European Politics and Society
Studies by Young Russian Scholars

Volume 4

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The Schools were organized and conducted by the Centre for German and European Studies at St. Petersburg State University in co-operation with the Russian Branch of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and Centre for European Studies – EU Centre at the European University at St. Petersburg.

The presented articles are dedicated to different aspects of European politics and society, and can be of interest for everybody interested in these topics.

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Preface

The publication of the first three volumes of this book in 2009-2011 demonstrated that the interest of both authors and readers in European matters was not only present, but that it has in fact strengthened. The fourth volume contains papers mainly from the PhD students who participated in the most recent Fifth Summer School-2011 for postgraduate students entitled, “European Union Studies: Methodological Opportunities and Limits”, with some participants of the previous four Summer Schools also taking part. All of the Schools were organized and run by the Center for German and European Studies at St. Petersburg State University and University of Bielefeld in co-operation with the Center for European Studies at the European University at St. Petersburg and the Russian Branch of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation. The Summer Schools have taken place in Strelna, a suburb of St. Petersburg, in June of every year since 2007.

The Summer Schools are aimed at tackling two of the main needs of PhD students working in European studies and on related topics in Russia: 1) the need to combat a lack of knowledge in Russia about new developing theoretical concepts in European politics and governance and 2) the need to better understand research methodology for PhD students’ own research. Both of these needs (conceptual and methodological) were confirmed during the first Summer School. The answers to theses issues, proposed during the course of the School, were recognized as appropriate both by the participating professors and students. Therefore, after the first successful experience, the Schools became annual events and have attracted a good deal of interest.

The main goal of the Summer Schools was defined thus: to give young Russian researchers a stronger theoretical and methodological background in European studies and to train their skills for use in the analysis of social and political processes. To achieve this goal, the following forms of teaching were combined:
- Lectures by German and Russian political and social scientists on different theoretical and methodological approaches in European studies, including demonstrating research results and ways of using them for students’ studies;
- Methodological discussion of the papers and research plans presented by the participants.

Daily classes were divided into two parts: one theoretical and one practical. During the theoretical meetings, German and Russian professors presented the theoretical and methodological foundations of European Union studies. The practical part of the classes was dedicated to applying this knowledge to participants’ scientific research programs and their papers through discussion of the student presentations. This was also supplemented by general discussions.

The idea for such a school emerged in 2005 thanks to a group of students from Petrozavodsk State University – young political scientists who studied both European studies and Russian politics. They saw a large gap between studies of European integration and politics on the one hand and Russia’s transforming politics on the other hand. Various different theoretical approaches were developed for these two different objects of research and these were applied in separate and divergent ways. Therefore, the question was asked as to whether these theories and theoretical approaches can help us to understand some of the other related objects of research. More specifically, the question arose as to whether European Studies can help in better understanding Russian politics and vice versa. The general idea of the School was therefore, from the beginning, connected with recent discussions of tendencies towards the development of different theoretical approaches both in Europe and Russia, which can be applied both in and for European and Russian contexts. So, all the time the idea of comparing European and Russian studies as well as applying them to various objects of research was kept in mind, although different topics and aspects were discussed on different days at the Schools.

The First Summer School was oriented mostly towards research of European governance, which was discussed in its contemporary form and with regard to prospects for the future of European Studies as a perspective, which has both opportunities and limits in Russian Studies. Approaches to European regionalism were especially interesting for many of the Russian students. European regionalism as a basis for European politics in the 21st century was then analyzed in terms of its conceptual foundations, empirical phenomena and strategic consequences. The influence of the EU on Russian regionalism studies was also an interesting topic for discussion. Studies of European identity were considered on one of the working days as well. In this regard, especially such aspects as European changes to the conception of identity and a comparison of European national identity concepts and Russian identity studies were at the center of the debate.

The Second Summer School paid special attention, together with research methodology, to discussing problem-oriented teaching and research in European Studies. In the field of European Studies, the topics of nation states and citizenship as well as civic education were discussed for a whole working day. One day was dedicated to discussing issues connected with globalization studies and border studies in contemporary Europe and Russia which are of special interest for PhD students, especially for those working in the North-Western region of Russia with its long, common border with EU countries. Finally, the problems of contemporary federalism and regionalism studies in Europe and Russia attracted much interest from the students, a majority of whom work not in the center, but in the provincial regions of the Russian Federation.

By keeping its main focus on the methodological issues and problems, the Third Summer School also paid much attention to the issues of the Europeanization of policies in the EU countries, as well as to the issues surrounding the transformations of ethnic, national and European identities in contemporary Europe. Special attention to the role of mass media in the Europeanization and European identity-building process was also a part of the lectures. More generally, the problems of contemporary European studies and the transformation of European governance together with its multi-level character were also intensely discussed from different perspectives. As usual, the students’ papers were presented and discussed in detail. They were dedicated to topics connected with European integration and the Europeanization of national policies, the comparison of European
and Russian policies as well as to relationships between the EU and Russia.

The Fourth and Fifth Summer Schools were marked especially by the focus on methodological problems and on the state of the art in the European Studies in Europe and Russia as well as by the inclusion of topics of traditional interest to the Russian audience, such as Identity Building in Europe and Russia, European Governance, the European Public Space etc.

During all the Summer Schools the students present their research design and discuss the methodological problems together with the other students and lecturers. For these proposes, they are usually divided into two or three panels for the presentations of their papers, so that in this way it is possible to ensure that everyone has enough time to present his/her topic and to discuss it with the other participants of his/her panel afterwards. Usually, the students are very glad to have interesting input not only from scholars, but also from other PhD students. Because they are from very different academic backgrounds, from sociologists to political scientists, historians, economists and jurists, different perspectives and approaches to the topics being discussed could be provided.

During the preparation phase and during the last school, Dr. Maria Nozhenko (Center for European Studies, European University at St. Petersburg) not only delivered lectures, but actively participated in all school discussions and sessions. The first panel “European Politics” was moderated by Dr. Denis Gruber (DAAD Lecturer, St. Petersburg State University) and Dr. Elena Belokurova (scientific manager of the Center for German and European Studies, St. Petersburg State University). The second panel “European Identities and Societies” was moderated by Dr. Maria Nozhenko (Center for European Studies, European University at St. Petersburg) and Dr. Tatjana Zimenkova (University of Bielefeld, German Deputy Director of the Center for German and European Studies). These academics not only moderated all the research seminars, but also gave detailed feedback on papers to all participants.

During the summer schools, many Russian and German professors held lectures and gave useful advice to the students. In this regard, many thanks go to Prof. Dr. Tanja Boerzel (Free University Berlin), Prof. Dr. Reinholdt Hedtke (Center for German and European Studies, University of Bielefeld), Dr. Markus Kaiser (DAAD Lecturer, St. Petersburg State University), Prof. Dr. Martin Nettesheim (European Center for Federalism Studies, University of Tuebingen), Dr. Elena Nikiforova (Center for Independent Social Research, St. Petersburg), Prof. Dr. Thomas Risse (Free University Berlin), Prof. Dr. Berthold Rittberger (University of Mannheim), Prof. Dr. Detlef Sack (University of Bielefeld), Prof. Dr. Peter Schmitt-Egner (University of Siegen), Prof. Marina Strezhneva (Institute for World Economy and International Relations, Moscow), Prof. Dr. Andreas Vasilache (German Director of the Center for German and European Studies, University of Bielefeld), Dr. Tatjana Zimenkova (Center for German and European Studies, University of Bielefeld) and Dr. Gleb Yarovoy (Department for Political and Social Sciences, Petrozavodsk State University). In 2011, for the first time not Russian or German, but a Lithuainian professor took part in the school: it was Prof. Gintautas Mažeikis (Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania), who was invited by the partner organization Centre for European Studies – EU Centre from the European University at St. Petersburg, to introduce the social anthropological perspective of the European studies.

The tradition of organizing special “Meetings on the Neva” in the framework of the School, where the participants have a chance not only to discuss the academic aspects of their work, but also to learn some practical perspectives and experiences of EU-Russian cooperation, also became especially important.

Special thanks also go to the administrators of the Schools. The first school was organized by a group of PhD students from the European University at St. Petersburg, the next by interns and administrators of the Centre for European Studies, European University at St. Petersburg and Center for German and European Studies at St. Petersburg State University. The third and the fourth school was fully administered by Ekaterina Kolesova, administrator of the Center for German and European Studies, with the assistance of the CGES content manager, Anna Zhelnina, and the CGES interns. In 2011, these interns were Olga Novikova from the MA program “Studies in European Societies” who studied at the Department of Sociol-
Preface

Introduction: European Studies in the Eyes of Young Russian Scholars
Elena Belokurova

This fourth volume continues the publication of articles written by young Russian scholars from several disciplines with the common research object of European politics and societies. Like in the previous volumes, all the texts presented are connected to dissertation topics defended or to be defended by students enrolled in various Russian universities and academic institutes.

Like before, the authors were selected by means of an open call for applications to participate in the summer schools (which became the only precondition for publication) and not on the basis of any special search for authors. Therefore, the collection does not really represent the most important institutions connected with European studies in Russia, such as the Moscow think-tanks, academic institutes and central universities. Quite the contrary, the authors are from very different, non-central universities and cities in Russia, as well as from very different disciplines and with varying levels of knowledge. However, they all are working on topics related to Europe; they are at the very beginning of their scientific careers and are a good indication of a new, developing interest in European studies in Russia.

Like in the previous “Introductions”, here I also will try to analyze the content of the volume within the framework of the broader situation connected with European studies in Russia. In this sense, I will show how the tendencies which were discovered before are being continued also in 2011-2012. By coming back to this topic every year since 2008, I consider it as a long term observation, which can bring some interesting results due to the temporary comparison of the incoming topics of the summer school participants and of the papers provided by the students for this publication.
The first tendency which was shown in the previous volumes is connected with the fact that Moscow-based central institutions have lost their monopoly over the European studies in Russia which they previously enjoyed. Other educational and research institutes outside of Moscow have begun to be interested in European studies. This volume again demonstrates it. Aside Moscow and St. Petersburg, the young authors represent the regional universities from Saratov, Novosibirsk, Kostrama, Nizhny Novgorod, and Petrozavodsk.

The second tendency is in the more and more active involvement of the new disciplines into the European studies. Although the most ‘natural’ international relations and legal studies are still the most popular in this field, other disciplines like comparative politics, sociology, history, cultural studies, economics etc. have become more and more involved with European studies. In comparison with the European studies in the European Union, in Russia this tendency is especially difficult, and therefore interesting and important. By being situated outside of the traditional for the European studies focus on the European Union, Russian scholars quite naturally are interested in the studies of EU-Russian relations and other aspects of the orientation towards Russia. Therefore, the international relations and legal perspectives are especially significant for the European studies in Russia. This makes it especially outstanding that also in Russia more and more studies of European topics and subjects became popular in the comparative politics, policy-analysis, sociology, economics etc. Thus, in the present volume, together with the traditional international relations studies, also economics, legal studies, policy analysis, sociology, gender studies and linguistics are represented.

Yet the papers presented in the volume show that the tendencies in European studies seen already in the previous volumes are stabilizing, and the interest in European studies is growing in Russia. The fact that young scholars writing their PhD dissertations in different regional universities of Russia have such focus, shows that this momentum comes not only from the central Russian cities or from people who have studied in the West, but from the internal academic and political development of Russia.

At the same time, the content of the volumes reflects the disciplinary division and perspectives in contemporary European studies in Russia. Like before, in this fourth volume some articles are dedicated to issues of the development of European politics and European society. But in comparison with the previous situation, when the articles on European politics dominated over these on European society, in this fourth volume (like already in the third one) seven papers on European societies are presented together with only five papers on European politics.

On Part 1 “European Politics”
The articles in the political science sections usually discuss topics connected with classical studies of the European Union politics and policies. In the present volume they are represented by the analysis of the EU policies, which are somehow connected with Russia and therefore especially interesting for the Russian scholars. Those are the EU policies towards the EU external borders and neighbors, among which Russia is a special and very important one: the policy on the Baltic Sea and on the EU Eastern neighborhood and cross-border cooperation with the third countries. Traditionally, a very important topic in the political section is connected with the Europeanization of the national states’ policies and interaction between the European supranational and national levels of politics and policies. In the presented volume this topic is shown on the example of the Council of Europe and application of its norms on the level of its member states including Russia. The national policies on the traditional state level are analyzed in two last contributions of the political section. They are dedicated to the understanding of the tax policies in the European countries and science models in Germany and Russia. Thus, in the part 1 “European Politics” policies on both levels of international organizations (the European Union and the Council of Europe) and nation states are analyzed as well as the interaction between these levels of politics.

The volume starts with a consideration of the European Union Strategy on the Baltic Sea Region, which was analyzed by Natalia Putilina, a PhD student at the Faculty of Sociology at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH) in Moscow. In her contribution she describes in-depth the history, background, chronology, and political significance and consequences of the adoption of the
European Union’s Strategy on the Baltic Sea. It is a unique policy instrument, which was elaborated in 2009 in the very special region of the European North, where already many actors, institutions and organizations were deeply collaborating together and so developing a unique network of cooperation and regional integration. For the interpretation and understanding of the political significance of the Strategy on the Baltic Sea, Putilina considers not only the political declarations and policy papers of the EU political institutions, but also action plans and concrete projects which are implemented within the Strategy both by the EU and member states. As a result, she comes to the conclusion that the Strategy is at the same time a result, a reason and a “key tool of maintenance of territorial coherence of macroregion, both for the Baltic Sea, and continental territories”. This should be taken into consideration by Russia, which is also a coastal state for the Baltic Sea and being not part of the European Union is a part of the Baltic Sea region and its cooperation networks.

The external policies of the EU and especially its neighborhood policy and cross-border cooperation with the external countries are discussed in the second paper from the political part of the volume. It is written by Nadezhda Zhuk, a PhD student at the Institute for Regional Economy Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. She analyses very seriously the history, main reasons and features and advantages of the Wider Europe concept, which defines the mechanisms of the cooperation of the EU with its neighboring countries. It is considered in the boarder conceptual framework, which includes not only the aspects of foreign policy, but also the EU’s specific understanding of the borders and cross-border cooperation. It helps to understand the political logic of the European Union better. Of course, by writing the article in Moscow, Zhuk is especially interested in the EU policies towards Russia and the role of cross-border cooperation which is played in it. Therefore, she analyses in more detail the European Neighborhood Policy and the corresponding European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, which is also relevant for the EU-Russian cross-border cooperation. The advantage of the article is that the attention is paid not only to the EU policies, but also to the Russian reactions and undertaken political measures. At the end, the author concludes that despite the lack of the strategic vision of the EU-Russian dialog and many problems, which should be solved in its framework, the cross-border cooperation takes and will continue to take a special and very important role by developing everyday interactions and cooperation of all kind of actors on both sides of the common border.

The policy and the role of another European international organization is considered in the volume using the example of the Council of Europe. Elena Gulyaeva, a young researcher from Saratov State Academy of Law at the Department of European Law and Comparative Law, studies the application of the European Convention on Human Rights, and especially its Article 5. It is a very important article of the Convention for many member states, because it allows lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. In her article, Gulyaeva writes about different legal aspects of Article 5, their implications and application in the legal practice and in the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. She analyses many cases connected with the Russian Federation and other Convention member states and makes interesting conclusions on the solid empirical basis. Finally, she comes to the conclusions that the European Court of Human Rights has developed some standards of interpretation to ensure the right to liberty and security of a person, which should be implemented at the national level by the member states for the achievement of the Convention’s aims. This contribution provides an example of the legal study, which is done in the traditional framework of jurisprudence.

In such a way, the first three articles deal mostly with the supranational and international level of European politics and policies, on the examples of the European Union and the Council of Europe and their corresponding political institutions. Although they are the most typical for the European studies, the research of national policies is still important and relevant, because many policy fields, even in the European Union, are still in the competence of the national level. The further two articles present the examples of such policy fields: tax policy and policy towards science organization. In both articles, the models of Germany are especially considered.
The national tax policies and their roots, theoretical background and different theoretical approaches to the taxation policies are the subject of research carried out by a PhD student of the Faculty of Sociology at St. Petersburg State University, Pavel Zakharin. His article provides a good example of the analysis done in the field of so called ‘fiscal sociology’, which is aimed on the understanding of the roots of different approaches to the taxation. In his contribution, Zakharin discusses both traditional and alternative approaches, makes an overview of the history, and current theoretical and social discussions on them. He underlines that the alternative approach is based not only on the economic theory and government perspectives, but should take into consideration tax moral, differences in compliance with the tax legislation between the countries, as well as such key factors as ethical standards and concerns, justice, and relationship between a government and its taxpayers. As result, he makes a conclusion that the alternative approach, which “aims to put the tax system in a broader social perspective and to highlight its dependence on other subsystems of society”, is very important now and will be developed further in the framework of fiscal sociology. So, this paper presents a very interesting contribution to the understanding of the roots of one of the most important policy fields still developed in Europe on the national level.

Another research on the national policy field is presented in the article of Ekaterina Studentsova, a graduate from MA Programme “Studies in European Societies” at the Faculty of Sociology at St. Petersburg State University, who is currently a PhD student at the Higher School of Economics – National Research University in Moscow. In her contribution, Studentsova analyses the establishment and transformation of the Russian and German models of science in the comparative perspective. By showing the basic elements of both German and Russian models, Studentsova finds out which of them are similar and different, and how they can be compared. It allows the making of very interesting conclusions about both of them. She describes both historical development since the 17th century and the current situation. In doing such a comparative research, she demonstrates how convergent with the German model, or the European one, the Russian science model was before the Russian October revolution in 1917, after which it started to diverge. It was developed differently within the Soviet socialist system, and now again has both convergence and divergence tendencies of transformation.

A review of the articles from the political part shows that young Russian scholars are working most successfully on topics from European studies, which are connected with Russia. All of the presented contributions in different ways deal with Russia. The first of them have analyzed the European Union policies towards its neighbors, which are of special relevance for Russia. The third was about the Council of Europe and its Convention on Human Rights, where Russia is a member. The fourth article on the theoretical and historical roots of taxation is relevant for every capitalist country, including Russia. The last paper has presented a good example of the comparative research, where the Russian case is compared with the German one. Moreover, the papers from this part make a very useful contribution to different disciplines including political science, international relations, legal studies, and new direction of fiscal sociology. This means that the study of European politics has become more multi-disciplinary, with more different perspectives. Moreover, the high quality of the presented contributions shows the potential of Russian social scholars in European studies worldwide.

On Part 2 “European Societies”

The sociological part concentrating on European societies is for the second time bigger than the political one in this fourth volume; a fact that attests to the increasing significance of sociology and related social disciplines in the Russian branch of European Studies. As usual, the most popular topic presented in three articles is connected with the study of supranational European identity-building and the theoretical and methodological problems in studying it. One more article is dedicated to the research of the theoretical perspective for the studies of the European level of society. All three other papers present the results of empirical research carried out in two European countries: Poland and Germany. So, the scholars study both the European and national societies in Europe.

The first article on the problems and perspectives of forming a European identity is written by Anna Isakova, a PhD student at the
Faculty of Sociology at St. Petersburg State University, working now in the Centre for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg. She formulates an interesting question “on the reasons why the question of common European identity is now so actively discussed both on the level of academic institutions and by European policy makers”. To do so, she presents an overview of this problematic field for the study of European supranational identity both in the academic and political fields. She pays much attention to understanding the definition and operationalization of the European identity and especially to the determination of “European demos”. Isakova carefully analyses different points of view presented by different scholars in the current debates by pointing out especially such factors as sharing history, values, and so called “othering”. Study of the political agenda for European identity-building brings the author to the conclusion that nowadays, when the EU citizens feel some crisis of the European project, the politics should formulate more profound strategy and implement more measures to strengthen the European identity. So, this essay tries to formulate some questions, which are very popular in contemporary European studies and which traditionally raise much interest among Russian scholars.

The debate on European identity building is also a subject of research presented by Alexander Kustov, associate researcher at the Laboratory of Comparative Social Research at Higher School of Economics, who currently holds a DAAD postgraduate fellowship in GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim in Germany. In his article he makes the first step in elaborating the complicated issue of European identity building by presenting a good overview of the current theoretical debate on this subject. But his aim is a little bit different than in the previous article of this volume: he is oriented toward finding the ways for the quantitative empirical study of this subject. Moreover, Kustov brings the debate on European identity building into the broader perspective of the academic discussions on cosmopolitan studies. In such a way, he considers the European identity as one example of supranational identities with the corresponding values, which are being developed in the contemporary world more and more actively. As result of his inquiry, Kustov comes to the formulation of the very concrete research agenda on the supranational and cosmopolitan values including the problems of operationalization, hypothesizing, evaluation of the available empirical data, and needs for the further research in this perspective.

The last, but not least important article on the European identity is presented by Elena Tsumarova, a PhD student at the Department for Political and Social Sciences at Petrozavodsk State University. Like the other two previous articles, this paper also seeks for the explanations of the nature of the European identity building and its crisis, but gives another very interesting perspective on it. Tsumarova tries to go deeply into the very nature of the identity and identity politics by bringing both sociological and political science perspectives into it. Firstly, she looks into identity politics as a political struggle of week social groups for their social and political recognition as it is being done in the sociological tradition. In this case, the explanation of the crisis of the European identity is explained by the lack of such a strong identification of some social group in politics. Secondly, she considers the political science perspective on identity politics, which is understood as a policy. As Tsumarova clearly shows, this is a more promising perspective in the European identity studies, but it still demonstrates some essential problems in the political structure and institutional design of the European Union, which lead to the crisis of European identity building as well. This article is useful not only as an example of the European identity studies, but also for every regional identity research on all the levels from the sociological and political science perspectives.

Another opening of a new research perspective on the subject of society development in the European Union is presented by Ekaterina Filatova who is currently a PhD student and senior teacher of English at the Department of Foreign Languages at the Novosibirsk State Technical University. In her article she analyses the work-life balance by women, i.e. in the gender perspective in the European Union. She looks on the history of the problem, definition and different approaches to the concept developed in the United States, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development and in other international forums. But the main question is connected with the European Union employment policy and its effects on the
Germany. Anna Sukhova, PhD student of the Faculty of Sociology at Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod, during her internship at the University of Duisburg-Essen University (Germany) in Fall 2011 has carried out 27 in-depth semi-structured interviews with the foreign students in both sciences and humanities. The paper presents the first results of its analysis structured into such blocks as the trip’s goals, trouble situations, issues of communication, academic adjustment, language proficiency, culture issues, and financial issues. For each of these aspects, the author presents both quantitative and qualitative data, which are complementing to each other and allow for very interesting observations and conclusions on very different issues. As for the general conclusions, Sukhova comes both to the academic and practical findings that the crucial adjustment factors enabling international students to feel confident and successful are connected with the host culture and community support, namely, the support received from the university, its members and agencies or departments. Thus, the article offers a good empirical analysis which can be developed further into a comparative perspective using data from other universities and countries.

Another aspect of the problems of migrants’ integration and behavior in European societies are analysed in the next article by Anna Sukhova from the Faculty of Foreign Languages specializing in English and German Languages at Lobachevsky State University of Nizhni Novgorod. In her research she tries to understand the situation of migrants in Germany through the linguistic analysis of cross-cultural specific character of comic in the German writer-migrants works. She looks at the short humor stories written by there authors: a Syrian-German storyteller and critic Rafik Schami, a Russian-born German short story writer, columnist, and disc jockey of Jewish origin Vladimir Kaminer, and Sasha Stanišić, who was born in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In her contribution, Sukhova firstly explains the nature and role of comic and humor as specific meta-communicative process, and then in detail explains what linguistic tools and instruments are chosen by the writer-migrants in order to present their native culture in Germany. It is interestingly enough that having different background and native languages, by writing...
Thus the collection of articles presented in this volume contributes to European Studies in Russia and, to some extent, reveals certain gaps and limitations in this academic field so far. With their different disciplinary belongings, the authors bring their new perspectives, approaches, theories and methodologies into a field which has been traditionally dominated by the international relations perspective in Russia. Since the contributions to the presented volumes are prepared by young Russian scholars, this provides hope for the long-term sustainability of the field which can actually enrich European studies not just in Russia, but also globally.

In general, the second part of the volume focuses on European societies and consists mainly of contributions reflecting European identity-building, trust and migration studies. All these topics are very traditional themes for sociology and sociological analysis, however now they are being used to facilitate the understanding of not just one’s own society, but also of other, foreign European societies, such as the whole European Union, Poland, Germany, and other countries. In most cases they do not even offer any explicit comparison with Russia. This can be explained by the difficulties associated with the comparison of such radically different contexts and subjects in the case of the European Union and Russia. Yet still, such a comparison can make sense when these different cases are treated in the methodologically proper way. Moreover, some research topics and subjects can be identified where similarities between both dependent and independent variables can be found. For example, some social problems, identity building, migration and trust in Russia can be compared with those in the EU or EU member states by finding some similar and different aspects, reasons and consequences as well as through explaining factors and policy responses.

Moreover, it is interesting that in the whole volume the three most developed perspectives in the branch of European studies focused on Russia such as EU-Russian relations, the Europeanization of the Russian politics and society; while comparison between the EU and Russian policies are not really presented in this volume. EU-Russian relations were mentioned only in the articles on the Wider Europe concept and a little bit on the EU’s Baltic Sea Strategy. The Europeanization of Russian politics is to some extent considered in the article on the European Convention on Human Rights and application of its Article 5 in Russia, but also in other Council of Europe member states. The comparison is on the research agenda of only one author, who tries to analyze models of science in Germany and Russia. In general, the collected articles have not many connections to Russia and present the examples of pure European studies, especially in the field of sociology.
The present article focuses on the analysis of the Strategy of the European Union for the Baltic Sea region. For better understanding the purpose and functioning the Strategy, the overview of the European integration in the North of Europe and in particular its collaboration with Russian Federation is given. In this article the author analyzes the reasons and landmarks that led to the creation of the first macro-region Strategy for the Northern Europe.

So, to start with, from the middle of the 1970s the European Union pays considerable attention to its regional policy. The major stages on this way are establishment in 1973 of the European Regional Development Fund; radical reform of structural funds in 1989; in accordance of the to the Maastricht Treaty establishment of the Cohesion Fund in 1993 and Committee of the Regions in 1994.

Nowadays the regional dimension of the European integration is expressed in formation and implementation of the policy of regions directed on curtailment of regional distinctions, strengthening of transboundary and interregional cooperation, development of the infrastructure and economic cooperation. So for example the Baltic Sea region including not only the countries of the Northern Europe, but also the Baltic states as well as the Northwest of Russia became one of the main actors of integration processes in Europe, and in particular the regional policy of the EU. Activities of such regional organizations as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, special administration bodies—the Nordic Council, Northern Dimension EU initiative—all this proves that the countries of the region pay special attention to the development of the regional integration in the North of Europe.¹

The important role in the implementation of the regional policy belongs to the new initiative of the European Union – the Baltic Sea initiative.

The Background
The first initiative of the European Union directed on development of the Baltic region was the Northern Dimension (ND) Initiative has been presented by the prime minister of Finland Mr. Lipponen in September 1997 at the intergovernmental conference “The Baltic Region Today”. In June 1999 the substantive provisions on its implementation have been approved at a meeting of heads of the EU member states in Cologne. The geographical operative range of ND covers territory of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Poland, three Baltic States and Russia. In realization of projects in the ND framework the third countries also can theoretically take part. This regional initiative accumulates financial resources of the organizations of the EU and region, including the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, Northern Investment Bank. The purpose of the ND is the strengthening of stability, well-being and sustainable development in the North of Europe. The ND is focused on concrete cooperation for the problem solving, connected with the common challenges and opportunities. Such interaction is useful not only for the countries of this macroregion, but also for Europe as a whole.

At the Northern Dimension summit in Helsinki in November 2006, which was held under the presidency of Finland in the European Union, heads of the countries participants have approved some new basic documents for the Northern Dimension Policy: the Frame Document and the Political Declaration. The adopted documents, which operate on a constant basis, have replaced the Northern Dimension Action Plans for 2000–2003 and 2003-2006 and serve as a guide for its further implementation.

ND continues to focus its attention on the problems having special significance for the northern regions, such as vulnerable environment, public health services and social well-being, cultural variety and indigenous peoples. The purpose of updating of basic documents is the policy activation of the Northern Dimension and strengthening of adherence of all participating partners. The ND initiative directed to expansion and strengthening of all-round communications in the North of Europe in sphere of ecology, economy, public health services and transport has formed a basis for deepening cooperation between the countries and for creation and the implementation of the first comprehensive strategy of the EU at the “macroregion” level – strategy across the Baltic Sea. ND is the initiative and policy of the EU, but achievement of concrete results in many sectors demands cooperation with Russia and other states. Besides, in the European Council Declaration adopted in December 2009 it is noticed that the external directions of the Strategy will be carried out with the participation of the ND structures.

The Formulation and Purpose of the Baltic Sea Strategy
In December 2007 the EU stakeholders (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden) have addressed to the European Commission a request to prepare strategy for the Baltic region development. Since November 2008 the public consultations and numerous public debates through the Internet has been carried out by the European Commission in eight countries. On June 10, 2009 the European Commission has published the first proposals on the Baltic Sea region. Presented by Danuta Hubner, a Commissioner on the regional policy, the Strategy was directed on the maximal usage of the development potential of the EU member states and regions around the Baltic Sea, whose population without adjoining regions of Russia makes almost 100 million people. Hubner said: “In the strategy we will indicate examples of the main potential actions to be carried out as soon as possible... I believe that we should have strong political leadership where it is needed, so we need governments of the region. We must find a way to maintain the priority and support that the Member States are showing. In my view this could

be best done by using the resources and qualities of the European Council and the Council of Ministers... I believe that the existing mechanisms, especially the Northern Dimension Partnership, should be used and, if necessary, adapted to enable the strategy to succeed with support from all sides".1

Strategy of the European Union for the Baltic Sea region is formulated in three documents:
• The Communication of the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament;2
• The Action Plan, supplementing the Communication, presented to the Commission and the European Parliament;3
• Commission staff working document a brief overview, in which preconditions, the approach and the Strategy maintenance are specified.

The Communication gives proof of the Baltic Strategy, its main objectives and problems. It claims the implementation of a complex EU marine policy, the necessity to react to the ecological changes concerning Baltic Sea in time, and application of the ND experiences for strengthening external aspects of the cooperation in the region.

The Action Plan contains an initial set of priority actions for the Strategy. It is regularly reconsidered by the stakeholders; it also includes the activities of other EU member states and the key stakeholders. The existing version of the Plan made in June 2009 will be updated in a context of development of the region.

The European Strategy for region of the Baltic Sea provides some measures for the development of such spheres as environment (for example, problems of waste water treatment); economy (in particular, encouragement of innovative technologies at small and medium enterprises); power and transportation (increasing of the region’s accessibility); safety (for example, improvement of cooperation, co-ordination and the coherence of maritime safety and surveillance agencies and disaster response).

These spheres in the Action Plan are subdivided for 15 priority directions including 80 large regional projects in the fields of power, transport, preservation of the environment, innovations, scientific research, tourism, public safety. Coordination of each of them is assigned to the EU member states, which work for its implementation in close connection with the other states, local and regional authorities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (see Figure 1). The member states participate in several projects simultaneously; as a result, they bear responsibility for all directions at the same time.

The Strategy formulation was caused by the current requirements of the region and the whole European Union. Five years after the last EU enlargement, the region still meets serious difficulties. The Sea condition worsens because of excessive dumps of nitrates and phosphates, and its biological variety is under the threat. The interrelation of economic systems of the countries demands improvement. The statistics shows its excessive dependence on trade with the nearest neighbors. The region suffers also from the big distances within it, and in relation to other Europe: for example, the trip by train from Warsaw to Tallinn takes 36 hours. Another problem is disconnexion of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from the point of view of power supply. At last, the increasing quantity of the bulk-oil tankers in the Baltic Sea represents constant threat of failures and even ecological accidents.

There is a strong need in coordination improvement between numerous interested state structures. Many of problems raised now in the region are in sphere of the EU policy and competence. Structural Funds programs in the region create a necessary basis for close cooperation on Strategy implementation. The European Commission addresses with its suggestions to the EU member states, and also recognizes that many problems can be solved only in strong cooperation with Russia.

