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Migration from Post-Soviet Russia to Germany and the UK:
Immigration and Integration Patterns on the Pages of Russian-Language Press in London and Berlin
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1. Introduction

Nobody can deny the intensified presence of international migration in the modern world. In European political and public discourse immigration issues are often linked with negative apprehensions and appeals to restrictive measures. However, the phenomenon of migration, as various studies show, is only a consequence of a set of factors, such as stimulation of cheap labour inflows by European countries during the 20th century, as well as historical links between receiving and sending countries. Apart from pressures created by the unevenness of economic development, post-industrial societies present other stimuli for migration, such as development of communication and transport infrastructures, growing awareness of ‘other worlds and peoples’, intensified economic and labour linkages. As Richmond summarizes it:

Easy and cheap transportation, together with an awakening consciousness of economic opportunities elsewhere, and the possibility of escape from oppressive political regimes, resulted in large scale movements of population. Personal and mass communication networks promoted aspirations to migrate. At the same time telephones and jet aircraft provided the means by which people maintained close ties with family and friends, as well as awareness of changing economic, political and social conditions in their former country and in other places. Consequently, high rates of re-migration and return were typical of post-industrial societies¹.

Despite a firm scientific belief in the fact that ‘no country, whether surrounded by water or not, can function as an island in the modern world’², and notwithstanding the evidence that migration can be a positive factor of economic growth, European states try to insulate themselves from migrants and are concerned with further restricting their immigration policies. Numerous steps are made towards a common European immigration policy which, using the media discourse, would protect ‘Fortress Europe’ from ‘barbarians at the gate’. While convergence of different immigration policies remains a project to be realized, immigration continuously remains the issue of highest priority on political agendas of European nation-states. The topicality of this phenomenon for contemporary world is also reflected in the flourishing studies devoted to migration, where scientists try to trace the geographical destination of migration flows,

² Ibid., p.8.
causes and factors of migration, explore nation-states’ capacities for its regulation and methods of integration of settled migrants inside the receiving societies.

This study will constitute an attempt to add pieces of knowledge to existing research on East-West migration, and more precisely, on out-migration from post-Soviet space. Geographically, such movement of migration has been defined as East-West in opposition to South-North. These were the two main migration directions with which Europe has had to cope during the 20th century. The South-North drew much attention from the Western European countries due to its inevitable connection (due to geographical position of sending areas) with issues of racial and religious differences. East-West migration has been no less dominant through this period, in numeric estimations as well as in historical and political importance. It is East-West migration that prevailed before the 1950s and constituted the crux of displacements of the immediate after-war years. And it was East-West migration again that began to dominate the European arena of migratory movements in the 1980s, being the result of political and social transformation in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.

Migrants who will constitute the focus of this research belong exactly to the population which was touched by these transformations in the end of the 1980s and used structural and economic opportunities which opened at that time for migration to Western Europe. More precisely, the object of the study will be people who in the course of the late 1980s and the 1990s of the 20th century migrated from the former Soviet Union and Russia to Western European countries, particularly to the UK and Germany. Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya define this migration flow as the ‘fourth wave’ of Russian migrants. Collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of ‘Iron Curtain’ marked the end of restrictions on immigration for normal Soviet citizens, and led to the realization of a wish to migrate to the West for many of them. Starting then and moving on into the 1990s, people from the former Soviet space began to constitute a large percentage in the East-West migration movement. Migrants had different motivations for migration and used different strategies for it. However, specific channels of migration, linked with opportunities offered for special groups of migrants, gained increasing importance. Among the pool of potential receiving countries, the three which offered structural possibilities of immigration for certain groups of citizens, defined by their ethnic origin,
were the USA, Israel and Germany. Besides these developed channels of 'ethnic migration', a move of academics and professional elites toward the West also marked the post-Soviet period. Russians also came on temporary work contracts in low-skilled sector jobs, intensified their presence as in specialized spheres and business, or came as students. One shouldn’t forget also about ‘tourists’ who overstayed their visas and joined the pool of illegal migrants offering their services on ‘black’ labour markets. During the last decade patterns of migration, as well as counties of destination have diversified, and numbers of Russian migrants living abroad have also increased. It is difficult to think of a European country nowadays where no Russian migrants can be found\textsuperscript{4}.

