that affected the application of a specific rule of conduct rather than another one. “How am I able to obey a rule?” Wittgenstein asks, “if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: ‘This is simply what I do’”.24 Apparently, the


actual practice itself is the only referential system suitable for any and all institutionalized meanings and rules.

Roughly speaking, there are two kinds of practices – bodily corporeal and linguistic. Linguistic practices can, in turn, be divided into performatives, or what John Austin identified as “doing things by saying words”, and practices related to the description and justification of the individual. Separating norms and values from activities – i.e. ways of doing and saying – we get two domains: the domain of practices and the domain of discourse about practices, each of which can be studied relatively separate. This allows us to get rid of the inclination to view culture as a “black box” with meanings, wishes and preferences which the researcher can always refer to while explaining any unusual or unexpected way of acting that does not conform to conventions accepted by the majority or particularly by him or her.

It is important to bear in mind the frequently revealed incongruity between how people generally act and what they say about how they are going to act, how they are acting at a given moment, or how they acted in the past. Social actors quite rarely carry out a reflexive evaluation of their own behaviour. Research conducted by sociologists and economists apparently shows that a person, while realizing parallel activities in several directions, is restricted by the resources of their attention and cognitive abilities, and usually ignores those areas of activities that meet the basic requirements of efficiency and predictability and

that satisfy them. An actor rarely gives a verbal account of their everyday behaviour in those areas, and tends to rely on practices self-perceived by the actor and by people around as taken for granted. The actor, however, is increasingly focused on the activities carried out in uncertain and irregular environments. He or she wants primarily to control and adjust these areas and is making every effort to do so by evaluating and analysing possible strategies of action. These areas are, for example, the milieu of entrepreneurial or political activities.

The normal regime of everyday life rarely makes an actor eager to problematize the current context of action. Ordinary and usual daily practices are conducted as they were throughout the individual’s life or during a slightly shorter period of time. This is why the role of any verbally evaluated rules, norms or regulations, which seemingly affect the character of human activity, is minimal. And therefore explication and verbalization of the rules, following which practice is presumably performed, is indeed a very difficult task for the actor and, as it is claimed by ethnomethodologists, at times it causes the individual a great stress. Nevertheless, an account of actions sometimes still has to be given, and in most cases it is given retrospectively when the actor is forced to gloss over their past behaviour. Typical examples of such critical situations are found in any sociological survey or court trial.

Creating a Practice Narrative

The account of which actors are ready to exercise their action in critical situations consists of a wide range of institutionalized ideas and meanings available in human-social discourse. These

30 These areas are totally constituted by the process of public decision-making as a method of planning. However, some studies show that “decision-making” is nothing more than just a social representation and a way of legitimizing action strategies which were already created and tacitly accepted long before. See Laroche H. From Decision to Action in Organizations: Decision-Making as a Social Representation, in: Organization Science 6 (1), 1995, p. 62-75. Because of this, even official documents, describing legal procedures, sometimes can give us only a dim understanding of the reality of social practice.
meanings form a common sense or sometimes consist of a more rigorous set of formal institutions; they are reflected in specific laws, formally and informally regulated rules of behaviour, proverbs and sayings, dietician’s advice or the political doctrine of the governing party. As Theda Skocpol argues, “at any given time cultural idioms are drawn upon by concretely situated actors as they seek to make sense of their activities of themselves in relation to other actors".31

The very existence of informal institutions which are not supported by special organizations like government or business associations is due to practices collectively performed that can be explained by referring to these institutions. As David Bloor thoroughly insists, “the rule R, as an institution exists only in and through references to R, citing R, describing actions as instances of R, or as not being instances of R, or as attempts to follow R, or as failures to follow R, and so forth through the entire gamut of possible glosses".32 On the other hand, human-social practice may be meaningful and can be defined as such only if there is an appropriate institution which allows actors and people around them to identify the practice through reference.

Glosses over behaviour, in addition to being an essential attempt to explain the meaning of the practice to oneself and to others in terms of rule-following, still serve the important purpose of orientation and embedding action in common representations of social reality, as well as helping to identify and legitimate behaviour in the environment of others’ ongoing conduct. The practice of accounting for actions is a pragmatic process33 and the set of rules and meanings that can be manipulated by an actor to create the desired image of his or her conduct is very diverse. No wonder, for example, that in almost any national proverbs and sayings, we can find ones with quite opposite meanings.34 This makes it possible to eventually justify our actions in many ways. Actors can be very pragmatic while utilizing their senses; they can create coherent narratives which describe their behaviour and identity, while at the same time preserving the appearance of consistency and reasonableness of their actions.

When an individual is creating his or her own narrative, some requirements of “appropriateness”, “admissibility” and “intelligence” come into force, as well as the limitations arising from representations of self-identity. The very activity of verbalizing motives and goals has its own structure and it influences the choices of further behavioural strategies and their future interpretation. In the aftermath, narrative may become a part of identity and permanently affect one’s self-justification process.

Despite the aforementioned distinctions between practice and its description,35 in a nutshell, between what people say and what they do, there is a connection amid the two domains. In practices, an actor can improvise (meaning “intelligent” improvisation) and be original, modifying conventional commonplaces, but changes can be made only to the extent that the innovative practice can be described and identified by referring to an existing institution, i.e., justified by existing legitimate means of semantic descriptions.

Without justification in the form of a narrative that regards institutionalized meanings, practice constitutes an unconscious flow of everyday activity, which is performed in the context of ongoing social arrangements. Each interpretation of an ongoing practice is akin to “snatching” a single episode from the activity flow, structuring and describing it in terms of common sense or

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34 For instance, “a stitch in time saves nine” but “better late than never”; “he, who loses money, loses much; he who loses a friend, loses much more” but “God helps those who help themselves” or “you’re the architect of your own fortunes”, etc. And these are only English ones.
another semantic system. Every type of account given for behaviour – perspective or retrospective – mobilizes the ability for interpretation. This “snapshot”, based on general assumptions, whether conventional and relevant to widely accepted cultural narratives or to deviant ones, allows us to attribute the responsibility for actions and their consequences, explains the nexuses and logical order of events. It should be understood that no description of practice may be completely accurate and precise. The way people evaluate their actions depends on the meanings that are available for them. Therefore verbal evaluation is only a gross approximation, which does not fully consider the particular arrangements of daily practices.

The flow of activity of individuals is relatively constant, but rarely is it as constantly attended by verbal or even mental accounting practices. In most cases, actions are perceived by the involved actors, as well as by people around them as taken for granted and not requiring any deliberate explanation. Still, sometimes actors have to give account for their behaviour. This occurs particularly in high-risk situations when normal routine is disrupted.

One of the most striking instances of problematizing everyday life, when individuals are forced to evaluate and to give an account of their behaviour, is sociological surveys. Sociologists, studying the so-called “attitudes” and “cultural orientations” of individuals, ask interviewees to evaluate and to make some conclusions about their past actions and to make certain assumptions about the character of their future practices. The process of verbal explication, which sometimes just takes the form of creating a new meaning previously not articulated or even nonexistent, may be weakly related to the conduct being described. What sociologists frequently receive as a result of polls, if the answers to the questions are parts of common knowledge or what Pierre Bourdieu36 called “orthodoxy” – the dominant ideology, is a kind of narrative or a set of meaningful excerpts from semantic stories that are composed of “standard” judgments based on common sense. A narrative can also be composed of standpoints that are being created at that moment, though it may also consist of views that already exist in public discourse and are unrelated to the specific practices in concrete contexts. An articulated narrative maybe even a part of knowledge that is not usually necessary to be expressed verbally, what Bourdieu called “doxic knowledge” – knowledge taken-for-granted.

Depending on the degree of stability and normativity attributed to the bonds between these or other aspects of problematized practices and discursive meanings, actors as authors of accounts can have more or less freedom for improvising while evaluating their behaviour.

For example, for the purpose of studying the peculiarities of interactions between members of different nationalities, we can ask about preferences in inter-ethnic contacts using the scale of social distance developed by Emory Bogardus.37 But what we get in the end will be no more than a collective narrative,38 constructed by researchers on the basis of personal choices of each actor of a certain division on the scale made depending on the cultural standings39 which are spread in their community. It is more likely that the narrative will not reflect the real practices of everyday interactions between people because they in fact do not obey the abstract rules of conduct, which are difficult to apply without regress in regular life. What really matters is the bodily arrangements, interpersonal contacts and even physical circumstances that are inevitably actual and tangible and define the logic of practice.


Trust is not a practice in the sense in which I use this term here: a way of doing and saying. Furthermore, it cannot be reduced solely to its behavioural component, ignoring the cognitive and emotional aspects. But it is worth noting that in fact the only possible way for trust to manifest itself externally and for observers to fix it can only be through a certain kind of behaviour. Trust can be defined as a meta-practice, consisting of a general experience being acquired from previous practices.