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The basic advantage of the Strategy is that now all eight EU countries compromising into the region of Baltic Sea – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden – can plan the activity and place priorities, knowing that their neighbors also put the efforts and means in region development.

It is important to underline also that the EU has developed for the first time such a comprehensible strategy at “macroregion” level. It could inspire application of similar approaches in such areas, as the Mediterranean or a river basin Danube. In particular, it is the first step in a direction to regional realization of a complex EU maritime policy.¹

The Core Projects of the Strategy
EU programs are of great importance for the Baltic region due to their solid financial base. During the period from 2007 till 2013 the region will receive more than 50 billion euro of investments including 27 billion on improvement of access to region, almost 10 billion on preservation of the environment, 6.7 billion on development of competitiveness and 697 million euro on safety and prevention of risks. A variety of problems as it was pointed out at the informal meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the EU countries in Leipzig in 2007, makes this region fine model for application of the approach of territorial coherence.

The European Commission putting forward the mentioned above indicative Action Plan has coordinated it with the EU member states and large regional companies participants to promote introduction of projects.

The planned measures are grouped in four pillars according to the basic directions of the Strategy, but it is made for illustration purposes only: each pillar is connected with a wide set the politician and will influence all other ones.²

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² Commission staff working document accompanying the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea region Action Plan, May 2010.
The first pillar – ecological stability of the Baltic region is realized on the basis of such documents, as the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the Action Plan in the area of Baltic Sea adopted by the Helsinki Commission. They are directed to influence rendering on environment, considering the general principles of the EU policy concerning agriculture, fishery and transport. Unique characteristics of Baltic Sea and ecological burden demand the macroregional approach to prevent situation deterioration in the long-term prospect. It is recognized for a long time already. Therefore the Action Plan on ecology provides reduction of dump of nutrients in the sea to admissible level; preservation of natural zones and a biodiversity, including some kinds of fishes; reduction of use and dump of dangerous substances; transformation of region in modeling for ecologically safe navigation; softening of influence of climatic changes and adaptation to them.

The projects status is given to the current and planned events at the level of the member states within the region:

- Latvia: the second stage of the development of Water Services in Liepaja (total cost € 32 million), which is due to finish by the end 2011; the second stage of the development of Water Services in Daugavpils (total cost € 25 million) which is due to finish by the end 2011;
- Estonia: renovation of Narva city water and sewage networks in Estonia (total cost of € 28 million);
- Lithuania: the first package of the Nemunas Midland River Basin Project, which is co-financed by the Cohesion Fund (2000-2006), with a total cost of € 64 million and a Cohesion Fund participation of € 51 million and which is due to finish by the end 2011;
- Poland: projects on building of treatment facilities in Warsaw (585 million euro, Szczecin (282 million euro), Vrotslave (158 million euro), Poznan (104 million euro), Gdansk (121 million euro) and Krakow (121 million euro), project financed by the European Parliament on the protection of the Baltic Sea from mainland-based threats by reducing agricultural nutrient loading and the risk of hazardous wastes.

The second pillar – prosperous economy and sustainability of agriculture – is focused on transformation of the Baltic Sea region into prosperous and flourishing. The creation of the common market and the Lisbon Treaty including the SME Law make the basis of corresponding sections of Strategy, in particular, connected with a development of the common European Research Area. Financing will be carried out at the expense of 7th Framework Programme of the European Union.

Today the region of Baltic Sea is accurately divided on the prospering, innovative North and the West and developing East and the South. Nevertheless, disparities between the most successful in sphere of innovations regions in the EU including countries of Northern Europe and Germany, and regions with highly educated young shots, but not enough developed infrastructure such as Poland and three Baltic countries give possibilities for additional cooperation and development with benefit for both parties. In particular, such cooperation will open real possibilities to SMEs, especially in innovative sphere. In present conditions when the EU has faced a serious economic crisis, it is necessary to use advantages of the common market, on the one hand, and to maximize the benefit from innovations, on another hand. The Strategy creates the possibilities of the further decrease in barriers to trade and getting of benefits from the common market to use potential of considerable distinctions in development of innovations. Besides, it is important to support profitability and competitiveness of key sectors of agriculture, forestry, fishery for the purpose of increase in their contribution to economy and a sustainable development.

To achieve high productivity, high levels of innovation and sustainable economic growth, the Baltic Sea Region also needs to increase labour market inclusion and integration. High levels of employment, good quality jobs, the continued presence of a well-trained and adaptable workforce as well as low levels of social exclusion are all vital factors in assuring both the competitiveness and attractiveness of the region.\(^1\)

\(^1\) http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009DC0248:EN:NOT
Examples of projects are:
• “The Fibre Optic Valley” (financed by Sweden) and the accompanying Swedish project “Testbed Gavleborg”;
• Cooperation of universities: the Swedish program Östra Mellansverige (2007–2013) financing the project under the title “PRIM” (Processes and Relations in Innovative Environments). It develops interactions between universities and business incubators (total costs 6.5 million euro);
• JOSEFIN – co-financing innovative programs of the enterprises of small and medium business. Represents the European territorial project of cooperation for the period of January 2009 – December 2011 (total costs 3.9 million euro);
• Pomorski Science and Technological Park, Poland – extension 3rd stage (total costs 48 million euro).

The third pillar of measures is devoted to increase of transport availability and attractiveness of region of Baltic Sea. Trans-European transport and power networks are the basic component of its development. Besides, the European rehabilitation plan of economy for an overcoming the crisis assumes additional financial support to many power infrastructural projects in region. Cooperation with Russia in fishery sphere is be provided according to the Agreement on Fishery between the EU and Russia. The geography of the Baltic Sea Region, the very long distances by European standards (especially to the northern parts which are very remote), the extent of the sea that links but also divides the regions, the extensive external borders: all these pose special challenges to communication and physical accessibility in the region. In particular, the historical and geographical position of the Eastern Baltic member states, with their internal networks largely oriented East-West, makes substantial investment in communication, transport and energy infrastructures particularly important.

At the same time, the very extent and variety of the region creates particular attractions for visitors and residents. The multiplicity of languages and cultures that have survived through centuries of interaction of various types, the range of urban heritage, landscapes, seascapes and cultural landmarks available, provide great potential to create a region that will be a magnet to visitors. The priority actions in this section therefore seek to address the risks and challenges, while also exploiting and enhancing the opportunities within the region. Well-planned projects can essentially advance performance of the problems comprised into the third pillar. Among them are the following:
• Latvia: The first stage of the Riga bypass – Koknese (estimated total cost € 291 million); Rail Baltica, in particular the reconstruction and development of TEN-T railway segments (estimated total cost € 80 million);
• Estonia: The development of Via Baltica, in particular the construction of Pärnu bypass in Estonia (total cost € 43 million); The improvement of the accessibility of Baltic Sea islands, improving harbour facilities and airports on these islands (total cost € 46 million)
• Lithuania: The design and construction of the railway ‘Rail Baltica’ which is planned to be co-financed from the Cohesion Fund (2007-2013) with an indicative total cost € 135 million and an indicative Cohesion Fund contribution € 97 million. The estimated implementation start date is the beginning of 2012.
• Germany: The improvements to the Lübeck harbour in Schleswig Holstein (total cost € 13.1 million); The promotion of sailing tourism in Schleswig Holstein (total cost € 5.5 million); Major transport investments like the railway Berlin – Rostock (total cost € 315 million) and the highway A14 (total cost € 1.4 billion).
• Poland: The major transport investments being implemented are the road S 22 Elbląg-Grzechotki (€ 116 million) and part of E-65 railway Warsaw-Gdansk (€ 1.261 billion). In addition, there are planned projects: Rail Baltica (connection with Lithuanian border, € 182 million), continuation of E 65 railway (Warsaw-Gdańsk € 801 million), roads S7 (Gdansk-Elblag – € 346 million) and Via Baltica (Bialystok-border with Lithuania – € 511 million) as well as the airports of Gdansk (€ 149 million), Olsztyn (€ 74 million), Szczecin (€ 21 million) and Koszalin (under study Zegrze Pomorskie – € 13.82 million).

The fourth pillar of strategy is devoted to safety in region. Cooperation in this sphere already exists, but should be considerably

1 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/baltic/
strengthened, that the region will become the world leader in the field of maintenance of sea safety. Incidents on the sea, ship-wrecks can have catastrophic consequences. EU enlargement and deepening of cooperation in the EU in the field of criminal law mean that regional activity on criminality counteraction should be focused on strengthening of practice of transboundary interaction. Among projects, in particular, are the following:

- Estonia: Improvement of the Estonian Rescue Board’s ability to handle forest fires, oil and chemical pollution and natural hazards – 5 different projects (EUR 12 million);
- Finland: Development of Maritime Safety Culture – METKU Project (EUR 730,000) and SÖKÖ II – Management of major oil spills (EUR 650,000).

Thus, based on the before mentioned arguments, a conclusion can be drawn that the Strategy of EU for region of Baltic Sea is the key tool of maintenance of territorial coherence of macroregion, both for the sea, and continental territories. In this context it is at all levels (local, regional, national and at EU level) aimed at competitiveness, integration and a regional sustainable development. The Strategy implementation should promote achievement of territorial integration: reduction of disparities between territories, creation of equal living conditions, growth of a diversification of actives, definition of the regional potentials, maintenance of stable access to an infrastructure and services, strengthening of polycentrism, establishment of strong communications between urban and rural territories, maintenance of qualitative management on the basis of equal participation and usage of the general resources, preservation of ecosystem at the expense of management and planning of usage of Baltic Sea resources.

The region of Baltic Sea is the successful example of macroregion as it comprises the number of the different countries and administrative areas, but thus facing some common problems that require a common strategic approach. Other territories of the EU also start to identify themselves more and more as macrorregions, therefore the approach applied in the Baltic Strategy, can become a pattern for implementing other macroregional strategies in the EU. Such macroregional approach is defined by the EU as a tool of an innovative policy and can be a good example of the efforts directed on solving of common problems and more effective coordination of the EU regional policy.

**EU-Russian Cross-Border Cooperation in Context of Wider Europe Concept**

_Nadezhda Zhuk_

This article is an attempt to evaluate the current concept of cross-border cooperation between the EU and Russia, based on the context of EU-Russia dialogue and an analysis of the concept of the “Wider Europe”. Starting with some theoretical aspects of cross-border cooperation, the logic moves secondly to the analysis of the conceptual basis of “Wider Europe” and of the factors which have influenced the forming of the concept of cross-border cooperation at the macro level such as EU-Russia dialogue and European Neighbourhood Policy, and the cross-border dimension in the EU-Russia Road Maps. Thirdly, there is an attempt to deduce the possible scenarios of EU-Russia cross-border cooperation policy and to describe the current status of cross-border cooperation programs as the ground level of cross-border cooperation policy. Finally, the conclusion provides a summary of the main ideas and inferences.

**The Concept of Border and the Concept of Cross-Border Cooperation**

One of the main terms for the better understanding of the concept of cross-border cooperation is the term border”. The borderline between two systems (integration unions/countries/regions/local areas) is the contiguity line. The term “border” has not only the meaning of the border of the state, but also the meaning of a border defining an area of homogeneous economic and social space. Each system has different features, characteristics, ideology and identity.

The issue of the identity is very important and mostly explains the phenomena of borders. The borders are themselves are not all identical in nature; they could be understood in different ways.
The borders have a duality of functions – meaning the combination of the barrier and contact functions. A border line presents kind of buffer when it hinders free movement of goods, people, transport, information, capital across the border. A border also fulfills the function of a filter, accepting and adopting some impulses which bring some value for the accepting system. At the same time, a border can play the role of contact point between the border areas as an important part of the relations between the regions / states / integration unions.

Cross-border regions also show a duality in terms of the geopolitical picture of the state, being at the same moment the state periphery and the centre of cross-border interactions. The border plays a crucial role for the local border territories, here it has a significant influence on the economies of the cross-border areas and at the same time is a subject of interest for regional, state and integration unions’ geopolitical ideology.

Cross-border cooperation as a process has its own character depending on the historical genesis of the borders in question. The conceptual vision of European researchers on the cross-border cooperation process is inseparably knitted with the concept of the European regionalism. European regionalism is reflected in the choice of a high level of economic integration and sustainable political union as a goal. Supported by resources and political will, cross-border cooperation in the European Union has become an effective mechanism of regional policy, targeting the interests of the European Union as an integration union and also those of the countries, border regions and local territories involved in it. The enlargement of the European Union has brought with it new tasks for European integration, as the old external border becomes the new internal border, and the need arises for a more active integration in all spheres of economic and public life. Integration as a model of interregional interactions could be named as a general vector of European regional development. And this applies first and foremost to the border regions where integration processes become the mechanism to overcome economic isolation and decrease disparities and social tension.

For example:
- the limit of the territorial safety space,
- the line for border-crossing,
- the margin of periphery area,
- the line of contiguity with neighbour areas,
- the territory which has its own characteristics formed under influence of tight cross-border and multicultural interactions – borderland.\(^\text{1,2}\)

The interregional interactions are not always determined by the factor of the geographical border. There is a set of the formal and informal borders, where the formal borders are the administrative ones, which define frames of legislation, policy, national identity, and informal borders distinguish the spaces of economic influence, shares of markets, labour mobility, cognitive changes, identity unity etc.

The historical background has also significant importance for the identification of borders as well as natural barriers (mountains, rivers) and cultural borders. Historical and social bases for identity are very important: in many cases, even if such borders disappear, border identity is still very strong in the self-identity of the people living in that area, and this factor has great influence. However, if historically, the areas were closely knitted together, after the cancellation of the official borders they appear to be a single unified area, mostly due to this common historical identity. The phenomenon of Euroregions is the good example of that effect.

A border line divides territory into areas that appear to show internal but due to globalization and interregional interaction, regional identity itself is transforming and official borders cannot match the borders of regional identity exactly. The transformation of regional identity through changes in interregional relations leads to the phenomenon of so-called “moving borders”.\(^\text{3}\)

As a result of interregional interactions, the formal and informal borders become more and more different from each other. In the context of development, this is becoming an important aspect for studies of cross-border cooperation.

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So, if we talk about the EU itself, European cross-border cooperation is based on an ideology of integration and the contact function of the border in that process is prevalent. This approach is integrated in the policy of the European Union and the Council of Europe, which declares that cross-border regions are ‘characterized by homogeneous features and functional interdependencies because otherwise there is no need for cross-border co-operation’. ¹

Another definition appears after the period of integration process when the integration links have become stronger and border regions which participate could be considered as a potential “transfrontier region”, which means ‘a potential region, inherent in geography, history, ecology, ethnic groups, economic possibilities and so on, but disrupted by the sovereignty of the governments ruling on each side of the frontier’.² It describes the experience of Euroregions which are aiming to implement the concept of joint integrative development.

The policy for the external borders of the European Union continues the ideology of European integration in a softer way, trying to find the balance between the contact and the barrier functions of the border. Soft integration focuses mostly on creating a safe environment and sustainable policy cooperation aimed at ensuring the basis for sustainable development and more intensive economic cooperation in the future. At the same time, such issues as, for example, border management and preventing illegal migration are discussed at high level – showing that the EU wants to ensure that the barrier function of the external border will be still effective.

In Russian academic works the most common term is “border region”, which according to most definitions, is determined through administrative and territorial generality. That understanding is based on the specific case of the external borders of the USSR which used to be called the “iron curtain”. So the size of the border region is determined by two main factors: by the state border as the political and economic borderline and by the size of territory which is equal to the area of responsibility on the regional or municipal level.³ The European understanding of cross-border region in the Russian studies is explained through another term “transboundary region”, which is more close to the concept of joint potential region.

The topic of cross-border cooperation in regional studies is quite new for Russia as the borders were becoming open only after the collapse of USSR in 1991. During the last 20 years, the policy of cross-border cooperation has evolved from the “security lobby” when the most of the cross-border topics were relevant to the security function and were aimed at ensuring the barrier function of the border, up to the modern position where cross-border cooperation is considered as a mechanism of regional development and cross-border policy becomes gradually more open and oriented towards the contact functions of a border.

Some opinions mistakenly understand cross-border cooperation only in the context of border management, customs and safety. Cross-border cooperation has a much wider coverage than just the border area, sometimes it helps to enhance the integration of the regional centres and is able to be an influential factor in the interregional dialogue.

According to the theoretical approach in economics, one of the main reasons for regional integration is the economic interests of the participating sides, and integration policy is a kind of derivative from the original aspiration towards open markets.² Unlike protectionist measures, which aim to provide the sustainability of a regional system against external influences, the growth of interregional interactions, knitting of the economic relations and links including the moving of the capital, labour force, the creation of joint ventures and so on, is strengthening the sustainability of the joint cross-border system — including regions on either side of the border. Although the effect of such interaction could be different for the various regions involved, this model is still thought to bring value to both participants.

Due to the strengthening of external influences, economic inter-regional links, growth of informational transparency and the forming of a united communication space, the border regions are also forced to take a conscious and active position with regard to the managing of the process, risks and consequences of the interregional interactions as a necessary condition to save and increase their global competitiveness, to ensure the sustainable development in the modern global world. The practice of cross-border cooperation has shown great results in the case of the internal integration of EU members, but even at the external borders of different integration unions, cross-border interregional relations are understood as a basis for sustainable development, good neighbourly relations and an additional opportunity for the economic growth.

In cases where the interests of regional development policy match the national interests, cross-border cooperation receives a significant impulse for intensive development. The example of that synergy is the cross-border cooperation in the framework of European integration, where the interests of the macro level and of the regional level were both aimed at enhancing interregional cohesion and smoothing away the border’s barrier function.

If cross-border cooperation is developing as a policy and has its own national / regional objectives and priorities, it could become an efficient mechanism for sustainable regional development. Otherwise, if it develops on a case-by-case basis, it may create a difficulty for border regions seeking to balance the interests of different governance levels and to implement cross-border cooperation initiatives in an effective way to bring value to the border municipality itself, to the region and also to the country as a whole.

The evolution of borders is a reflection of the evolution of the political relations between countries. That is why the ideology and macro context, such as the national policies of cross-border cooperation, is very important and determines the vector of cross-border cooperation policy.

The genesis of cross-border cooperation at the border between the EU and Russia is based on macro processes like the collapse of the USSR, EU enlargement, and political and economic changes in the post-soviet space. The understanding of the concept of border and macro processes which are influenced by it, provides a trail for forecasting the trends in cross-border cooperation policy for EU and Russia.

The Concept of “Wider Europe”: Conceptual Basis and Current Status
The conceptual basis of “Wider Europe” arose from the consequences of World War II, when Europe was divided into two spheres of influence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe needed a new ideology, a new vector which could unite the European Community and create a sustainable base for future development. Integration as an ideology offered to share common values and take the benefits of intensive economic integration. The integration processes have also given birth to an ambitious political project. Starting with the European Economic Community in 1957 (6 countries) it has grown into the modern European Union which has now 27 members and a waiting list of candidates and potential candidates for membership.

As a result of the enlargement process, the European Union has become a serious political and economic global factor. The European Union has developed a set of values; basic to these are freedom, democracy and the market economy. Those values are named as the “cornerstones of European civilization” and they aim to provide stability, civil liberty and economic prosperity. The European Union has addressed the internal policy to cultivate those values through European integration; the famous “four freedoms” is a good example for that, those values are enshrined in the EU Treaties. The European Union has also tried to promote European values to the neighbours to create a “ring of friends”, who will be loyal and probably accept those values and the European ideology in general.

The period of intensive enlargement has shown the perspective and reality of the membership status and even the crisis in some regions like Greece has not made the “membership dream” less wanted. So it could be said that the issue of the neighbouring countries for

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the European Union is naturally accompanied by the question of potential enlargement.

Geographically, the main direction of the EU enlargement is towards the East. The questions like “Where could the final border of the European Union’s enlargement to the East be determined?”, “Where should the final border of Wider Europe be?” were, and still are, widely discussed – both in politics and the social sciences such as philosophy, sociology, economics and other spheres of scientific knowledge.

It seems that having neither the will nor the ability to give an answer to the “final border” question, to each neighbouring country, the EU put forward the Concept of Wider Europe in March 2003. The corresponding Communication says: “the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations”. And here is one more important quotation: “Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)”.

The Concept of Wider Europe proposed by the European Commission determines three main groups of EU neighbours such as Russia, the countries of Western Newly Independent States (WNI S include Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) and the Southern Mediterranean countries (including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia). Each of those three groups has its own specific characteristics and own story, and they have different interests in neighbouring with the EU. The text of the Communication does not include separate cases for each country, and proposes a general conceptual basis for further cooperation on the principle of “Different countries – common interests”.

In spite of the question of “potential membership” there should be delimitation between the Wider Union and Wider Europe. Membership acceptance is a kind of official procedure which has its own legal norms. If we are talking about the Wider Europe – this is a more idealistic concept and the main topic is the Europeanization of political, social and economic relations. The founding idea of Europeanization is the “liberal democratic ideology, which does not claim to be hegemony, and provides for multinational and multicultural diversity”. One more interesting explanation – “process of the origin, dissemination and institutionalization of the formal and informal rules and procedures, political paradigms, convictions and norms, which are firstly formed and consolidated at the level of EU political process and then incorporated into policy at national level”.

The issues of European identity, acceptance of European values and liberalization, prospects for economic integration and presence of the political will – all those aspects influence the idea of Wider Europe. It means that we should be careful with the term “Wider Europe” due to the variety of its possible meanings. If we talk about Wider Europe as a phenomenon of globalization, different approaches to determine the borders of Wider Europe can be used:

- “Brussels” approach: the EU plus the neighbouring states mentioned in the Communication “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”. Here the Wider Europe is associated with the processes of Europeanization in the form of promotion of stability and prosperity through the European values.
- Formal approach: the member states of the Council of Europe. “The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress”, Along with democracy and human

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2 Ibid.
rights, these values have been the pillars of the Council of Europe and remain an essential basis for the identity of Wider Europe.1

- Identity approach: the nations of the continent which identify themselves with European values, history and culture. Ideas of Wider Europe were formulated long before the 2003. There were works by political leaders and social scientists, who tried to answer the question about the Europe’s future and propose a conceptual basis.
- Identity approach with a religious aspect: here religion is regarded as a significant factor to find common identity. The states of the European continent predominately identify themselves as belonging to Christen civilization (identity approaches).2

During the research carried out by the author in the framework of LGI Visiting Fellowship (Research “Cross-border cooperation policy in the context of wider Europe concept: case of the Finnish-Russian border”, Local government and public service reform initiative, Open society institute, Budapest, Hungary. 2010-2011) at the same time with literature and analysis of documents, a set of interviews was carried out with representatives of think tanks and other organizations relevant to the topic of cross-border cooperation. One of the questions asked was about the respondents’ understanding of the concept of the Wider Europe (in terms of the Brussels approach). The question was formulated as: “The concept of Wider Europe was initiated in 2003. Do you think that now this concept is out-of-date and needs changes or still could be sustainable basis for future development?” Two popular types of answers could be marked out, which also are reflected in the papers and experts’ commentaries at media and internet resources.3 The first type of answers is below to the identity approach and associates this question with the question of European identity and the future of Europe. The respondents do not agree that this concept is out of date as the question of Europe’s future will always be topical both for politicians and for the scientific community. We also could find references to the Wider Europe in public speeches by European politicians – in such cases, the term Wider Europe is used to associate the issues with global aims and prospective. “The idea of Wider Europe could be realized if European countries are accepting the concept of cultural diversity and supporting the policy of social reconciliation and integration – not interpreting it as assimilation – at national level”.4 This type of answer follows the identity approach for defining the Wider Europe, where the union is understood not as a legally-based political union, but as a space of multilateral cooperation and open dialogue.

The second type of answers reflects the “Brussels approach”, those opinions state that the “Wider Europe” term is out of date and has been replaced by the Neighbourhood Policy. “The term Wider Europe is not used any longer in the EU. The concept of Wider Europe is today called the European Neighbourhood Policy” (interview citation, adviser of Ministry for foreign affairs, Finland). It is interesting note that if you put into the search of the popular web-resource Wikipedia the words “Wider Europe” it will directly address you to the page of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Here should be underlined the important distinction between those two concepts – Wider Europe and ENP. The Wider Europe includes Russia as one of its three strategic directions. The ENP (where the main actor is clearly defined as the European Union) does not include Russia, because of the same strategic character of relations and the decision “to develop further their strategic partnership through the creation of four common spaces”.5 In EU analytical papers we can find some interesting opinions about it: “Russia needs to be considered as a regional centre itself, as it displays more features of a centre

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than any other semi-peripheral country even though it also serves as a semi-periphery for the EU in ways. It therefore makes perfect sense that Russia is not included in the ENP”.

In the discourse about the future of Europe and the future architecture of relations in Europe, the term “Wider Europe” seems to be still topical and conceptual in its essence. Actually, the Wider Europe context in public speeches and papers is used to discuss the future of Europe, the perspectives of Europeanization and the global tendencies on the European continent. Those topics could not be discussed fully with the term European Neighbourhood Policy, in particular because of the exclusion of Russia which the latter term supposes.

The Concept of “Wider Europe”: Context of Cross-Border Cooperation in the EU-RF Dialogue

The topic of borders is very significant for the Wider Europe discourse. The concept of Wider Europe proposed by the European Commission aims “to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union”.

The topic of cross-border cooperation appears as a refrain through the whole document. The Neighbourhood Policy is tightly knitted with the issues of cross-border cooperation, as it is precisely cross-border cooperation which constitutes the ground level of neighbourhood relations between countries. Actual living cross-border cooperation includes the issues directly relevant to borders such as customs, border management, safety and preventing the crimes and ecological problems etc. as well as the issues influencing regional development of the border regions such as the flows of goods, capital, people, cultural contacts and the regional political dialogue. All those activities are going on a daily basis and compose the reality of cross-border cooperation.

The economic relations between the EU and Russia are very intensive and are even strengthening by the separate sectors. For some period after the collapse of the USSR, the new Russia maintained a Eurocentric direction, where the EU played the role of the main vector for external policy. But, in recent years, Russia has made efforts to reanimate the integration processes in the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (and has had some success in that direction), and tried also to enhance the relations with eastern neighbours, first of all China, and other Asian countries. Those activities reflect the willingness of Russia to form a diversified multi-vector external policy, and this could lead to some changes to the Eurocentric model of external policy.

Those processes of changes in Russia’s identity in the modern world and Wider Europe influenced Russia’s position concerning EU-Russia relations. Russia is insisting on a special format of relations with the EU which provide the opportunity to promote its own positions and views.

If Wider Europe offers the conceptual basis for the future of Europe in general, the ENP represents the aims of the EU’s external policy, and has a more general pragmatic approach to all groups of neighbouring countries. The EU sets the priorities and the frameworks, offers the mechanisms and instruments for implementation. The ENP proposes the model of cross-border cooperation policy where the main impulses, its general approach, and specific regulations etc. come from the centre (EU) and are accepted by other participants. At the same time, there is an opportunity for joint management and development of the priorities but still, the role of the European Union is the dominating one.

Being not agreed with general approach proposed by the ENP; Russia took the perceived decision not to join the ENP and develop a strategic partnership with the EU as a unique case on the basis of equal partnership. Actually there were a lot of opinions about the motives and arguments of the Russian refusal to be a part of the ENP, including one explaining the situation with too high ambitions on the part of the Russian government: “Russia does not understand why it should be treated in the same way as Moldova or Morocco and, instead, claims a special status and special relationship with Brussels”.

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The fact that Russia is not included in the ENP goes against the Brussels approach, which means that the EU and Russia should evaluate the situation and search for a new model of the relation architecture, where the two players are able to find contiguity points and build a strategic partnership.

As an alternative to ENP, Russia and the European Union have chosen a new format, which was defined at the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, where four Common Spaces in different spheres were formulated. In the framework of the EU-Russian summit in May 2005 held in Moscow, four corresponding Road Maps were adopted as an instrument for the creation of these four Common Spaces:

- Road Map for the Common Economic Space;
- Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice;
- Road Map for the Common Space of External Security;
- Road Map for the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects.

The initiative of the adoption of the Road Maps was received by the expert community as a real step forward in the relations of the EU and Russia, some kind of the milestone on the way to progress.

The signing of the Road Maps became the impulse to reinforcing EU-Russia relations and refreshing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement\(^1\) is a fundamental document for the relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation. It provides the legal framework for cooperation and fixes the willingness of both parties to promote bilateral cooperation on a mutually advantageous basis.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement came into force in 1997 (December) and officially was thought until 2007 to be prolonged for another year by default, if neither of the sides wants to withdraw from the Agreement. So, legally there was opportunity just to prolong the existing agreement, but both sides have expressed the opinion that the current agreement should be updated. That decision was taken at the Sochi Summit in 2006. That step is seems to be a logical stage, because the strategic partnership requires special legal frameworks and implementation mechanisms and instruments.

For this reason, work on the draft of the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement seems to be very important at the current stage. It will give the material for analysis on the issues of changes in the reality of EU-Russia relations, external priorities and level of flexibility for both sides. The important task is to search for solutions to the existing contradictions which will be acceptable for both sides. Of course it will be some compromise game but the important point is that both partners have the willingness to progress and are ready for constructive dialogue.

It is too early to make final conclusions, but it seems that the Road Maps did not become a magic wand, and there is still a lack of strategic vision for further EU-Russia relations. If the EU and Russia keep their current positions and keep the EU-Russia dialogue at the same level, we can expect the continuation of the stagnation period.

At the current stage, there is a need for rethinking the ideology and strategic direction, searching for joint interests and priorities, and defining the role of the partnership EU-Russia in the modern world. In that context, the approaches to the concept of the Wider Europe serve as a guide to modelling the prospects of the EU-Russia dialogue.

EU-Russia relations and cross-border cooperation are tightly knitted and this correlation could even be formulated as the “cross-border dimension” of the EU-Russia dialogue – as a lot of issues from the agenda of EU-Russia cooperation are relevant for cross-border cooperation. That is why it is so important that the cross-border cooperation policy is developed with the system approach, taking into consideration the ideological factors in EU-Russia cooperation and also trying to reach a synergy of efforts, and to use cross-border cooperation as the vanguard of the EU-Russia cooperation in general.

In the context of the changes in the paradigm of the political dialogue between the EU and Russia, the format of cooperation, including cross-border cooperation issues has required the revision and the search for new approaches able to meet the interests of the both sides. Some progress was reached in approving of four Road Maps on the Common Spaces. The Road Maps became an important element of the EU-Russia cooperation that are repeatedly referred to in political speeches: “the “movement” on the Road Maps is the

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main mechanism of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union”.¹

The cross-border regions such as St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Murmansk etc. are important actors in the implementation of the Road Map for the Common Economic Space as advanced posts ensuring the cohesion and integration of the economic systems of the EU and Russia. Therefore, the group of the cross-border regions has a rather strong potential and a significant meaning for the successful implementation of the idea of the Common Economic Space.

Each of the four Road Maps topics is closely linked to cross-border cooperation issues. Thus, the Roadmap for the Common Economic Space has a separate section dedicated to the interregional and cross-border cooperation. It includes the following measures for deepening the cooperation:

- “Increase the importance of regional development and cross-border co-operation through an active support to cross-border initiatives and programmes;
- Encourage the involvement of local and regional key actors such as authorities and civil society, in all aspects of cross-border co-operation;
- Further deepened cooperation, and facilitation of investments, in the border area;
- Promotion of establishing and strengthening of economic and people-to-people links between Russian and EU regions”.

The Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice aimed to “serve the objective of building a new Europe without dividing lines, thus facilitating travel between all Europeans”. One of the three sections of that Road Map the section entitled “Freedom” has an objective which is directly relevant to cross-border issues: “To facilitate human contacts and travel between the EU and Russia, ensure smooth legal border crossings and lawful stays on their territories, as well as to work together to tackle illegal migration and illegal cross-border activities”.² In the Section “Freedom” mostly relevant aspects for the cross-border cooperation are connected with the security and safety aspects such as border control, migration control and so on. This Road Map is relevant both to contact and barrier functions of the border, targeting at the same time the issues of stimulating the human contacts and cross-border crossing, as well as ensuring the legal aspects of cross-border crossing and prevention of illegal migration and other illegal cross-border activities.

The Road Map for the Common Space of External Security is also important from the point of view of cross-border cooperation policy analysis. Regional cooperation and the integration processes are considered as an instrument to ensure security and stability. According the text of this Road Map, the EU and Russia “agree to actively promote them in a mutually beneficial manner, through close result-oriented EU-Russia collaboration and dialogue, thereby contributing effectively to creating a greater Europe without dividing lines and based on common values”³. In this context the cross-border cooperation is the ground level for those processes and has a significant meaning for the successful implementation of that objective.