Germany and the UK can be picked out as two contrasting cases. In the first case, the country hosts about 5 million Russians, who, although sharing a common native language and place of birth, have, in the majority of cases, either been granted German citizenship (Russian Germans, called in Germany \textit{Aussiedler} or \textit{Spätaussiedler}) or have been given asylum as quota refugees (Russian Jews). Additionally, ‘normal citizens’ (Darieva, 2004), that is ethnic Russians without certain privileges, entered Germany after the collapse of the USSR just in search for new experiences and better life. Other groups of Russians to be found in Germany are students, professionals on contracts, businessmen, and asylum seekers.

In the case of the UK there have not been any inducements or structural opportunities from the receiving country for Russians to enter. However, in the course of the last years it has suddenly developed into the country where Russians make themselves heard and receive coverage from the mainstream mass-media. This attention reflects the fact that numbers of Russian-speaking people are increasing in the UK, and the causes for this process seem worth definition. In this case there has not existed any particular prevailing strategy of migration. Consequently, migration patterns are diversified, reflecting individual initiatives rather than a group movement.

On the other hand, common logic could tell us that Russians in both cases might have much in common. The periodic frame of their migration, which is from the late 1980s till the present, overlaps. They have a shared cultural past, and seem to have made a similar decision of moving west. Moreover, both communities have launched Russian-language press catering for interests of Russian-speaking persons in the two countries.

\textsuperscript{4} For evidence, one could refer to a portal \url{www.russiaeurope.com}. 
Presentation and rationale of research

In this respect it would be very interesting and academically beneficial to do a comparative research on, firstly, respective patterns of immigration to Germany and the UK used by people from Russia, and, secondly, specific trends of migrants’ integration and self-identification in the two countries. It is important to stress here that ‘Russianness’ would be defined by previous country of settlement and by socio-cultural characteristics, such as language, shared past, mentality, cultural myths. Many people coming from Russia have either received citizenship upon their arrival, as was the case with ethnic Germans, or naturalized after a long period of residence (both in Germany and the UK). However, despite changes in legal status that migrants might have gone through, they still share this common cultural ‘Russianness’, at least in the language they speak and in the fact that they came from the FSU or its successor states.

Main research question:

What are the main trends of immigration and integration of migrants from Russia in the UK and Germany and what factors account for their difference or similarity?

Object of study

The immigration and integration practices of migrants with a Russian cultural background in the UK and Germany will become the object of this study. Different spheres of integration will be differentiated within an object of this study, such as economic, social, cultural and identificational integration of Russian migrants in receiving Western societies.

Subject of study

Russian-language press: Londonsky courier and London-Info for the UK and Russkaja Germanija/Russkij Berlin, Evreyskaya Gazeta and Partner for Germany. They would serve as sources of information about immigration patterns and integration issues of Russian migrants in the UK and Germany, and about identity discourse they use in their self-representation.

Objectives of research:

1. Examination of general trends in East-West migration and in emigration from Russian and the CIS in the 1990s, linking the present situation with migration realities which had developed in the course of the 20th century.
2. Identification of strategies and patterns of migration used by people with Russian cultural background on their move to the UK and Germany, and establish the extent of their linkage with structural opportunities presented by the immigration policies of the two countries.

3. Analysis of chosen articles in the Russian-language press in the UK and Germany for the purpose of tracing realities of immigration at their present stage, and of identifying ways and means of social, cultural and identificational integration of Russian migrants in their host countries through their representation in media.


Basic categories

We will understand under the term *migration* all patterns of mobility of Russian citizens which have led to their stay in the West. Under *temporary migration* those cases of movement will be considered which have led or are expected to lead to a migrant’s consequent return to Russia after a visa or work permit’s expiry date. The term *permanent migration* will be applied here to all types of movement which have led to a migrant’s permanent stay in the country and his obtaining an immigrant status.

The term *migrant* will be used to for people who have moved to the UK or Germany for purposes other than tourism. The term *immigrant* will be used to describe people who either have German or British citizenship or have applied for it and may soon receive it. Therefore, the first term will be more general and all-inclusive, while the second would indicate a special category of migrants who have either changed or are in the process of changing their citizenship.