Beginning from the moment when trust has been formed as a stable feature of relations, it starts to play an essential role in individual behaviour and interactions. Gradually, the more individuals train themselves to trust each other, the more lessens the influence of cognitive and affective components and eventually trust as a behavioural non-reflexive meta-practice begins to dominate. Thus, I argue that the role of cognitive and affective aspects is vast in the early stages of the development of trusting relations, but consequently it virtually has no crucial effect on trust in the normal regime of everyday life. While the observer may still note the importance of knowledge and emotions for the actors over a whole period of lasting trust practices, both of these components are insignificant.

We therefore insist that trust is neither a value, nor a norm that exists in the “cultural system” of society. After all, if this was the case, then we would need to go further in our speculations and argue that each trust practice is the result of interpretation of a norm. But it would be at least strange to claim that every action that features trust, is preceded by a period of decoding and enacting the norm. Individuals rarely trouble themselves by carrying out complex heuristic analyses; they just act. We also should not forget that the very moral essence and value of trust, claimed as early as by Hume in his Treatise, does not consist of commitment or obligation to behave in a certain way, but with a spontaneously appearing good will and aspiration to behave honestly.

It is unreasonable to approach trust practices as an individual’s trusting habit. It may be a collective practice also prevalent in circumscribed societies or in more limited contexts, and in that sense be part of the repertoire or toolkit of practices peculiar to a certain culture. The more common and shared a practice is, the less there is a tendency to its problematization as the risk of disruption of everyday interactions is reduced. Nevertheless, these gaps sometimes do occur and actors become liable to present their rationales and motives for trusting behaviour.

Actors’ accounts are based on a definite system of meanings related to the discursive perception of reality. So, actors’ attempts to retrospectively and prospectively evaluate their actions are based on a desire to conform to conventionally established standards. Such standards, in the case of trust questions, may be, for example, contained in folk wisdom, specifically in assertions such as “trust but verify”, “trust is good, but control is better”, “God save me from the one I trust and I will deal myself with others”, “do not trust strangers”, etc. It is these very sayings as discursive elements of common sense or the so-called “normative system of a society” that are the meanings referring to which trust can be interpreted as a reasonable strategy, or vice versa, as a poor consideration (blind trust). Discursive practices of description may not match with the actual behaviours that they define. The process of identifying trust practices as “prop-

40 For instance, there may be cases in which trust practices are widespread within the walls of the university library – where students always leave their belongings unattended with no worry. Though, in the rest area of the university campus such practices are not prevalent. And we do not mean any type of convention consisted of tacit or explicit knowledge. “Convention” is nothing more than a metaphor that fits in a certain account. In reality, students have simply trained and are used to behaving within the walls of the library this way.

41 Perhaps that is why most of macro-level studies suggest that there is an insufficient or low level of trust for successful functioning of society or certain institutions, compared to other societies and institutions. Yet, in general, it is still unclear what level of trust is desirable in modern societies.

42 Ernst Fehr et al. use a very fruitful approach in the study of relations between the real observable trust practices, which were fixed in the experiment, and discursive practices which only describe trusting behaviour. They conclude that answers to some trust questions with relatively high accuracy predict the subsequent trusting behaviour. The only thing that was not considered
er” or “foolish”, as “justified” or “unwarranted”, is carried out through manipulation with words and meanings of verbalized norms and rules, which seem appropriate and convenient to the actors involved.

Meanwhile, the fact of problematizing everyday trust could have a substantial impact on trusting behaviour itself and on the glosses given over it. An interviewee, for example, may wonder to a considerable degree about the fact that he or she is being asked about trust in relationships or interactions, since they had not previously thought about it deliberately. With a high degree of probability instead of with the desired reasonable answer based on intelligent reflection on past experience and future plans, we will then get a standardized response, tailored to the common understanding in a given society, culture or community of what is “bad” or “good”. And even if the interviewee had deliberately reflected on that very issue, then they had likely done it referring to a specific social circumstances (e.g. trust in the library) and with respect to certain individuals, that may ultimately have nothing to do with their usual practices of interacting with people.43

Semantic and verbal justifications given while accounting for the choice of certain practices related to trust are thus based on actors’ representations about their own identity and are standardized in public discourse. These justifications are often terminologically stable and are expected as routinized practices as soon as a certain type of activity is reflectively evaluated and interpreted. The appraisal of past experiences may influence future actions, for instance, in the form of an actor considering themselves as “logically consistent in behaviour”, or in constructing self-identity of a “fond” or vice versa of a “suspicious”, “worldly-wise” or “sophisticated” person. Similarly, the rationale for future action may be determined by a researcher or any other observer as reasonable and therefore legitimate if it suggests some links to rules and regulations considered as a part of society’s common sense and therefore as “intelligible”.

In the table 1 below some results from a questionnaire survey are presented. This one was conducted in the February 2007, at universities in Kazan and Nizhnekamsk (both in Tatarstan, Russia). The general, non-randomized purpose sampling of students made up 299 interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Answers to Questions about Other Peoples’ Attitudes Given by Various Groups of Students (N=299)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In your opinion, most people would have used you for their benefit if they had such a chance, or they would not do use you for their benefit because of their decency? (in points from 1 – would have used – up to 10 – would not have used)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When you are dealing with strangers, do you often talk to them openly with trust, or suspiciously with distrust?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openly with trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspiciously with distrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some people think that most fellow citizens can be trusted, others think that one can’t be too cautious when dealing with fellow citizens. Which point of view is nearer to yours?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most fellow citizens can be trusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One can’t be too cautious when dealing with fellow citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* St. dev.

43 Continuing the analogy, the respondent’s reflection on trust in the university library may have no effect on political activity or participation in voluntary associations.
At first glance, the distribution of responses looks extremely paradoxical: the students who express trust of strangers at the same time much more pessimistically appraise the intentions of most people, than those who communicate with strangers openly. If we assume a direct expression of designated “attitudes” in everyday practices, a bizarre image of a fatalistic person arises: he or she trusts strangers, but at the same time is waiting for an absolutely pragmatic and instrumentalist response from them. However, this inconsistency can be resolved by admitting the existence of different logics: the logic of trust practices, which is just slightly present in the answers, and the logic of the discursive activity of respondents, which is abundant.

One of several reasons for such contradictory answers is that responding to the first two questions (on the left side of the table), students described themselves (i.e. who they are). In answering the third question (at the top of the table), they expressed their opinion about others (i.e. who other people are). It is apparent that in each case respondents gave socially approved responses, which are expressed in dictums, in regard to themselves: “I am cautious”, and considering others: “others are good”. People want to show that they “do not trust strangers” (i.e. it is deemed an element of common sense, something their mother told them not to do), but in actually trusting strangers (to a degree), they openly communicate with others and do not want to seem as misanthropes (i.e. this is an element of etiquette and a standard of communal living). The narrative of a “sophisticated person” can be also traced out: individuals are always “on the alert” and simply refuse to even think that someone could take advantage of their weakness, i.e. the “decency” of others simply does not matter.

As it has already been mentioned, trust questions lead people to self-reflection and to search for reasonable arguments in favour of or against buoyant terms with strangers in the sense of existing rules and norms. Those who claimed uncertainty, on the contrary, refuse to self-reflect and appear to be more positive-minded in evaluating their partners. This fact can serve as an important argument for the view that daily non-reflexive trust practices differ significantly from the discursive practices of trust description, i.e., related to evaluation and articulation of the causes of trusting behaviour.

The conventional and most common meaning of “interpersonal trust” refers to whether “most people can be trusted” or whether one “can’t be too cautious when dealing with people”. This question was asked in the world value surveys (WVS). In 1998, according to WVS, 59 % of Russian respondents answered that one can’t be too cautious, and 30.5 % that people can be trusted, with 10 % claiming uncertainty. This is slightly lower than in 1992 when, in response to the same question 47.9 % expressed their vigilance, 37 % claimed trusting and about 15 % marked “don’t know”. My own survey carried out in 2007 among students aged 18–21 in Tatarstan brought the following results: 69.9 %, 15.7 %, and 14.4 % respectively. Exactly the same question was used in 2005 by the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) in studying a representative sample of the Russian population. According to their results, 58 % were in favour of cautious behaviour, 36 % insisted on trusting and another 6 % claimed uncertainty.

If my study is left out of account, i.e. in which a very specific sample of Russian students was used, what is noticed is the practical absence of a general upward or downward trend. Therefore it would be quite strange to argue, for example, that a 9 % decline of trust level between 1998 and 1992 has led to a real reduction of trust practices behaviour in Russia within everyday life, and that by 2005 the intensity of those practices returned to a prior level. We instead suggest that the number of actual trust practices has not changed. They existed and were implemented

Interpersonal Trust Narrative in the European Union

Quite frequently in European studies the EU is approached as a supra-national or inter-state entity, i.e., a set of related governmental bodies and institutions. This account confines the scope of attention to this very original and hitherto unprecedented integrative phenomenon only within the political context. Membership in the EU itself is often determined by the degree of coherence to a defined benchmark level of improvements (cf. development) in formal institutional environments, compliance with legal norms and economic performance standards (e.g. the Copenhagen criteria). Furthermore, the requirements for new member states, except for their actual geographical location, are limited to specific and fixed empirical indicators of economical development and modernization. This is not surprising, since the very mottos and goals that were manifested while creating the EU were more connected to economic and political achievements.