The implementation of the Road Map for the Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural Aspects consists the strengthening the cooperation in scientific research, education, promoting cultural and people-to-people links. That Road Map has some achievements especially in the cross-border regions. Geographical closeness in conditions of intensive interregional interactions can bring good results as can be illustrated by the Russian-Finnish border. Good transport communications and opportunities for fundraising have produced a growth in student and teachers exchanges, joint projects and intensive mobility. Due to impulse from two regional centres – Helsinki and St. Petersburg, and due to the intensive cross-border activeness of the border universities and institutes, in the Finnish-Russian border region a so-called “Cross-Border University” was established. It gives to its graduates a double diploma accepted both in Finland and in Russia. In general, the cooperation in the sphere of education is very important for cross-border cooperation sustainability. It intensifies the mobility of the population, increases the number of cross-border links and strengthens the networks activity.

¹ President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, Summit Russia-EU, 21-22 May 2009.
³ Ibid.
From the point of view of their conceptual basis, the Road Maps describe the directions to reach the four common spaces objectives. They define the agenda for cooperation of EU and Russia for the middle-term prospective. The concept of the common spaces could be the platform for EU-RF dialog for the next period. It is important to take into consideration the experience of the previous steps and bottle necks which bring obstacles to the realization process, by avoiding the expression that the Road Map is just the new “hat” for the existing initiatives. It seems that there is a need to improve the implementation and coordination mechanisms, so that the implementation of the Road Maps does not look like a set of uncoordinated efforts but has a systematic approach, and quantitative and qualitative monitoring.

The implementation of the Road Maps is closer to concrete cooperation. So, in the near term, it will be under certain attention both in the political context and from the point of view of the involved actors. The new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement could support the ideology of common spaces and become the ideology and legal foundation for the further realization of Road Maps and reinforcing their practical implementation.

To maintain the cross-border cooperation process it is necessary to ensure that the organizational and financial instruments are in place, but it is difficult to agree the realization mechanisms without agreement on the main principle issues. So the situation with ENP has become a challenge for the EU-Russia dialogue and for cross-border cooperation especially.

As a compromise in that ambiguous situation, Russia has accepted the realization of cross-border cooperation policy through the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument and even took the commitment of co-financing five cross-border programmes (more details in section 4).

The next five years is an important period for the EU-Russia relations as there are several parallel processes which are in transformation stage, and the format of those relations will mostly depend on the political dialogue and the quality of the implementation phase and ground work.

There are several important concepts that should confirm their viability in next period. First of all it is the concept of Wider Europe, whose implementation and development will depend on the trajectory of the relation of the EU and Russia with Ukraine, Russia’s participation in the Eastern Partnership, the progress of the Russia–Belarus union, and Russia’s membership in the WTO.

The legislation aspect has crucial meaning for the development of cross-border cooperation and at the current stage there is a legislative initiative in Russia on development of the federal law on cross-border cooperation which should form the legal basis and help to implant a systematic approach into the current uncoordinated legislation. Another point is the close prospect of the next ENPI period after 2013. It will be an important milestone for EU-Russia cross-border cooperation, which will be the marker of the progress in the EU-Russia dialogue. For the current period of ENPI, Russia has accepted the rules and regulations proposed by the EU, but it seems that there are several points that Russia wants to discuss as possible changes – so it could even lead to the transformation of the ENPI programme’s format.

The topic of free-visa regime will also be in focus in the EU-Russia cross-border cooperation dialogue. This topic is rather complicated for EU-Russia dialogue as Russia is very active in its position to achieve the visa-free regime with the EU as soon as possible, meanwhile the EU is rather conservative about that prospect, which is not denied by EU representatives but considered as long-term objective. The compromise or intermediate step could be the simplification of the visa issue procedure for the border region citizens. Partly that approach was implemented on the Finland-Russia border, where the visa conditions of Finland have become much more flexible and offer the opportunities which let Russian citizens get a Schengen visa for half a year (most of the time should be spent in Finland) without any special official invitation. This gives an additional impulse for increasing the mobility of the population, tourism and academic exchanges. People living in the border regions (including St. Petersburg) most actively use those opportunities, which leads to improving the transport communications. Thus, the opening of the new fast train line between Helsinki and St. Petersburg and the airport in the border city of Lappeenranta are the results of the regional integration.
But still the cross-border cooperation has not yet become for Russia a mechanism of regional development. Cross-border cooperation between the European Union and the Russian Federation was until recently financed by the EU in the framework of cooperation programmes. That led to the understanding of the cross-border cooperation content as the cross-border cooperation programmes only. That erroneous opinion still exists on the Russian side, and it is supported by the tendency that most of the negotiation between the EU and Russia on cross-border cooperation issues is focused on the programmes.

Meanwhile, the cooperation programmes make a significant contribution to EU-Russia relations in general and to cross-border cooperation in particular. The general evolution of the EU-Russia cooperation programmes could be characterized as developing “from technical assistance to partnership”.

Possible Scenarios for the Development of Policy on EU-Russia Cross-Border Cooperation

One of the important questions for the cross-border cooperation policy topic is what format of cross-border cooperation programmes will be chosen for the new period after 2013.

The previous experience of the Neighbourhood programme shows that there is some disproportion between the Russian and EU participants, due to the lack of experience, knowledge, programme management skills and even the language barrier. That disproportion is quite objective as the format and procedures of the ENPI is closer to the EU standards and project practice. Therefore, the EU participants have more expertise in that field and better opportunity to use so-called “seed money” to prepare large-scale projects and write the applications. On the Russian side, most of the efforts on preparation of the applications are taken on a volunteer basis. There is also still a lack of professional consultants and support in application writing and project implementation processes. That disproportion leads to the situation where most projects are lead by the EU partners; sometimes the direct participation of the Russian partners is just nominal. In the course of time, the level of activity of Russian partners has risen, competences were strengthened and now a number of Russian partners are taking the role of leading partner.

The significant change in realization of ENPI instrument is that, in 2010, Russia took the decision of co-financing five cross-border cooperation programmes from the state budget. That decision led to the increase of interest in the topic of cross-border cooperation and to the revision of the format of cross-border cooperation. As a result, the Russian side initiated some changes such as increasing the significance of the large scale projects which have received special status in programmes, a separate evaluation procedure and so on.

Another possible change that could be expected is launching the special evaluation procedure including monitoring and co-financing resource efficiency from the Russian side. The co-finance resources are going from the state budget so, following the current approach to general budget financing control, there are all the preconditions for initiating the monitoring and evaluation from the Russian side. The approaches and procedures for measuring effectiveness are quite different in the EU and Russian practice, so it could be presupposed that Russia will prefer to add its own evaluation procedure and use its own approaches to that.

It was discussed on the Russian side as a proposal to launch the separate federal targeted programme for cross-border cooperation, which would serve the objectives of the Russian external policy on cross-border cooperation and, in the ENPI case, would co-finance joint cross-border projects. Due to the lack of legal basis and the possible difficulties with the administration of such a format, the decision was taken to transfer the co-financing resources of the current ENPI period to a joint “pot” on the European side. Possibly for the next programme period that idea could get a new impulse.

It is difficult to forecast, but the special characteristics of EU-Russia cross-border cooperation and the active position of the Russian officials could lead to the idea of a separate cross-border cooperation programme between the EU and Russia, which would be alternative to the existing ENPI programme based on the best practices of the previous experience and meeting the objectives not only of the EU or Russian external policy, but also ones of the partnership, such as implementation of the common spaces concept through the Road.
Concerning the cross-border cooperation policy, it should be noted that the EU will keep open the alternative to join the ENPI for the next period, offering the opportunity of joint management and defining the joint priorities. As the ENPI rules are proved for all programmes, for Russia it will be difficult to lobby for possible changes as might happen in the case of a bilateral programme. So, the development of cross-border cooperation policy between the EU and Russia will probably go on by the EU scenario and will be focused on the format where the role of ENPI programmes will be the dominating one.

Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes as Mechanism of Policy on Cross-Border Cooperation

Cross-border programmes are a significant element of the cross-border cooperation policy and for EU-Russia cross-border cooperation it is still the main financial resource. During the long period from 1994 up to 2006, the EU-Russia Cooperation programme was financed by the TACIS programme. Russia was the main beneficiary of technical assistance among the countries of the former USSR – getting about half of the whole financial support. The TACIS programme was mainly focused on the wider content both in regard to the top-ics and geographical coverage, but also had a special cross-border cooperation part. That programme made a significant contribution to supporting the transition period in political, economic and social life of Russia.

In the period 2004-2006 the Neighbourhood programmes were implemented, which have combined the resources of the TACIS and INTERREG financial instruments. During this time, the partners got experience of joint preparation of the applications and implementation of the projects. At the same time, different sources for funding were used for the Russian and EU territory of the projects: the Russian partners could get only the TACIS funding, while the EU partners could also be funded within INTERREG.

Although Russia was not included into the ENP, the cross-border cooperation of the EU and Russia is still estimated as a significant part of EU and Russian external policy. To provide the financing of the cross-border programmes between the EU and Russia, they were included into the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru-
ment (ENPI 2007-2013) with the aim of dealing with the common challenges on the EU external borders.

The launching of the ENPI on the Russian part was significantly delayed and started the operation activity just after the signing of the financial agreement at the end of 2009.

According the ENPI Cross-border Cooperation Strategy Paper, 1 the cross-border cooperation itself is the crucial programme component which aimed:
- to promote the economic and social development in the border areas;
- to address the common challenges;
- to ensure the efficient and secure borders;
- to promote people-to-people cooperation.

The experience of the Neighbourhood programmes has contributed to the development of the ENPI programmes as practice and lessons learnt have shown the bottlenecks and the successful examples. The first period of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument covers the years 2007 – 2013 and has the direct relevance to the topic of cross-border cooperation. The ENPI includes seven cross-border programmes involving regions of the Russian Federation:

1. Kolarctic
The programme includes the following countries and regions: Russia (Murmansk and Archangelsk Regions, Nenetskiy okrug, the Leningrad Region, St Petersburg City), Sweden (Norrbotten, add. Vasterbotten); Finland (Lapland, Northern Ostrobothnia); Norway (Norland, Finnmark, Troms).

2. Karelia
The programme includes the following countries and regions: Russia (Republic of Karelia, Murmansk, Archangelsk and Leningrad regions, St Petersburg City); Finland (regions of Kainuu, North Karelia and Oulu).

3. South-East Finland – Russia
The programme includes the following countries and regions: Russia (the Leningrad Region, St Petersburg City, add. Republic of Karelia); Finland (regions of South Karelia, South Savo, and Kymenlaakso).

4. Estonia-Latvia-Russia
The programme includes the following countries and regions: Russia (The Leningrad and Pskov regions, St Petersburg City); Estonia (Hiiu, Ida-Viru, Jogeava, Laane, Polva, Parnu, Tartu, Saare, Valga, Viljandi, Voru); Latvia (Kurzeme, Zemgale, Riga, Vidzeme, Latgale regions).

5. Poland-Lithuania-Russia
The programme includes the following countries and regions: Russia (the Kaliningrad region); Latvia (Klaipeda, Taurage, Alytus and Marijampole regions); Poland (Pomorskie, WarmiiAsko-Mazurskie and Podlaskie provinces).

6. Baltic Sea Region
The programme includes the countries of the Baltic Sea region: Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Russia, Belarus.

7. Black Sea Basin
The programme includes such countries as Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine.

The last two of those programmes are formed on the sea basin principle, and the Black Sea basin is an entirely new programme.

The changes in the context of EU-Russia relations have also influenced the changes in the programme format. As Russia considers itself as an equal partner in the neighbouring dialogue and refused to be a participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy along with other neighbouring countries, the next logical step in confirming the status of equality was the decision to participate in financing the neighbouring initiatives. That principle is included in the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument and as soon as Russia decided to participate in ENPI, the decision of co-financing required the revision of legal base to fix these changes in financing principles.

In November 2009, in the framework of the EU-Russia summit, the Financing Agreements for five cross-border cooperation programmes were signed by both sides (including all land border programmes). The total sum of co-financing from the Russian side will take about 30% of the total funds for land basis ENPI programmes, which is about equal to the contribution of the participating EU member states.

Those resources are distributed among the programmes:
1. Kolarctic:¹
   Co-financing from the EU: EUR 28,2 mln,
   Co-financing from the Russian side: EUR 14,1 mln.
2. Euregio Karelia:²
   Co-financing from the EU: EUR 23,2 mln,
   Co-financing from the Russian side: EUR 11,6 mln.
3. South-East Finland – Russia:³
   Co-financing from the EU: EUR 36,2 mln,
   Co-financing from the Russian side: EUR 18,1 mln.
4. Estonia-Latvia-Russia:⁴
   Co-financing from the EU: EUR 47,8 mln,
   Co-financing from the Russian side: EUR 15,9 mln.
5. Poland-Lithuania-Russia:⁵
   Co-financing from the EU: EUR 132,1 mln,
   Co-financing from Russian side: EUR 44 mln.

So there is some evolution process in the cross-border cooperation programmes between the EU and Russia: starting from technical assistance and then gradually moving to a more equal basis of cooperation. The principle of equality includes not only the co-financing approach, but also the active participation of both sides in the programming process itself, administration, evaluation procedures and taking the decisions on the basis of joint negotiation. That step leads to the discussions on financial control, procurement procedure and more technical things relevant to the programme implementation. The difference of the administrative procedures, legal standards and institutional environment on the EU and Russian sides caused some inevitable incompatibilities of positions that caused delays in signing the financial agreements on ENPI programmes.

There were even opinions that, in spite of the general agreement, Russia could refuse to sign the agreements as had happened with the Baltic Sea Region Programme. Due to the fact that the Russian government has not approved the financial agreement for that programme in time, the Russian participants lost an opportunity to participate in that programme in the current financial period. The situation with the Baltic Sea Region programme has the critical opinions both from the EU side and from the expert community within Russia. It could be said that this experience has intensified the dialogue on financial agreements of other ENPI programmes. And in spite of some negative positions in the State Duma of the Russian Federation, the agreements were finally signed in November 2009, one month before the deadline.

At the end of 2010 some significant changes were approved, concerning the implementation of the ENPI programmes relevant to Russia, which were fixed in Addendums to the programme documents. The changes were included into the texts of all programmes. Here are some significant changes on the example of the South-East Finland – Russia programme document:

In the general part of the text the phrases about some critical points in the situation in economics, environment etc. in participating Russian regions were deleted, as for example this one: “The innovation system in Russia has weaknesses such as insufficient funding, low efficiency in many types of operations, excessive government regulation, low commercialization of research and development results, as well as underdeveloped bridging institutions and public and private partnerships”¹

• The procedure for administration of funds co-financed by the Russian Federation was clarified: “Russian funding to the Programme will be transferred to the JMA (joint management authority) through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and used to fund projects. Rules and procedures concerning Community Contribution shall apply mutatis mutandis to Russian co-funding”.²
• A new chapter was added concerning the issues of the large scale projects: “There will be a possibility to implement large-scale projects, which in accordance with ENPI CBC Implementing Rules Article 2 (7) are projects comprising a set of works, activities or services in-

¹ South-East Finland-Russia ENPI CBC Programme 2007-2013.
² Ibid, p. 63.
tended to fulfil an indivisible function of a precise nature pursuing clearly identified objectives of common interest for the purposes of implementing cross-border investments. Taking into account the regional and cross-border dimension of the Programme as well as the size of the budget, the number of the projects and percentage of the Programme allocation spent on these kinds of projects should be limited, therefore up to 50% of the total Programme budget can be spent on large scale projects.¹

- The Programme area was widened by the adding a new region to the Programme area for the current period – the region of Uusimaa. That change is rather significant for the South-East Finland-Russia programme as the Uusimaa region includes Helsinki, and this fact can significantly influence the content of the projects.

The issues of harmonization between the legislation of the EU and Russia both in general and in the context of cross-border cooperation programmes could have an influence on the quality of the future progress of cross-border cooperation. The adaptation of some EU regulations and harmonization of the Russian regulations in practical questions such as, for example, taxes (VAT) could give an additional impulse to intensifying of cross-border activities.

As for the evaluation of the macro-context of the EU-Russia dialogue and the current status of cross-border cooperation, it could be said that establishment of a joint cooperation programme in the nearest future as the next ENPI period after 2013 is unlikely. A more plausible scenario is the prolongation of the ENPI format. Also the enhancing of the regional policy on the Russian side could be expected, including the synergy of the regional target programs and cross-border cooperation initiatives, and also the continuation of the generating the regional cross-border cooperation programs as the instrument to co-finance cross-border projects and to promote specific regional priorities of cross-border cooperation.

Conclusions
The understanding of the process of cross-border cooperation is closely linked to the general conception of cross-border interregional interactions which in turn is based on the historical background, specific characteristics of the regional identity and political processes at the macro level. As a result, different degrees of balance of the contact and barrier functions of the border have taken place at the different border cases. The prevalence of the contact function is relevant to integration process meanwhile the “iron curtain” of the former USSR could be an example of the case where barrier function was dominating.

Cross-border cooperation is a part of the regional development policy which could help to promote the economic development of the cross-border areas, decrease the regional disparities and strengthen good neighbourly relations. At the same time, cross-border cooperation is a part of state policy and it could be considered as an instrument for implementing the state’s foreign policy strategy, protecting geopolitical interests, etc. This point is important for EU and for Russia also as they have a wide and very heterogeneous border line.

As for Russia, during the last 20 years it was going through a difficult period of different institutional changes and economic transformations. The cross-border interactions developed very intensively, but not always successfully. It could be said that, at the current stage, the policy of cross-border cooperation of Russia is still under development – including the legislative framework, such as the federal law on cross-border cooperation.

As for the evaluation of the macro-context of the EU-Russia dialogue and the current status of cross-border cooperation, it could be said that establishment of a joint cooperation programme in the nearest future as the next ENPI period after 2013 is unlikely. A more plausible scenario is the prolongation of the ENPI format. Also the enhancing of the regional policy on the Russian side could be expected, including the synergy of the regional target programs and cross-border cooperation initiatives, and also the continuation of the generating the regional cross-border cooperation programs as the instrument to co-finance cross-border projects and to promote specific regional priorities of cross-border cooperation.

1 Ibid, p. 65.
In general, it seems that the EU-Russia dialogue has too many unanswered questions, such as what is the strategic vision for the EU-Russia partnership? What should be the format of the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement should be? What progress can be expected from the implementation of the Road Maps? Not to mention the discussion of free visa regimes, and Eastern Partnership. All these things bring uncertainty to the EU-Russia dialogue in general, and to the issue of cross-border cooperation in particular.

Therefore, to identify the next steps for the EU-Russia cross-border cooperation policy, some solid basis in understanding of the strategic vision of the EU-Russia partnership should be established. The cross-border dimension could potentially become one of the focus topics for reinforcing the EU-Russia dialogue and make a contribution and bring a new impulse to renewal of the concept of the Wider Europe.

result there is some contradiction when cross-border development between EU and Russia is supported by the instrument of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENPI) meanwhile Russia is not a subject of that policy. So we could see that the more concrete issue of cross-border cooperation leads the analysis to the more serious issue about the format of the partnership between EU and Russia, its ideology and prospective.

One of the concepts which could give the insight for understanding the situation is the concept of “Wider Europe” used in discourse about the future of Europe, perspectives of Europeanization and the global tendencies on the European continent. Some of the opinions are substituting the concept of Wider Europe with the more concrete concept of European Neighbourhood Policy. Both of those concepts relate to the issue of EU enlargement, potential membership candidates and neighbourhood relations. But the difference of those approaches is principle for the case of EU-Russia relations as the topics of Europe’s future and the architecture of partnership could not be discussed fully within the terms of European Neighbourhood Policy, in particular because of the exclusion of Russia from that policy.

In spite of some uncertainty due to the support through the ENPI funds the EU-Russia cross-border cooperation seems to be in a reasonably sustainable state and even demonstrates some evolution. Starting from the format of technical assistance (after the USSR’s collapse) step by step the format has evolved into a partnership. An important stage has just recently been started with the acceptance of Russia to co-finance the cross-border programs from the state budget (5 cross-border cooperation programmes).

This step maintains the sustainability for the cross-border cooperation initiatives for the future program period and also creates the preconditions for evolution in cross-border initiatives. One of the tendencies is the development of policy on cross-border cooperation in Russian border regions supported by the approved regional documents such as program or concept of cross-border cooperation. For example, for the new period, the new format of large-scale project was accepted and we can therefore expect soon the realization of large infrastructure projects.
Arrest or Detention of a Person with a View to Prevent His Effecting an Unauthorised Entry into the Country or to Ensure Deportation or Extradition according to the Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights

Elena Gulyaeva

Introduction: Objective, Methodology and Empirical Base of Research

The right of everyone to liberty and security of a person is set forth in article 5 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950¹ (hereafter referred to as Convention). First and foremost, legal grounds of interference with exercise of the right to liberty and security of a person are contained in art. 5 (1) of the Convention which sets forth their full range. At that, only restrictive interpretation of these exclusions corresponds to the aim of art. 5 of the Convention – the guarantee of frivolous deprivation of liberty.²

One of these grounds is the article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention which allows lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.

The aim of this article is consideration of content of the article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention alongside with legal views of the Court in relation to lawfulness of arrest and detention to prevent an unauthorised entry into the country or with a view to deportation or extradition, elaborated in the process of interpretation of the given provision.

Examination of the correspondent legal views of the Court allows to reveal content of the “international legal standard”1 of the given right.

The methodology of the following research consists in the analysis of the practice of Court judgments using the structure of the “test” of lawfulness of interference with realization of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.2 This approach allows the Court to establish availability of interference as such and to evaluate observation of the interference lawfulness criteria.

The actuality of the analysis of legal grounds of restriction of the right to liberty and security of a person guaranteed by the Convention within this essay is explained by the fact that according to the number of violations established by the ECHR in “Russian” cases, art. 5 of the Convention setting forth the right in question, is one of the “leading” among all other provisions of the Convention.

At that, such a situation is typical for many other member states of the Convention. This circumstance gives evidence of the fact that problems of ensuring the right to liberty and security of a person is one of the most vulnerable spheres of the Russian legislation and practice of its application.

**Establishment of the Fact of Interference with the Right to Liberty and Security of a Person according to the Provision of Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention**

**General Grounds**

Significant importance of the provision of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention lies in the fact that though the Convention doesn’t guarantee the right of aliens to reside on the territory of the Contracting States, nevertheless, article 5 of the Convention provides for the certain guarantees in a case of aliens’ detention pending decision on his residence, deportation or extradition.3 The guarantee provided for by § 1 (f) includes a guarantee concerning three categories of persons:

- 1) persons against whom the authorities take actions to prevent their unauthorised entry into the country,
- 2) persons against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation,
- 3) persons against whom action is being taken with a view to extradition.

Notwithstanding the fact that the legal status of each category of those persons bears inherent differences they are of minimum significance in the context of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention; even conditional differentiation of the guarantee content provided for by that sub-paragraph is hardly of practical importance. In the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) such an approach is observed in application of the similar standards of evaluation of detention lawfulness in respect of all the above mentioned categories.

First and foremost it should be noted that article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention doesn’t guarantee lawfulness of actions taken to prevent the unauthorised entry into the country as well as deportation and extradition actions, and concerns only the detention lawfulness in connection with the implementation of these actions. It is worthy of note that the Commission specially underlined in one of its decisions4 that cases concerning the detention lawfulness in connection with extradition actions should be distinguished from cases where applicants complain of lawfulness of those actions as such and the order of their realization.5 In this regard issues of lawfulness can be considered in the context of art. 6 or art. 3 of the Convention.6 However, it should be noted that, in particular, in respect of art. 6 of

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2 This text can be rarely occurred in a generalized form directly in the Court judgments, at the same time its elements form the basis of the Court analysis of lawfulness of interference with exercise of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. The dissertation defended at the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law attached to the RF government was dedicated to generalization and analysis of the given test criteria. See: Lipkina N. Legal Views of the European Court of Human Rights in Relation of Freedom of States Discretion in the Exercise of Interference with Rights and Basic Freedoms: Dissertation Abstract, Moscow, 2008.
the Convention the Court recalls that the right not to be extradited is not as such among the matters covered by the Convention, and the extradition procedure doesn’t raise the polemic concerning civil rights and obligations or of a criminal charge under art. 6 of the Convention.

**Compliance with the Limits of the Margin of Appreciation to Interfere with the Right to Liberty and Security of a Person (article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention)**

**The Criteria of Lawfulness of Interference: the Existence of an Appropriate National Legal Norm and the Norms’ Quality**

As it was mentioned above, the first criteria of observation of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention is the connectivity of a persons detention and application of extradition or deportation actions in his respect, or prevention of his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country. Here the purpose of admissibility of that interference with the right to liberty and security of a person is clearly seen – the facilities for relevant actions. To clarify the content of this purpose one should refer to the provisions of international law, as well as Russian national law concerning detention of persons on the corresponding grounds. Professor Igor Petroukhin marks in his comments on the provisions of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention – in the context of the Russian legislation that “under Russian legislation arrest and detention in terms of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention – are admissible in respect of aliens and stateless persons passing the procedures of expulsion from a country in cases provided for by the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation (RF). The ground for the administrative detention of a person can be the grave violation of the customs regulations, and all the more, the wholesale contraband (art. 188 of the RF Penal Code). At the same time it appears that such an approach narrows a little groundlessly the sphere of action of the legal basis in question; besides it doesn’t touch upon the categories of those persons against whom actions are being taken to prevent their effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or with a view to their extradition, and insufficiently reveals the notion of deportation actions as well.

Legal governing of entry into the country rules, regime of the national frontier, is the inherent right of any state and violation of the relevant rules is always considered as a serious threat to the national law order. In the preamble of the Agreement on cooperation of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States on fighting illegal migration of 1998 it is marked that “the illegal migration being a threat to the public and national security, contributes to complication of the criminal situation in the territories of the Parties”. The Russian Federation is a party to a number of other international agreements directed at fighting illegal migration.

In accordance with art. 11 of the RF law of 1 April 1993 № 4730-1 “On the National Frontier of the Russian Federation”, 1 “alien citizens and stateless persons not admitted into the RF in accordance with the RF legislation and persons in respect of whom the decision on prohibition of departure from the RF was taken in due process of law, are not permitted to pass the national frontier”. Art. 30 of that Law determining the frontier bodies’ authorities in the sphere of the national frontier protection, directly refers to the possibility to apply actions with a view to restriction of the right to liberty and security of related persons.

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3  Rossiiskaya gazeta [Russian Newspaper], 04.05.1993, № 84.
Application of the Grounds
In the context of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention the specification of grounds for such actions under the circumstances of the concrete case is of a principal importance. If actions of aliens or stateless persons who didn’t gain the residence status but crossed the RF national frontier from the territory of a foreign state, involve elements of offence or the administrative offence, and persons in question are placed in detention on the ground of a relevant suspicion, then it is not art. 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention which extends to restriction of their right to liberty and security of a person, but article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention. If actions of persons in question lack grounds for initiation of a criminal case or administrative violation proceeding, then their detention must be referred to the sphere of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. Inasmuch as under art. 14 of the RF law “On the National Frontier of the Russian Federation” mentioned above persons, if they don’t enjoy the political asylum right, are subject to extradition to the authorities of a state wherefrom they crossed the national frontier; if such an extradition is not provided for by the agreement of the RF with that state the frontier authorities expel them beyond the RF frontier at points determined by the frontier authorities.

As it was noted by the ECHR observation of the guarantees provided for by article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention is of special importance for asylum seekers. It appears to be of current interest in connection with lack of mechanisms of these categories of persons protection marked in the literature.

Under part 1 of art. 63 of the Russian Federation Constitution “the Russian Federation grants the political asylum to aliens and stateless persons in accordance with the generally recognized rules of the international law”.

“Refugees”
In 1993 Russia ratified the Convention on the status of refugees of 1951 which is the principal international legal act determining obligations of a state in relation to this extremely vulnerable group. In the context of the right to liberty and security of a person considered in the present work the guarantee provided for by part 1 of art. 31 of the given Convention reads: “the Contracting states will not impose penalties on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who … enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence” is of special importance. At the same time this international agreement allows to some extent certain restrictions of freedom of movement of persons pretending to be of refugees status: “The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be applied until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission to another country” (see part 2 art. 31 of the Convention).

Grounds and rules of recognition as a refugee in the territory of the Russian Federation are determined by the Federal Law of 19 February 1993 № 4528-1 “On Refugees”,1 which details a procedure of gaining a status in question in our country. In the light of the examined norm of the Convention, the Russian legislation allows certain restrictions of the right to liberty and security in respect of a person applying for the refugee status, for a period of an application consideration. In particular, the question is detention of persons in “temporary detention facilities” at the Russian Federation frontier checkpoints. In my opinion, § 1(f) of art. 5 of the Convention extends to such restrictions.

“Deportation”
What concerns such an institute as deportation, a rather uniform approach to its essence from the point of view of the international legal regulation should be noted.

2 Konov V. International Legal Standards of the Asylum Granting in the Practice of State Construction of European Countries, Gosudarstvo i pravo [State and Law], 2007, № 12, p. 38.
5 Rossiiskaya gazeta [Russian Newspaper], 03.06.1997, № 126.
7 Rossiiskaya gazeta [Russian Newspaper], 03.06.1997, № 126.
9 In accordance with the paragraph 10 of the General provision on the temporary detention facilities of persons applying for refugee status “accommodated persons not admitted to pass the RF frontier in a period of their applications consideration reside in the facilities” (General Provision on Persons Applying for the Refugees Status in Places of Temporary Detention Facilities, adopted by the RF Government Regulation on 30 June 1998 № 679, Sbornie zakonodatelsiva [Collection of Laws] RF, № 27, 06.07.98, art. 3196).
International legal documents refer to this institute in the context of guarantees of inadmissibility of arbitrary expulsion, prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens, prohibition of discrimination in the exercise of expulsion, prohibition of expulsion of nationals, and responsibility for crimes against humanity etc.

Uniformity of this approach is reflected in the fact that in spite of the terminological difference used for the “deportation” definition, all these instances concern the compulsory movement of persons beyond state frontier in no connection with extradition of persons who have committed an offence. The given approach is best demonstrated in the legal position of the UN Committee on Human Rights: it pointed out in interpretation of the provision of art. 13 of the International Covenant on civil and political rights that the guarantees provided for in the Covenant concern any form of “compulsory expulsion” of aliens no matter how this process is defined in national law. In this connection it should be noted that a term “expulsion” is encountered in the official translation of the Convention into Russian, firstly, in § 1(f) of art. 5 of the Convention, secondly in art. 1 of the Protocol № 7 to the Convention and art.3,4 of the Protocol № 4 to the Convention notwithstanding the fact that the term “deportation” is used in the first instance and the term “expulsion” in the second instance in the original text of the Convention in English. Applying the analogy of the mentioned above legal position of the UN Committee on Human Rights to the considered issue, terminological difference in English text is not of a principal importance, to my mind, and usage of one and the same term in the Russian version of the Convention is allowable.

1 Art. 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; art.7 of the Declaration on Human Rights in Respect of Persons Non-nationals of the Country of their Residence, of 1985, Actual International Law, V.1, M., 1996, p. 255-259, part 3 of art. 25 of the CIS Convention; art.1 of the Protocol № 7 to the Convention.
2 Part. 4, art. 25 of the CIS Convention; art. 4 of the Protocol № 4 to the Convention.
4 Part. 1, art. 25 of the CIS Convention; part. 1, art. 3 of the Protocol № 4 to the Convention.
6 CCPR General Comment No. 15 of 11 April 1986: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant, United Nations Human Rights Website, Treaty Bodies Database, URL: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/bc561aa81b5cd86ee12563ed004aaa1b?OpenDocument (date of application: 01.10.11.).
7 There are no mentioned differences in the French version of the text; the term “expulsion” is used in both cases.

In general, certain terminological differences can be encountered in the national legislation. Specialists note that at present “the following terms defining different forms of expulsion of aliens and stateless persons who have committed an offence can be encountered in a number of foreign states law (Germany, USA, France, Japan, Switzerland, Finland): “transfer” (movement to another region of a country is meant), “deportation”, “expulsion”, “exile”, “compulsory expulsion from a country” etc.