Under *migration strategy, or migration pathway* we would understand the way through which an individual or a group of migrants with specific characteristics succeeds in moving to Germany or the UK.

*Integration*, a notion which comprises many aspects of successful interaction in a new society, would be used both in social and cultural contexts. Firstly, *integration* is the degree of successful and stable infusion into the Western system of social stratification. *Integration* as a cultural aspect, indicating the degree of adapting cultural practices of a new society, such as language, life style, norms and rules of behaviour would be analyzed in a specific part of the study dedicated to cultural challenges of migration.
Concepts of *identity*, *self-perception* and *image of self* will be used at the last stage of research. *Identity* will be interpreted as a way of constructing a group image through references to ‘significant Other’ and defining boundaries between *us* and *them*.

**Main theoretical approaches**

In the theoretical part of the work, theoretical approaches of structuralism and institutionalism will be used in order to reflect the dependence of existing immigration regulations of Germany and the UK and existing migration patterns used by Russian migrants in their movement there. Migration from the former Soviet Union and Russia will be presented both as the effect of push and pull factors, (thus stressing the prevalence of rational choices made by individuals), but also as a phenomenon influenced by the development of structural links between the UK and Germany, on one side, and specific groups of Russian citizens who are given incentives to migrate, on another side.

In the empirical part of the study, multi-variate approach to integration suggested by Anthony Richmond\(^5\) as a way of taking into consideration the complexity of issues and stages that constitute the integration process of a today’s migrant. Constructionist theory and discourse analysis will be used in the second part of the empirical research. These theoretical approaches will be applied to the analysis of identity discourses construction in Russian-language media and to the examination of perception of Russians by mainstream media in the UK and Germany.

**Hypotheses and expected results**

This empirical research will allow us to make conclusions about the specific characteristics of integration of Russian migrants in the UK and Germany, applying the multi-variate approach to integration which distinguishes numerous aspects or stages in integration process and various factors influencing the success or trajectory of integration process. The research will also allow us to make links between existing structural opportunities of Russian migration to the UK and Germany and specific characteristics of integration experienced by migrants in the two countries respectively.

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The examination of identity discourses construction in Russian-language media will allow us to understand the functioning of such media in the process of identity formation and group identity realization by Russian migrants.

**Hypothesis 1.** Differences in the immigration policies of Germany and the UK, by presenting different structural opportunities for Russian people to migrate, are the major factors causing differences in immigration pathways and highly divergent patterns of integration of migrants and different structures of Russian communities. Such patterns, if found, allow conclusions to be drawn about the prevalence of nation-specific pathways of migration and integration.

**Hypothesis 2.** Different structural opportunities of migration don’t have a strong impact on further stages of integration of migrants from Russia. Differences in their social and cultural integration are defined mainly by their financial and social capital, as well as by individual decisions taken at further stages.

**Methodology of the research**

In the empirical part of the work the main sources of information are articles from the Russian-language press. Out of the range of methods of media analysis two methods were chosen as the most appropriate for this study. Firstly, *frame analysis* allowed the researcher to distinguish the main themes appearing in the Russian-language press with regard to immigration and integration spheres. Recurrent issues were picked out and analyzed with the objective to define main tendencies in immigration and integration of Russians in the two studied countries. Special attention was given to a possibility of subjectivity in highlighting certain issues in the studies spheres. Secondly, *discourse analysis* comes about as an effective tool of analyzing how certain images, attitudes and standpoints are presented on the pages of the studied newspaper. This method, with its focus on the aspect of constructiveness of social phenomena, has allowed us to examine how certain problematic issues are presented in Russian-language press. This method has also been used for analysis of identity discourses in the newspapers, as it allowed objective demarcation of reality and constructed group images.
Overview of the literature

The number of studies which have been made on migration from the former Soviet Union and Russia to abroad in general and to Western European countries in particular is quite limited. Most of the existing studies present overviews of general patterns and migration potential of citizens of CIS countries and Russia in the late 1990s and in the present time. The majority of such articles are written by Russian scholars. One of the most prominent specialists in the field is Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, and she is the author of a range of articles on tendencies of migration in Russia and the CIS. Additionally, other sociologists, such as Codagnone\(^6\), Kitova and Kuznetsova\(^7\), Krassinets and Tiuriukanova\(^8\), have focused on specific trends in emigration from the former Soviet Union and Russia.