On the one hand, it is intrinsically correct that the criteria are limited to those indicators that can be identified with a high degree of objectivity only. As any requirements related to the development of society will ultimately be grounded in the interpretation of social experts (e.g. sociologists or social analysts) and, therefore, to a large extent will be influenced by stereotypes such as matching or not matching some mythical “standards” and “values” of “European” or even “Christian” culture.

However, we can notice as a consequence the declining interest in scientific interpretations of the EU as a community of individuals who are increasingly integrated and who intensively interact in everyday practices. The result is a scarcity of literature on this topic. The studies of what many researchers call “social action”, or the “interaction” of individuals is often restricted by sociological surveys that are aimed at registering attitudes only, in which respondents are asked to evaluate their past or future actions or to describe the behaviour of others. The key question is to ask how relevant such type of research is to defining the mechanisms of real everyday practices.

46 As Karl Deutsch claimed, “the populations of different territories might easily profess verbal attachment to the same set of values without having a sense of community that leads to political integration. The kind of sense of community that is relevant for integration [...] turned out to be rather a matter of mutual

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46 Michael Polanyi mentions a remarkable instance concerning this issue. He refers to the precedent practice on which the Anglo-Saxon institution of Common Law is based. He argues that the procedure of one court following the example of others in the process of making a judgment “recognizes the principle of all traditionalism that practical wisdom is more truly embodied in action than expressed in rules of action. Accordingly, Common Law allows for the possibility that a judge may interpret his own actions mistakenly. The judicial maxim which sometimes goes by the name of ‘doctrine of the dictum’ lays it down that a precedent is constituted by the decision of a court, irrespective of its interpretation [...] of the judge who made a decision”. See Polanyi M., op. cit., p. 54.

Indeed, the Eurobarometer (EB) offers an outstanding opportunity for studying the trust narrative, which is manifested by a representative sample of the population of EU member states, as trust questions are sometimes included in EB questionnaires. Yet studying the long-term trends, unfortunately, is complicated by the fact that there was a change in question wording. If in the EB 6 questionnaire\footnote{Eurobarometer 6. Twenty Years of the Common Market, October/November 1976. www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/eurobarometer/questionnaires/s0990gb.pdf.} used in the 1976 survey, the question was formulated as follows: “Now, I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from different countries. For each country please say whether, in your opinion, they are in general (1) very trustworthy, (2) fairly trustworthy, (3) not particularly trustworthy, or (4) not at all trustworthy?” In 1996 while carrying out EB 46 they used a different conceptualization of trust: “Now, I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you (1) tend to trust them or (2) tend not to trust them?”

The difference in wording appears to be very important. If in the first case, respondents are asked to evaluate their own actions, and that is in greater degree related to their actual practices; in the second case, trust is studied not as a practice in itself, but rather as a stereotype of what kind other people are. Not paying much attention to these differences is apparently equivalent to believing that ultimately the very mentioning of the term “trust” in question automatically generates the desired response. No doubt that accurate responses will be truly desired, the problem is that the desirability for trust will have very little in common with the character of everyday trust practices.

As it turned out quite predictably, the EU-25 is less coherent and shows a much lower level of cross-national trust, in comparison with the EU-9. But does this mean that as a result of the acceptance of East European states, the French, for example, have become less trustful in others and have become more suspicious in their everyday life? Or will they no longer trust their well-recommended Polish neighbour’s daughter to look after their children when they spends evening out with their spouse just because Poland was accepted into the EU and now they are being asked Eurobarometer questions about the credibility of Polish people? Actually, when responding to such questions, people just stand for one or another point of view that is already expressed by others and that is stabilized in discourse, rather than explaining their real behaviour. Therefore, the enlargement of the EU really leads to an increase in the number of judgments about distrust (which is an attractive subject for discourse studies), but does so only because it is followed by the expanding of geographical as well as discursive space that brings new uncertain perspectives, new meanings and new opportunities to manipulate them. Poles, before Poland joined the EU, had never been asked about their orientations towards the French, and only after EU enlargement were Poles included into the standard Eurobarometer sample. At that very moment, a type of new artefact emerged, a statistic, which expressed the Pole’s uttered attitudes toward French
people. And that very judgement made by Poles (as well as by French people), was generated on the basis of common sense and discursive space which now became much wider.

There is another example from states of Eastern Europe newly included into the EU that can be given. It is a well-known fact that the level of trust in national governmental bodies has fallen greatly,\textsuperscript{51} which happened simultaneously with increasing levels of integration within the EU. It is a process that Sztompka called the “externalization of trust”.\textsuperscript{52} But does this really mean that national governments have seriously downgraded the efficacy of their activities? Probably it does not. Rather, the case is that new advanced norms and standards have appeared in public discourse, and that now they are used by interviewees while constructing and uttering their judgments and evaluations about their national bureaucracies; more so, we have to take into account the fact that citizens of newly included states are more inclined to admit the closeness of EU members’ value narratives.\textsuperscript{53} Over time, new tools and instruments for the production of opinions and statements about national governments have come into existence.

**Conclusion**

Questions about trust implicitly assume other questions about the rationales that one has to believe the other side of interaction is trustworthy. Any question about trust presupposes an actor’s account of their everyday life, as it requires reflection on one’s actions already executed or just being planned. Quite frequently a verbal evaluation of individual behaviour fits perfectly with legitimate meanings that are already widespread in public discourse and in identity narratives inherent to the society under focus. It also conforms to the requirements of being “intelligent” and “consistent”. Yet, in the long run this doesn’t explain the real nature of trust practices.

There certainly exists some interrelation between trusting behaviour and discourse practices which describe it. But this relation is thoroughly mediated and indirect. Accordingly, while presenting the results of trust studies we should avoid claiming complete equivalence between what people say and what they do. We should either stay away from constructing “cultural and value systems” as sets of partly-deterministic rules by using narratives received through polling individuals. Questioning has to be complemented with observations of real life which, in the case of trust research, can be carried out in “crowded places”. In the EU instance, these could be university campuses, immigration offices, quarters of EU governmental offices, etc.

My main aim in this article was to raise the issue of the complex relationship existing between trust as an everyday non-reflexive practice and trust as a narrative created by individuals. I made this attempt in order to better understand the essence of trust as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon demanding sensitivity, deep insight and interdisciplinary approaches.


\textsuperscript{52} Sztompka P., op. cit., p. 118.

The dual processes of globalization and internationalization have been developing in the second half of the 20th century and have made interactions in the intercultural sphere an aspect of social communications actual in everyday life. As an observable sphere for research, these two processes have become part of the scientific viewpoint. At the turn of the century, as a result of the fall of the “Iron Curtain”, Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe have emerged from their former conditions and have been engaging in processes of wide change in the world order. It has become a common practice for Russian people of post-Soviet time to seek intensive, positive developments of international relations at the state level. Commercial and noncommercial organizations have also been involved at different levels of dialogue between contemporary Russia and the West. Intercultural dialogues have also begun to develop intensively at the level of interpersonal communications.

Contact between representatives of different cultures generates a set of problems that are caused by a kind of discrepancy in norms, values, points of view, and other features. The discrepancies cannot be eliminated during normal interaction processes, so the success of the relationship depends on achieving some kind of consensus concerning the rules and the schemes of communication, which do not disturb the interests of the representatives of various cultures. What is required is to adapt traditional models of monocultural interaction to the new mult-
cultural social environments, which are presently preserved in various countries around the world.

In Russia, issues of intercultural communication (IC) are the focus of many research projects. Traditionally, interactions between different ethnic groups which co-exist within one state are studied. The intensity of ethno-national sentiments in contemporary Russia, which are partly a consequence of the collapse of the USSR, in addition to the economic challenges and the global economic crisis, the intensive migration out of Russia and other factors, have made various aspects of ethnic and national consciousness influencing the cultural landscape in Russia into relevant areas for scientific study.

Approximately since the 1990s, Russia has started re-thinking the problems connected with other forms of intercultural communications. Considering the problematic is a relative novelty for Russian science, it is important to turn to the Western scientific research experience where the area has been actively developed. Diverse international contacts have shown success in all kinds of international activity, which is necessary for Russia both in the spheres of economy and politics. It depends much on the efficiency of Russian specialists' degrees in the field of intercultural communications. Not only the national economic sphere but also the political, diplomatic, scientific and other areas share the importance of better understanding professional and social intercultural communications.

**Main Definitions and Approaches**

The term “intercultural communications” (IC) in a narrow sense appeared in American literature in the 1970s. The beginning of the IC discipline is connected with Edward Hall’s works. Hall asserted that “the culture is communications, and communication is a culture”. As IC scientists suggest, the enlargement of cultural competencies allows us to communicate more effectively with representatives of other cultures. Another definition of IC can be found in the well-known book of Larry Samovar and Richard Porter: “Intercultural communication is such a version of communication, whose successful or unsuccessful results are substantially defined by cultural differences between communicants”.