What concerns the RF law, the legal basis for expulsion under the RF legislation requires the additional analysis in accordance with the provisions of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. First and foremost one should pay attention to the usage of the term “expulsion” in art. 61 of the RF Constitution of 1993, part 1 of it reads as follows: “The RF citizen can’t be expelled from the RF territory or extradited to another state”. In general, the Russian legislation not often refers to this term, and it is not referred to at all in the Administrative Code and in the Penal Code of RF as well.

At the same time, art. 3.2 of the Administrative Code mentions “the administrative expulsion of an alien or a stateless person beyond the RF frontier” among administrative penalties, fixed and imposed for commitment of administrative offences. It is obvious that both the term “deportation” under art. 61 of the RF Constitution and the concept “deportation actions” under article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention extend to this kind of penalty. In this regard one should bear in mind two circumstances.

Firstly, a starting point for the lawful detention of a person under § 1 (f) of art. 5 of the Convention in connection with deportation actions related to the administrative expulsion will be imposition of this kind of penalty by a court or a competent official. It means that not § 1 (f) but § 1(c) of the Convention extends to detention of a person (if it takes place) until a corresponding decision is taken. Thus, under the provisions of § 7 of the Instruction on Organization

1 Kourakin A. Administrative Expulsion of Aliens and Stateless Persons Beyond the RF Frontier, Yuriis, 2000, № 9, p. 47-51.
2 Under part 2 of art. 3.10 of the Administrative Code: “Administrative expulsion beyond the RF frontier as a measure of the administrative penalty is fixed in relation of aliens or stateless persons and is imposed by a judge, and in a case of commitment of an administrative offence by an alien or a stateless person when entering the RF – by competent officials”.

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of the frontier authorities’ activity in relation to the administrative expulsion of aliens and stateless persons beyond the RF frontier,¹ “an authorised official of the frontier authority while detecting an administrative offence, … for which the administrative expulsion of an alien as a measure of the administrative penalty can be imposed, … arrests an alien in the administrative proceedings for a time-limit fixed by art. 27.5 of the RF Administrative Code”. To my mind, article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention extends to this situation. One should bear in mind that the given conclusion is fully reasonable in relation of such a kind of expulsion as the administrative expulsion, because it is a punishment for committing an offence, and, for example, in relation to deportation – which will be the question hereafter and another approach will be reasonable.

Secondly, one should understand that § 1 (f) of art. 5 of the Convention allows not application of deportation actions as such but detention in connection with such actions application. Consequently, considering the administrative expulsion as a measure of the administrative penalty it’s necessary to bear in mind that its nature is not related to detention, otherwise one should carry the question of lawfulness of its application over to the scope of art. 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention. And detention in connection with the administrative expulsion relates to the order of implementation of this kind of punishment provided for by art. 34 of the Federal law of 25 July 2002 № 115 “On Legal Status of Aliens in Russian Federation”.² Point 5 of it reads as follows: “Aliens subject to the administrative expulsion beyond the Russian Federation frontier are kept in specially allotted premises of internal affairs or security authorities agencies in accordance with the Court decision, or in specialized institutions established in order fixed by legislation of the RF territorial subject, until the decision on the administrative expulsion beyond the RF frontier is taken”. Detention of persons subject to the administrative expulsion in specialized premises is also provided for by part 5 in art. 32.10 of the Administrative Code.

Another kind of the compulsory movement of persons beyond the Russian Federation frontier is deportation. In accordance with the provisions of art. 2 of the Federal law “On Legal Status of Aliens in the Russian Federation”, “deportation is the compulsory expulsion of an alien from the Russian Federation in case of loss or termination of legal basis for his further residence in the Russian Federation”.

One should distinguish deportation from the considered above administrative expulsion, both in relation to this action application and in relation to its nature, though scholars mark lack of precision of the terms “deportation” and “administrative expulsion” usage in Russian legislation.¹ Thus, in particular, not quite fair usage of the terms “expulsion” and “deportation” as synonyms² may be marked in the Federal law “On Refugees”. Besides, in the above mentioned RF Law “On the National Frontier of the Russian Federation” the term “expulsion” is used in no connection with the administrative penalty,³ and in my opinion substitutes for the term “deportation”. In administrative law science it’s possible to encounter several somewhat divergent points of view in relation to the considered notions.⁴

In general, the above mentioned problems of the administrative law theory and legislative “imprecision” have no influence upon the positive solution of the question of both deportation and administrative expulsion qualification as the category of actions to which the notion “deportation” is extended under the provisions of § 1 (f) of art. 5 of the Convention. Besides, the Russian law allows interfer-

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ence with the right to liberty and security of a person in the course of the deportation realisation.\footnote{1}

**“Readmission”**

The Federal law “On Legal Status of Aliens in the Russian Federation” separate out extradition of a person to a foreign state by the Russian Federation under the international agreement of the RF on readmission\footnote{2} as another kind of the compulsory movement beyond the RF frontier, though there is an opinion in literature that it touches upon deportation in this case as well.\footnote{3} At that, the given law makes reference to extradition of aliens in readmission procedure as a separate action among administrative expulsion and deportation.\footnote{4}

The order of aliens’ extradition under the international agreements of the RF on readmission is also determined by this law; art. 32.2 of this law provides for the possibility of temporary placement of the relevant persons in specialized institutions.\footnote{5}

**“Extradition”**

Extradition actions application is the third ground for arrest or detention of a person enumerated in art. 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. The extradition institute in international law is governed thoroughly at the universal, regional, and bilateral levels.


\footnote{2} At present the RF is a party to a number of agreements on readmission. In particular: the Agreement between the RF and the European Community on readmission of 2006, Sobranie zakonodatelstva [Collection of Law] RF. 04.06.2007, № 23, art. 2693; Agreement between the RF Government and Lithuanian Republic Government on the Reception and Return of Persons Illegally on the RF Territory and Lithuanian territory (Agreement on Readmission) of 2003, Sobranie zakonodatelstva [Collection of Law] RF. 25.08.2003, № 34, art. 3358.

\footnote{3} Art. 6 § 8 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970, Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheni y i conventsiy, zakluchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami [Collection of the Contemporary Agreements and Conventions between the USSR and Foreign States], Ed. XXVII M., 1974, p. 292-296; art. 6 § 1 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 1979, Sobornik mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov SSSR [Collection of International Agreements of USSR], Ed. XLIII., M., 1989, p. 99-105.


\footnote{5} For details on the readmission legal governing in the RF see: Andrichenko L. Problems of Readmission Legal Regulation, Zhurnal Rossiiskogo Prava [Journal of Russian Law], 2010, № 5, p. 18-30.

It’s necessary to take the theoretic research of the prominent national scholars related to the extradition classification in international law as a basis of the analysis of the term “extradition” used in the Convention and of the systematization of the relevant issues concerning interpretation and application of art.5 § 1(f) of the Convention within this research. Thus, Professor Lev Lazoutin distinguishes two grounds of extradition classification: (1) according to the legal basis and (2) according to the extradition types.\footnote{1}

What concerns those types of extradition distinguished according to the first ground – extradition on the basis of the universal conventions on prevention of certain types of offences; extradition under universal, regional and bilateral agreements (conventions) on mutual legal aid and on extradition; extradition according to the interdepartmental agreements of the law enforcement bodies on legal aid and cooperation; extradition in accordance with acts of the international judicial agencies; extradition according to the international organizations acts – a notion of extradition under art.5 § 1 (f) of the Convention unquestionably extend to all of them. At that, provisions of the relevant international documents can provide for detention of an offender or an alleged offender,\footnote{2} or a person whose extradition is requested.\footnote{3}

The extradition types distinguished by Lev Lazoutin according to the second ground of classification – extradition with a purpose to institute criminal proceedings, extradition with a purpose to execute a judgment, extradition for a specified period –can also be considered as covered with art. 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention.


\footnote{2} Art 6, § 1 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970, Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheni y i conventsiy, zakluchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami [Collection of the Contemporary Agreements and Conventions between the USSR and Foreign States], Ed. XXVII M., 1974, p. 292-296; art. 6 § 1 of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 1979, Sobornik mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov SSSR [Collection of International Agreements of USSR], Ed. XLIII., M., 1989, p. 99-105.

\footnote{3} Art. 6 § 8 of the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988, Sobornik mezhdunarodnykh dogovorov SSSR i Rossii [Collection of International Agreements of USSR and Russian Federation], Ed. XLVII. M., 1994, p. 133-157; art. 44 § 10 of the UN Convention against Corruption, Bulletin Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov [Bulletin of International Agreements], 2006, № 10, p. 7-54.
International agreements dedicated to extradition directly provide for the arrest or detention of a person whose extradition is requested, even until the moment of receipt of a request for extradition by a requested state. Analogous provisions are also contained in bilateral international agreements to which the RF is a party. With reference to the Russian legislation norms governing arrest and detention in connection with the extradition procedure, one should mainly refer to the provisions of art. 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RF, which allows application of a measure of restrain including detention to a person in relation to whom the extradition request from a foreign state was received. Interpretation of a term “extradition” encountered in art. 5 § 1(f) of the Convention gives rise to the following issues which may be separated in the context of Russian legislation.

Firstly, the solution of the question is required, whether the given term extends to the institute of convicted persons transfer for service of sentence in a country of their citizenship; this question is also reflected both in international law norms, and in Russian law norms. Considering this question, it appears reasonable to recognize the significant difference between extradition and transfer following the prominent Russian scholars. When interpreting the term “extradition” in accordance with the provisions of art. 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention, the notion of transfer of convicted persons for service of sentence in a country of their citizenship should not be included into it, because transfer of a person assumes that a sanction involving deprivation of liberty has been imposed on a person in accordance with the final judgment of a court, and consequently a person is kept in custody not in connection with his transfer actions, but in connection with imposition of the relevant sentence.

Secondly, one should recognize a low level of regulation of the extradition institution in Russian law on the whole and, as a result, imperfection of the legislative regulation of detention action and detention of persons against whom action is being taken with a view to extradition. The ECHR judgment in the case “Nasrulloev v. Russia” is of special interest; in this case the Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of the Russian law governing detention of persons with a view to extradition are neither precise nor foreseeable in their application and fell short of the “quality of law” standard required under the Convention. The Court came to that decision having regard to the inconsistent and mutually exclusive positions on the issue of legal regulation of detention with a view to extradition in the period of the decision-making process at the request for extradition to another state.

The case “Shchebet v. Russia” is also rather demonstrative in this respect; no record of the applicant’s arrest was drawn up upon her apprehension because both the police officers and the public prosecutor’s office representatives believed that an arrest record was not required in the framework of extradition proceedings. The ECHR pointed out that the given fact is the most grave violation of art. 5 of the Convention. However, it is fair to say that certain decisions of the Constitutional Court made during recent years significantly clarify these questions.

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Compliance with the Purpose of Interference Provided by the Article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention

Going over to the analysis of the ECHR practice on interpretation of the provision of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention it may be pointed out that the observation of the purpose of the interference provided for by it assumes that a state must have either the intention to extradite a person or exile him beyond a country’s frontiers, or prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country. At the same time, the interpretation of the given purpose requires an especially careful approach, because the erroneous notion of the interaction of a person’s detention and application of corresponding measures in his relation may appear. Interaction of the purpose and the measure of restraint is rather clearly reflected in the text of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention, in the content of the first part of the guarantees provided for by it – detention of “a person with a view to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country”. What concerns the following part – detention of “a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”, such interaction seems to be less clear. Really, in the second instance the text of the examined purpose lacks the purpose indication, and the notion of “a measure” may be interpreted in different ways.

In the judgment in the case “Caprino v. the United Kingdom” one can see the Committee’s approach to the evaluation of the appropriate interpretation of the corresponding purpose. Firstly, the Committee pays attention to the fact that in this case the decision on deportation was made before the applicant’s detention; it shows that there is a fair chronological sequence; secondly, the Committee analyses the informative part of that sequence. Under the circumstances of this case the applicant submitted that his detention had been unlawful from the point of view of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention due to the fact that it was not necessary for the deportation action.

The Committee pointed out that there is no note of the “necessity” element in the text of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention and all that is required under sub-paragraph (f) is that “action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition”.

At that, the Committee points out that it doesn’t follow from the text of § 1 (f) that the decision on extradition must enter into force at the moment of a person’s detention, and the possible result of extradition actions application is of no importance. Thus the fact that the deportation decision was set aside afterwards, under the circumstances of the case, didn’t give evidence of the applicant’s detention unlawfulness.

In the case “Chahal v. the United Kingdom” the Court affirmed this conclusion in its judgment and added that article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention provides a different level of protection from article 5 § 1 (c) and it does not require that the detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to extradition be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or absconding.

A similar approach is applied in relation to the extradition, and to the prevention of an unauthorised entry into the country. Considering a case “Saadi v. the United Kingdom” the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, being a third party in this case, held the opinion that when interpreting article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention “the necessity” test must be applied in relation to refugees. That is to say asylum seekers must be separated from a category of persons unlawfully within the territories of a state or persons subject to deportation; besides something more than absence of the decision on an asylum seeker’s application is needed to place a person in detention under provisions of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. Detention must be necessary in the sense that less punitive measures would be insufficient, and must be proportional to the purpose. At the same time, the Court noted that interpretation of the first part of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention in the sense that it allows detention only

when it’s proved that a person is evading the rules of entry into a country, would impose excessive restrictions on this norm provisions and on the state authority in exercise of its indisputable rights in the migration control sphere.

Apart from the difference between § 1 (f) and § 1 (c) marked by the Court, reference to difference between § 1 (f) and § 1 (e) may be encountered. Thus, in the case “Zamir v. the United Kingdom” the Committee pointed out that if § 1 (e) requires observation of a “material” condition, § 1 (f) doesn’t require observance of the condition of lawfulness of deportation action.

So, in the case “Chahal v. the United Kingdom” even notwithstanding the fact that the Court came to the conclusion that the decision on deportation of the applicant to India contravened art. 3 of the Convention because he was exposed to the real threat of torture or life deprivation, his detention for 6 months pending the Court decision was admissible according to article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. At the same time, issues of lawfulness of the deportation actions application can be touched upon in the context of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention in those cases where detention lawfulness depends on deportation lawfulness according to the national law.

Thus, the second part article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention should be read so that from the point of view of the purpose observation detention is lawful if it’s implemented in connection with either extradition or deportation of a person, or actions to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country, regardless of the stage of these actions implementation, i.e. whether their application is completed, whether the final decisions are taken and come into force, and regardless of detention necessity for implementation of these actions. This approach to my mind shows that the peculiarity of article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention is the specific nature of the criteria of validity of interference with the right to liberty and security of a person. Its role is mainly reduced to evaluation of observation of the condition related to deportation, extraditions or prevention of unauthorised entry into the country actions; which is a reasonable and sufficient ground for detention, according to the general rule.

Considering the case “Saadi v. the United Kingdom” the ECHR underlined that “the position regarding potential immigrants, is different to the extent that, until their application for immigration clearance has been dealt with, they are not “authorised” to be on the territory; besides, the State has a broader discretion to decide whether to detain potential immigrants than is the case for other interferences with the right to liberty. All that is required is that the detention should be a genuine part of the process to determine whether the individual should be granted immigration clearance and/or asylum”.

The circumstances of the case “A. and Others v. the United Kingdom” may be a typical example of absence of the necessary connection between detention and corresponding actions implementation. A number of alien applicants were placed in detention in connection with the deportation actions taken in their respect, according to declaration of the authorities of Great Britain. At that, it was necessary to find a State to receive them where they would not face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Thus, in particular, the Court pointed that the authorities held no negotiations with other states in this respect, and came to the conclusion that actions of the authorities of Great Britain could not be recognised sufficiently clear to be qualified as “deportation actions”.

1 Application no. 13229/03, Saadi v. the United Kingdom, ECHR Judgment of 29 January 2008, §§ 44-45.
2 Application no. 3455/05, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, ECHR Judgment of 19 February 2009, §§ 137-190. Circumstances of that case were complicated by the fact that Great Britain made preliminary notification of derogations from obligations under the Convention in accordance with art.15 of the Convention, however the Court in its evaluation of lawfulness of relevant actions of the authorities, drew a conclusion on disproportion of derogation on account of unreasonable discrimination of nationals and “non-nationals” and found a violation of Art. 5 of the Convention.
“Special Diligence”
Apart from the criteria of the necessary connection between detention and application of actions specified in article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention, lawfulness of interference with the right to liberty and security of a person in accordance with legal ground provided for by it assumes that these actions must be realized with “due diligence”. In the Court practice the given condition is disclosed in the evaluation of the fact whether the detention period exceeds the time necessary for actions on prevention of an unauthorised entry into the country, as well as deportation and extradition actions. Considering the case “Quinn v. France” the Court pointed out that “it is clear from the wording of both the French and the English versions of Article 5 §1 (f) (art. 5-1-f) that deprivation of liberty under this sub-paragraph will be justified only for as long as extradition proceedings are being conducted. It follows that if such proceedings are not being prosecuted with due diligence, the detention will cease to be justified under Article 5 §1 (f) (art. 5-1-f)”. The Court notes that, at the different stages of the extradition proceedings, there were delays of sufficient length to render the total duration of those proceedings excessive and consequently the violation of art. 5 of the Convention was found.1

In another case – “Kolompar v. Belgium”, on the contrary, the Court came to the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 5 of the Convention, in spite of the fact that the period of detention of a person against whom the extradition actions were taken was found excessive; however the reason of that was not the actions of the state but on behalf of the applicant, whose conduct gave rise to delays.2

In one of the Russian cases the Court underlined that article 5 § 1 (f) of the Convention doesn’t require the detention period limitation by national law in the period of extradition proceedings. At that, the detention duration is not as important as that diligence of extradition actions realization by a state.3 Thus, if in the case “Quinn v. France” the applicant’s detention for over two years was found excessive, the case “Chahal v. the United Kingdom” the Court, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case and the facts that the national authorities have acted with due diligence throughout the deportation proceedings against him, this detention for 4 years complied with the requirements of the Convention.1 It appears that therein lays the specific character of action of the proportionality criteria of the interference with the right to liberty and security of a person provided for by §1 (f) of art. 5 of the Convention: this rule comes to the requirement to observe the reasonable time of detention. Therein lays the next difference of § 1 (f) from other grounds provided for by §1 (e) of art. 5 of the Convention.

Conclusion
Summing up, it is worthy to note that the guarantee provided for by § 1 (f) includes a guarantee concerning three categories of persons: (1) those persons against whom the authorities take actions to prevent their effecting an unauthorised entry into the country, (2) persons against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation, (3) persons against whom action is being taken with a view to extradition.

The legal positions of the ECHR make it possible to define the following criteria of restriction of the lawfulness of the right to liberty and security of a person in the context of the legal basis under consideration:

• Detention is connected with actions on deportation/extradition/prevention of an unauthorised entry into the country of a person, and detention of a person can be implemented only within a period of these actions application;

• Application of these actions is realized with “due diligence”.

It appears that a number of precedents concerning art. 5 of the Convention will rise in time and one can hardly talk about final and exhaustive views of the Court in relation to lawfulness of liberty deprivation regime, bearing in mind that the Court doesn’t deal with “the abstract control”, but judges concrete cases.

However, today one can say with certainty that rather articulate standards of interpretation of the provisions of the article 5 § 1 (f) of

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the Convention were elaborated during the Court activity; observation
of them is necessary for ensuring the right to liberty and security of
a person by the states.
Examination of such standards and their implementation at the
national level is extremely necessary for the achievement of aims
laid down by the Convention.

**Problem Statement: What Questions Remained Unanswered?**
When it comes to getting wise to taxes, we turn to economic theory
or to lawyers. However, it is very difficult to explain the specificity of
national tax systems within the traditional approach, so it refers us to
the problem of the nature of taxes and taxation system development.
Firstly, the system of redistribution based on not only the rationality,
but also on a certain social ethical principle, takes priority in modern
tax assessment. The second aspect is an analysis of the social and
historical rootedness of the taxation practices: development of the
differentiation of labour, development of its productivity and, as a
consequence, complicacy of the social structure, strengthening of the
centralized power, and expansion of money as an exchange instru-
ment were the factors of development of the taxation system as a
social institute. Therefore, the disclosure of national “tax culture” as
an assembly of all relevant formal and informal institutes connected
with the national taxation system and its practical realization which
are grounded in national historical events (in the sense of “historical
rootedness” by Mark Granovetter) including dependences and connec-
tions caused by their continuous cooperation is an important element
of the analysis. Everything abovementioned gives us a new view to
the nature of tax assessment and specificity of national tax policy.
In this article we will consider a critique of the traditional approach
to tax assessment based on the alternative continental approach
rooted in the European, mostly German, cameralism. However,
herewith we come up against a new problem – the significant part
of works dedicated to the alternative sociological analysis of the tax
assessment and state finances is dissipated within different social

**Alternative Approach to Studying Taxation:
Fiscal Sociology and Tradition of the European Cameralism**
Pavel Zakharjin
with very different constitutions and economic and political systems including different systems of taxation and political decision-making and also different histories, cultures and sociopolitical visions”.

In Reinhard Blomert’s opinion, from the American Revolution on, which started under the slogan “no taxation without representation” (that meant, political participation due to the money power), to figures like Charles Merrill, who made a fortune by selling tax redeemed pension schemes to middle class people in the 1930s, to the most powerful actors in financial markets today, the pension funds, we find not only changes in the lives and hopes of people for security and changing attitudes in the finance sector, but also changes in the dominance of professional finance groups, made possible or initiated by special state laws.

Why Does the Tax Assessment Analysis Continue to Be Relevant Today?
Let us suppose that taxation is an evil, even if an “inevitable (necessary)” one. A question now arises of why the tax level, both absolute and relative, has been stably growing over the last 100 years. The fact that since 1900 tax receipts in many Western countries increased from 10% to 40% of the national output shows that the impact of taxes on society became greater than ever. And no evidence was found suggesting that globalization, capital mobility, and consequently, competition among taxation areas prompt the states to further decrease tax rates in their strive for tax payers.

Juergen Backhaus believes that the need to define tax laws was again brought to modern the political agenda after the European Union began to take more definite shape and an emerging European constitution became more tangible. “The fiscal constitution of the European Union will have to meet the classical criteria developed in political doctrine; it also has to be in line with the requirements of a modern global economy; and third, it must accommodate member states

tion tools, there is an inconsistent concept of taxes that is considered an “inevitable evil”. On the one hand, it can be characterized by an absolute aversion to this phenomena naturally experienced by the rational active individual, and on the other hand – by the inevitability of this phenomenon. And although the economic theory is mainly dedicated to the rational person’s freedom of choice and action, however, taxation phenomenon is interpreted as inevitable, and at the same time as mutually rewarding and evident to everyone, and consequently having no alternative.

Another important aspect of analysis of taxation is historical evolution underwent by forms of this phenomenon. In the subsistence economy era there was no indirect financing of the so called public goods (actually, the function of tax system is such indirect financing) in the form which is familiar to us in the beginning of the 21st century. All the material needs were satisfied in kind, with direct involvement of poll tax payers: military service, villein-socage, tillage of communal land etc. According to Werner Sombart, at that time people produced consumer goods rather than exchangeable values. Put it otherwise, they produced articles with diverse characteristics, not converted to an abstract form of value. And only wide circulation of money as an exchange tool, a rise in labor productivity and, consequently, further complication of the social structure made it possible to transform the social debt into the chief rent, to abolish slavery as demanded the increasingly widespread specialization of labor, and growth of population along with retention and entrenchment of centralized power.

One can highlight two main trends in the scientific analysis of economic activity: classical economic tradition which focuses on the formalized economic approach, and alternative continental tradition (it may be described as “Staatswissenschaften”) which covers a broader spectrum of political and social issues. According to experts in alternative approaches to taxation, in the English school of liberal economy, the state as an economic agent has actually disappeared: for Adam Smith, the state was not involved in the production process. On the other hand, from 1723 economic in the European continent was studied in the context of cameralistic and political sciences, including the law. Actually, cameralistic sciences were economy and government finance incorporated in a broad approach of social policy, where the state and its institutions were considered as the main source of initiative. The above structure of research and education explains why all the studies on economy and government finance written over the 19th century were of quite multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary nature (of course, from the modern point of view). One can see that in monographs of such authors as Sombart, Schumpeter or Weber, which, although they were pioneers in sociology, did not regard themselves as sociologists.

Classical financial science begins with Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717-1771). While Adam Smith (1723-1790) began to search the causes of wealth a bit later, Justi was interested in the foundations, i.e. the main reasons for the state power and well-being. The state power consists of its citizens “possibilities”, hereunder he considered not the well-being itself, but the capability to create something and reach something. Friedrich List (1789-1846) used the term “productive power” later. According to Justi, state happiness is provided only if its citizens are very happy, therefore the state is responsible for the necessary conditions of development. In Justi’s opinion state happiness is obvious: the more it is, the more prosperous citizens are living here. It is also reasonable, since it is referred to as the capability to create wealth and multiply it.

Justi has proved the financial science as one of the sciences about the state in terms of cameral science. Hereby it is understood that those persons who were using it, i.e. the cameralists, had access to

1 Sombart V. Burjua [Bourgeois], M., 2009, p. 25.
the duke’s treasury. The duke was consulting regarding the question how to maintain power and well-being. In other words, the consulting has an addressee, the prince, therefore it has a clear identification with the government, and its purpose is to increase the corresponding state power and happiness, today we are calling it a “well-being”. The idea which was developed later as an economy of well-being was clearly stated in cameral science with the difference that the consultative actions are implied on fact and the consultants are included into analysis.  

Marc Leroy believes that fiscal sociology, which emerged in the 20th century due to the impact of world wars on the state and economy, resulted from the influence of two scientific schools — socio politico — social and economic. These two schools, along with psychology, social psychology, and history, should, in capacity of social sciences and as a result of “dialogue” between them, provide the specialized vision of taxation. Fiscal sociology as a separate scientific field gains its true significance only when gaps become evident due to discrepancy of sociology and economy. At the same time, some representatives of fiscal sociology consider results of alternative studies as additions to traditional vision.

The Logic of Alternative Approach to Taxation Analysis

Semantic interpretation of actions related with product flow, has always been complicated and multi-faceted. Economic approach (a rational approach based on practical economic activity and explaining the logic of exchange in the context of limited resources, which is actually the catallactics), became dominant in analysis of any other product movements within society. As a result, the essence of the other transactions not covered by logic of material rationalism, remained unrevealed to some degree, and such transactions were interpreted in a simplified way. Economics always tends to simplify human activity; therefore any economical action in its pure form contains powerful averaging elements, thereby producing an appearance of similarity of aspirations of humans. The said contradiction was revealed by Karl Polányi; moreover, he introduced the semantic and formal meaning of the term “economical”. On the one hand, there is the formal concept of “economical”, i.e. the concept based on the logic nature of relations between means and objectives. Such interpretation implies the situation of choice between diverse ways of using these means resulting from their limited nature. Rules which determine such choice are called logic of rational action. These rules turned to be a methodological obstacle for social sciences. “Only semantic meaning of ‘economical’ can generate concepts, necessary to carry out empirical study of all types of economy, past and present, within the context of social sciences”. Thus, we obtained a new tool of analysis of social phenomena – drawing the logical distinction between the semantic meaning of processes and their institutional presentation. Following the logic of Polányi, the framework of analysis necessitates examination of the taxation system in terms of semantic definition.

The actual exchange of consumer values conceals some symbolic value existing in the social environment, i.e. some value which implies action and relationship between anonymized persons or some equivalents of entities. These actions of such factors are evaluated in terms of the system and social balance. Some authors who share this view, namely Marcel Mauss, studied the symbolical and information content within the phenomena of exchange and contract in societies, with practice of exchange different from practice of exchange adopted in our country. In the context of such approach, diverse courtesies, such as feasts, rites, dances, festivals, fairs etc. are “just some aspects of a broader and more constant contract” or “a system of complex total supplies”.

Actually, the current interpretation of taxation is just a description of laws which determine a particular historical rationality, which emerged in the era of developing monetary relations, progressing specialization of labor and, the most important, the advanced and multi-faceted system of centralized power, which made it possible to link the economic interpretation of this phenomenon to the functional concept of the state. A number of examples show that logical unification of economic ideologies can be refuted, and import of diverse institutional constructions leads to ambiguous results. The logic of “sensationalism” provides an opportunity to draw analytical distinctions between physical movement of product (in physical or monetary form) and his “institutional presentation” which makes it possible to develop a more complete macro-level theory of taxation.

Julius Landmann shows the typical method of the sociology of finance. It was historically and process oriented, considering the financial interests and burdens of the main social groups (supposing not rational homo economicus, but the fact that not all social groups are actually aware of their financial burdens). “The sociology of finance looks at the power struggles between different groups, their different modes of competition, their different ways of formulating interests and opposing imputations, their various relations to the state and its clerks. It looks at the financial perspectives of people of different social strata, e.g. their ways of saving and their mode of caring for the old age, seeking typologies of group interests and their changes under institutional dynamics and political steering”.

The Current Research: Diversity of Approaches to the Problem

Despite a great deal of research on the subject, fiscal sociology is still in its formative stage. This is due to the fact that only a small part of scientific literature is dedicated to sociologic analysis of taxation and government finance. Nevertheless, even now one can find monographs which summarize the accumulated materials and contain an overview of existing studies. According to John L. Campbell, the specificity of fiscal sociology in comparison with other disciplines is that fiscal sociology gives particular emphasis to complicated social interaction, institutional, and historical contexts, which relate society to the state, thus giving rise to fiscal policy and its effects.

Put shortly, fiscal sociology is the discipline dealing with:
- the way taxation and government finance influence a broad spectrum of political, cultural, historic, and institutional factors as well as the feedback effect these factors have on taxation and government finance;
- institutional causes and effects of fiscal policy of the state;
- principles of control over government finance and principles of tax burden redistribution among social strata;
- how income and expenditure of the state are determined by the social sphere and how they influence it;
- cultural aspects of taxation.

Some authors tend to focus their attention on tax moral and to point out differences in compliance with the tax legislation between the countries, specificities of tax compliance as well as on standard economic models being unable to explain these differences. While considering current tax rates and level of tax control, one may observe too high a level of tax compliance, which was not expected to occur in the context of classical economic theory.

Birger Nerré described tax culture as a particular complex of formal and informal institutes relating to the national tax system and its implementation, which has historically been incorporated into the culture of a country, along with connections and the relationships resulting from continuous interaction of these institutes. According to the author, “tax culture”, typical of any given country, arises out of traditions of taxation (for instance, predominance of direct/indirect taxes), on the one hand, and out of interaction between actors and cultural values, such as “honesty”, “justice” and “sense of duty”, on the other. Although some preliminary studies were conducted in the 1960s by the Cologne school of tax psychology, the concept of tax ethics or tax morale was largely ignored by researchers. Lars Feld and Bruno Frey pointed out that most studies perceive tax morale as a “black box”, making no attempt to understand its origins. As a rule, tax morale is considered as a part of general preferences of taxpayers and used in studies focused on tax evasion. As far as we can see, it would be more interesting to consider factors affecting formation and maintenance of tax morale. Political culture of any country undergoing transformation processes is subject to more or less significant changes. According to Nerré, such situations can cause tax culture shocks. The term of culture shock was first introduced in 1960 by anthropologist Kalervo Oberg to describe (unexpected) negative responses of individuals to behavior patterns typical of foreign cultures, giving rise to a sense of vulnerability, lack of understanding or anxiety. First of all, tax culture shocks are becoming increasingly widespread in the process of globalization, which can be exemplified by VAT failure in Japan after World War II.


The economics lack empiric and experimental evidence of cultural impact. Cross-cultural studies on tax compliance are especially new, and most of existent studies fall into the category of experimental literature. Findings from these studies show that observed differences in tax compliance and morale might be explained by the justice of tax administration, perceived justice of financial exchange, and general attitude toward governments in different countries. Data from the World Values Survey (WVS) are often used in comparative studies. For instance, J. Alm, I. Sanchez, and A. De Juan compared tax compliance in countries such as Spain and the USA, having entirely different history of culture and taxation. They found a significantly higher tax morale in the United States than in Spain, and explained this phenomenon as resulting from the higher “social standards” relating to tax compliance.