Ethnic-related migration from the former Soviet Union has received, however, particular attention from the part of the researchers, especially in Germany and Russia. The recent work on Russian Germans \textit{Zuhause fremd}\(^9\) analyzes various aspects of ethnic migrants’ identity. Other interesting work in this sphere is the book \textit{Soviet Jewish Americans}\(^10\) which gives useful insights on reception of Soviet Jewish migrants of the last waves in the West.

Other destinations in Western Europe, apart from the USA, Germany and Israel, for emigration of Russians, have not been sufficiently considered by modern researchers. The only large research in this field, published in 2005, is the work \textit{East to West migration: Russians in London and Amsterdam} by Helen Kopnina\(^11\). It has served as the second blueprint to this research, as it describes in detail peculiarities of integration of individual Russians in the UK and the Netherlands.

The study of mediascapes in connection with migration from Russia and the FSU is also a new direction of research taken by far only by a few scientists. For instance,

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Pfetsch\textsuperscript{12} invokes the use of media, both ethnic and mainstream, by Russian Germans in order to get insight on their identities in Germany. Also, Elias\textsuperscript{13} analyses the role of mass media in social and cultural integration of migrants from the Soviet Union to Germany and Israel. Another excellent, up-to-date research is \textit{Russkij Berlin: Migranten und Medien in London und Berlin} by Tsypylma Darieva\textsuperscript{14}, which in many respects have helped the author in defining the directions of work.

\textbf{Originality of the work}

In this context the present work will gain a new insight on new migration from the post-Soviet space, by placing it in two contexts: that of East-West and, more specifically, emigration from the FSU and Russia. Secondly, it will present an original comparison of two migration situations in the two countries which could be considered as dramatically different cases, as far as migration opportunities, migration histories and number of migrants is concerned. For this purpose it will present up-to-date analysis of coverage of immigration and integration issues on the pages of Russian-language press in Germany and the UK. The final aim of the theoretical and practical analysis will be to collect evidence which will allow the support or rejection of hypotheses about the factors of similarities or differences between the two studied migration situations.

\textsuperscript{12} Pfetsch Barbara (1999) “In Russia we are Germans, and now we are Russians” – Dilemmas of Identity Formation and Communication among German-Russian Aussiedler. – Science Centre Berlin for Social Research, Working paper FS III 99-103.

\textsuperscript{13} Elias, Nelly (2003). – From the former Soviet Union to Israel and Germany: The roles of mass media in the social and cultural integration of immigrants. - The Department of Communication, Tel-Aviv University.

2. Part I. Migration from Soviet Union and Russia in the framework of East-West migration.

2.1. East-West migration: main tendencies during the course of the 20th century

2.1.1. Two directions of migration in Europe. Main trends in East-West migration

In the classic literature on immigration in the 20th century two flows of migration, according to their geographical distribution, are usually distinguished: South-North and East-West. Indeed, this dual division also corresponds to polarization of the world along similar lines, which is usually stressed by the supporters of modernization theory. Similar divisions are highlighted in Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*\(^\text{15}\). While division between East and West was prevailing during the Cold War era, the polarization between South and North is considered by Huntington as a tendency of modern times. Indeed, it would seem that migration from the South was the first tendency of modernity with which developed European states had to cope during the 20th century. It was closely related to the colonial legacy of such European countries as Britain, France, Netherlands, and Portugal, and was directly linked with issues of racial, cultural and religious diversity. Migrants were coming from Africa and Asia, and brought new religions and cultures which were perceived with different degrees of hostility from the European side, seen as absolutely incompatible at one extreme, and just different, but tolerable, on the other. The model of the *melting pot*, much cherished by American scientists of Chicago school, which presumed the inevitability of assimilation of migrants into the receiving culture, seemed not to work in Europe, at least with migrants who had come with the South-North migration flows. Although the notion of the *melting pot* is not altogether alien to Europe\(^\text{16}\), there were obvious obstacles to Europe repeating the experience of the United States.