The first scientific approaches of intercultural communication studies were based upon cultural differences, analysing the interaction of people and individual human behavior under those conditions. This work was done by Ruth Benedikt, Geoffrey Gorer, Margaret Mead and others. The main ideas of American theorists contain various theoretical and cultural approaches, e.g. cultural relativism and ethnorelativism, to describe, interpret and estimate cultural similarities and differences. Thus, the cultural model of a person, which underlines that every existing culture creates its own personal values and rules, was developed in those times. The question of correlation between culture and communication has been developed in four methodological approaches: first, the subject-object approach in the positivist philosophy, which can be described as the information society approach (Daniel Bell, Alvin Toffler). The focus here is on the system links and functions, information as the basis for culture and cultural values. The second, non-classical approach is based on the cognitive model of subject-object relations and uses the

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The third approach studies the society as the net of communications which cover a society as a whole, describes it and makes it self-reproducible. The fourth is the linguistic approach, which examines the matter of speech communication, where the basis of functions of language plurality and its interaction with life were laid by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

The discipline of intercultural communication has been forming in an eclectic way. The subject has been elaborated by specialists of many different scientific spheres and has brought different scientific approaches into an interdisciplinary arena. On the whole, Western approaches include scientific experience of studies from various fields: folklore studies, ethnology, linguistics and many others.

Two significant approaches have been constructed on the basis of folklore and cultural anthropological studies. If the first one uses a descriptive character to represent human behavior and to reveal the cultural factors that influence it, the second approach aims to investigate human-cultural activities, their norms, values and rules. The methodological approaches of sociology, psychology, pedagogy and other fields make a narrower focus on methodological approaches, often using the discipline of ethnology. Studies of folklore and ethnology have introduced the most theoretical and methodological knowledge in the area of intercultural communications research. The first approach has a descriptive character and investigates the daily behavior of people caused by cultural factors. The second one – ethnology – has a variety of social-cultural community activities, including their norms and values as objects of research.

The majority of Western scientists have used one of two methodological approaches at the group level in the framework of sociological or anthropological approaches to define the phenomenon of culture: 1) understanding culture as a cognitive system (e.g., Ward and H. Goodenough), and 2) understanding culture as a symbolic system (e.g., Clifford Geertz). The first approach is distinct from linguistics and attempts to determine “cultural samples” and “cultural standards”. On the basis of cultural standards, “self” and “other’s” behavior is formed and regulated. The linguistic approach defines language as a product and tool of culture simultaneously. In communication studies, by applying linguistic approaches to intercultural communication, cognitive and linguistic-pragmatic aspects come to the forefront. In this viewpoint language becomes first a symbolical system that supposes ambiguity that can in turn be resolved with the help of studying sociocultural and situational contexts. “Language serves as a guide to understanding how the culture reflects an external world”.

The need for theoretical approaches to study language as a way to clarify various culturally-specific meanings arose not long ago. Similar paradigms coexist under different names, for example, cultural linguistics, ethnosemantics (ethnography of communication), pragmalinguistics, inter-language pragmatics, and others. All of these sub-disciplines share the same problem: the formalisation of the disciplines – linguistics and anthropology (ethnology) – throughout the twentieth century involved aspirations to develop a strictly scientific methodology. Yet the displays of culture were rather poorly defined and involved the sphere of research that served to spoil the “game”.

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Scientific research in the field of intercultural communication now is focused on human behavior facing various situations of language differences and their consequences. Results of these researches have been presented in descriptions of cultural specificity that reflect and interpret communicants’ situational language actions. On the contrary, the symbolic direction of the second approach considers culture as a united set of rules. Thus, the sociologist and psychologist Geert Hofstede formulated four features which are the result of extensive research conducted in the late 1970s.\(^{15}\) He described national cultures to each other by their position in accordance to a scale of four parameters.

Jong Kim and William Gudykunst have investigated intercultural communication as a symbolic process of exchanging means among representatives of different cultures.\(^{16}\) The independent cultural system or ethnic culture of the people is formed in the frame of cultural anthropology, on the basis of residing jointly with a unified way of life and collective activities.\(^{17}\) Intercultural communication appears as a specific form of communication between two or more representatives of different cultures. According to this view, information and cultural values are exchanged among interacting cultures. The process of intercultural communication is not limited only to the knowledge of languages, but also demands knowledge of the respective material and spiritual culture, values and norms, all of which defines the models of behavior of partners in communication.

Intercultural communication is implemented on two levels: the group and the individual. Entering an intercultural dialogue, each participant has a system of rules due to their sociocultural attributes or specificities. If the personal qualities of partner-communicators become significant for successful communication, the elements of group culture become valuable in small groups. Thus, the ethnic level of intercultural communication can happen with interaction between local ethnic, ethnolinguistic and ethnoconfessional groups. As a result of such interaction, new experiences of mutual cultural enrichment may take place and greater ethnic consciousness intensifies; the tendency to preserve human ethnic belonging amplifies. Intercultural communication in this case comes to an end with mutual or unilateral penetration of cultural elements without identity loss. Thus the formation of interethnic cultural elements as a basis for further interaction takes place.

One finds, above all in Anglo-Saxon psychology and social psychology, the expression “cross-cultural communication”. This usually involves giving preference to a comparative perspective and, typically in such cases, neglects any analysis of linguistic interaction. Although German word-formation rules sometimes prevent direct translation, there are other good reasons why the phrase “interracial communication” has not been adopted in Germany. The expression “interracial”, which is used particularly in the USA, refers to communication between different races, mainly between blacks and whites.\(^{18}\) But nowadays it is more often between “mainstream” Americans on the one hand and all other types of minorities on the other hand.\(^{19}\) In this context it is not so much biological factors that are in the foreground, but rather problems such as discrimination and racism. “Interethnic” is a term used frequently in anthropological and sociological studies, when groups communicate with one another within the framework of a society which is largely defined by national frontiers. Groups nevertheless consciously set up boundaries between themselves and others by emphasizing

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linguistic and/or religious differences or features of outward behavior, however slight they may be objectively, which thereby define their identity.\textsuperscript{20}

In ethnology, the interactions between ethnic groups have been titled as “interethnic communications”, which stands for the exchanges between two or more ethnic communities with material and spiritual products of their cultural activity carried out in various forms.\textsuperscript{21} Proceeding from this communication, interethnic relations are understood in a broad sense as interactions among people of different ethnicities in different spheres of public life, i.e. the political sphere, art, science and so on. “In a narrow sense interethnic relations are interpersonal relations of people of different ethnicities which also occur in different spheres of a social life – work, family-household and various informal kinds of mutual relations. From all set of relations the intercultural interactions between ethnic groups are usually investigated”.\textsuperscript{22} “Intercultural communication in ethnic sphere or interethnic communication is a part of micro-level of intercultural communication and enters into more extensive concept of sociocultural communication as communications on various territories with their cultural specifics, united into general social system”.\textsuperscript{23}

**Studying the Ethnic Aspect in the Field of Intercultural Communication Barriers**

Intercultural contacts generate sets of problems that are caused by discrepancy of norms, values, differences in partners’ views, and so on. These problems are difficult if not impossible to eliminate in the process of interaction. Therefore, the success of interaction depends on achieving a consensus concerning the rules and the schemes of communication, which do not restrain the interests of the representatives of different cultures. According to the American researcher Carley Dodd, a distinction between views is one of the reasons for disagreements and conflicts in intercultural communication.\textsuperscript{24} Studying the most typical concepts of several cultures which are basic for certain societies, Dodd developed a system of categories that estimates the fundamental cultural structures of different groups. He believed that mastering of cultural knowledge promotes perfection of intercultural communications.

Features of the national and ethnic consciousness of representatives of various cultures often act as barriers in intercultural interactions. The particular interest in this context is represented by an observable tendency toward ethnocentrism, which is a propensity to negatively estimate representatives of other cultures through the prism of own ethnic or cultural standards. At first, ethnocentrism as a feature of intergroup perception and communication was examined by Ludwig Gumplovitz (and William Sumner further developed the issue), who characterized it as the confidence of ethnic groups or nations in securing their special place among other groups and nations.\textsuperscript{25}

Robert LeVine, Donald Campbell, Henry Tajfel and John Turner further elaborated the concept of “ethnocentrism” in their theory of social identity. The problem of developing ethnocultural competence in promoting understanding and interaction of individuals with other cultures was considered by Milton Benne\textsuperscript{26} to be based on a model of development of culture different from that of the individual. According to the model, people pass


\textsuperscript{25} Gumplovicz L. La Lutte des Races. Paris: Guillaumin, 1893.

through six steps of personal growth: three ethnocentrist steps (negation of intercultural distinctions; protection against distinctions by estimating in favor of their own group; minimizing distinctions) and three ethnorelativistic ones (recognizing distinctions; adapting to distinctions between cultures or ethnicities; integration, i.e. ethnorelativism to own identity application).