James Alm and Benno Togler studied differences in tax morale in Spain and the USA using data from the World Values Survey (WVS) and empirical methods allowing the assessment of tax morale determinants at the individual level. Data on 14 European countries are also included in the analysis. Findings from this study again provide evidence that people in the United States have the highest tax morale across all countries, followed by Austria and Switzerland. It is also worth noting that studies in tax morale were conducted in Australia, the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and in Latin America. The study in German tax morale and culture is especially interesting since this country underwent a unique “natural” experiment involving tax policy changes: Western capitalism prevailed on one side of the iron curtain, while Eastern socialism was predominant.
on the other. These two parts of Germany developed completely different tax cultures. West Germany adopted the “modern” and market-oriented taxation (including, for instance, self-assessment system), while East Germany introduced indirect and hidden taxes.¹

Axel Ockenfels and Joachim Weimann reported that people in East Germany are more inclined to cooperation and joint working and are less selfish, than people in West Germany. According to them, the socialist system created a social dilemma: “Personal efforts aimed at expanding of production got nowhere, therefore they are not rational. Each person should develop strategies to overcome the emerging deficit”.²

According to Nerré’s brief description, the tax system of East Germany was as follows: First, it was dominated by indirect taxes, that is, taxes were, for the most part, hidden from the population. Second, the tax system was highly complicated. Thirdly, taxation had a confiscatory nature and trampled on free enterprise, moreover, there was no public discussion on taxation issues.³

Research conducted by Torgler and his colleagues shows that after reunification, the levels of tax compliance in East Germany were higher as compared with West Germany.⁴ At the same time, this variation seems to have tended to even out over the nineties— tax compliance of East Germany’s population gradually decreases, first of all, with the younger generation. However the variation still exists.

An explanation can be found in the study done by Annette Mummert and Friedrich Schneider, who pointed out that living in the totalitarian state for many years resulted in people’s profound confidence in state institutions.⁵ People gradually accept the rules that they were forced to comply with for many years. Once the social norms are rooted in an individual’s mind, they tend to feel guilty when they act contrary to these norms. The research findings show the impact of the social norms enforcement. People in East Germany felt negative about shadow business to a greater degree.

Summary

The state tends to redistribute more and more money and its legitimacy depends on objectives this money is spent on. Every budget provides a complete picture of the political relationship between authorities and society. “Who pays for whom?” This question shapes the future of every member of society. One of the discoveries of fiscal sociology is the idea that the state is not just an institutional setting, but also the focal point of national competition and discussion related to diverse priorities, subsidies, taxes, fees and charges, customs duties, tariffs, refinance rate etc. All these conditions of life, works and commerce result from political strife between diverse groups and interests. Fiscal sociology aims to understand the essence of these processes using the new approach.

In recent years, extensive studies have been conducted on taxpayers’ behavior in diverse countries, which highlight the role of non-economic factors affecting taxation. This approach aims to put the tax system in a broader social perspective and to highlight its dependence on other subsystems of society. Some authors tend to focus their attention on tax morals and to point out differences in compliance with the tax legislation between the countries. Three key factors are emphasized which are important in the understanding of tax morals: ethical standards and concerns, justice, and relationship between a government and its taxpayers. These authors tend to view social norms as a general alternative to government’s enforcement aimed at correcting behavior of individuals.

The systems of science in Russia and Germany are difficult to compare. Despite being of the same institutional structure with similar sectors, they differ considerably by the functions which are executed by actors in the field. The main difference of the German model is extensive functions of universities, among which research activity is granted the highest priority. In contrast, the “core” of the Russian model is the Russian Academy of Sciences, universities are mostly regarded as a part of the system of higher education, they are obliged to execute the teaching function in the first place.

Nevertheless, during a long period in development of the Russian and German models of science, they were convergent in many aspects (as it will be demonstrated further) – or, in other words, had much in common. Features of the German model can be traced back in Russia: university research was also strong here until the first part of the 20th century, when the Communist Party took the office, and the system of science was significantly restructured.

Another round of the models convergence lasted until the late 1980s. For many decades, until the re-unification of Germany in 1989, this country was divided into two parts, Eastern and Western Germany (the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany respectively). In the eastern part of the country, the GDR, science was organized following the Soviet principles which were the basis for organization of science in the USSR. Thus, research in GDR was concentrated in numerous academies of sciences under control of the state, while university research was distinctly disadvantaged. This model still functions in Russia (though some attempts to change it and make it more flexible are yet to be permanently made), but in former Eastern Germany it was mostly re-structured during the first years after the re-unification. It was one of the starting points
of the new unified state to reinforce transformation of science and research in the former GDR from highly centralized social structure into a decentralized one with multiplicity of sub-systems and actors, funded from different types of resources, which was predominant in the FRG. Science and technology (S&T) in Germany were (and still are) one of the most important priorities, “the main objective of current S&T policy-making is to develop Germany into one of the leading-knowledge based societies”.1

The present paper seeks to answer the question when and why institutional convergence of the Russian and German models of science turned into divergence. The article briefly examines the main stages of development of the models of science in both countries and also provides an analysis of their current features to demonstrate the models’ differences and similarities.

1. Period of Institutional Convergence

Historically, organization of science in Russia was developing along the European traditions, though having some peculiarities. Originally, universities and the Academy in Russia were intent to have clearly delimited functions. The Russian (originally – Imperial) Academy of Sciences was established in 1724 along with the Saint-Petersburg State University (the first university in Russia). Initially the Russian Academy of Sciences was supposed to be established as a research institute, while the University had solely an educational function. Nevertheless, in fact universities those days were not only the centres for learning, but also the scientific research institutes: many prominent scientists were involved in research activity here (for example, mathematician Leonhard Euler, chemist Friedrich Krafft, philologist and historian Gottlieb Bayer, astronomer Petr Inokhodtsev – all of them worked in Saint-Petersburg State University). The University had strong interrelations with the Russian Academy of Sciences, which had not such a well-developed apparatus or a network of departments and committees as it has nowadays. Even on the contrary, Renate Mayntz declares that Russia in those days “used to have academies in the form of learned societies, but their universities were the major sites of basic research. To that extent they stood in the West European tradition”.1

The same “peaceful” co-existence of universities and academies of sciences can be traced in many European countries in the 17th – 19th centuries: Academia dei Lincei in Italy (it was the first academy of sciences in Europe, founded in 1603), the Royal Society of London in England (1660), Académie des sciences in France (since 1666) etc.2 In Germany, the Prussian Academy of Sciences was also established in 1700 (now – Berlin-Branderburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften). Thus, in the 18th century and later, the institutional models of science in Russia and Germany converged, there was no strong distinction between Russian pattern of organization of science and the situation in most European countries, though the Russian Academy of Sciences still had a remarkable distinction. Most European academies of sciences did not have at their disposal numerous institutions and laboratories, they gained from the state only limited funding for libraries and museums, publishing journals, and sometimes for awarding prizes. The members of these academies – as a rule, the professors of the universities and other higher education institutions – often did not get salary for their work in academy. The Petersburg (Russian) Academy of Sciences was originally the only scientific academy, which was entirely financed by the state and made by the scientists for whom their membership in the Academy was a kind of civil service.

While the starting point of the both models was similar, later the trajectory of development of the system of science in Germany was slightly different: instead of gradual concentration of research functions in one body – academy of sciences – and its extensive support by the state, the German model followed a direction of growth of complexity: a number of universities which played (and still do) an extremely important role in research was impressive with a tendency for a permanent increase.


Preconditions of a high level of complexity of the system of science in Germany can be found in the history of the state. Up to 1871 (when the state was united into a national state of Deutsches Reich) it consisted of many independent states. Each of these small states had its own university which was established and funded by its sovereign, in addition the biggest cities such as Hamburg or Frankfurt often founded their own universities. Even after unification of the Deutsches Reich, in additional to state universities there was a number of universities and research institutes governed by individual states (Länder) or cities still existing. Moreover, there were also complex research institutes operating in the whole Reich, such as Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft and the Notgemeinschaft der deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Association of German Science), whose main function was promotion of research and science in German universities and outside their walls. These peculiarities of the historical development of the country, in my opinion, can be considered to be the main precondition for formation of the very complicated system of science, which continues to exist nowadays.

2. Turning to Divergence Trace
According to many authors (Mayntz, Jablecka, Kehm), the turning point in the history of development of both systems of science in Russia and Germany occurred after 1925. This radical change was caused by governance of the Communist Party which initiated a new direction of development of science in Russia and moved the Russian model away from the Western pattern. Also it influenced science in Germany as later it launched restructuring of the whole system of science in its eastern part.

The organization of research in national academies of sciences as the major institutions of state financed research was a Soviet invention. During the Communist Party governance, science was regarded as a necessary basis for economic progress, production and planned innovation (“science push model”). It was the main reason of that extensive state support which science enjoyed in the Soviet period and caused rapid growth of a number of scientific institutes in Russia and scientific personnel in them. Even nowadays, according to studies made in Russia by the OECD (the last one in 2006) and other international and foreign organizations, a number of scientific personnel in the Russian Academy of Sciences exceeds an average quantity of scientific community in most other countries manifold.1

Thus, due to the priority role of science for the country’s development, it became necessary to put this vital system under the central control of the state: the easiest way was to pass the main functions of doing research from quite a diffused network of the universities to one centralised body of the Academy of Sciences which was supported and, what was even more important, funded almost solely by the state. “The academy model, i.e. the concentration of research in one large, specialized, and politically controlled organisation is thus closely linked to a particular view of the function of science in a planned society and the proper relationship between knowledge production and application”. 2

Under the governance of the Communist Party, the system of Russian science and science in the GDR were significantly restructured: the Russian Academy of Sciences developed an extensive network of its departments throughout the country and in the Soviet republics and also obtained almost the sole right to carry out research. In the GDR, 60 institutes of the Academy of Sciences were also established.3 The universities lost most freedoms and rights they had possessed earlier and became responsible mainly for teaching, in contrast with the universities in the western part of Germany, where not only universities, by also state-financed extra-university research enjoyed a considerable higher level of academic freedom (even in comparison with other Western European countries). During the Communist period, in the eastern part of the country the organization of science was similar to the model which was predominant in the USSR: “state-financed research was organized along the lines

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1 The official website of the OECD: www.oecd.org.com (02.02.2010).
of universities to absorb additional personnel from the academies was also limited. Additionally, many academy researchers did not have enough qualification to fulfill the requirement of university jobs.

In Russia, in contrast to Germany, the model of science was not restructured significantly after the fall of the USSR. Despite of the ongoing changes and current attempts of the Russian government to incorporate education and science, the Russian model still preserves the features it gained in the Soviet period and thus differs significantly from the Western model. The governmental sector still prevails: the number of scientific institutes here increased during the 1990s, contrary to the worldwide tendency to decrease. It occurred not only because of establishment of the new academic organizations, but also because of the division of some already existing academy institutes. The Russian Academy of Sciences has a large share in this sector of science, it comprises 11 per cent of Russia’s total of research and development (R&D) institutions, in comparison with six per cent in 1990.

The Russian Academy of Sciences is composed by nine departments (according to the branches of sciences), three regional departments and 15 regional research centres, which are mostly involved in and responsible for basic research.

The business sector of Russian science is represented by the market-oriented R&D institutions, including R&D units of industrial enterprises, which specialise primarily in performing applied research.

The system of science in Germany is notable for a much higher level of institutional diversity than in Russia. It consists of a great number of different institutions and academic organizations, each contains a network of numerous sub-divisions and departments, which also can contain a number of sub-structures. All these institutions are funded from different resources, they have different degrees of freedom and different objectives, and are subordinate to different actors.

State research institutes constitute one of the sectors of the system of science. All of them can be divided according to their affiliation and source of funding:

1. Research institutes which are controlled and financed by their controlling state ministries or by one of the sixteen states. These organizations conduct research in different spheres of science: agriculture, astronomy, international relations, biology, medicine etc. The brightest examples of this group of research institutes are the famous Zentralinstitut für Kunstgeschichte in Munich, the Sigmont Freud Institut in Frankfurt, the Pädagogisches Zentrum in Berlin, some of them are situated in foreign countries.

2. The so-called Big-Science Institutes (Großforschungseinrichtungen) which are funded by the state, but privately organized. Mostly, these institutes are involved in research in natural sciences and engineering. Usually their projects are carried out beyond the scope of university or industrial research, consequently, they can be regarded as a link between these two actors in the system of science. All the Big-Science Institutes are united in a network in order to promote exchange of ideas and interdisciplinary research.

This sector of science includes also four large institutional networks (the sector is typically called extra-university research sector, what stresses the benchmarking role of the system of universities, though the networks of academic organizations, which are listed below, still cannot be considered to be of less significance):

1. The Max-Planck Society (Max-Plank-Gesellschaft, MPG) focuses on the basic research in science and the humanities. The 80 Max-Planck-Institutes (MPIs) are the oldest extra-university research institutions in Germany. The Max-Planck Society is compared often with the Russian Academy of Science. Indeed, it has similar structure, it concentrates mostly on fundamental research; nevertheless, the Society has a much higher level of autonomy from the state: it is granted with a use of a mixed system of funding and mixed system of management.

2. The Fraunhofer Association (Fraunhofer-Gemeinschaft, FhG) focuses on applied research in science and engineering in cooperation with industry. The first institute was founded in Mannheim in 1954, and there are now 57 Fraunhofer-Institutes.

3. The Leibniz Association (Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, WGL) is specialized in applied research in all fields of science and the humanities. The 80 Leibniz-Institutes were founded individually and became members of the Leibniz Association at different points of time.

4. The Helmholtz Association (Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren, HGF) is constituted by former providers of large research facilities. The 15 Helmholtz Institutes were originally providers of large research facilities serving universities and other research groups, some of them have developed into broad-range science and engineering centers, working more especially on long-term research topics that are relevant to the State and society.¹

The member institutes of the last two associations enjoy a certain degree of freedom from their holding organizations, while the members of the first two are strongly connected with their heading organizations. Extra-university research centers are free from political influence owing to a comprehensive system of governance and decision-making process. When being internationally compared, German extra-university institutions are well-known for their high level of autonomy.

Business and industry constitute the third sector of science: as a rule, large companies in Germany have their own research centers and laboratories. Moreover, the business sector provides financial support for state academic organizations and university research centers, some of the larger enterprises found grant programs. Quite often, even smaller companies stay in cooperation with research institutes of universities or extra-university research sector. It helps smaller enterprises to solve problems they face and to conduct research necessary for their development, but which they do not have facilities to carry out themselves.

Nowadays in Germany the share of industry in funding and conducting research is about 50-60%, it is a federal priority to maintain the existing degree of industry participation and involvement into research activity. Nevertheless, because of decreasing state support and influence of globalization, the in-house R&D capacities of enterprises have decreased.

All the three sectors discussed above play an important role for development of science and technology in Germany, but nevertheless, universities are granted traditionally (and these traditions are still

alive today) a status of the central actors in research. In Russia, on the contrary, universities account for only 10.4% of the total R&D activities (2003). Only 38% of accredited higher education institutions have funds for R&D activities, and only 20% of the academic personnel are engaged in research. Universities’ role is one of the main differences between two models of science: research is organized differently within universities of these countries, the systems of funding differ considerably, even obligations of faculty members concerning research activity are defined in different ways.

Conclusions
Nowadays, the Russian and German models of science have divergent structures, with only one convergence feature left – their composition. They both are composed of four main sectors, nevertheless, functions of these sectors and their interrelations differ significantly in Russia and Germany. The systems of science in the two countries are organized according to diverse principles. The Russian model is based on the central role of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in Germany the central actors in the field of science are universities which execute two main functions simultaneously – teaching and research. In contrast to Germany, universities are considered in Russia most of all as educational institutions and their share in total fundamental research of the country is rather low.

As it was demonstrated in the article, the current institutional divergence started its development in the first part of the 20th century as a result of influence of the political system and changed state priorities. Before this turning point, the Russian model of science had been staying alone with the European tradition.

The results of the analysis described above and conclusions made throw light on historical development of Russian science and discover the original convergence of the Russian and European models, which are often regarded nowadays as two radically different traditions. The study also provokes further reflections on the impact of political system on science in Russia – not only in historical perspective, but in current period as well.

Elaborating on “European Identity”:
What Is of Interest for Social Scientists and European Policy Makers?
Anna Isakova

Introduction
It is not a secret that the story of the European Union is not simply the one with only successful paths taken and right decisions having been made. As every entity that deals with economic, political, social, cultural and other issues, the EU is meant to work for people, bring benefits to its citizens and defend their interests if necessary. In some areas the results of the EU policies work better than in others, but still this fact strengthens the Union by making it set certain agenda for the future. With all these presuppositions taken into account, we have the idea of the European Union as a supra-national organization designed by and for people and their needs. However, one thing is vital in understanding what the EU is about: it is in the first place the community of people. Due to this reason, when we speak about the EU, we should keep in mind its three main dimensions. Sociologically speaking, the European Union is, primarily, the social ground where people’s interactions take place. Secondly, people who constitute the EU experience the sense of belonging to it. Thirdly, they are seen as members of this community by others (non-members).

In this paper I will concentrate on the second (and partly the third) part of above mentioned definition, thus, investigating the question of the feeling of belonging to the EU among its citizens. To be more precise, I will be addressing the issues of common European identity. My prior goal is to raise the questions of different interpretations of the term itself, to give reflection on the place that studies of European identity have in social science. Moreover, I will comment on the reasons why the question of common European identity is now so actively discussed both on the level of academic institutions and...
by European policy makers. One of the main tasks for me is also to look at the historically changing discourse within the European Union regarding its identity. With this paper I hope to contribute to the better understanding of the main trends in research on European identity and to show the importance of further elaboration of this phenomenon.

This work is structured into two main parts: in the first one I will try to thoroughly investigate so-called theoretical content of the term “European identity”, giving specific attention to its operationalization. I will also discuss such questions as the subject of European identity, comment on an appropriate ground for common European identity building and show the place of European identity in the multiple structure of a person’s identity. The second part of this paper will concentrate on the overview of changes in how the European Union addressed the issues of common identity in its own documents, actions, and strategies. It will also provide the reasons explaining why strong European identity is so much needed at the moment for the EU.

Preliminary analysis of the issues of European identity required from the author of this paper the knowledge of the scholars who touched upon the topic of European identity at different periods of time and in different academic institutions. For instance, it is worth mentioning some classic works of Jacques Derrida, Juergen Habermas, Benedikt Anderson, and Alan Smith. Moreover, European identity has a lot to do with European integration and Europeanization in general, which was thoroughly studied by Ernest Haas, Robert Landrech, and Thomas Risse. The ideas of Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez contributed to a large extent to understanding of how important common European identity is in the process of European integration. The issues of European citizenship and citizenship education are also closely connected with identity and, thus, the works of such scholars as Michael Bruter, Reinhold Hedtke, Thorsten Hippe and Tatjana Zimenkova are of great value.

Even though the history of European identity studies is not brand new and it has been addressed in the scientific environment for several decades already, most of the scholars, however, concentrate on the possible forms that common European identity should or might take. At the same time few research draw attention on how the concept of “European identity” is rooted in what the EU does and says. That leaves the space for further attempts to study the phenomenon of European identity and try to contribute to its better understanding.

**Operationalizing “European Identity”**

To begin with, I would like to shed light on the term “identity” and “European identity”, in particular. One can argue that “identity”, in a broad sense, is a “slippery” concept exposed to various interpretations. Its understanding can differ depending on perspectives of research and social disciplines, theoretical schools and their definitions. Nevertheless, some assumptions are shared by most of the researchers. For instance, classical is the thought that there are two main forces underlying identity, be it ethnic, national or European one. It is the desire, on the one hand, to be similar to something/ somebody and, on the other hand, be different from something/somebody. Let me take this idea as a basis and give the definition of “identity” that I find quite apt. So, identity can be conceived as “the images of individuality and distinctiveness (’selfhood’) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time), through relations with significant ‘others’”.

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As we can see here, distinctiveness (the desire to be different) goes along with necessary willingness to build up interactions with “others”, with whom a person wants to feel connected and whom he/she wants to resemble (the desire to be similar). Thus, together with the term “identity” usually come such expressions as “belong to”, “identify with”, “think of yourself as”, “feel attached to” or “feel close to”.\(^1\)

In the case of the European Union, the fact of identification of its citizens with the EU entity is seen as a marker of existing European identity. In other words, European identity is “the disposition of different nationals to consider themselves, their compatriots and their foreign fellow-Europeans as equal members of the European community”.\(^2\)

This is the definition I will be using onwards.

Nevertheless understanding of European identity alone raises the question of what we can actually consider the European community to be and which vital characteristics it possesses. This is going to be the main topic of discussion in the next paragraph.

**“European Demos” as a Subject of European Identity**

The concept of the common “European identity” alone makes the researchers wonder: what or who should be considered European in this case? Some scholars (e.g. Glynis Marie Breakwell) point out the “emptiness” of Europe as a category, “which implies that different groups might fill it with very different contents”.\(^3\)

To provide some examples: German nation used to see Europe and the European integration as a way to overcome the mistakes of their military, nationalist past, whereas for elite groups in France the EU project seemed to be a perfect way to externalize traditional French values (e. g.: republicanism, civil society) on a global level.\(^4\)

Reflecting on the substantive content that people refer to when identifying themselves with Europe and/or the EU, another researcher – Michael Bruter – takes into account two dimensions of “European”

\(^1\) Ibid p.3.


\(^4\) Ibid p. 6f.
Inhabitants are aware of these “stories”, they study history lessons at school, and so, get familiar with common heritage. Kahn-Nisser in her paper calls this an “inclusion axis” of integration and identity building process. However, both historical and cultural basis of common European identity bring us back to the distinction between “civic” and “cultural” understanding of Europe. I would argue that all mentioned above is appropriate for cultural aspect of the notion of “Europe”. Due to this fact, strengthened “we”-feeling and pride stress some common European cultural roots, but it has actually little to do with Europe as the Union. It is more about diversity of cultures within European civilization. The EU by now didn’t manage to create shared background of its own – European Union’s – cultural aspects. At least, not in a tangible form.

• At the same time one shouldn’t forget that identity formation can’t take place without the process of “othering”: this is how the boundaries of a community with the shared identity feelings are formed. Nevertheless, in case of the EU this “diversity axis” (in Kahn-Nisser’s terminology) can be hardly considered the only source of identity building. Just seeing others as different, in some cases taking them as enemies, is definitely not enough for a sense of common identity to appear. Moreover, as long as there is no fixed meaning as to what Europe constitutes of, there are no fixed “others” in regard to Europeans. This feeling of distinctiveness from others is pretty much contextual.

• Probably the most popular is the opinion that the natural basis for European identity lies in main values; a set of key principles on which the EU as a political project was created and is now functioning. Europe has always defined itself as a multicultural community sharing a set of universal values. Indeed, the ideals of democracy, tolerance and human rights have become the main markers of the Union: “Europe is above all a community of values. The aim of European unification is to realize, test, develop and safeguard these values…”


Fundamental European values are based on tolerance, humanity and fraternity”. However, there are at least two reasons that in a way undermine the paramount importance of common values in the process of European identity building. First goes the indisputable fact that freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights are not specifically European guidelines. They can be equally seen as core features and principles on which, for instance, American society is based and which it tries to promote in the world. Secondly, these values can hardly be seen as a main ground for common European identity which derives from the history of Europe. They are rather “the pillars of this political project” playing a vital role in the overall survival of Europe’s project.

So, as we may see, for scholars studying European society, as well as for European Union policy makers it is still difficult to find the ground on which common European identity can be successfully built and maintained. Apparently, the EU can not rely on the same sources of identity building that the nation states apply (e.g. territory, common language, shared history, memory, cultural peculiarities).

However, it is not the only problematic field. Questions and doubts are also on the way if we suppose that European identity can by default appear or if we argue that it is already an existing phenomenon. Then, what is the correlation between national and European identity? Is the latter a substitute for the former? The next passage is trying to give answers to this question.

European Identity in the Structure of Multiple Identity
It was once well-said: “The European Union has been symbolically constructed as a civil alternative to the ethnically burdened nation states”. Contemporary analysis and research on European identity tends to turn away from the straight-line assimilation model which claimed that national identity is abandoned as long as a new European identity is acquired. It is now making a way for the idea of a multiple...
identity. Here, the central point is that simultaneously under specific conditions a person is capable of maintaining both identities — national and European, therefore they coexist on equal terms. As Risse puts it: “it is wrong to conceptualize European identity in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decreases one’s loyalty to national or other communities”. In order to prove this argument the researcher provides an overview of possible ways of correlation between common EU identity, national and ethnic identity. In fact, he speaks about three basic scenarios. The first one looks like a Matryoshka model: one identity is situated “inside” the next one. Secondly, there is cross-cutting possibility for identities of different type to co-exist. And finally, Risse mentions the case when there is no overlapping in identity structure, due to the fact that these identities are separated ones. Out of all three scenarios Risse finds the third one to be least present in real life. Apparently if we look on the current survey data of the EU, we will find out that mass publics in most member states hold national and regional identities as their primary sense of belonging, while European identification is not significantly expressed. Commenting on such ideas, Etzioni stated: “this disposition is enhanced by a rather wide-spread ideology of the “post-national” identity, supported by the political EU layer… From the point of view of the “post national” identity, political power is based on a pure civic community, dissociated from any essentialities, origins and histories as well as from culture, since it is the culture that upholds these matters”. Application of the views of both Risse and Etzioni implies that people can simultaneously feel themselves as a part of several communities (ethnical, national, European). Thus, “there is no need to abolish loyalties and bonds of affections to one’s nation, as long as on selected matters the loyalty to the new, encompassing com-

4 Etzioni A. The Community Deficit, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 45(1), 2007, p. 34.

European Identity and the EU: Lessons from the Past and Agenda for the Future

As I mentioned above, the second part of this paper will give an overview of the EU’s attempts to include the issues of common identity into its agenda. Moreover, some specific reasons for the EU’s further attention to identity issues will be provided later on.

It is well known that over the time, the European Union has evolved not simply as an economic and political body created to solve existing problems. Now it sets on a new phase of its own expansion and integration. Apart from the establishment of supra-national institutions, what makes a difference for the EU and its future development is the “importance of inter-subjective meanings that people attach to the Europeanisation process as a whole”? Being an objective reality unified in terms of economics, political agenda and social policy, the EU doesn’t seem yet to get a place in the life and heart of Europeans. The discussion on whether there is this “feeling of being European” is far from being solved. In the 1970s, when the question of common European identity was addressed for the first time, this idea was directly connected with further advancement of European integration. “Declaration of European Identity”, the document called also the Tindeman’s Report, claimed that the European identity should be taken as an essential element for constituting the future of the Community. In the Declaration the emphasis was on the multiculturalism strategy of the Community and the set of common principles “that are considered constituent of the Europe that is being built”. This step was perceived by many social scholars as a sign that European policy-makers for the first time in their practice realized that the Union as a political entity is impossible without people supporting it.

1 Ibid p.40.
Later elaboration of the term “European identity” brought about its new understanding. European Union policy makers as well as social scientists argued that “the creation of belongingness to the EC/EU emerged according to what individuals did or might aspire to do with reference to economic and political participation”. That’s why policy makers have been working hard in many directions on the so called “active European citizenship” project, whereas the scholars are addressing the issues of European citizenship and common European identity building in their research. It is obvious that successful results of the “Citizens’ Europe” project are unimaginable without people’s commitment to the Union or their sense of belonging to the European entity. But the question behind is: whether this “Europe for Citizens”, “United Europe” is just an objective, a good intention that is supposed to be reached one day or is it already an existing phenomenon? There are certain doubts within the academic community when it comes to evaluation of how successful in terms of European citizenship policy makers are. Giving as examples the low turnout of voters in European elections and the failure of the EU Constitutional Treaty, social science (for example Enrique Banús and Franz Eichinger) proves that there is now little indication of the EU’s citizenship practice really being at work. According to the above mentioned researchers, these problems are closely connected with the fact that European citizens don’t see themselves as Europeans possessing not only certain political and economic rights, but also obligations towards the Union. Based on the results of Eurobarometer surveys (which show that only 4% of the EU citizens consider themselves Europeans, while 7% claim that their Europeanness is more important than their national identity), Richard Bellami’s conclusion sounds quite reasonable: “there is little in the way of a pan-European demos”.

To sum up, I would like to provide the overview of the reasons why exactly the European Union needs citizens who strongly identify themselves with the entity. Certainly this list is not the complete one and there are many more beneficial outcomes for the EU in the case of people having common European identity. But let’s just mention the following ones:

• Firstly, strong European identity means people’s commitment towards the EU. The latter, in its turn, has a lot to do with ensuring compliance with EU policies, legitimacy of its institutions and decisions they make.

• Secondly, the question of further European integration, as it has already been mentioned, depends heavily on the extent to which people in the member states share common European identity. Common future, feeling of belonging to the same entity, is crucial in non-seeing others (other nations) as threats (the latter, as we know, already brought alone the rise of nationalism all over the European continent in the past). If identification with the EU is strong enough, the interests of the Union will be treated with more (or at least with the same) respect as national interests of member states.

• Thirdly, it is obvious that there are many challenges the EU is facing now (e.g. migration issues, global situation, economic crisis). Solutions for all these problems can only be successfully found if there are coordinated efforts of member states, and for that it is essential to eliminate prejudices and negative stereotypes of “others”. Common identity can contribute to that. Moreover, it has the potential to promote European values, interests and goals on a global arena.

• Finally, the last but not the least reason for robust European identity lies in everyday life issues. Educational programs that aim to cultivate

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the feeling of “Europeanness” among the EU citizens have a very good outcome. Thanks to them one has a chance to get appropriate information regarding decisions taken in Brussels, actual work of the EU institutions, etc. According to findings of Eurobarometer, there is little comprehension among the people of Europe of what is made in Brussels. Providing information on that will contribute to a higher level of active participation in the life of the European Community by making the work of the EU more visible to the eyes of its citizens.

**Conclusion**

Since the 1950s, the European Union has proved to be an active player in the world economy, an efficient actor in terms of political unification and building a common space. The main challenge it faces today is the achievement of integration through constructing a common European identity. Due to several enlargements and actions taken in order to deepen EU integration the identity question is now crucial for the EU. “It has been argued to various degrees that the construction of common European identity has become indispensable, if the dynamics of economic and political integration are to be sustained”. Strong identification with the EU among its citizens will result in strengthening the commitment of citizens to the EU, in further developing integration, and in a better defined position of the Union on the global scene. Otherwise, the continuing distance of the citizens from the European project is going to take place, and the solution for this problematic situation will not appear out of nowhere.

Already in its motto – “United in diversity” – the European Union has set the direction of the way to foster the process of integration. Now it is time to bring this idea into life and focus on its overall implementation. The question of common European identity has a lot to do with it. Apart from already established politics in terms of European identity building which consists of having identity issues mentioned in the Treaties of the EU, elaboration of the European citizenship project, creation of various symbols of united Europe, as well as educational mobility and exchange programs, there is now a need for more profound and well-maintained actions from both EU institutions and citizens of the European Union.

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For some time past capital, goods, information and people have been increasingly moving around the world crossing national borders, while various international and supranational organizations, as well as transnational communities have been strengthening their positions. Most of these occurrences are especially evident in Europe. Considering globalization, transnationalism and particular European integration, scientists have recently started to raise the question of its influence on people’s identity and the nation-state. Similar changes in people’s life all over the world and related gradual break with the methodological nationalism within social sciences have given renewed impetus to the cosmopolitan discussion, begun a long time ago in ancient Greece.\textsuperscript{1} At the same time, the question of European identity was raised by many scholars and policy makers. However, empirical research on such topic has appeared just recently and its results are still ambiguous. Whereas the difference of the institutional basis for these two supranational identities is clear, the question of its mechanisms and effects (i.e. undermining the nation-state system) is not so straightforward.

Seemingly, there is no single response to the call of such a complicated phenomenon as globalization\textsuperscript{2} and the questions of how different supranational identities are prevalent and how they relate to each other is open. While some scholars believe that the European identity is a form of cosmopolitanism, others consider it as a form of nationalism on the new level. All in all, despite all the philosophical speculations, only a thorough look at the empirical data can solve this puzzle.

In this context, the aim of my article is to make a contribution to this new trend of the quantitative research on supranational identities by proposing a research agenda, which links European identity studies to the cosmopolitan scientific tradition.