The stereotyping of ethnic consciousness occurs through the formation of simplified images of representatives of different cultures. Meeting persons who come from other cultures, we usually have a natural propensity to perceive their behavior from a position of our culture, i.e. to measure them from our own cultural positions. Misunderstanding of another language, the symbolic meanings of gestures, mimicry and other elements of behavior often lead to a deformed interpretation of their actions that can result in a variety of negative feelings: vigilance, contempt, and animosities. Nina Arutyunova states that “foreign language is received in ordinary consciousness more as a negative, than a positive connotation”.

David Matsumoto asserts that “the effect of a foreign language is connected with temporal decrease of personal thinking abilities when one uses a foreign language”. Depreciating personal forces cause in people quite a natural protective reaction in the form of stereotypes, representations and prejudices, and so on. As a result of such intercultural or interethnic contacts, the most typical reaction of stereotyping occurs. The stereotype of ethnocultural and cultural-linguistic groups erases borders between individuals, but they fix and support borders between groups. As a whole, stereotyping of personal reactions is a behavior that saves effort, reduces the uncertainty of existence and allows the stereotyped person to adapt to their surrounding social environment. Step by step ethnocultural stereotypes represent general views about typical features, relevant for a particular nation or its cultural form.

Marshal McLuhan analyzes ethnonims in intercultural discourse. In a sense, “cumulative individuals (nations) also consist in communicative relations within the limits of constant process of mutual definition of roles where ethnonims and stereotypes are caused by them rule the mutual roles definition”. Walter Lippman considers aspects of communication in a context of functioning ethnonyms. Lippman allocates four versions of ethnocultural stereotypization: simple auto- and heterostereotypes (we think of ourselves and “strangers”) and portable (projected) auto- and heterostereotypes (what we assume that “strangers” think of us and about themselves).

In the framework of a functional approach, the consideration of facts is one of the most widespread through joint social activity of people where special communication is carried out. Neil Smelzer names this the “collectivist” approach. He shows how people connected by representations about a general origin, form a group for the purpose of protecting their interests. The analysis of competition, rivalry and conflicts is held in the framework of this approach. The analysis focuses on a person included in an ethnic group within the framework of middle range sociopsychological theories. It is considered that structural components of psychology (mentality) of a person are reproduced in group psychology. These components are a kind of imposing, interaction of motivational, informative, affective (emotional) and communicative (dialogical) processes.

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**Approaches to Interethnic Interaction Studies**

Social interaction includes such components as actors, actions, responses and expectations. The various bases assume definitions of interethnic communication: sociological realism points to the primacy of group properties in relation to individuals, while sociological nominalism or constructivism undermines free individual manipulation as specific features of one's ethnicity. Exchange theory as one of the main concepts of social interaction traces economic, political and other explanations of ethnic processes.

Ernest Gellner pays attention to the role of language in individual status growth. Thus ethnic cultures, languages in this case are “the markets of investments”. Investors will protect their contributions and try to create guarantees for the safety of their contributions, including political ones.

Edna Bonacich, the author of a theory about “the market of split work”, examines the specificity of ethnic interactions as an example of a “primary” and “secondary” labor market. Ethnic discrimination is obvious, so it allows consideration of situations of discrimination provoking ethnic conflicts as situations of nonequivalent exchange and also consideration of nonequivalence as the reason for conflicts. Ethnic antagonism generated by the collision of three interest groups – employers, highly paid workers and low-paid workers-migrants, according to Bonacich, can be expressed in two models. First, one presents the exception movement (exclusion movement), second one is the “caste” system, which depends on a number and an origin of co-operating groups, and aggravates “the split” labor market which modernization processes contribute.

A rationalistic understanding of interaction, typical of exchange theory, is possible to observe in the movement of secession analysis in Michael Hechter’s works. According to his theory, secession is the claim of one territorial unit to separate from a central political power, based on a claim for the independent sovereign status. Separatism, on the other hand, aims at not separating, but at differentiating powers and increase the unit of status. The theory also takes into account that different groups in the frame of an ethnic territory can consider secession profitable (for example, an ethnic elite) or unprofitable (for example, inhabitants of frontier areas). The group considering secession as profitable can persuade, deceive or bribe others. The equivalent exchange in this theory is regarded as accessible to measurement (in monetary terms) and is considered in its economic and political aspect at the macro-level, though it is measured at the micro-level.

Functionalism considers models of labour-based cultural division and functional language paradigms from the rationalistic point of view. Interrelation of elements in a language system is functional-additional, that is, language subsystems used by an examined society are distributed in utility spheres, social functions, and communicative situations. The complexity of the functional approach is that the question of the place of an ethnic community in a system or as an independent subsystem remains open.

In the situation of interethnic interaction the problem of corresponding different systems of socially practiced values from the position of symbolical interaction arises in translation. This matter reveals the necessity of corresponding both verbal and nonverbal types of communication. A similar problem arises in the translation process of social symbolism that is important for analyses of interethnic conflicts, particularly in the sphere of intercultural communication. While analyzing the precondi-

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tions of conflict resolution, Lewis Kozer notes that opponents can have different points of view on the weight of the position or the price of a victim’s demands. The probable winner should dispose of the proper data on symbols which his or her opponent regards as symbols of defeat.\footnote{Kozer L. Zaevshenien konfliktka [Conflict Completion], in: Dobren’kov V. (ed.). Amerikan’skaya sociologicheskaya mys’l. Teksty. [American Sociological Thought. Texts]. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyj universitet biznesa i upravlenija, 1996, p. 550.}

Erving Goffmann’s dramaturgy approach, which pinpoints the conscious efforts of interacting subjects to create a certain impression, a desirable image of oneself, can help in studying rather prominent aspects of interethnic interaction as ethnic identification, having expanded on an understanding of social interaction as a communicative process. Understanding ethnic identity as something to a certain degree situational and voluntary is typical for constructivism, particularly, for Frederik Barth’s theory of ethnic borders. It uses the concept of a “marker” as a signal about cultural distinctions and only defines cultural distinctions of people themselves.\footnote{Barth F. (ed.). Ethnic Group and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969.}


Schutz’s phenomenological approach specifies that ethnic groups can be considered as examined communities where interpretational distinctions arise during the interaction of individuals. It prohibits social (and ethnic) communication formation. A successful typification, which helps to establish social relations, is constructed on an understanding of common language and of possessing shared background practices. This is fully observed by representatives of the ethnomethodological approach. In a situation of interethnic interaction that is similar to the situation of destroying background practices, ethnic aspects working in experimental conditions allow for a better understanding and investigation of phenomenon of cultural shock. The key moment here is the impossibility for a person to lean on habitual background practices in an unusual situation.

We can conclude that all methodological directions describe interethnic communication as an example of facing the problems caused by distinctions in standards of interaction (no matter what way these standards could be understood). Theories of social interaction are expected to explain interaction within one community. Interethnic activity is possible in practice, so that participants somehow overcome the difficulties described above.

One type of communication situation that is potentially replete with novelty, unfamiliarity and dissimilarity has been elaborated by American researchers Yong Kim and William Gudykunst.\footnote{Gudykunst B., Kim Y., op. cit., p. 270–271, 281.} They argue that when individuals are confronted with cultural differences they tend to view people from other cultures as strangers. Strangers are unknown people who are members of different groups. Anyone entering a relatively unknown or unfamiliar environment falls under the rubric of “stranger”. In their conceptualization, Gudykunst and Kim contend that interaction with people from cultures other than our own tends to involve the highest degree of strangeness and the lowest degree of familiarity. Thus, there is greater uncertainty in initial interactions with strangers than with people who are familiar. In such circumstances not only is uncertainty high, but so is anxiety. According to Gudykunst and Kim, actual or anticipated interaction with members of different groups (e.g., cultures or ethnic groups different from our own) leads to anxiety. This type of communication...
anxiety is labeled as “Intercultural Communication Apprehension” (ICA) by James McCroskey,\(^{41}\) that is, the fear or anxiety associated with either real or anticipated interaction with people from different groups, especially different cultural or ethnic groups. Conceptually, ICA relates to a person’s fear or anxiety of communicating with people from different cultural or ethnic groups. Thus, the measure of one’s ICA should focus on those circumstances where an individual is interacting with people from different cultures and/or ethnic groups. Within multinational organizations, the scales of ICA can be administered as a learning tool to managers and employees in order to predict potential problems in culturally or ethnically diverse work settings.

Young Kim elaborates the theory of intercultural identity development and acculturation, having examined it in the case of foreign migrants. She characterizes “acculturation” as a phenomenon whereby the subjects of the acculturation process finally come to understand better the norms and values of the society and get actively involved in the adaptation process. In her later work (1992), Kim expands her view of acculturation to include the establishment of an “intercultural identity”. Intercultural identity is used to identify an individual’s ability to grow beyond his/her original culture and to encompass a new culture, gaining additional insights into both cultures in the process.\(^{42}\) These theories of acculturation and intercultural identity describe communication as the mediating process required to facilitate transition from one culture to the next. “Ethnic communications” that include components of the home culture are not expected to enhance intercultural identity.