The Question of European Identity
The importance of the common European identity for the further prosperity of Europe is often emphasized not only by EU policy makers, but also by social scientists. For instance, one of the most prominent contemporary sociologists Manuel Castells in his statement prepared for the European Presidency of the European Union described it this way: “While integrating Europe without sharing an European identity is a workable proposition when everything goes well, any major crisis, in Europe or in a given country, may trigger an European implosion of unpredictable consequences.” He defines identity as “a set of values that provide symbolic meaning to people’s life by enhancing their individuation (or self-definition) and their feeling of belonging”. Therefore, European identity is about belonging “to a distinctive European culture and institutional system that appeals to them [people] as legitimate and worthwhile.” From such point of view, Europeanism really could be seen as a nationalism on the new level, though Castells himself would probably disown this statement. As it was indicated by Dirk Jacobs and Robert Maier, “the new forms of citizenship and new discourses on identity are in the supranational European context still closer related to the exclusionary characteristics of national citizenship on a membership and (constructed) cultural basis than to a proclaimed inclusionary postnational citizenship on a territorial and personhood basis.” What is more, Eurobarometer and other surveys show that the prevalence of the European identity is significant, but still not high. It is considerably lower than the national one in most of the cases.

Research on Cosmopolitan Identity
Most works in cosmopolitan empirical tradition are based on the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The certain particularity of data forces researchers to conduct the operationalization of cosmopolitan identity indirectly, defining it negatively by the absence or weakness of a local identity. This might be subjected to a harsh criticism, because the weakness of local identity can also be the indicator of an anomie.

In the paper “Cosmopolitans and Locals: An Empirical Investigation of Transnationalism” Swedish researchers are trying to adequately operationalize cosmopolitanism, measuring it using the available ISSP data. By analyzing survey data for 1995 and 2003 in Sweden, they have tested a one-dimensional model of transnational continuum, and come to the conclusion that a two-dimensional model is more adequate. According to this model, each person is located on two independent continuums – from local to global (measurement of belonging to territories), and from protectionism to openness (measured attitudes towards migrants and open trade). As a result, the

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.

researchers have received four different groups of people—local protectionists, global protectionists, open locals and open globals. The authors noted that the number of protectionists and locals has significantly increased from 1995 to 2003, despite all the opposite expectations. Considering predictors, they stated the significance of various sociodemographic variables.1

The article “Social Indicators of Cosmopolitanism and Localism in Eastern and Western Europe: An Exploratory Analysis” continue the ongoing debate on the operationalization and study of cosmopolitanism. The authors, as well as their Swedish colleagues (following their criticism and agreeing that cosmopolitanism is too complex to be one-dimensional) offer a two-dimensional measure of cosmopolitanism, however, a different one. Keeping a dimension of belonging to a certain locality, for the second dimension they suggest the relation to the nation instead of individual attitudes towards migrants and open trade. Thus, they eventually distinguish “placed-based” and “nation-based” localism-cosmopolitanism. They test the resulting model with factor analysis, come to the conclusion that it is valid and use it to analyze the European states. Results of the study let them state that in Europe both types of cosmopolitanism have been recently increased.2

It could be argued that these results are true just in Europe due to the ongoing integration processes there. That is why, in their more recent article, Roudometof and Haller have tried to analyze states all over the world. The outcome confirmed the initial conjecture about the uniqueness of Europe. The rest of the world, despite the decline of the placed-based localism, is showing the growth of nation-based localism. All this confirms that impact of globalization on people’s identity is ambiguous. On the one hand, it makes people less attached to a particular locality, but on the other hand, it “wakes up” nationalism.3

and even different meanings for people from different cultures. In general, the study revealed the following predictors of cosmopolitanism: environmental concerns, lack of patriotism, political activity, a positive attitude towards migrants, education, and age. As it can be seen, some of the findings are contrasted with existing stereotypes, and even with the results of previously conducted studies.\(^1\)

**Conclusion**

After reviewing most of existing literature, it is legitimate to conclude that there is still no unified approach to the study of supranational identities, its operationalization and measurement. The case of Europe is especially interesting for the research on supranational identities, though scholars still lack the data for examining it thoroughly.

One of the major reasons for the small number of quantitative empirical research on identities is the almost complete absence of the necessary data despite the existence of many global and European comparative surveys (WVS, ESS, ISSP, Gallup, Eurobarometer and others). The problem is that all these studies usually have a wide scope, and, given the limited number of questions, they are not allowing to fully explore the topic. Even if we assume that the study of identities and supranational identities in particular in the near future will become even more important, it is obvious that the addition of questions to the existing research is problematic due to the certain reasons. However, I hope that a detailed questionnaire block for the more exhaustive study of identities will be added to the European Social Survey (ESS) at a certain time. Meanwhile, researchers who have taken the first steps in empirical quantitative studies of the topic have to rely on and work with the data which is available.

Taking into account the previous research on the question of identity in Europe, I believe that, for the further empirical analysis, the notion of “supranational identities” should not be limited to the only European identity measure, but also include the cosmopolitan one. Supranational identity is a complex multidimensional social phenomenon, the empirical study of which, apparently, should

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about each of the territorial identity separately using the standard four-point scale. The variables were as follows: “Locality, Region, Country, Continent, The World”. These changes are very important because now we can compare the strength of different identities and supranational identities in particular, i.e. calculating the relative cosmopolitan or European identity, obtained by subtracting the power of national and local identities from them.

- To answer the question of the distribution of supranational identities, there would be created a dataset with the maximum number of countries, where respondents answered the questing of belonging. For this purpose, the latest wave of WVS, which covers most of the European population, will be used.
- To answer the question of the predictors of supranational identities, e.g. what factors affect the level of European or cosmopolitan identity in the European Union, an empirical model of the phenomenon would be constructed and most advanced statistical techniques would be used. For instance, it would be rather rational to build a complex multilevel model, which examines individual variables (fixed effects), taking into account aggregate variables (random interlopes) and thus controlling country and regional effects.
- In the matter of hypothesizing, it is anticipated that most people consistently combine their national and other more local identities with a European or cosmopolitan one, which are assumed to be correlated. It is also expected that the main predictors for supranational identities would be the country’s prosperity level (measured with GDP per capita) and the index of globalization (computed by Axel Dreher1). In addition, it is assumed that people who are prone to a supranational loyalty will be greater in those societies in which more than other prevalent “post-materialist values”, in other words, where this has an existing social environment.2 At the individual level – the various sociodemographic characteristics, as well as the mobility characteristics associated with the possible personal gain from globalization and Europeanization (primarily education and status).


European Identity in Crisis. Some Perspectives for the European Identity Studies
Elena Tsumarova

The topic of identity has become one of the most popular and demanded research dimensions lately. At the same time, research of the European identity takes a special place. The European identity is considered to be (1) a “cultural identity” based on the common historical heritage,1 (2) a “civil identity” linked to the implementation of the common European citizenship2 and, at last, (3) a “new level of political identity”3 contributing to the local, regional and national identities.3 Nevertheless, despite the different points of view, researchers agree that at the moment the European identity is in crisis.4

In political science much attention is paid to the role of the political elites in the process of national, regional and even local identity construction. Often this identity formation is defined as “identity politics”. Nevertheless it should be mentioned that there’s no common interpretation of this term in the literature. Alongside with the territorial identity research5 there is a big number of studies which focus mainly on all kinds of social movements.6 Therefore, the term “identity politics” is inferred in two different meanings: politics and policy.

5 Rokkan S. and Urwin D. were one of the first ones to introduce the term of “Identity Politics” regarding the territorial communities (The Politics of Territorial Identity. Studies in European Regionalism / Edited by Stein Rokkan & Derek Wurwin (SAGE Publications, 1982); see also: Keating M. The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change. UK, USA: Edward Elgar, 2003.
This article conducts analysis of the term *identity politics*’ application and tries to apply this concept to European identity research. For these proposes, firstly I will present the sociological paradigm in identity studies to show how identity politics can be understood as a political struggle. Then I will describe the paradigm of political science which understands identity politics as a policy. In the end of each chapter I will apply the concept of identity politics to the European Identity to try to answer the main question: why there is a crisis of European Identity in the EU.

1. Identity Politics: Sociological Paradigm

Originally the term “identity politics” was used to describe the activity of suppressed social groups which were struggling for changes of their position in a society. As Mary Bernstein mentions, the term “identity politics” was introduced to the academic discourse in 1979 by Renee R. Anspach, who contemplated it as a movement focused at shifting self and public concept of the handicapped. At the same time, some scholars attributed the term’s emergence to the activity of The Combahee River Collective in the 1970s, the group which described itself as “adherents to the fight against racial, sexual, heterosexuality and class suppression”. Anyway, the biggest part of the researchers come to the conclusion that the “identity politics” emergence was a reaction to the liberal democracy, which originally was mainly oriented on the white, able-bodied and heterosexual male citizens.

Later the term “identity politics” was used to describe ethnicity as the contemporary form of politics, and critical pedagogy, or to illustrate the activity of social movements oriented on the construction of cultural identities of their members. In the mid 1990s identity politics was also regarded as the activity of violent ethnical groups and was equaled to nationalism.

Nowadays, identity politics in general is defined as “conscious construction of the collective identity aimed at position improvement in the field”. The main agents of the politics are groups “of a specific social position, which have been rejected or persecuted by this time”, they develop “a set of political projects” to improve their position. Julia Knouse highlights that identity politics might be determined as “the political activity of the identity groups”. However, the next question arises as to how to identify the identity groups themselves. Who is the main participant of the identity politics? How can we define the identity group? How do these groups differ essentially from the other social groups?

Knouse marks out three main types of social groups: phenomenological groups, identity groups and ideological groups. The phenomenological groups are those which are formed on the basis of the anatomic and quasi-anatomic features, such as, for example, groups of people united by eye color or similar political perspectives. The identity groups are phenomenological groups which are associated with cultural norms, determining the level of the political power (or its absence) of their members. A group of black people in America might illustrate that. At last, ideological groups are unions of people formed on the basis of non-anatomic features, such as philosophy or systems of belief. Knouse ascribes the feminist or pacifist movements to the latter.

Thus, the main participants of identity politics are the social groups whose “membership is perceived by them as suppressed by force of...
the general and marginalized identity”. An identity is understood as a construction of “meaning on the certain cultural characteristic, or on the corresponding range of cultural characteristics, which have priority to the other sources of the meaning”.2

Manuel Castells distinguishes several forms of identities depending on the different sources: (1) legitimating identity is introduced by the dominant social institutes to broaden and rationalize its dominance over the social actors; (2) identity of resistance is formed by actors who are in a position of underestimation or/and stigmatization by the dominant logics; (3) projective identity appears when social actors, based on the existing cultural material, build a new identity which predetermines their social position and aims at transformation of the whole social structure.3

Furthermore, Castells highlights that identities of resistance are more meaningful nowadays. In his opinion it links the social networks formation, and attributes legitimating identity crisis, to the new forms of social life which, in turn, decrease national state sovereignty. Castells mentions that in the end of the 20th century the institutes of liberal democracy stopped playing big role in the real political process and turned into “empty shells little related to the people’s life”.

In his point of view, “the king, the queen, the state and the civil society became naked in the end of the millennium and their citizens-children are scattered in different orphans”. Alongside with this, the process of resistance identities’ formation is observed, which are built on the “traditional values of God, the nation and the family, erecting fortifications around their camp which is put up according to ethnical and territorial indications”.5

Castells makes an example of the women’s movement “creating its space where the new anti-patriarchal consciousness can emerge” as the most explicit one. The main distinctive feature of this type of identity as a rule is its independence from the state and absence of contact between them. There’s an exception when one’s own values and interests are at risk and have to be protected.1

The resistance identities may become a basis for the projective identities (the one which is directed to the future), which is aimed at “overall transformation of the society with keeping the values of resistance to the dominating interests of the global capital, power and information flows. Thus a women’s movement may be focused not only on its own gender identity protection, but also on the undermining the male role dominance in the society and on redirecting the state from the patriarchal to the egalitarian form.

In the scientific literature one might come across the instructions about some methodological approaches to substantiation of the identity politics emergence. Historically, based on a macro analyses, the neo-Marxist approach is the first type. From the neo-Marxists’ point of view, the source of identity politics is the class inequality coming from one class exploitation and suppression by the other. The main agents of the social life are activists of the suppressed class who are trying to overcome economic inequality and change the social structure. Identity politics is looked upon as “a special political practice”.3

The appearance of new social movements in the 1960s-1970s led to emergence of a new dimension in identity politics research, which connected identity and culture. L. A. Kauffman determines the identity politics in the cultural terms expressing belief that “identity on its own, its creation, expression or its statement should be the prime focus of the political activity”.4 Among this kind of research, gender and feminist studies take a special place. Feminism followers contemplate the identity politics as a mechanism of “acknowledgement of the collective suffering, which results from the wrong position of the group for the (dominating) culture”.5 Elena Zdravomyslova mentions that there is always discursive articulation of the suffered on the basis of identity politics: “women’s experience of suffering

1 Ibid, p. 751.
3 Ibid, p.23.
5 Ibid, p. 298.
from violence is constantly reproduced by the feminist rhetoric which is necessary for the political project of emancipation realization”.¹

Nevertheless, the biggest popularity the term “identity politics” has gained within the frames of theory is with new social movements. Despite the fact that the language of the identity politics was not used in this approach, theorists special attention to the role of identity in the movement’s activities. As Alessandro Pizzorno and Alberto Melucci have stated, identity politics is the main mechanism of the mobilization of social movement participants.² In other words, they contemplate identity politics as a special political practice connected to the struggle for the symbolic (power) resources.

Similar understanding of identity politics can be found within constructivism. The founders of the constructivist approach in the social sciences, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, determine identity as the key element of the subjective reality formed by the social processes.³ In other words, identity politics is interpreted as political logics aiming at overcoming hostility through creation, expression and confirmation of the collective identities.⁴

Melucci marks out three main mechanisms of the collective identity formation: (1) cognitive process resulting in overall perception development of the movement, incorporating in the ritual, practices and cultural symbols system; (2) collective activity connecting the members of the movement in a single unity and (3) emotional investments which become a psychological basis for solidarity.⁵ Thus, identity politics includes both, the dissemination of the common knowledge (for the group members) and the member’s integration in the maximum number of networks and interpersonal interactions to shape the group perceptions.

Berstein highlights that there are at minimum three analytical levels of interaction between identity and social movements. First of all, common collective identity is indispensable for mobilization of any social movements. Second, identity expression might be displayed on the collective level as a political strategy which goals might be the ones traditionally known as cultural or/ and political. Third, identity may be the goal of a social movement activity itself. In another case acknowledgment or deconstruction of the existing identities such as “man”, “woman”, “black”, “white” may become a goal.¹

Thereby sociological paradigm within the identity politics research determines the latter in a sense of “politics”, political struggle. As Grigorij Minenkov highlights, identity politics is first of all “a theoretical and socially-political fight and not just a union on the basis of interests; it is a fight connected to the former legitimization deconstruction and a search for acknowledgment and legitimacy and, sometimes, power, but not only the possibilities for self expression and autonomy”.² This kind of interpretation of the identity politics allows us to explain a rather slow expansion of the European identity “from below”. There’s no group in the EU that would promote the change of the existing situation and the formation of a new one. European integration apologists who call for the foundation of the European Federation can’t be a significant actor inside the EU and they lose in the fight for identity to the national and regional groups.

2. Identity Policy: Paradigm of Political Science

Another approach towards identity policy interpretation might be found within the frames of the political communities’ analyses, which are not taken for granted or contemplated as a historical monument but as a social construct being constantly organized and reorganized.³ It also might be found within the frames of territorial identity analyses not as a “final result, but as permanent project”.⁴ In this case, identity policy is rather taken as one of the possible political courses (policy) conducted by the political, economical or cultural elites than a struggle of separate social groups for acknowledgement. This kind of research appeared, mainly, due to the processes of regionalization taking place in Western Europe. These processes relate to interna-

² Ibid, p. 121.
⁵ Ždravomyslova E. “Soldatskie materi”: mobilizatsija traditcionnoj zhenshchinnosti [“Soldiers’ Mothers”: the Mobilization of Traditional Femininity], in: Politicheskaja nauka, 3, 2005, p. 41.
ionalization of the territorial economics and “growth of the effort on periphery, regions and districts directed against the cent. They also relate to the minorities cultural autonomy statements and gaining the authority to take decisions regarding this territory”. As a result, regional political movements have appeared in the regions of Western Europe. These movements identified themselves with territories and groups which borders didn’t coincide with the state borders and the borders between national populations; they were appealing to the central authorities on behalf of these territories and groups.

Taking the identity policy as a special political course (policy), the term “identity policy agents” becomes the central issue which is contemplated as “political entrepreneurs mainly belonging to the different elite segments”. For example, the French regionalism of the 19th century was basically supported by the intellectuals who were against modernization and secularization of the state. Economic elites in the most developed regions of Europe (Baden-Württemberg, Flanders, Catalonia) in the century were becoming the key agents of the identity policy as well, demanding more economic and political independence for the region. Moreover, the regional political parties were becoming identity policy agents. For example, the main bearers of the regional independence idea in Scotland and Basque Provinces were political parties.

Basing on the constructivist understanding of the region Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin distinguish two types of spaces which exist on the territory of one region: territorial space and space of belonging. In this case, territorial space is perceived as a space of self identification with a certain geographical area and dwelling within its borders. The borders of these areas as a rule coincide with the borders of national states or the administrative borders of regions and are determined as lines within which live “the same” people. A region as a self identification space involves belonging to the group which carries some common socio-cultural features. And in this case the borders of the space are “determined from the beyond, they form the line separating ‘us’ from enemies”. Regional identity plays the key role in the process of regional space construction. Michael Keating marks out three components of the regional identity: cognitive, affective and instrumental ones. The cognitive component includes knowledge about the region’s existence, its borders, specific features and the knowledge about existence of other communities. The specific features might be geographical issues (landscape, nature monument), national cuisine, folklore, historical heritage and even the political preferences or economic structure.

The affective component of the regional identity implies feelings and emotions, which people have towards the region and the way of the regional knowledge interpretation. The affective component lets us determine the level at which emotional ties with the region serve as a basis for the common identity and solidarity, especially towards the other identity basics such as class or nation.

Finally, the instrumental component of the regional identity answers the question if the political elites use the region as the basis for mobilization of the collective activities to achieve their goals (as well as the regional autonomy demand and the everyday tasks). In other words, the instrumental component makes it possible to find out if the regional identity serves as a resource for the legitimization of the regional political elite, and if the legitimizing identity exists on its territory.

The understanding of the region and the regional identity described above makes it possible to determine identity policy as a purposeful activity of the regional elites forming the political community with a goal of “legitimate regional institutes of power within and beyond the region”.

Vladimir Gel’man and Evgenija Popova contemplate identity policy as “the regional elites activity aimed at managing the informational environment to create the required notion about the region for the

2 Ibid, p. 124.
3 Gelman V., Popova E. (eds.) Regional’nye politicheskie elity i strategii regional’noj identichnosti v sovremennoj Rossi [Regional Political Elite and Strategies of Regional Identities in Contemporary Russia], in: Centr i regional’nye identichnosti v Rossi. St. Petersburg, Moscow, 2003, p. 190.
consumers of these informational streams inside and outside the region and the required notion about the regional elites themselves, their past, present and the future of the region”. Using Robert Putnem’s metaphor, authors suggest to consider identity policy as a game “at two levels”: it is directed not only “inside the region”, but also outside of it. Since the political actors are interested not only in the electoral support but also in the inflow of the possible resources in all forms (from investments to tax privileges or support of powerful All-Russian actors on the elections)”,

The Novgorod region in Russia may be an illustration for that: in the 1990s there was active identity policy conducted. As Gel’man and Popova mention, the Novgorod elite was successfully transmitting the image of Novgorod as a hanseatic city with ancient democratic traditions (Novgorod “veche” as a popular assembly). After this kind of strategy turned out to be rather successful on the “external market” (international investments actively entered Novgorod region), the strategy was a little bit changed on the “internal market” where there was also a pent-up demand for regional identity. The goals of the identity policy on the “internal market” were status-quo legitimization and liquidation of political opponents. Therefore, the specific feature of this policy became naming of the existing problems, reformulated in the new circumstances: “practitioners of the Novgorod politics imitated the attributes which “had to be inherent” to the image of the region according to their notions about the “golden age” heritage”.

The mechanism of the identity policy formulation here looks much alike with the mechanism of “traditions invention”, which is thoroughly described by the Eric Hobsbawm. Talking about the invented tradition he implies “a complex of public practices of ritual and symbolic character usually regulated by explicitly or implicitly recognized rules; its aim is to introduce certain values and norms of behavior, a means towards this end is repetition”. The process of tradition invention is always linked to ritualisation and formalization, and a new tradition is always connected to the past despite of this link mostly being fake.

Hobsbawm makes an example of the invented tradition talking about Swiss nationalism of the 20th century which coincided with the federative state formation. Previous tradition practices (folk songs, sport contests, shooting) were modernized and institutionalized to serve the new national goals. New songs made by the teachers with the use of old expressions were added to folklore, the Federal Song Festival was organized which had a huge ritual influence. One can find examples of the new traditions invention in other regions of Western Europe. Flanders, for instance, is presented as historical union which overcomes the provincial and local borders of the real past; Padania was invented as the oldest community in Europe etc.

Thus, political science considers identity policy, first of all, as a process of conscious identity construction within the borders of a political community from the part of different segments of elites. Main mechanisms of identity in this case are mythologization, reutilization of history, borders demarcation, and positive community image shaping both inside and beyond its bounds. It can be mentioned that in the case with the European Union there are no institutions inside of it that are capable of conducting the purposeful identity politics nowadays. The European Parliament, which is the only democratically legitimated institution, takes a rather insignificant position in the decision-making structure. Being more powerful, the Council of Ministers functions more as an arena for the negotiation of national interests rather than as a conductor of European identity. At last, the European Commission which has the legislative authority pays attention mostly to the everyday functioning of the EU.

**Conclusion**

Thereafter, the concept of identity politics / identity policy allows us to refer to the process of identity shaping and / or introducing in different social communities: from small groups to regions and national states.

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2 Ibid, p. 192.
5 Ibid, p. 48.
The notion of the work-life balance (WLB) has captured considerable attention of researchers for several decades. The combination of work and private life is increasingly becoming a critical issue in different fields including psychology, sociology, management and gender studies.

The importance of WLB has been given recognition not only in academic circles but in professional business practice as well. Work-life balance has come to the forefront of policy discourse in developed countries in recent years, against a backdrop of globalization and rapid technological change, an ageing population and concerns over labour market participation rates, particularly those of mothers at a time when fertility rates are falling.\(^1\)

The vital necessity for work-life balance solutions by employees and managers is increasing at an unprecedented rate. There is conclusive evidence linking work-life imbalance to worsened health and well-being among individuals and families. As a consequence, work-life balance has become a central topic in boardrooms and government halls at present.

Despite the fact that both men and women have to deal with the problem of imbalance between work and life, the latter are affected by imbalance more seriously. For most working mothers keeping balance between work and family life has become a challenging task. Traditional social roles of women imply and require their greater participation in the life of a family. It allows us to look at the problem from the perspective of gender placement.

Both approaches can be utilized in the analysis of European identity. Thus, the concept “identity politics” allows us to contemplate the process of European identity formation “from below”. In this perspective there is not a social group on the citizens level that promotes the European identity and is able to lead the fight with the regional and national movements. At the same time, the concept of “identity policy” highlights the role of the political elites in the process of new identity construction. The analysis of the institutional design of the European Union reveals that there are no structures that could be able to conduct a purposeful European “identity politics” among the EU institutions.

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a mother, a wife, a daughter and so forth. A female worker in the public sphere is heavily dependent on her employer, the state, and often – on her family members.

The aim of the present paper is to analyze the EU employment policy and to find out if working women enjoy proper balance between professional and private life, and if flexible work arrangements, aimed at reducing work-life conflict, really give female workers greater choice and enhance their career opportunities. The hypothesis is that take-up of flexibility is gendered, as women tend to work part-time or to experience other forms of flexibility due to necessity to perform their traditional family roles and functions. As a result, women have to take double responsibility; they are paid less money and have a remote chance of succeeding in their career.

The History of Work-Life Balance Policy in the European Union

The term “work-life balance” was coined in the 1970s in the USA, when it was used to describe the balance between an individual’s work and personal life. During the 1960s and 1970s employers considered work-life balance as a problem of working mothers who struggled with the demands of their jobs and raising children. During this period and into the mid-1980s the US government turned much attention to this issue, which can be proved by the Presidential Conference on Families, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (1978), and the Quality of Employment Survey. These steps on the government level encouraged such big companies as Merck and IBM to introduce changes in their internal workplace policies. They comprised maternity leave, employee assistance programmes, flexitime, home-based work, and child-care referral. During the 1980s men also began to articulate deep concerns about work-life balance.

In the late 1980s and 1990s Active Labour Market policies were proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and implemented in many Western economies including the EU as a response to high levels of unemployment. It became clear that it was impossible to build a flexible labour market without flexible companies, where flexible working practices were introduced. As a result, the employers began to use flexible working on a continual basis, and employment gradually increased. In the late 1990s, the EU started promoting part-time work in order to involve more working mothers in the labour market.

The EU has done plenty through legislation to improve employment conditions and the health and safety of workers. The 1993 Working Time Directive, and its subsequent revisions, stipulates that working time policies should ensure a high level of protection of workers’ health and safety in terms of working time, allow for greater flexibility for companies and Member States with regard to the management of working time, ensure a better balance between work and private life, and avoid unreasonable constraints on companies, in particular on small and medium enterprises.¹

In December 1995, the European Council acknowledged the European Union’s commitment to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPfA), which was adopted during the Fourth World Conference on Women. Since 1999, the Presidency of the Council presents a review which reports on the implementation of one of the twelve areas of concern of the BPfA in the member states.² The twelve areas include “Women and Poverty”, “Education and Training of Women”, “Women and the Economy”, “Human Rights for Women” etc.

The reconciliation of work, family and private life is widely recognized at EU level as a priority for securing gender equality. Reconciliation is a key element for achieving an EU headline target of the Europe 2020 strategy for Smart, Inclusive and Sustainable Growth. Obviously, it is a precondition for increasing the employment participation of both men and women and is an essential part of gender equity.

² Ibid.
Work-Life Balance and Business Interests

Needless to say, the issue of working time has important consequences for competitiveness, plays a decisive role in shaping family life, and has an enormous influence on gender equality and gender roles. For all these reasons, the issue of working time has drawn much attention in EU policymaking discussions over the last 20 years. These discussions have focused especially on making working time more flexible and facilitating shorter working hours, both as a way of making jobs accessible to more citizens and to aid in balancing work and private life. Another key policy area implicated in working time is gender equality, stemming from the fact that men and women have very different working time patterns and that women tend to devote much more time to unpaid work in the home.¹

At present in policy discourse it is often taken for granted that work-life balance implies a win-win situation, where employees’ preferences match their employers’ burning desire for better flexibility of working practices. Nonetheless, many papers written by European scholars bring such assumptions into question.

For instance, Steve Fleetwood recognizes that all flexible working practices can be divided into employee friendly and employer friendly.² Employee friendly practices traditionally include: flexible start and finish times, voluntary part-time, job-share, compressed working weeks, shift swapping, sabbaticals and career breaks. Employer or business friendly flexible working practices comprise: involuntary temporary working and involuntary part-time working (with loss of pay), zero hours contracts, unsocial hours working such as twilight shifts, Saturday and Sunday working, overtime (especially unpaid), etc.

He states that current employer friendly practices have a tendency to hinder, rather than enable possibilities for work-life balance. The emergence of WLB discourses is understood as part of the emergence of flexible working in general, and the latter can be understood as part of the emergence of neoliberalism. Fleetwood argues that discourses of WLB have gained popularity because they have been helpful in legitimizing the employee unfriendly working practices essential for neoliberalism. Needs of business [not the needs of the family] are still of paramount importance. This leads to an asymmetrical power relation.

WLB support is a strategy of the human resources management that is gaining ever-growing popularity among employers. It enables them to attract and/or retain talented workers. Moreover, nowadays it is very prestigious to be top-listed in different lists and rankings of work-life supportive employers. Obviously, such recognition of employers promotes a positive image of being supportive to their employees’ WLB and gives them competitive advantage in the labour market.

However, a large discrepancy between the image of WLB supporters and real company policies can be found. It can be supported by the findings from research carried out by the Dutch scholars Samula Mescher, Yvonne Benschop and Hans Doorewaard.¹ The researchers investigated how employers portray themselves as supporters of WLB in texts found on 24 websites of 10 different companies. The main conclusion is that “support is not always supportive”. The analysis demonstrated the ambiguous character of different messages conveyed on WLB support.

On the one hand, the explicit message on the majority of websites is that the companies are in favour of WLB of their employees by offering a broad range of WLB arrangements for all workers. On the other hand, the implicit messages concerning work, life, work-life balance, ideal worker and ideal mothers can be revealed. The key findings suggest that the portrayal of WLB arrangements is characterized by gender bias. For instance, childcare is considered the most apparent reason to use such arrangements and is believed a female issue. Besides, private lives of women include mainly care duties; the portrayal of men’s private lives is more diverse: study, travelling, doing sports, writing books, etc. The ideal worker is represented in terms of traditional cultural norms. Ideal workers should be available full-time; they agree that work has priority over private life; they are willing to work more hours and take on extra responsibilities.

On the whole, despite the proclaimed commitment of employers


¹ Ibid.

to WLB support, business needs often come first instead of private needs of employees.

The key findings of the Eurofound about the working time in the EU – 2012 are the following: almost one fifth of European workers are having difficulties achieving a satisfactory work–life balance, a slight decrease since 2000. The use of flexitime has increased in European companies since 2004. Part-time work is widely used across Europe, most notably in the Netherlands. On average, around three times as many women work part time as do men, mainly to facilitate their domestic responsibilities. When their unpaid work in the home is factored in, however, women working part-time work nearly as many hours per week as do men working full time.

To sum up, the boundaries between work and non-work have been changed increasingly in favour of working life. So, the demands of work take supremacy over all aspects of private life. What is more, when it comes to reconciliation of work and family needs, mainly women are faced with tough challenges to deal with new demands in the labour markets. The problem of “fitting” roles of women into modern mode of life and, first of all, employment patterns, mostly remains the private affair of families.

In conclusion, in spite of a broad variety of policies and measures to affirm gender equality announced and adopted in the European Union, care activities are basically done by women. At present, in the European Union, women between the ages of 25 to 44 spend three times longer than men in childcare per day. Similarly, care responsibilities give an explanation for the major reason why women work far longer hours than men. As a consequence, this puts a limit on women’s prospects to a balanced working and family life.

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2 Ibid.

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Trust in the Catholic Church in Contemporary Poland: Influence of the Communist Past
Galina Novikova

This article examines the level of trust in the Roman Catholic Church in contemporary Poland and the influence that the Communist past of the country gives on it. During the Communist oppression in Poland the Church had a great credibility. It was exactly the church that organized a very strong resistance to the Communist regime. It played a significant role in moral reconstruction of the nation.

But after the crash of the Communist regime the level of trust in the church in Poland had diminished. We try to understand why it had happened despite the fact that up to now Poles are a very religious people and the Church continues to play a very important role in the country.

Attitude of Poles toward the Catholic Church during the Communist Regime

The Catholic Church has always been the predominant denomination in Poland. According to the data of the World Values Survey, in 2005 96.6% of Poles belonged to Roman Catholic denomination. Therefore, to be a Pole practically means to be a Catholic. It is also connected with the fact that Poland has been at the beginning of 1990s, and still is, a very ethnically homogenous country. As Krystyna Daniel noted in 1995, “ethnic minorities, such as Germans, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, constitute no more than 3 to 4% of Poland’s population… For example, in 1931, Poles made up only 69.9% of the whole population…”

But if we look on the latest survey, we can find that since the collapse of communism in 1989, the level of social trust in the Church

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1 Official website of World Values Survey Association: www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
in Poland has diminished. Nevertheless, it is still one of the highest among the European countries.