In extending her theory to interethnic communication, Kim points out that “many of the major conflicts today are being fought within states, engendered by issues of ethnicity”.\(^{43}\) In applying intercultural identity theory to interethnic communications, Kim contrasts intercultural identity with the prejudice and irrational biases that are sometimes found in interethnic encounters. Her assessment is that intercultural identity, like the concepts of “multi-cultural man”,\(^{44}\) the “Double-Swing” model of intercultural communication,\(^{45}\) “humanocentrism”, and “moral inclusion”,\(^{46}\) reflect “the vital component of a level of intellectual and emotional maturity that allows an outlook of interethnic accommodation and integration”.\(^{47}\) The individual who has fully attained an intercultural identity has demonstrated the ability to handle interethnic communication. Those individuals able to possess interethnic/intercultural identities are most apt to be able to bridge the gap between cultures in comparison with those who do not possess such an identity.

An Integrated Theory of Interethnic Communication

Yong Kim lays the ground for an integrated theory of interethnic communication.\(^{48}\) She uses a general systems theory (open systems) as an organizing framework. The organizing scheme consists of a set of four circles; a circle with behavior in the center surrounded by three circles representing distinct contexts (from center to outer circles): 1) behavior (encoding/decoding), 2) communicator, 3) situation, and 4) environment.


\(^{47}\) Kim Y., op. cit.
\(^{48}\) Gudykunst B., Kim Y., op. cit.
Kim organizes various aspects of encoding and decoding using an associative – disassociative behavioral continuum. She argues that "behaviors that are closer to the associative end of this continuum facilitate the communication process by increasing the likelihood of mutual understanding, cooperation...behaviors at the disassociative end tend to contribute to misunderstanding, competition".\(^49\) To illustrate, we can say that associative decoding behaviors include the processes of categorization, decategorization, personalization and mindfulness. Disassociative decoding behaviors include processes like categorization, stereotyping, communicative distance, and making the ultimate attribution error. Associative encoding behaviors include processes like convergence, person-centered messages, and personalized communication. Disassociative encoding behaviors include processes like divergence, prejudiced talk, and the use of ethnofaulisms (disparaging foreign allusions).

Kim examines communicators in terms of their "relatively stable psychological attributes".\(^50\) She includes factors such as cognitive structures (e.g. cognitive complexity, category width), identity strength (e.g. ethnic identity, ethnolinguistic identity, ingroup loyalty), group biases (e.g. ingroup favoritism, ethnocentrism), and related concepts (e.g. intercultural identity, moral inclusion). Kim views the situation as defined by the physical setting. She isolates interethnic heterogeneity, interethnic salience, and interactive goals as the critical factors of various situations. The environment includes national and international forces that influence interethnic communication such as institutional equity/inequity (e.g. history of subjugation, ethnic stratification), ethnic group strength (e.g. ethnolinguistic vitality), and interethnic contact (e.g. interaction potential of an environment). Kim argues that the organizing model provides a framework for integrating research in a variety of disciplines. It also serves as "a framework for pragmatic action".\(^51\)

Examining the various theories of intercultural communication, including the ethnic component, has been developed in a variety of aspects by Western researchers. The leading social and humanitarian disciplines have been working on distinguishing the intercultural component in basic theories. We can say that in the framework of intercultural communication theory the ethnic aspect does not take the lowest place. A variety of works by classical and modern theorists make an approach to determine the particular features of intercultural communication, then define the place of the ethnic component, the links and functions of theory components which can bring a better understanding of the component examined. It is obvious that many of the approaches used in examining the ethnic component of intercultural communication theory have included those which let us use the approaches to better understand human behavior, language, ethnicity, group interactions and then turn to the problems of ethnic issues.

Concerning the scientific field of intercultural communication in Russia, it is important to notice particularly interethnic communication, research that has been developing since the 1990s. Western theoretical grounds have also been considered. Nowadays both Russian and Western approaches have tendencies to strengthen specialization in examining intercultural communication theory, because of their good practical usage potential in many common and specific spheres. The experience of Western approaches in this field is of great importance for Russian research and specialists.

\(^{49}\) Ibid, p. 270.
\(^{50}\) Ibid, p. 271.
\(^{51}\) Ibid, p. 281.
Many scholars have been focusing recently on areas of applied linguistics, concentrating on the mechanisms of word influence in different spheres of public life. Linguists in particular pay attention to research on peculiar language functioning in the sphere of political communication.

Not only is language an important tool for politicians, but it is also the way he or she expresses themselves in the area of professional activities they have chosen. Whatever a politician does, whatever area they try to influence, they are always working with a written, read, heard or spoken word; it does not matter whether it is diplomatic correspondence, proceedings of a meeting or comments given for newspapers. Politicians write letters and speeches to be presented in parliament, works out an election programme, makes up advertising texts and reports, and so on. The indications, amendments and remarks to these things are also given by the politician through the means of language. The working day of a politician consists of meetings (discussions), public statements and presentations, which is why it can be said that the life of a politician consists of the following forms of language activities: speaking (presenting the papers), writing (composing documents in a written form) reading and comprehension – these are all the natural forms of dealing with words.

Thus politicians turn to different language spheres, levels and styles. The better they understand the nuances inherent in each specific area, the more successful they are in their professional arena. Usually a politician uses formal language (in Germany it is “Hochdeutsch”, in Russia it is Russian literary language), although he or she needs to know idioms and colloquial language typical for every region of the country (in Germany these are
dialects, existing in each federal unit). The more actively and often these expressions are used by a politician, the more authority he or she can gain, along with the chance to be heard and understood by the common people.

The same concerns are with using slang or the specific professional languages of different social groups. Martin Greiffenhagen stresses the importance of speaking foreign languages, knowledge of literature, anecdotes, and other figures of speech, as all of these things foster the popularity of public men, and the art of irony can make things more efficient when working in the Parliament and on election campaigns. Furthermore, the language for a politician is the most important source of his/her efficiency in the professional field of activity. In their speeches, they use a rich range of vocabulary, which “sweeps them to the position”, and thus to power.

Another scholar, Bergsdorf, considers the potential influence of a politician’s language, calling it “the power factor” (Machtfaktor). He writes: those “who are in the [political] realm, try to give ‘the correct’ understanding to the word”. It is to be kept in mind, that “language is not only a variation of the action, but also a key to the world of speaker and listener, as well as being the means of thinking; [it] serves for understanding [the] political views and actions”.

Three factors explain the need to study political language and its vocabulary. Firstly, there is an internal demand within linguistic theory itself, which in different periods of its history has turned to the real spheres of language system functioning. Secondly, pure issues of political science pose a cause for concern with the study of political thought, its connection with collective and individual political attitudes and the necessity for constructing foreseen models in political science, as well as the development of methods for analysing political texts and mass media materials. And finally, there is a social demand for attempts to release political communication from the manipulations that can deceive common, unprepared people.

Although there are many works devoted to the study of political language, there is as of yet not one single definition that holds sway. In the works of linguistics one uses the phrases “language of public thought”, and “political communication”. Many scholars use the term “political language”, “political vocabulary” and “totalitarian language”. Along with these terms, one comes across various definitions of “political discourse”.

According to the definition given by Gasparov, political discourse is a phenomenon of culture, in which its dominants and

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2 Ibid, p. 80.
4 “Wer mächtig ist, versucht die ‘richtige’ Bedeutung der Wörter vorzuschreiben”. See Bergsdorf op. cit.
value priorities can be added. This is a central moment of human life reflected in the “language”, “language existence”. 14

The modern stage in Russia and Germany displays a high interest in studying political discourse, as “[…] in the conditions of relative freedom and impossibility of administration pressure on those who do not agree, one should turn to different kinds of language tricks in order to gain the power over the minds of common people”. 15

The term “political discourse” has not yet been defined completely, despite the number of researches dedicated to it. The most known specialist in the course of elaborating this term is a linguist from Holland, van Deik, who keeps to a “narrow” definition of the term. He regards political discourse as a class of genres, which belong to the sphere of politics. Political discourse is a discourse of politicians. Restricting political discourse to a professional framework and the activities of politicians, however, contrasts with scholarly remarks that political discourse is at the same time a form of institutional discourse. This means that political discourses are to be considered those discourses that are produced in such institutional environments as government committees and parliaments or at the meetings of a political party. Such an expression should be pronounced by the respective speaker while performing his or her professional role as politician in an institutional environment. Thus, discourse as a communicative phenomenon is political when it accompanies political action in political circumstances. 16

Gerasimenko puts emphasis on the study of political discourse as “a sum of speech creatures put in certain paralinguistic con-

texts – e.g. in the context of political activities, political views and convictions, including its negative forms (evasion from political actions, lack of political convictions and etc.)”. 17

The researcher enumerates certain peculiarities of political discourse: 1) functional unity of the sphere of politics; 2) thematic unity of political issues, issues of government organization, society, mutual relations between the individual and state, intergovernmental relations, etc. 18

Political discourse is tightly connected with value orientations in a society. Still, it should be mentioned that language in politics is usually pragmatic in character. That is why studying its pragmatic features, as well as different aspects of linguistic influence should be given much attention.

Pragmatics is one of the current popular trends in linguistics. It studies the signs conducted in processes of communication. The determining factor for pragmatic research is recognition that it is language which facilitates the understanding of many linguistic phenomena.

Another trend also deserves attention, which considers special issues of choice in language as a subject of pragmatics. The factor of “choice” is the main element in the pragmatic study of language. A choice is made by an author in the process of creating a text; a choice is also made by a recipient in the process of reading and understanding it.

There might even be no aspect in the study of language that cannot be regarded as pragmatic. Most evident of this is the potential of vocabulary. As Baranov notes, the idea of expanding uncertainty and abstractiveness in the meaning of a word lies at its basis. 19 That is why the meaning of words does not necessarily facilitate an understanding of language. As such, how can

18 Ibid
the electorate choose this or that party, for example, if the words used in the election programmes are unknown to them because of linguistic unclarity?

As stated above, the way language organization influences political discourse is determined by the task of conveying certain content by means of purposeful and deliberate selection of language materials. What is sought is a mixture of information and personal assessment, with the latter prevailing to make the foreseen and planned effect on the public. The copywriters of mass media texts, in which political discourse is implemented (consciously or unconsciously), choose the means and methods of verbalization that best corresponds to the position or opinion they would like to form in people’s minds.

In texts of political discourse, pragmatics plays a very important role. In this type of institutional discourse, emphasis is put on the pragmatic skills of the addressee to successfully and efficiently use language in their communication process. It would be good to suggest that language usage in the political discourse of various cultures has national peculiarities.

There is no doubt that the lexical elements of language have pragmatic potential so vividly expressed that it demands close attention of researchers. In this regard, studying the pragmatic qualities of language patterns, which are used for characteristics of things, in particular adjectives, seems to be especially interesting. In the system of morphological resources, the adjective has its own place as a category, where its qualitative component dominates and which determines the subject.

Adjectives, which can express different meanings, qualities and behaviors of subjects perceived by senses, including external and physical characteristics; inner qualities; common assessments (e.g. moral evaluations and so on), are one of the most expressive language patterns in political discourse. Qualitative adjectives reflect the qualities and features of the things they describe (for example, red or brave). Relative adjectives describe things and events not directly, but rather in their relation to other things, circumstances or actions (belonging or related to someone or something) – for example, scientific or social. Possessive adjectives show that some thing, a particular subject, belongs to one person, an actor.

A comparative analysis of the morphological peculiarities of advertising texts in three languages (Russian, English and German) conducted by Medvedeva has shown the active usage of attributive language patterns, to which the adjective also belongs. This reveals the dominance of adjectives and participles in the Russian and German languages.\textsuperscript{20} The same conclusions were reached via analyses of the characteristics of such famous politicians as J. Carter and R. Regan. The analyses, presented in Pochepzov’s monograph, show that almost all of the characteristics are expressed by adjectives.\textsuperscript{21}

Texts of articles from newspapers and journals, texts of political advertising distributed during the periods of electoral campaigns and the electoral programs of some political parties have been used as sources for this research. We have analyzed the following materials: “Argumenti i Fakty” (Arguments and Facts, 2005, 2006, 2007), “Rossiskaya Gazeta” (Russian Gazette, 2007), “Zeit” (2003), “Stern” (2005, 2006), the regional newspaper “Schweriner Volkszeitung” (2005), the materials of electoral campaigns (2005, 2008), and on-line versions of “Spiegel” (2005), Wahlprogramm and PDS (2005).

Applying the method of complete selection to the sources mentioned above we have extracted 8000 contexts that use adjectives in each language chosen for analysis. The analysis of texts in Russian and German political discourse has shown that among the three lexical and grammatical groups of adjectives, relative adjectives are the most actively used. Possessive adjectives are used rarely in political discourse.


These data are reflected in Tables 1 and 2 (results extracted from 8000 contexts):

**Table 1. Russian Political Discourse**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative adjectives</th>
<th>Qualitative adjectives</th>
<th>Possessive adjectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>63.17 %</td>
<td>36.73 %</td>
<td>0.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. German Political Discourse**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative adjectives</th>
<th>Qualitative adjectives</th>
<th>Possessive adjectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55.88 %</td>
<td>44.08 %</td>
<td>0.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tables depict the number of relative adjectives is in significant excess of the number of qualitative adjectives, in Russian even more than in German. Such a proportion of groups of adjectives in political discourse could be explained by the fact that the main task of political discourse is to consider political and economic issues related to relations between the state and other actors in the economic sphere, the state and individual and so on. These are the things that determine the prevailing number of relative adjectives. The significant number of qualitative adjectives is due to their role in expressing assessments of this or that event, which is an inalienable component of political discourse. The low frequency of usage of possessive adjectives could be explained by common linguistic factors, since their role and amount in both discourses is minor.

Analyses of material in both languages have made it possible to select four semantic groups of relative adjectives (see Table 3):

**Table 3. Semantic Groups in Russian and German Languages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Semantic group</th>
<th>Russian language</th>
<th>German language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The adjective, reflecting the sphere of social and political life and the structure of political power</td>
<td>22.49 %</td>
<td>11.83 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Adjectives with characteristics of “temporality”</td>
<td>16.34 %</td>
<td>20.63 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Adjectives with territorial or/and national characteristics</td>
<td>15.44 %</td>
<td>9.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Adjectives, reflecting social and economic aspects of life in the society</td>
<td>9 %</td>
<td>13.62 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The largest group of relative adjectives is represented by lexemes, concerned with describing political events or processes; in Russian material examined they constitute 22.49 %, in German 11.83 %. This group includes following examples in Russian – political (32.6 %), power-holding (6 %), presidential (6 %), gubernatorial (4.3 %), parliamentary (4.3 %), electoral (3.4 %), administrative (3.4 %), oligarchial (3 %), liberal (2.6 %), forceful (1.7 %), socialist (1.7 %), governmental (1.7 %), democratic (1.7 %), pro-Russian (1.7 %), oppositional (1.7 %), non-governmental (0.8 %), supreme (0.8 %), pro-Western (0.8 %), pro-American (0.8 %), anti-Russian (0.8 %). In German – politisch (53.6 %), demokratisch (26.4 %), sozialdemokratisch (5.6 %), parlamentarisch (2.4 %), link (2.4 %), neoliberal (2.4 %), parteipartei (1.2 %), parteiübergreifend (1.2 %), christlich (1.2 %), christdemokratisch (1.2 %), gesellschaftspolitisch (1.2 %), sozialreformerisch (1.2 %).

The lexical content of adjectives in both languages reflects socio-political processes and the current state of political forces

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22 In English it would be expressed via another lexem, not through adjective, but as “governor’s”.
in Russian and German societies. In the German language discourse we can see lexemes dominating, which characterize political aspects of society and everyday life, as well as the variety of political parties and groups. This situation indicates that well-formed multi-party system in Germany, which has existed long enough to be accepted within German society, implies the active participation of multiple political parties in the political life of the country.

In comparison to German political discourse, in Russia the description of political parties and groups is more poorly represented. The hierarchy of Russia’s governmental structure, however, is still well depicted. This can be explained by the fact, that the multi-party political system in Russia has not been fully-formed yet. And which is one reason why the political life in the country is determined mostly by administrative (presidential, gubernatorial) structures.

Thus, differences in the socio-political situations in the two countries are being reflected in the political discourses of both languages examined. Analysing the content of German word combinations has also shown the difference, as German language is more homogeneous and has mainly a neutral connotation. The analyses of Russian political discourse reveal, in turn, the expressive and evaluating constructions of actors in this language group. This is caused by the peculiarities inherent in Russian political life and its perception in public conscience, along with the habitual use of adjectives in political contexts or discussions.

National peculiarities can quite obviously be noticed when comparing the frequency of using the adjective “democratic” in Russian (1.7 %) and in German (26.4 %) political discourses. The low frequency of this particular adjective in Russian political discourse reflects, we believe, the discrepancy between changes undertaken by democrats in the country and real democratic reforms. This may also explain why a negative connotation of this high-profile lexeme has emerged in the public opinion.

The high frequency of the adjective “demokratisch” in German political discourse shows that it belongs in the category of highly esteemed terms for German participants; hence the particular lexeme it embodies has solid pragmatic or better to say rhetorical power.

The comparison of adjective usage and frequency it reveals many interesting facts and interconnections that are not obvious at first glance. As such, it should be continued. Such research allows one to reveal the most typical features of political discourse in both languages, and also to analyze the peculiarities inherent in German and Russian political discourse, which has emerged from the special features and language patterns in each of the languages considered.
American Movies on the Second World War: Between the Truth and Myth

Natalia Munina

Modern historiography offers a wide variety of studies devoted to the history of cinema in general and to the representation of national movie versions of the Second World War in particular. Nevertheless, there are a lot of unknown facts and new interpretations remaining that can be useful to a researcher nowadays.

The choice in this paper of the period from the 1950s to the beginning of the 1960s is justified by two factors: on the one hand, the events of the Second World War were still painful to remember during that time; many of the war’s participants were alive and socially active. On the other hand, unlike in the 1940s, during this period historical and philosophical reflections of the war’s place in the history of the 20th century started to appear.