In Polish history, the Catholic Church has always been not only a religious institution but it has also played an important role in periods when the government was weakened. It was particularly noticeable during the period of Soviet domination, after World War II, when the Catholic Church gained “some level of autonomy”. K. Daniel indicates among the characteristics of that the following: conservation of the religious classes in the public schools until 1961; financial aid from the communist authorities (since 1961 the support of the university-level Catholic school and payment of salaries for the teachers of religious classes).¹

At the same time, all the years of the Communist regime in Poland the Roman Catholic Church was a bulwark of Pole’s resistance. It took a particularly critical form in the end of 1960s when the countries under the Communist regime began their attempts to throw down regime, hateful for them (Hungary in 1956², Czechoslovakia in 1968³).

At this time the Church in Poland took the role of a “powerful element of independent civil society” and it was impossible without it to revive the Polish state. Large groups of society – “not just practicing Catholics, but skeptical intellectuals and non believers as well” – all concentrated around the Catholic Church.⁴ As Robert Royal notes, “the Church had such great credibility in Polish society that Polish intellectuals – traditionally anti clerical – as well as labor leaders, journalists, historians, all came to regard Polish Catholicism as central to the basic moral reconstruction of the nation”.⁵ It was especially noticeable during the last decade of the communist regime

¹ Ibid.
³ A brief period of liberalization known as the Prague Spring. Alexander Dubček tried to create “socialism with a human face”. This was forcibly ended by 21 August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion.
⁴ Daniel K. The Church-State Situation in Poland After the Collapse of Communism, in: Young “socialism with a human face”. This was forcibly ended by 21 August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion.
On the opposite to the relative distrust in the social system – government, mass media, politicians, most of political and social institutions and even in each other – we can point out the highest indicators of trust in the church in Poland in 1990 not only among the Post-Communist counties, but also among the Western countries: 82.6%. According to the data of Global (European) Value Surveys, the nearest figures are observed only in Northern Ireland (79.6%), Ireland (72.3%), Romania (71.4%), Iceland (67.8%), USA (67.6%), Canada (63.6%), Italy (63.1%) (see Table 2).

The Catholic Church in Poland after the Collapse of the Communist Regime

After the democratic transition and formation of the Polish Third Republic, the level of trust and confidence of Poles in church began to diminish (see Table 1).

Table 1. The Level of Trust in Church in Poland in 1989-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>51.4 %</td>
<td>45.6 %</td>
<td>30.0 %</td>
<td>33.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite a lot</td>
<td>32.4 %</td>
<td>38.2 %</td>
<td>37.4 %</td>
<td>36.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much</td>
<td>14.2 %</td>
<td>13.5 %</td>
<td>25.0 %</td>
<td>23.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None at all</td>
<td>2.0 %</td>
<td>2.7 %</td>
<td>7.5 %</td>
<td>7.4 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>922 (100%)</td>
<td>968 (100%)</td>
<td>1127 (100%)</td>
<td>1076 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


If we present these data in diagram, it is obviously that the number of persons having “great deal” and “a lot” of confidence in church since 1989 had decreased: from 83.8% in 1989 to 69.3% in 1999. At the same time, the number of persons who have not very much confidence in church or not at all had increased: from 16.2% to 30.7% (see Figure 2).

Table 2. Trust in Different Social Institutions, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Labour union</th>
<th>Press</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Legal system</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Interpersonal trust</th>
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<td>Western countries</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38.3</td>
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<td>66.5</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>22.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
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<td>26.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
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<td>35.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>65.4</td>
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<td>39.7</td>
<td>37.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>87.9</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>45.4</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>52.7</td>
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<td>75.1</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>65.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>16.1</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>79.6</td>
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<td>85.6</td>
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<td>67.6</td>
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<td>84.2</td>
<td>63.6</td>
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<td>67.8</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>45.8</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>81.5</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own summary of data of Global (European) Value Surveys.1

*The value is the sum of means “A great deal” and “Quite a lot”. The value is given in %.

the church-state relations: the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed, the Statute on Social Insurance of Clergymen and the Statute on the Relationship between the Catholic Church and the State. For example, the Statute on Freedom of Consciousness and Creed declared religious freedom and freedom of conviction, gave citizens a right to form church or other denominations, to bring up children according to their own beliefs etc. At the same time, it also guaranteed the wide autonomy and self-government of the Catholic Church.

But despite the principle of church-state separation, set up in the Constitution, there were adopted some laws that entangled the Church with state.

First of all, it was the Statute of Education of 1991 with its statement about introducing (after 30-years hiatus) religious classes to public school and about the necessity to respect Christian values in the process of education.

Then, in 1992 the Statute on Radio and TV Broadcasting stipulated that radio and TV programs must respect Christian values. It was followed also by the limitations on abortion, nevertheless “most Poles wanted abortion to remain legal”.

And as we can suppose, that is exactly why the level of trust in the Church in Poland began to decline. Poles considered the influence of the Church on their lives as excessive as reported by a poll in 1993 in which 59% of respondents expressed this.

Figure 2. Trust in Church in Poland in 1989-1999

Question is: “I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The churches”


But what has caused such changes in the Pole’s state of mind concerning the Church? At the moment of the collapse of the communist regime the Catholic Church “was the unquestioned moral authority in society”. After 1989 the new Polish government tried to legitimize and strengthen the position of the Church in society.

According to the Constitution of 1952, the Church and state were separated in Poland. There was declared the freedom of consciousness and creed and assured the equality of conscience and creed. In 1989 the Polish Parliament adopted also three statutes that specified

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2 Till 1997 Poland was governed by Constitution of 1952. In years after collapse many changes of its text were made and in 1992 the much part of this Constitution was replaced by Small Constitution of 1992 that changed mainly the statements of Constitution of 1952 concerning Poland as a communist and socialist state with those of liberal democracy and market economy. Finally the Constitution of 1952 was replaced only in 1997.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
Trust in the Catholic Church in Contemporary Poland...

Galina Novikova

The scandal with the case of bishop Wielgus snowballed rapidly also because Pope Benedict XVI and the Vatican were misled about the profundity of Wielgus’s ties with secret police and therefore didn’t divulge the information about these collaborations: “…the Polish church, together with the Vatican under Pope John Paul II, a Pole, has been criticized for keeping collaboration among the clergy quiet – even though it was widely known inside the church that up to 10 percent of priests, monks and nuns had some contact with the Polish secret police”.

As Craig A. Smith notes, this scandal “has already tarnished the Catholic Church’s image as an unimpeachable moral authority during the Communist years”.

On the other hand, in the last decade the accusations of Catholic clergymen from different countries, including Poland, in pedophilia also appear regularly. And these numerous scandals with catholic priests force people to rethink their attitude towards the church. 26-year-old Anna Sawa supposes that such scandals take place among different strata and people of different profession but when it is talked about regarding priests, it has “much agiotage”. But she thinks that the Church should change: “It’s very strange for me that up to now the Roman Catholic Church has this law of celibacy. And I think that it is to a large extent this law that provokes such affairs, because every prohibition popularizes the prohibited thing… This is indicative of necessity to reform, to change something…”

There is also the question of “in vitro fertilization” that is particularly pointed in Poland in the last years: Roman Catholic priests don’t want to christen children which were conceived in such a way. Some respondents, interviewed during our own research in Poland, said that they have known people who faced this problem and couldn’t find a Church to christen their child, because the priests said that “this procedure is from Satan”.

1 Stanisław Wojciech Wielgus (born 23 April 1939) is a former Roman Catholic archbishop of Warsaw. After his appointment to the position of archbishop by Pope Benedict XVI on 6 December 2006, he assumed the office in a private installation ceremony on 5 January 2007, only to resign two days later, less than an hour before his public installation ceremony, because of a scandal connected with his cooperation with the Shuba Bezpieczeństwa – the Polish communist secret police.


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

Nevertheless, the trust in the Church among Poles is still very high. If we look on data of the World Values Survey, Poles trust in church more than in other institutions: 72,7% of respondents said they have a great deal or a lot of confidence in church. As compared with the values of 1990 it is not the best “result”: Romanians (88,1%), Italians (74,8%) trust in church more, but still one of the highest (see Table 3). Like in the most other counties, the church remains in Poland the institution with the highest level of trust in comparison to other considered political and social institutions (police, labour unions, mass media, justice system, parliament and army).

It is considered that “after Malta, Poland is probably the second most strictly religious country in European Union”.¹ Up to now, it has many national heroes associated with the church. Family and religion are the cornerstones of Polish society.² The role of the church is very important in Poland: since from the birth to death it leads a Pole in his life. There are special religious media channels, clergymen are often invited to different TV talk-shows or news programs and many people trust in their opinions. And it is considered also that opinion of the Church “may even decide the outcome of elections”.³

The position of the Church in Poland concerning homosexuality is very strong: gay marriages are not allowed. Also the topic of divorces is just like a taboo. Abortions are illegal except for medical reasons.

If we turn our attention to the data of the World Values Survey, we’ll find that 94,6% of Poles say that they are a religious person.⁴ 48,2% of Poles attend religious services once a week, 9,5% – more than once a week, 17,7% – once a month, 13,7% – once on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days.⁵

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parliament</th>
<th>Labour union</th>
<th>Press</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Justice system</th>
<th>Police</th>
<th>Church</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Western countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>35,5</td>
<td>38,7</td>
<td>38,5</td>
<td>34,6</td>
<td>68,3</td>
<td>40,1</td>
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<td>88,1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*The value is the sum of means “A great deal” and “Quite a lot”. The value is given in %.

Concerning the question if the Church gives adequate answers to different problems, the answers are distributed as following: two thirds (66,7%) of Poles think that Church gives adequate answers to the moral problems and needs of the individual; 66,1% – to the same problem as regards the integration of the individual into the community.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Officcial website of World Values Survey Association: www.worldvaluessurvey.org (Access: 05.05.2012 ). Question is: “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are? A religious person; Not a religious person; A convinced atheist”.
5. Ibid. Question is: “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?”.
problems of family life; 83.9% – to people’s spiritual needs. And only concerning the social problems 53.2% of Poles say “No”.¹

At the same time, the level of interpersonal trust in Poland is very low. On the standard question if most people can be trusted or you need to be very careful in dealing with people, only 19% of Poles say that most people can be trusted.²

**Conclusion**

There can be no doubt of the role that the Roman Catholic Church had played during the Communist regime in Poland. As we showed, it was exactly the Church that organized a very strong resistance to the Communist regime; that is why communists intimidated, beat and even killed Polish priests, bishops and other clergy. Most of these attempts took place in the 1980s. In this gloomiest period of the Polish history, the Catholic Church played a significant role in moral reconstruction of the nation. It had a great credibility in Polish society: the indicators of trust in Church were very high at the end of Communist regime – 83.8% in 1989 and 1990. It was the highest value of trust in the Church not only among the Post-Communist counties, but also among the Western countries.

But after the crash of the Communist regime, the level of trust in the Church in Poland began to diminish. The number of persons who had not very much confidence in the Church or not at all had almost doubly increased (to 30%).

Maybe it was a result of disappearance of necessity in church as a central element of resistance to the Communist regime. This partly confirms K. Daniel who notes that through ages the Catholic Church was like a “significant national icon, especially when Polish political institutions were weakened”: “This was particularly true when Poland lost its political independence during 123-year period that began with its partition among Austria, Prussia, and Russia and ended in 1918, when Poland regained its independence following World War I”.³

Therefore, we can suppose that the Catholic Church after the World War II was the institute around that the Poles, even non practicing Catholics, concentrated for the fight against common enemy – constrained communist authority. And when this enemy was “defeated”, the attitude of Poles to the Catholic Church with its strong wish to control every sphere of life changed. The Church that despite of declared church-state separation has begun to pierce Pole’s life with Christian values – in schools, on TV and radio, anti-abortion legislation, became for some people the “enemy” itself.

Yes, Poland is a country with a very strong religious tradition and it’s impossible to imagine it without Catholicism. The trust in the Church among Poles is still very high. Poles trust in church more than in other institutions. And its value is one of the highest in the European Union. As before, Church plays a very important role in Poland. It influences people’s opinion not only through preaching, but also through mass media. Themselves, Poles are very religious people. And the most of them suppose that the contemporary Catholic Church gives adequate answers to the moral problems and needs of the individual, to the problems of family life, and to people’s spiritual needs. Maybe it is only social problems that the Church doesn’t solve.

But at the same time the Poles appraise the influence of the Church on their lives as excessive more and more. And also the scandals with accusations of Roman Catholic priests in collaboration with the secret police during the Communist years and in pedophilia don’t raise the level of trust in the Church in Poland.

In conclusion, we can note that talking about the trust in the Church in Poland and we can also point to the question of the role of religion in the journey toward freedom. In point of fact, the Church was that catalyst which started the process of destruction of the communist regime in Poland. In the latter half of the 20th century it solidified the Polish society and, to a large extent exactly because of that, maintained the high level of trust among Poles up to now. We can also mention other countries of Eastern Europe like Hungary or Romania where church played some role as the opposition to the communist regimes too.

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¹ Ibid. Question is: “Generally speaking, do you think that the churches in your country are giving adequate answers to: the moral problems and needs of the individual, to the problems of family life, to people’s spiritual needs, to the social problems?”.

² Ibid. Question is: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”.

The article focuses on the issues of international students’ adjustment within new academic, cultural and social environments after students arriving to a new environment, while taking a course at Duisburg-Essen University (Germany). It is based on the results of the first wave of empirical research carried out in Fall 2011. The sociological method used in the empirical research is in-depth semi-structured interviews. The sample includes 27 students of 19-27 years old taking course at Duisburg-Essen University (Germany) in both sciences and humanities. The respondents study either under special academic programs or independently.

The goal of the research is to identify the most problematic spheres of international students’ adaptation in their interaction with the host environment at the primary adaptation stage. The main questions are: what are the most problematic spheres of adjustment; how they affect the success of the adaptation process; and what are the mechanisms of decreasing the effects of trouble situations. It is essential to define factors and preventive mechanisms which enable the reduction of discomfort during social, cultural and academic adjustment. In this article I will try to follow step-by-step the role of adaptation in different fields of living abroad, and to find out the most problematic ones as well as identify connections between difficulties and troubles in each field.

The empirical part of the research is based on the theoretical approaches of “capital”, offered by Pierre Bourdieu' and Robert Putnam. Bourdieu showed that various types of capital reveal themselves in

specific spheres of life-activities: cultural capital is reflected in material values or knowledge accumulation; social capital is developed under the extension of social nets and sociability; economical capital demonstrates the power of financial self-reliability, and intellectual abilities which refer to accumulating knowledge form intellectual capital.

Patnem classified “capital” into 2 levels: the first level is interpersonal and the second – individual. The first one describes the social bounds among group-members. The specifics of these 2 types depend on how strong and stable the social connection between people is.

In terms of the students’ adaptation process, various types of capital are seen as predominant and providing benefits for their owners.

According to the students’ experience of being abroad, seven spheres of adaption were selected. Each of them describes specific problematic components of entering a new environment.

The Article consists of the following modules:

• Module I. The trip’s goals
• Module II. Trouble situations
• Module III. The issues of communication
• Module IV. Academic adjustment
• Module V. Language proficiency
• Module VI. Culture issues
• Module VII. Financial issues

**Module I. The Trip’s Goals**

One third of the respondents possess minimum knowledge of German language needed for everyday communication (A1-A2 levels). That’s due to the programs under which the respondents take their courses at the University. It’s important to mention that one of the key issues regarding the importance of the German language as the host culture language is the fact that the lectures for international students are held in English.

For those students who came to Germany under the Erasmus program – as the research shows – the degree of importance of being involved in the academic process in German is quite low (however, it is not as low as it is for students under the Dual diploma program). Thus, these students do not speak actively about their strong motivation to learn German to function more efficiently in the academic environment, which is important.

Half of the respondents (N=14) see their main objective of staying in Germany to be the opportunity to learn/advance their German language level within the native environment. Almost one third of the respondents (N=8) consider their major opportunity to be studying at the University of Germany, and for less than half of students (N=6) it is to receive high-quality education. The main motivation and goals of the respondents’ stays in Germany are listed in the Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivation/goals of stay in Germany</th>
<th>Number of the respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To learn/advance German language</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To study at a German university</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To get good/high-quality education</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. To meet new people/get contacts</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. To experience new culture</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among other reasons for staying in Germany, the respondents named travelling within European zone, self-improvement by learning both German and English, living abroad and the opportunity to bind one’s future to Germany.

All the goals mentioned by the respondents correspond with the idea of social capital accumulation, particularly, the accumulation of social, academic, professional and cultural competences and contacts. New experience is the major and the most valuable resource of adaptation named by the respondents.

The sociological and socio-cultural contexts of using the ‘capital’ concept for my research might be revealed in the following:

1. The respondents are most interested in intellectual and symbolic capital accumulation, which is reflected in their motivation to learn German and advance their language skills; it is also shown by the respondents’ motivation to study abroad (in Germany particularly)
and to get high-quality education regarding future professional and life perspectives.

2. Social and cultural capital accumulation results in reaching such goals as getting new interesting and useful contacts as well as personal enrichment with new cultural values.

3. Spiritual and symbolic capital development is important for the respondents in terms of widening personal life horizons, travelling and enriching life experience.

4. The desire to link one’s future with Germany and the opportunity of personal improvement as well as the wish to advance one’s language skills and enrich one’s life experience in different social and cultural background all enable a joint investment to human capital accumulation.

Thus, in general, the widening of geographical horizons makes new experience, new social contacts and personal growth valuable for respondents.

It is also interesting to look into the reasons for choosing Germany as the country to live and study in, as explained by the students themselves (see the Table 2).

Generally speaking, the majority of respondents talk about their previous experience of being in Germany, about family roots connected with German culture or German people mentality as the reasons of coming to Germany for living and studying.

The respondents explain that planning the trip was an important but not the crucial step in organizing their stay in Germany:

Tyaniu, China: «I kept thinking about going abroad for studying since I was a school boy. But when I talked to my dad, he said I was too small to go abroad, so he offered to wait till I leave high school...».

But some of the respondents report that their decision was spontaneous:

Ella, Poland: «My friend said she was going to Germany under the Erasmus program and I said «I’m coming with you...»;

Hector, Spain: «It was a spontaneous decision...I thought I would probably go abroad someday...but I was not quite sure about that. My friend told me “Hey! Let’s go!” So I am here!»;

W. Cheng, China: «Most probably, it was a spontaneous decision...».

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The reasons of choosing Germany</th>
<th>Respondents’ comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have been learning German at school, university</td>
<td>Katarijna, Poland: «For 9 years I've been learning German...»; Erna, Russia: «I started learning German at school and then I've become more and more interested in it...»;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in Germany as a country</td>
<td>Daniela, Mexico: «I studied at German language school so I grew up not like a normal Mexican child. I was brought up in the spirit of the German mentality and that's why I came here...»;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affordable/cheap education</td>
<td>Tyaniu, China: «I chose Germany primarily for the costs for education...»; W.Cheng, China: «In Germany the tuition fee is much lower when compared to other countries...»; Fahim Aziz, Pakistan: «It was the cheapest option for me...»;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No choice was given (program restrictions)</td>
<td>Djoi Chung, China: «The program under which I am here was developed for my home university and that of Duisburg-Essen...»; Karina, Russia: «It was not my choice but that of my home university as our faculty has connections with the local university...»;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have friends/contacts in Germany</td>
<td>Fahim Aziz, Pakistan: «I have class mates here, they also do their studies in Essen...»; Lena, Russia: «My sister was here once for her studies and when returned, she told me I should come also...»;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Erasmus students who took part in the research are more likely to express the idea that their decision regarding going abroad was spontaneous. The students who live in Europe do not confront the problem of mobility within European region, which can be a hindrance for other students. Such an opportunity of being mobile helps ‘Europe-born’ students make a fast decision regarding their trip trajectories. For visitors from Asia, Russia, and the Near East the decision is planned and thoroughly thought over. But at the same time, in my opinion, it is more a question of culture, than just that of geographical distance. Partially, it is also connected with the necessity of receiving visa support.
The main criteria of respondents’ cross-cultural experience classification was measured in the research in terms of positive/negative aspects as felt by the respondents (see Table 3).

**Table 3. Respondents’ Attitudes towards New Socio-Cultural Environment (in descending order of importance)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive experience reported</th>
<th>Negative experience reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Interaction with people</td>
<td>1. Interaction with people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angel, Spain: «German people speak English, they are more open now than before when I just came...»; Hector, Spain: «The Germans are very friendly, polite... Most people think they are cold but I think that’s not true...»; Jano, Spain: «German people, I think, are more concentrated, it seems they know what they want...».</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Interaction within academic process Tyaniu, China: «It’s like the attitude of a tutor to his students and vice versa. It’s common here to ask questions if you have some so you address your tutor directly or your groupmate. For me that was quite new...».</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transport Karina, Russia: «I already got used to local transport, everything works to the minute, to the hour, and if something is wrong – it is announced. Knowing this I really do not know how I’ll come back to Russia. I like this about Germany very much...».</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Academic process organization Hector, Spain: “I like everything here”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Psychological discomfort Omar Suhil, Pakistan: «I came on Sunday and nothing was working here – everything was closed...»; Friya, France: «It was hard to be a student at the beginning...».</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Local cuisine Tyaniu, China: «Having come here, I did not appreciate local cuisine... It doesn’t taste as delicious as it does in China».</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to mention here that the interaction-with-people factor has both positive and negative interpretation due to the respondents’ opinion, in terms of their experience, and has become for them a crucial cultural adjustment criterion. The respondents report a positive interaction experience with local background twice more often than a negative one.

A large number of participants (about 2/3 of the respondents) was prepared for the trip, but it was quite diverse and of various intensity (see Table 4).

**Table 4. Types of Deliberate Preparation among the Respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of preparation /the resources used</th>
<th>Interpretation of Respondents’ Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Visiting language courses</td>
<td>More than half of the students took the opportunity to learn or advance their German proficiency. This step is more important for those who do not speak foreign language at all or at minimum level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gaining information about the town, the university, the tuition program (including Internet sources).</td>
<td>About 1/3 of the respondents were interested in receiving information: Fahim Aziz, Pakistan: «The Internet: it’s the major source of information today for many people...»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Friends’ and relatives’ experience and advice</td>
<td>About 1/3 of the respondents took the opportunity to know their friends’ and relatives’ opinion regarding their prospective trip: Chao, China: “Being at home I started asking other students who studied here under the same program about different issues...”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The smallest part of the respondents as a means of preparation mentioned saving money, collecting paper and solving formal documental issues. About 1/3 of students who came under the Erasmus program (European citizens) were not quite busy with preparing for the trip – they do not treat this step as an important one.

First impressions and expectations of the new environment proceeded trouble situations, which follow the adaptation process during the first period of being abroad. The next module reveals the most sufficient issues in terms of coping with difficulties and problem situations.

Module II. Trouble Situations
At the first stage of adjustment, getting involved in a new socio-cultural community means risk and uncertainty. The ability to cope with trouble situations becomes meaningful for the whole first-stage adaptation process as it is presented in the Table 5.

Table 5. Trouble Issues (in decreasing order of importance)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trouble spheres</th>
<th>The nature of troubles</th>
<th>Respondents’ comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic process</td>
<td>Almost 1/3 of the respondents note the importance of self-organization in learning, time management, coping with geographical issues of the University’s inner structure (finding class rooms etc.), and the system of academic credits exchange.</td>
<td>Friya, France: &quot;The classes, the schedule...it’s hard to manage my own time...&quot;; Fiona, Ireland: &quot;I had difficulties choosing the subjects and with the conversion of credits according to my native education system...&quot;; Julia, Spain: &quot;I faced a problem when trying to find a room at the university...&quot;; Chao, China: &quot;The system of course selection – that is difficult for me, especially to choose the subject I would like to study...&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language barrier/skills</td>
<td>It’s an important issue reported by those students with low language proficiency and/or experience difficulties of interaction within new socio-cultural community.</td>
<td>Erna, Russia: &quot;It’s difficult that everything is in German...and when you learn the language in Russia, it’s only theory and you cannot apply it in practice but here you have to apply it...&quot;; W.Cheng, China: &quot;The first troublesome issue is of course the language...My German level is quite low...&quot;; Djoi Chung, China: &quot;The only problem for me by now is language, because when you understand what people are saying, it helps you to live in a community...&quot;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trouble spheres</th>
<th>The nature of troubles</th>
<th>Respondents’ comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrain orientation</td>
<td>Many respondents are faced with the problem of orientation in town, at the university and students residence.</td>
<td>Friya, France: &quot;I was afraid of getting lost so I tried to stay closer to my group...&quot;; Ella, Poland: &quot;I cannot read and easily get lost even with a map of the building...I could not find the gym or even a room in a student’s residence.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic issues</td>
<td>These were mentioned by those students who had to deal with all the paperwork on their own (including visa support, opening a bank account, etc.). It is not acute for those students who came to Germany under the Erasmus program because they were supported by their coordinators assigned within the program.</td>
<td>Erna, Russia: &quot;When you have to do or arrange some documents, you come and do it. But then there appears another problem – so you have to think of a better way to arrange all this at the same time...&quot;; Fahim Aziz, Pakistan: &quot;The problems were connected with visa support as I had to submit an income statement to four-five thousand Euros to get visa – the rule is only for Pakistani citizens...&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport use</td>
<td>The majority of the respondents reported troublesome situations connected with transport use and terrain orientation.</td>
<td>Maria, Russia: &quot;I was confused in the metro that when to get out you need to push the button. Such full automatization...It’s very unusual&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being independent in everyday life</td>
<td>Some aspects of routine life were reported by the respondents as troublesome, mainly by those of them who were living before only with their families and have no experience of independent living.</td>
<td>Tyaniu, China: &quot;The most problematic for me were all the issues connected with independent living here, when I have to cook for myself...to clean the room, etc...&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues of interpersonal interaction</td>
<td>The respondents comment on the situations connected with their personal space namely.</td>
<td>Angel, Spain: &quot;Interaction with my roommate is a troublesome issue – he is Ukrainian...&quot;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Erasmus students the first-stage adjustment difficulties are felt not as deep as for those came from other than European countries. Most Erasmus students possess quite good German language skills (B2-C1 levels), and have an assigned coordinator as a main source of help and support. The prominent value of group identity was reported most by Asian students and those taking courses within a group (compared to those studying independently from any program).
Belonging to a group appears to be one of the major factors of successful adaptation within new socio-cultural community:

Gosia, Poland: «Well, I did not experience any prominent problems indeed as our small 2-student group has its own assigned coordinator/advisor…».

The difference between various trouble situations should be mentioned in terms of their nature and the degree of its stressful affects. Such variables as language proficiency and native culture peculiarities effect the process of social, cultural and psychological adjustment. The following interdependency can be mentioned: the higher the level of one’s social capital accumulation (in terms of the possibilities to communicate with a research advisor/coordinator/tutors, group-mates, and other close social background), the lesser the troubles students must cope with at the first socio-cultural adjustment stage.

Another field of concern is connected to students’ communication proficiency. The specifics of interaction between new-comers and host society will be discussed below.

Module III. The Issues of Communication
Communication is a meaningful adaptation tool that influences effective and successful outcomes. At the first adjustment stage the language and emotional issues are crucial as socio-cultural indicators: most respondents, as the survey has shown, are motivated to overcome this barrier via active interaction with host community members. The logic and the steps of this interaction can be seen as following:

1. Searching for communication partners – these are mainly the students’ native culture representatives and native speakers (which helps them to minimize the language barrier and lower the risk of wrong interpretation and misunderstanding during communication process).
2. Supporting «weak ties» in the native speakers’ group or extending the communication field by involving the representatives of other cultures. Thus the socio-cultural environment that the student communicates with becomes an important part for successful interaction within the new community. It is the context of the interaction that affects the intensity of social contacts and determines the possibilities of building new ties. For students these possibilities are enabled by the university (academic) environment and their everyday life, in particular, those that takes place in student residences. The latter means a significant experience of co-existence with the representatives of other cultures and nationalities.

The first stage of socio-cultural adjustment could be seen as making respondents vulnerable because of the different kinds of barriers, psychological namely, and the space of interpersonal communication that becomes narrowed by the close surrounding which can and wants to help the newcomer to meet his social needs.

The result of communication seen by the respondents is the extended social network and increasing number of contacts:

Angel, Spain: «Communication is important for not feeling lonely and like an alien…»;

Ella, Poland: «I think it’s extremely important… and I would like to get new knowledge about the things happening here and feel closer to the new culture that I’m in right now…».

Nevertheless, talking about the possibilities and the importance of being actively involved into the communication process, the respondents admit it is a difficult and confusing aspect. According to their opinion, the need and the desire of effective communication is not enough for reaching good results and feeling oneself confident:

Maria, Russia: «I’m extremely interested!! That is why I have to communicate with foreigners and Germans just to advance my language level…»;

Djoi Chung, China: «Well, yes. I admit I’m a bit shy»;

Fahim Aziz, Pakistan: «Here I got involved in a student community, so I made many new friends… ».

Foreign language proficiency, particularly, English language, is considered by the respondents as an important advantage in organizing their own life in the new community (as the tuition of international students is held in English and quite a large number of citizens speak English). It is also important, in students’ opinion, because language skills might be of great importance for their compatriots in solving their problems. In that sense, the knowledge of German is as important as the knowledge of English: the first is used in informal communication mainly; the second is the additional ‘op-
tion in situations where English is not sufficient. As reported by the respondents, having little knowledge of German (A1-B1 levels) and in informal interaction, students are more likely to use English as they feel themselves more confident. Thus, the students who came from non-European countries are more likely to use their native language or English.

In establishing contacts with the representatives of other cultures, the students report that they feel more comfortable when communicating with representatives of their native or similar cultural backgrounds. Many of the respondents point out that little knowledge of local community language is neither the only nor the main problem in interaction with Germans. Many of them talk about discomfort and barriers rooted in stereotypes concerning German society and German citizens (including those which were confirmed by their own experience of interaction with German people):

Djoi Chung, China: «...Well, communication with German people is restricted for me...Of course, we can communicate with them, but only at lectures and only in English...But for the most part of our spare time we spend together with our compatriots, with Chinese people...».

In general, establishing new contacts is mentioned by the students as one of the most problematic aspects at first adjustment stage. The situation is complicated by the contradiction showing that the respondents seem to be motivated and interested in effective communication with the representatives of different cultures, but continue their interaction with local people mainly in their native language; the group of that communication is narrowed to their compatriots. For people from Asia or Near East as the respondents’ answers show, the problem of effective communication and new contacts is more acute than for students who came to Germany from other European countries. Non-European students express their group identity, not the individual identity, specific for the latter group: students that come to Germany from other European countries are more active in the realization and extension of their personal potential in new culture and new social surroundings.

The interaction with the host community is characterized by the respondents in terms of different features presented in the Table 6 (in decreasing order of popularity).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Specifics of interaction (in decreasing order of importance)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Characteristics of non-European students (N=9):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The sense of humor (N=8):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Characteristics of communication and German people’s attitude towards interaction and communication partners (N=4):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The specificities of welcoming behavior (N=3):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. German people’s behavior, attitude and lifestyle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
Speaking about the issues of formal and informal communication, it is important to mention that more than half of the respondents perceive formal interaction (within academic process when talking with tutors or other university representatives) more effective and useful in terms of their adaptation process. But they also tend to perceive formal aspects of communication more difficult when compared to informal interaction (in terms of everyday or domestic behavior). Interaction within a formal environment is seen as confusing by the respondents because of the peculiarities of topics being discussed: the students report that they have to distinctly formulate and articulate their thoughts very carefully and to understand the answer precisely when speaking a foreign language. The understanding, interpretation, style and format of communication become the key aspects within the interaction process.

The next module focuses on the most problematic sphere of adaptation, as mentioned in Module II. It is revealed how expectations, aspirations and specifics of the educational process affect students’ perception of the Academic Environment.

IV. Academic Adjustment

Understanding the features of the academic process is said to be difficult as the respondents have to take on the formal rules and new ‘regime’ of their activities. At the same time, communicating with other students, which is mainly informal, is as important as formal interaction in terms of involvement in the academic environment.

Firstly, it is important to list the students’ objectives in regarding academic activities as talked about by the respondents: the results are presented in the Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Students’ aspirations</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The tuition organization</td>
<td>Fiona, Ireland: «I expected that tuition would be more organized...»; Kristina, Russia: «I thought that it would be much harder and more interesting...»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tuition flexibility (the opportunity to choose subjects)</td>
<td>Julia, Ukraine: «There are certain rules and there is a certain number of subjects for every specialty; I knew the education is very flexible here, heard about the many options we would have the opportunity to choose from – so I thought it would be difficult for me in terms of that choice...»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The variety of possibilities</td>
<td>Chao, China: «I thought I would be able to get more opportunities to learn different subjects...»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The specifics of subjects being taught</td>
<td>Sandra, Poland: «I thought that it would be more difficult as the subjects differ from those I had been studying in Poland...»</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. No certain aspirations</td>
<td>Maria, Russia: «I did not have any expectations as I knew that the system of educations is entirely different...»; Friya, France: «The difference between academic systems there in France and here in Germany is not large so I did not have any specific expectations...»; Karina, Russia: «I expected the same things as those we have when studying at home – the only difference is the language used in tuition... »;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Administrative issues connected with academic process</td>
<td>Max, Sweden: «Here they offer about 20 sub-departments for solving students’ questions – compared to our one in Sweden, so I expected to refer only one office when having problems. It makes the process complicated a bit...»</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents estimate the correspondence of their expectations to German academic realities giving the following comments:

Julia, Spain: «The Erasmus program, as I heard, intends to give students chance to live abroad without thorough efforts... and to get higher grades than those at your home university... But from what happened indeed... I understood it is not true. And you have to put all your efforts to succeed in your academic results...»;

Djoy Chung, China: «It turned out that the situation is better than I expected... Because I can get to know new people and to advance my language level... The lectures... It’s all very interesting to me...».

As the previous communication module showed, non-European students experience academic adjustment difficulties more intensely than European youth.
The academic specifics were commented on by the respondents from several perspectives (in decreasing order of importance):

1. Tutors’ attitude towards students
This aspect was introduced by the respondents as the key academic factor making their studying process challenging and different from that in their native university:

_W. Cheng, China_: «Here we may ask questions and clarify everything…in China it’s not common…The tutor there stands above his students, and everything he says is conventionally true…But here you can even debate with him…»;

_Karina, Russia_: «Well…the students ask questions, they have contact with their tutor…and that’s different from Russia. Our tutors normally ask if we have any questions. And nobody says ‘Yes’ as a rule…Here it’s not common to perceive a professor as an ‘idol you have to worship’…And in Russia we do have this attitude…That means that here the professor and his students are on nearly equal platforms…»;

_Erna, Russia_: «I see that many students come to a professor, they are interested, they are not afraid to ask…sometimes the professor tells jokes and that make students feel more comfortable…».

2. Tuition organization and students’ workload
Many respondents mention an unusual – compared to their native university life – rhythm of the studying process:

_Friya, France_: «The lecture lasts one-and-a-half hours here, but in the schedule it’s said to be two hours. In France you would sit all two hours…»;

_Hector, Spain_: «Well, here the class lasts two hours, in Spain we got used to an hour class…»;

_Julia, Spain_: «Here the number of tuition hours is less (less subjects and workload) than that we have in Spain…»;

_Maria, Russia_: «Here it is common for students to study for one year, and if you got tired – to have break in your education and then continue…so in the middle of the term it’s possible to take a break….You may not study for half of your life but then you have an opportunity to start it or to continue…»

3. Tuition quality
As a positive aspect of their learning process, students reported of the high quality of education being received:

_Tyanui, China_: «In China most of the universities do not give you the best possible education because of the system of education organization – it is tied to governmental structures, so the heads of the university are involved in political structures as well. They do not care enough about the quality of our education; about our science…They are not academic people, tutors in that word’s genuine meaning…»;

_Rahun Batun, India_: «In India people like to study, like to learn… We have many colleges…But it is hard to get in there. To pass entrance exams…».

In their comments the respondents also refer to the organizational side of the very tuition process:

_Karina, Russia_: «In our system of education in Russia we are forced to study, we do it mainly not by our own initiative…Here it’s the opposite tendency: people come into the class, they are not controlled by others, so that do it by their choice…Everything depends on one’s motivation and desire»;

_Kristina, Russia_: «I acutely feel the difference, and I like the German system of education… The university in Russia that I study at is considered to be very prestigious…But I feel that education here is better, it is more serious…».

Thus, the attractiveness of German academic system is seen as a norm (or standard) by the respondents. Most of them perceive the differences between their native and host universities’ life in a positive way. It seems to be due to a different kind of attitude of the tutor towards his students. From the respondents’ point of view, that attitude defines the perception of student community by the academic community as existing on equal level – not in the academic but also in the personal way. It means the students feel that they are acknowledged by their professors which makes their adaptation within new academic environment more efficient. In that sense, the opportunity to choose and to be self-reliable and independent in making decisions regarding one’s own studies also contributes to successful social adjustment.
4. Students’ attitude towards tuition process

The students talk about the tutors’ liberal attitude towards lecture time. In fact, they point at absence of usual studying regulations:

Gosia, Poland: «When someone is chatting on Facebook and someone is on Skype right in the lecture time, for me that was like shock; at our home university the lecturers do not really approve students playing with their mobile phone, eating or leaving the class when they want to...»;

Ella, Poland: «...unusual is that you may use your netbook right in the class or even drink something during the lecture...such things seem common for this university...».

5. Teachers’ Feedback

Julia, Ukraine: «The tutor has his web-page and he uploads to there, for example, the information about the course he taught or the information he gives at lectures. It’s very convenient».

6. Nothing special regarding the German educational rules

Fahim Aziz, Pakistan: «... There was no significant difference between in terms of tuition system as I have the experience of studying within Cambridge system when I was learning the language, and here I don’t feel any distinct difference...»;

Julia, Spain: «As all European countries are being involved in the Bologna educational format, the difference is disappearing...».

Among other factors contributing to the tuition process, the respondents mention equipped classrooms, overall Internet access and the characteristics of scheduling:

Max, Sweden: «The classes start at different day times only; and that is an advantage: in Sweden the classes were scheduled at different days and different day times...».

The respondents also talk about the diversity of subjects compared to that existing in their own countries, and having different classmates in different classes (depending on the course studied):

Ella, Poland: «The difference is that...there is a group which you are a part of, so you see those people and get friends with some of them...but here every day you meet different people, and you do not know them...it’s kind of hard for me...»).

As a special feature of the German education system, the respondents report on its competitiveness in comparison to their native education systems. Most of them mention that this is a prospective professional resource (especially for those specializing in engendering and science).

Positive and developing aspects of academic training are balanced with corresponding difficulties (listed in descending order of importance):

• the university ‘geography’ (hard to find rooms);
• understanding lectures and asking questions (held in foreign language);
• lack of course specializations and subjects presented in native university course at home.

In general, the students named such problematic issues hampering educational process as student residence issues, the problem of choosing one’s own behavior model being involved in studying activities; difficulties of course entry, self-positioning in the new academic environment. But, considering the challenging perspectives of being part of a developed modern country, having the opportunity to receive new knowledge, the respondents do not treat the issues listed as strictly problematic or discomforting.

The students who are not provided with organizational support report of the opportunity to receive help from a specialized program of the «Orientierungswoche», which enables them to get to know the new place and receive corresponding consultations regarding University functioning. Thus, the International Department helps the international students to improve their adaptation skills.

Many respondents, nevertheless, report interest in some additional options/resources that they would like to get access to. These are:

1. Detailed information regarding the course/classes organization;
2. Detailed information regarding the examination process/structure and attestation;
3. Detailed information about the academic credits’ system and their transferability;
4. Assistance with arranging the meeting of students coming to the city alone;
5. Medical care;
6. Assistance in mastering the lecture materials and solving problems of misunderstanding at lectures;
7. Financial support advancement (increasing the amount of scholarship);
8. The opportunity to have a contact person to deal with acute/urgent issues.

According to the results, presented in this module, we can state that the most problematic issue – the academic sphere – goes under the control of the host university. The International Office’s staff, personal tutors, coordinators, and guides offer special protective mechanisms: visitors are provided with professional assistance and help while entering new academic environments. Thus, the intensity of negative experience while adapting to the university is reduced.

Along with Academic difficulties, Language Competence is seen as a great concern. The importance and the role of Language skills in terms of students’ adaptation will be discussed below.

V. Language Proficiency
Foreign language (German) skills are seen by the respondents as a significant source of social and intellectual capital accumulation. ‘Social capital’ means here to make new friends, get new contacts with the foreign community; ‘intellectual capital’ is connected here with language proficiency by the capability to acquire and effectively accumulate the information related to the studying course. It is important to name ‘symbolic capital’ here, because it is an important aspect of understanding the differences between cultures. Thus, foreign language seems to be perceived as the major communication adjustment tool – for both pragmatic, intellectual and leisure use.

The respondents tend to estimate language skills as a supportive, but not the major, adjustment mechanism. They express the following opinion on the language issues considered important for their regular activities in the new culture. More than half of the students tell about the difficulties of first-step communication directly connected with language used. According to the participants, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the knowledge of German language is the most valuable resource – English is accepted as the work/study language for international students. English is the second ‘native’ language for a major part of the respondents and is reported to be of great use in their everyday activities. Thus, German language skills are seen as an additional bonus, but not as a prohibitive mechanism: host language helps international students to interact with social and academic society, but it is not an essential requirement for students.

What is not so crucial, but very important and valuable during the adaptation abroad, is inclusion in the cultural context. It helps to understand and re-estimate personal perception and attitude towards German people, their way of living, traditions, customs and norms. It also helps to construct the whole picture of Germany as a host country for international students.

VI. Culture Issues
Getting involved in a new cultural environment and understanding it depends on the prior knowledge the person possess about it. Interaction as a two-way process is related to the knowledge exchange – in our case, the host and home cultural values exchange. It is seen by the respondents as an irreplaceable part of socio-cultural adaptation process.

Regarding preparation to their trip to Germany, the students talk about the following ways of obtaining corresponding information about the country and the culture:
• Studying German culture (N=11):
  Sandra, Poland: «My knowledge is quite deep as I studied that all at the university...»
• Getting superficial knowledge of new culture (N=1/3):
  Antonio, Spain: «I watched some films about Germany but I possess no deeper information regarding its culture or something...»
• Having no knowledge about new culture (N=2).

When talking about the German cultural and community everyday life, the respondents tend to mention its following features (in order of frequency):
1. ‘Beverage’ culture:
  W. Cheng, China: «They often drink beer; and it’s unusual for us, but it’s a part of their culture and I respect its features...»;
2. Appearance/clothing:

Erna, Russia: «...I was impressed by young peoples’ appearances...they have lots of piercings and tattoos... If that kind of person would live in Russia, he would be the object of overall attention... but here it’s usual, it seems to be a common thing...»;

Tyaniu, China: «Germans have many piercings and tattoos. In China it’s not popular. But I treat it normally. It’s the freedom to choose. But what is more important is their inner content. They are quite responsive although their external look is strange...»;

Maria, Russia: «... I had an impression that girls are careless about their appearance...».

3. Customs and traditions:

Djoi Chung, China: «... I know that here they have special festivals...»;

Tyaniu, China: «... Here as in any other culture they have their own celebrations and holidays. Christmas, for instance. Something I know from the Internet or read about...»;

Max, Sweden: «I live in Sweden and we use to talk about Germany as we are neighbors. And Germany has many things in common with our and Dutch culture as well».

It might be concluded that the respondents perceive the new culture in terms of their own culture being compared to the first one. This comparison relates to such dimensions as:

Way of living: half of the respondents draw their attention to the differences in everyday life and that usual for their native culture. These opinions are subjective but not stereotyped. The respondents comment German way of living in terms of:

• leisure:
  Maria, Russia: «Much is said about Russia, that there are drunkards and idlers – I think those are prejudices... Here I can hear it’s also noisy...»;

• life style:
  Fahim Aziz, Pakistan: «I also think of their lifestyle as not healthy enough... Food I mean... But the thing I like is that they seem to be fond of sports...»;

• rhythm of life:
  Chao, China: «Our rhythm of life in China seems to be much faster and hectic than I see it is here; the German people seem to live very slow, unhurried...»;

• stability:
  Erna, Russia: «in Germany I feel stable...; there are lots of privileged options and they are neat...»;

• events:
  Antonio, Spain: «In Spain we often make parties or just have fun...her people are more reserved, calm...»;
  Fiona, Ireland: «German people do not go out at night and it’s strange for me...».

Meal quality: the respondents see ‘food culture’ as an important part of everyday lifestyle of German people:

Julia, Spain: «Food here is different, it’s not very healthy...»;

Chao, China: «For Chinese people it’s really unhealthy food... When we invited our tutor in the students residence and made out traditional dinner – vegetables and light meat... He said it was wonderful...»;

Gosia, Poland: «Indeed I don’t really like German food...».

1. ‘National’ mentality: the respondents tend to compare their own and German mentality to reveal differences in their personality traits or the whole society character. They talk about the following points:

• Spontaneity in action:
  Ella, Poland: «The difference was... In Poland you... will be just said about that someone is ready to help you... He just come and do... Here it’s not like that... Nobody seems ready to help you by his initiative... Too many reserved feelings, conventional phrases... without valuable content... as it seems to me...»);

• Responsiveness:
  Gosia, Poland: «German people, they are friendly, but in the street when you ask the way, they more often would say ‘Sorry’... In Poland you will never be refused in help... Polish people would probably take your hand and accompany you where you need to go. Even when they are busy... German people are more serious, they seem to value their time and it seems they meet only on business occasions...»;
Crosscultural and Academic Adaptation of the Students Abroad...

Daniela, Mexico: «Religion is very important for us, although I’m agnostic. Here I feel more comfortable as here I see more people opened to all new things and they are ready to know something different about other religions…».

Also, the respondents talk about subjects related to German culture such as attitude towards money; language peculiarities; friendliness; the working hours of institutions; their attitude towards social media and the Internet.

In general, the students’ answers were quite independent of stereotypes, based on their personal experience. They often use analogy, comparing their own cultural aspects with those existing in Germany:

Fiona, Ireland: «The Germans are more open-minded and ready to try something new than people in Ireland; and here I felt myself uncomfortable a bit… As I saw that the common stereotype regarding the Germans – that they are extremely serious – is not verified in practice…».

Those students representing East cultures report feeling more vulnerable in terms of the difference between their values and worldview and European ones. For them it is more important to successfully adapt to German reality and culture; but the same time they feel that the process is quite a risky and uncertain ‘enterprise’;

Chao, China: «… I would like to stay here to live and I think it’s very important… if I won’t understand German culture the process won’t be successful…».

The respondents agree that when trying to adjust to a new culture and social life in other country, Germany in our case, the lack of one’s own culture perception and rejecting the new cultural patterns becomes serious a obstacle on the way of successful adaptation. They report of the importance of understanding cultural life as a strategy for adaptation at its first stage.

2. Communication and feelings’ expression

The body language when meeting people:

Max, Sweden: «In Germany people are more spontaneous and free in their emotional and body language… For example, they hug when meeting each other… In Sweden it is considered a part of one’s private life… There those must be people who know each other very well…»;

Daniela, Mexico: «When you meet a German person, you reach out your hand and keep distance… In Mexico you will see people hugging and kissing when they meet. And always smiling…»;

Informal greeting patterns:

Katarjina, Poland: «When you meet someone in the office or in the corridor even if it is an official person, here you would hear ‘Hi’. Very informal. In Poland we address such a person in a more official way to show we are polite… Here it’s more personal…»;

3. The sense of humor:

Lena, Russia: «Sometimes I do not understand their sense of humor, their jokes… sometimes it looks like they are at school…»;

Katarjina, Poland: «In Poland people like telling funny stories, in Germany they seem not to do it so much… They are more earnest…»;

4. Religion issues:

Sheun, Ireland: «Germany seems to have more religious culture than our country…»;
Conclusion
In conclusion of this article I would like to give an answer to the main question, raised in the very beginning: what are the most problematic spheres on the first stage of international students’ adaptation are concerned academic field and language proficiency? It is significant to underline that no crucial problems and difficulties were met by visitors while the supportive mechanisms were established. Host culture and community support are the crucial adjustment factors enabling international students to feel confident and successful (namely, the support received from the university and its members and agencies/departments). Primary groups and close surroundings are reported to be the main sources of emotional support, as well as new contacts for international students. The support from classmates in similar positions is also extremely important, as is the experience available from those who already went through all those difficulties of adjustment.

Social environment is the key factor of first-stage adaptation for all of the respondents. The differences are made by the identity types being formulated by the respondents: East culture representatives tend to express more ‘group’ identity than ‘individual’ identity which is specific mainly for European students worldview.

The difficulties of formal environment adjustments are felt more acutely than those connected with informal communication and everyday life, especially for representatives of Eastern cultures and those students who came to Germany independent of any program. The latter report than belonging to a group of compatriots is the factor that enhances adaptation and improves the sense of comfort and group-reliability.

Academic adjustment is confusing for the international students in terms of organizational and normative rules. The main problem for most respondents is said to be the opportunity to choose courses and manage one’s own timings. Many of them talk rather about challenging, developing character of those new practices than about their difficult and problematic aspects.

Language proficiency issues were reported as problematic in terms of personal and objective situations. The importance of being open in communication with new people is both desired and difficult in psychological and social way. The lack of language skills is the main problem for newcomers when adjusting to their new communication space. English is reported to be the commonly used language for all the students (even those who have some skills in German).

The respondents report the ‘normative’ nature of their difficulties in general. They tend to always compare their own and new cultures, saying that unusual standards of living and thinking are not a problem but a personality developing tool. These issues become quite significant for non-Europeans (from Russia, Asia, Near East) as they more often face misunderstanding and are confused by new cultural and social standards of living.

Thus, being a part of academic, social and cultural life means getting involved in new practices of living. It is significant for the representatives of other cultures to get new knowledge if they are not involved directly in new social backgrounds.

In conclusion, it is essential to mention that the difficulties foreign students face are seen as an inevitable and significant attribute of adaptation. The degree of concern regarding adaptation difficulties overcoming depends mainly on the availability of social nets and students’ motivation. Thus, it is valuable to improve and develop the skills for establishing social nets. Newcomers are invited to become involved in a new environment, but they don’t necessarily possess the skills of an effective actor abroad. In this concern the assistance from the International Office is seen as a very helpful mechanism in overcoming the adaptation consequences. Social, cultural and academic involvement into new environment is a contemporary process that is regulated by supplementary factors, produced by foreign students and their surroundings.
Appendix:

Table 1. The sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Friya</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Fiona</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Angel</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Antonio</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sheun</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Max</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ella</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hector</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Julia</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Jano</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Sandra</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Katarjina</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Gosia</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Tyaniu</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Chao</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. W.Cheng</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Djoii</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Rahun</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Fahim</td>
<td>Near East</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Omar</td>
<td>Near East</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Daniela</td>
<td>South America</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Erna</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Maria</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Karina</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Elena</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Kristina</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Julia</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Respondents’ Specialization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specialization</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Electronic/computer engineering</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Foreign languages</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Science</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Humanities</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Studying of the German language and German culture</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents’ German language level varies from non-existent to fluent. All the data is based upon respondents’ subjective opinions and formal scores of language certificates.

Table 3. The Level of German Language among Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>German level</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A2-B1</th>
<th>B1</th>
<th>B1-B2</th>
<th>B2</th>
<th>B2-C1</th>
<th>C1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N of participants</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. The Program Where the Participants Are Studying.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The program/scholarship</th>
<th>Number of participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Erasmus</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual diploma program (within the student exchange collaboration between two countries)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Au-pair</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Voluntary civil service in Germany’ joint program</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Came for studying independently</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Linguistic and Cross-Cultural Specific Character of Comic (Case of German Writer-Migrants Works)

Marina Sitova

Some History
The inquiry of the comic’s nature is a pointed question, which has not left people unmolested for thousands of years. Regrettably scholars have delved into the entity of humor and laughter without quite solving the mystery of it, more exactly they have not reached a compromise to create the general rules and methods for the investigation of the comic.¹ Thinking about the comic in the scientific aspect turns back to the times of ancient Greece. Plato and Aristotle turned particular attention to a social value of laughter and regarded the comic as a negative phenomenon. Ancient Greek clear thinkers pointed out specially the importance of public ridiculous behavior’s avoidance, because it was based on “mismatch of pleasure and pain”.² Roman thinkers (Cicero, Quintilianus) devised methods of rhetoric and vice versa noticed a positive role of the comic in the communicative discourse.³ Since that time there is an opinion that challenge of the comic’s usage in personal contact and cross-cultural communication can be realized as double-sided – in a positive and a negative direction.

Until now, there is no one leading theory, which would dominate the academic discourse about the studies of the comic. There were a lot of significant, but to date, scattered comments relating to essence of the comic phenomenon created in the academic dialogue of scholars,

¹ Under “the comic” I understand in this article „natural (i.e. irrespective of somebody’s intention) events, objects, relations built between them as well as a specific kind of creativity, which is oriented on the conscious construction of certain system of phenomena and ideas, as well as the system of words in order to provoke the effects of the “comic”. See more: Dzemidok B. O komicheskom [About the Comic], M.: Progress, 1974, p.7.
on which theories of recent time are based. The scholars of comic worldwide use as basis such recognized authoritative comic theories as the theory of superiority by Resnais Descartes, Benedict Spinoza, Thomas Gobbs and Fridrich Nitzsche, and the theory of contradiction by Georg Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer and Anry Bergson or the theory of relaxation by Immanuyl Kant and Sigmund Freud. However, these theorists of comic did not work out communicative interaction and rules of the humor usage. The settings of the comic in real life were rarely studied by apposite comic research. This situation began to change with the advent of technology for the collection and careful study of genuine interactional data and due to advances in linguistic pragmatics and sociolinguistics.

Humor as a Specific Metacommunicative Process
In his recent research, Rod A. Martin investigated how different types of the comic used during arguments influence relationship satisfaction and conflict resolution. According to his study, there are four styles of the comic, two of which are considered healthy or positive (affiliative and self-enhancing) and two that are considered unhealthy or negative (aggressive and self-defeating). Thus, on the one hand, the comic contains potential difference of facilitatory effect, which can be used to clear the intense air, especially in cross-cultural dialog. No doubt, the humor in various guises is a prevalent feature in many forms of international communication. For humor to be well received, the person should understand his audience. It plays a significant role in the humorous communication between different cultures. On the other hand, there is a theoretical frequency including such possible cases, where through the comic somebody’s friend or colleague can unconsciously take the chair of scoffer and thereby wound somebody’s pride. According to a 2009 study conducted by Washington State University, failed humor has an even more negative effect amongst acquaintances. When humor is not well received in the midst of an already contentious situation, it may only worsen the conflict. This potential danger to make oneself to a laughing-stock can ruin reputation and spoil the multilateral talks (e.g. truce talks, cease-fire talks, summit talks). The cause of such misunderstanding is script’s mistake, precisely meta-communicative confusion between inference and perceptible sense of message.

According to a widely-used definition, meta-communication is communication about aspects of the ongoing communication. In this context, the comic in general can be understood as a production/reception process with a necessary meta-communicative component. For the sender of comic message, the means of humor can be explicitly announcing a joke and giving explicit information on some aspects of the ongoing discourse, or constructing the communication in such a way that the recipient’s attention is necessarily drawn to some aspect of the communicative process, without which the means of the comic would not deliver. From this Alexander Brock’s point of view it is clear, that the potential resources of the comic as an assistance in the search for the ways of overcoming cross-cultural conflicts is not easy to use though the instrumentality of humor.

For successful interaction processes it is important to realize, that a successful joke can “discharge tense relationships and promote mutual understanding between people” through deep understanding on the meta-communicative level. Therefore, in the usage of comic in free cross-cultural dialogue it is important to possess language of communication and cultural knowledge. It is necessary to extract those receptions, means, and themes, which possess linguistic and cross-cultural specificity, in other words which are equally comical for representatives of all nationalities.

Owing to the fact that an essential model of the comic is an antinomous set of meanings, senses, and forms, more up-to-date scholars are interested in this theme; moreover, it allows to consider the essence of the comic in the framework of different approaches. Therefore, in the last decades the systematic studies of the comic-effects phenomenon was significantly changed. At present it reflects


2 In this article I use the term “humor” as a close synonym of “the comic”.


the great number of new directions in the comic discourse, which are formed by philologists (e.g. Alexander Brock, Helga Kotthoff), biologists (e.g. Michael Owren), culture experts (e.g. Mihail Bachtin, Vladimir Propp), cognitive studies scholars (e.g. Viktor Raskin, Girdrildne Kuipers), semiotics (e.g. Umberto Eco), aesthetics (e.g. Maria Rjumina, Neal R. Norrick) etc. In consideration of diverse disciplines (literary school, historical science, semiotics, cognitive anthropology etc.) there are more probabilistic elements to find the profitable “perfect model” of usage of the comic in communication. My study serves this purpose too and is an attempt in a slightly new direction, namely the linguistic study of cross-cultural humor. I suggest a hypothesis, that some means of the comic has linguistic and cross-cultural specificity, and other means of humor don’t have it and should be avoided at dialogue between different cultures. Under linguistic and cross-cultural specificity of means of humor, I understand the presence of the same means of humor both in accepting and native cultures.

1 On-stream I summarized obtainable scientific material about classifications of means of comic in Russian and German languages over the past few years. In general all language experts (Elisa Riesel, Evgenia Shendels, Rita Zalsman, Margarita Brandes, Wolfgang Freischer, Georg Michel, Nina Naer etc.) distinguish the same means of humor, but they streamline it in different ways. For example, Riesel and Shendels mark out comic categories of play on words (double meaning, pun), syllepsis (oxymoron, zeugma, clause with jerk, incorrect bonding) and style’s discordance (stylebreaking, discrepancy between form and substance). And Naer marks out separately double meaning, play on words, paronomasia, contamination, incorrect bonding, irony and category of contradiction figure (oxymoron, stylebreaking, zeugma). I have studied this linguistic material and reflected that different principles underlie each classification of means of humor and satire – lexical, morphological, and communicative. On the ground of these I develop some new classification for means of humor. I divided means of humor and satire into different levels: phonetic, lexical, morphological, stylistic and syntactic. To my mind, this clas-

sification is substantial and optimal for research of writer-migrant’s works, because it can form a communicative and result-oriented model for usage in cross-cultural introduction.

German Writer-Migrants Works under Study

Germany today is a multicultural society and is open to new influences and transformations through migration. According to the official sources of the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) 15.6 million of Germans from the total population of 82.1 million have a migrant background. Moreover, it is clear from the data that the increase recorded was due to two trends: the population with a migrant background rose by 155,000 as a result of immigration and birth figures. At the same time, the population without a migration background fell by 277,000 to 66.6 million. Such constitutive internationality of the German population is the reason for a collection of cross-cultural conflicts. After all, different cultures have different standpoints to different issues such as historical development, way of life, religion, benefits of culture as well as a different set of traditions and moral values. If cultural communities want to find the compromise, it is necessary to impart practical skills to listening and hearing each other. To understand basic rules of comic usage in cross-cultural communication, I study some works of the writer-migrants known in Germany for their humorous short-stories in the German language. Under the concept “writer-migrant” I consider modern writers who write in German, but simultaneously are supporters of other culture, in which they are born. These authors live “between languages” and use in their short stories national features of at least two cultures – German and the native ones. Undoubtedly the usage of writers-migrant’s positive experience in the dialogue of cultures becomes possible only after the careful stylistic analysis of these works.

1 URL: https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Migrationshintergrund/Migrationshintergrund.html.
3 Lebedushkina O. Na peresechenii kontaktov [On the Point of Contact’s Intersection], in: Druzhba narodov [Friendship Among the Peoples], 5, 2008, p.78-82.
For works of writer-migrants some typical thematic features of writer-migrant’s literature are:
- autobiographical character;
- place of creation – Germany;
- bicultural design.1

All writer-migrants under study choose the genre of the humorous short story. These works contain a lot of realities of their native cultures and autobiographical details. The accent of authors which one can hear in audio-versions of their short stories and on public readings is not only acoustic, but also graphic. One can distinctly see that in construction of clauses, lexical phrases and transposition of phrases. Such exotic is well perceived by Germans, who are motivated to learn more about cultures which live in the same country, and read stories of writers-migrants as the informative textbook on intercultural communications. Moreover, these “not German” features of short stories, differentiate in contrast to classical and modern German literary works which involve the native German reader.2

Results of the Linguistic Analysis of the Writer-Migrants’ Works

Three authors were chosen for this study: a Syrian-German author, storyteller and critic Rafik Schami, a Russian-born German short story writer, columnist, and disc jockey of Jewish origin Vladimir Kaminer, and Sasha Stanišić, who was born in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were chosen both because they are successful writers-migrants which enjoy wide popularity in Germany3 and because, they write exclusively in the German language. These facts give the grounds to believe that writer-migrants reached a coincident point between different cultural perceptions – German-Turkish, German-Serbian or German-Russian, and it’s never too late to become a mediator between two cultures, a person in any age can get such role.

Under the analysis the following works were: “Erzähler der Nacht” by Schami “Wie der Soldat das Grammofon reparierte” by Stanišić, and “Ich bin kein Berliner”, “Mein leben im Schrebergarten”, “Mein erstes Dschungelbuch”, “Ich mache mir keine Sorgen, Mama” by Kaminer. During the analysis I put quantitative method into practice and marked all linguistic means in the texts with help of my own classifications. Due to the stylistic analysis I defined the main means of humor and satire used by the writers-migrants under study. For Kaminer it is an irony, for Stanišić – an ironical simile, and Schami uses hyperbola very often.

**Figure 1. Proportion of Means of Comic in Works of Writer-Migrants Under Study**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Writer-Migrant</th>
<th>Leading Means of Comic</th>
<th>Frequency of Usage/Percentage</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rafik Schami</td>
<td>Hyperbola</td>
<td>39/21%</td>
<td>“…obwohl du Geschichte 300mal erzählt hast”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir Kaminer</td>
<td>Irony</td>
<td>43/ 27%</td>
<td>“Ich wusste aus Erfahrung: Wenn meine Frau etwas im Kopf gesetzt hat, wurde das früher oder später Realität”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saša Stanišić</td>
<td>Ironical simile</td>
<td>18/ 15%</td>
<td>“…die Österreicherinnen gucken alle wie Bruce Lee”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are some general tendencies in the new applications for certain means of the comic. By the use of statistical method I have identified that the writer-migrants most often use in their short stories means of humor and satire of lexical language level such as *ironical simile, irony, metaphor and choice of words*. Second-widespread are means of humor and satire of stylistic level such as *hyperbola, zeugma, and play on words*. Most often writers use morphological means, or more exactly *equivocate*. 

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3 See in Spiegel.de: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-78413843.html; http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,346346,00.html; http://www.spiegel.de/unspiegel/wunderbar/0,1518,439916,00.html.
Thus, it is possible to come to a conclusion that Shami, Stanishich and Kaminer adapt realities of their native countries for Germans and, thanks to a thin language guess, select exact words for transfer of color and features of their culture to the reader through short stories, and do it in the most difficult form – by means of humor. Authors understand that at the given stage such creativity is a unique possibility to pull together eastern and the western worlds. They take an intermediary role between cultures which is especially needed today for mutual understanding. The meta-communication focuses here on likely and unlikely patterns of word-formation, which depends on language levels. No doubt, the intention of comic and predilection among some writer-migrants for creating new comic expression will not be difficult to detect. With that, not only the static forms of words are the subject of meta-communication, but also word-formation processes and their sociolinguistic. Therefore the studying of receptions of cross-cultural means of comic in writer-migrants short stories, disclosing of secrets of their art bilingualism, and studying of humor’s features in different cultures have a considerable potential for future studies.

It is also necessary to notice that some means of comic from phonetic level of language make only 2%. Writer-migrants avoid the using of such means as a rhyme, phonetic play on words, a paronomasia, variations of accent, and alliteration. These means provoke misunderstanding and a rejection of these works in the German-speaking world of literature. Balancing between cultures, writer-migrants refuse completely the using of means of humor and satire, which can be understandable by native speakers only. These are the means demanding background knowledge (from literature, cinema) such as a parody, caricature, paradox and the means based on the use of set expressions, phrase logical word combination such as reconstruction and demotivating of phraseological phrases.

According to success of writers, it is possible to conclude that Germans understand exactly these means of comic. Thus, on the one hand, the means, used in short stories of writers-migrants under study are close and understandable for German native speakers. On the other hand, using these means of humor, writer-migrants don’t lose their cultural identity, short stories representative of other culture inform about the “typical” for their cultures. This fact allows us to assert that these means of humor possess linguistic and cross-cultural specificity.
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