This unique combination has been reflected in many kinds of art, especially in cinema. In national movie versions of the Second World War, a kind of distance and abstractness appears, which helps us to look at some of the details of the war in another way. While in films of the 1940s stamps and clichés (good – evil, our guy – enemy etc) were used, in the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s (preserving the cliché itself) more difficult and inconsistent images appear, with accompanying attempts to look on psychology of the foe or a weak person made a mistake. This is really a unique period when memories become history step-by-step. War films, which were shot in the first post-war decade, have clear anti-fascist coordinates. Yet in the early 1950s the situation changes. Another explanation for choosing this period is that it corresponds with a flourishing of the cinema, the so-called “Golden Age”. The 1950s is its climax since the 1920s and is characterized as an ideal combination of poetics and politics. Since the United States of America has the most developed
it is interesting to observe the depiction of the Second World War in its particular cultural environment. In this article, I make an attempt to point out general and specific traits in American war movies.

Most studies of war movies belong not to historical sciences, such as art history, movie history etc. One of the best monographs dedicated to this theme is considered to be “Films and the Second World War” by Roger Manvell. In this book there is a good state-of-the-art review of movies made not only in English, but also in the languages of other countries, including the aggressors (Germany, Japan). In the article “Prelude to War”, there is an analysis of tendencies in pre-war movies. But unfortunately, a lot of great films that won many awards at international film festivals and influenced cinema beyond their time, including modern filmography as well, are not mentioned in this research (for example, “Ivanovo detstvo” by Andrei Tarkovsky (1962) and “From here to eternity” by Fred Zinneman (1953).

Going further, we suggest it is useful to show the meaning of the Second World War in the history of the United States. The United States of America is considered to be one of the most well-to-do countries during the period of World War II. This country did not have any (excl. Pearl Harbour, see below) bloody battles or foreign invasions on its territory in the 20th century. However, this does not mean that the USA did not face difficulties. The Great Depression of the early 1930s is an example of a very hard period for American society. During the Second World War, one of the main “American tragedies” is the attack of the Japanese aviation on the military base in Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. This day for the United States is like June 22, 1941 for Russia. It is no wonder, that this topic is considered to be the most painful for American movies. In the 1940s, the cinematographers even had to correct the scripts of some films. For example, like in the case of the film, “Across the Pacific” (1942) by John Huston, with the legendary Humphrey Bogart. According to an evil twist of fate, the authors in the film were primarily going to tell a fictitious story about the Japanese secret services preparing an attack on Pearl Harbor. After the attack happened in reality, the script writers had to change the Hawaiian islands to Panama. This is also why the film “Dive Bomber” (1941) by Michael Curtiz is now perceived as a high-budget theatrical preview or trailer that lasts two hours and was shot at the request of the US army. In an entirely different spirit, another movie by Michael Curtiz, “Casablanca” (1942) was shot during war time. In this film, in spite of some positive propaganda elements, there is a feeling of tragedy and hopelessness.

Nobody claims that propaganda cinema is something worthless. For example, British directors Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger managed to shoot a film ordered by the state to improve British-American relationships. It was “A Matter of Life and Death”, which became a wonderful parable. This creative pair was relatively free in their self-expression, even with hard frames via studio requests and ideological inquiries by the state. It was in the film “The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp” by these directors, which was shot in the very heat of the Second World War, that for the first time showed an image of a German who was disappointed with the ideas of Nazism, and who had suspended relationships with his grown-up sons who had become Nazis and later left their native country because of it. For the movies of the war period, it was typical to show the enemy like a stupid animal that cannot even think and has only negative traits. So it is not surprising that Winston Churchill disliked this film.

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3 Ibid, p. 34.
In general, American films on the topic of the Second World War can be divided into two groups:

– “We did not participate in this war”. Repentance syndrome. Examples: “From here to eternity”, “The Judgment of Nuremberg”;
– “We also struggle”. Examples: “STALAG – 17”, “Young Lions”.

One of the most vivid examples proving the first hypothesis is the film “From here to eternity” by Fred Zinneman, an Austrian film director who moved to Hollywood after the Nazis came to power. This screen adaptation of James John’s novel with the same name is a perfect example of shooting films in the United States and on American material by a non-American film director. Because of the negative image it gives of the American army, filmmakers for a long time could not find an approach to it. At last, one film director had to make a compromise, which eventually happened. This movie is rarely mentioned in English-speaking literature and reference books on film history. Of course, it is not mentioned at all in the book by Roger Manvell. And it is not surprising: at that time, in the heat of war in Vietnam, it was unfavorable to show the American army negatively. To prove this statement, it is useful to mention that some other war films of Fred Zinneman are analyzed in this monograph: “The Seventh Cross” (1944), “The Search” (1948) and “The Men” (1950). In all of these films, American soldiers are shown positively. The movie “From here to eternity” completely breaks away from a positive image of the American army. It was practically the first time when all of the carefully hidden defects of the American army were shown on American screen: drunkenness, stupid bosses, the humiliation of soldiers, debauchery, etc. American army life is shown in its moment of disorder, which is only a part of the national crisis that is seen as leading to great social changes. If the example of this film’s uniqueness is any indication, the army of a country which proclaimed democracy as its main political ideology still suppresses the freedom of choice in cases such as films that show its officials and public servants in a bad light.

In American films on the Second World War, the conflict of two different points of view is clearly seen. On the one hand, there is an official view, something like “we all participated in this war”. And on the other hand, there is an informal view, as it is presented for example in the film “From here to eternity”: “we were not in this war” and the impossibility to get into the war leads to full degradation of the army in general and some individuals in particular. The film “From here to eternity” influenced Soviet movies as some devices from this movie were borrowed by Mikhail Kalatozov in his film “Letayat zhuravli”, one of the greatest films on the Second World War.

Proof of the second hypothesis is found in that American films from the 1950s on World War II (for example, “STALAG-17”) are classical examples of a desire for moral rehabilitation. For the first time in American movies, the theme of prisoner-of-war camp, hero, and traitor appears. For example, films like “The Caine Mutiny” (1954, by Edward Dmitryk) help Americans to resist the syndrome of not participating in the war and to feel a sense of guilt by showing images of people who were actively at war since the first days of America’s entrance into the War. Another film by Edward Dmitryk, “Young Lions” (1959), based upon the novel by Irwin Shaw with the same title, is shot with a completely different tonality. It can be seen as a remarkable change that resulted from the character development of enemy imagery in American movies: from “Casablanca”, where the killed foes’ representatives are spoken about with sarcasm and even scorn, to “Young Lions”, where one of the

6 Ibid, p. 73.
main heroes is a young Nazi German who gradually becomes disappointed in the ideology of his native country (wonderfully played by Marlon Brando). This was the first time in American cinema, when a reflective enemy with an intensive inner life struggle is shown. Such a change in perspective toward one’s enemy as portrayed in film was a greater character innovation in America. The fact that the enemy is not a stupid pawn, that obeys its leader thoughtlessly, is proven in the image of German soldier Christian Distl. Marlon Brando personally built up the role. It was easier for him to play a stupid animal, but in this case there would be no problem in his hero. The director let the actor play this adaptive, growing type of character without changes in the plot. The fault of the hero is that he tries to lull his conscious by Philistines’ excuse: “Everybody does so”. In the films “From here to eternity” and “Young Lions”, the theme of the Great Depression is reservedly present; it is a well-known fact that this theme for a long time was closed off from American movies. Nevertheless, this film has much in common with the overall genre of Hollywood production, which means that it has a happy ending, where the enemy is punished and a positive hero is awarded with a well-deserved happy and peaceful life.

As a conclusion, the results of my research can be summed up in the following statements. In the American war films analyzed, the directors dare to tell some truths about the Second World War, which were not told in the first postwar decade. They are in this sense original documentaries or stories of their time, where they show how artists change their interpretation about the war. Of course, in general, American movies pay much more attention to the common genre features rather than to the historical truth. But the movie “From here to eternity” is a great exception to this law.

Another important law that can be traced in war movies of most countries (and in American one’s as well) can be formulated as follows: the more time goes by from the end of World War II, the more terrible, tragic and hopeless it is depicted in films. If in the first post-war decade mostly comedies were shot, in the 1950s – 1960s, comedies were replaced by serious existential dramas (just compare, for example, two films on the same topic: “Foreign Affair” (1948) and “The Judgment of Nuremberg” (1961), which are shot in completely different tonalities). One more important detail: most of all war films of this period are screen adaptations of popular books. So we can make a conclusion that at that time fiction literature still played a great role in American society.

In general, American films on the Second World War in the 1950’s and early 60’s represent a new kind of psychological reflection on this event. Therefore, we can even talk about a repetitive screen adaptation of the Second World War as much more sincere, less official and one that discovered new details about this war that were not known earlier.

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8 Bereznitsky J. Kak sozdat’ samogo sebya [How to Create Yourself], Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1976, p. 85.
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