Firstly, the assimilative principle of integration was brought under critique, as new immigration realities ceased to support its main assumptions. As Richmond writes:

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\(^{15}\) Huntington, Samuel P., *The Clash of Civilizations?*, in "Foreign Affairs", vol. 72, n. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

It was not until after the Second World War, following the immigration of new waves of refugees and others to the United States, Israel, Canada and Australia, that the ideas of the Chicago sociologists came under critical scrutiny.\(^{17}\)

Realization of assimilative expectations failing to work and the growing awareness of distinctions between migrants and white European population were linked in the European migration experience of the 20th century first and foremost with migrants coming along the South-North geographical lines. Their complete assimilation proved not to be possible, as their presence brought to life discourses of racial, religious and cultural differences. The newcomers not only constituted ‘visible minorities’, being distinguishable from host European population by their psychosomatic features, but also proved unwilling to give up their long-held religious and cultural idiosyncrasies. Multiple ethnic, religious and cultural communities flourished in European cities, especially in large urban conglomerations. Discourse of the incompatibility of migrants from the South remains very topical today, has gained support in public and is therefore used by many politicians in populist speeches, even though many of Indian or Algerian migrants have lived in Europe for decades. Different European states have shown varying degrees of success in dealing with these differences through integration policies and overarching identity myths (the French, the British). However, the discourse of difference has entered firmly European migration studies and is there to stay. Ethnic minorities have firmly entered the scene both of European social and political realities and of academic discourse related to European migration studies.

Another factor accounting for complexities linked with the presence of migrants in Western European states is a specific European approach to the immigration issue that is linked with the timing of immigration. Immigration did not coincide with, but came later than the process of nation-building:

As in all European nations, large-scale immigration postdated the nation-building experience in Germany. Accordingly, immigration has not become part of national self-definition. [...] No country in Europe conceives of itself as a 'nation of immigrants', US-style\(^{18}\).


Consequently, European countries refuse to incorporate the notion ‘country of immigration’ in their national self-identities, disregarding the numbers of already settled foreigners and continuously coming new migrants.

So, it is to some extent understandable why migration from the South has instigated the discourses of difference and exclusion in Europe, although it also became for many European countries the stimulus for measures aimed at re-organizing their societies so that they could, by their new self-definition and reformulated citizenship concepts, include the incoming foreigners. Some of them, as Germany, continue to assign ‘foreigner’ status to settled migrants, some, as France, disregard their differences, awaiting only allegiance to the republican values, some, as Britain, have developed and implemented ‘multiculturalism’ logic of co-existence of the newcomers and the host population.

But while it seems logical that the arrival of people from Asia and Africa could cause concerns about the prospects of their integration into or co-existence in European societies, let us trace what has been the case with another direction of migration - that from the East.

East-West migration, according to definition given by Fassmann and Münz, “includes the migration from east-central and eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Balkans to Western Europe, overseas countries and some countries belonging geo-politically to the West”. It has constituted another direction of migration through which Europe has been receiving new migrants, and it intensified in the course of the 20th century. Although it may seem counter-intuitive, it has a longer history than that of South-North, and has in many periods constituted the major source of migration to Europe. Fassmann and Münz summarize its main tendencies throughout the 20th century:

Until 1949 the dominant flows in Europe were East-West. After 1950 the cold war reduced this pattern to a flow (of considerable size until 1961) between the two Germanies. All in all after the mid-1950s, migration from the south to the north became more important. [...] After a short period of little international mobility in the early 1980s the course of migration changed again: East-West migration increased dramatically. After the fall of the iron curtain Poland, the former Soviet

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Union/CIS, the collapsing GDR and parts of the Balkans became main sending areas\textsuperscript{20}.

The 21\textsuperscript{st} century brought new intensification of East-West migration due to the Enlargement of the European Union in May, 2004, which legally, abiding by the law of free movement within the EU, opened borders for people from Eastern European and Baltic states. Let us look into the history of East-West migration in more detail, as this study will focus upon migrants who came to Europe exactly along this geographical line.

As a mass movement, it started in the mid-nineteenth century with migration of Polish, Ukrainian and Czech workers in search of jobs into developed industrialized centers in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Austria. Also, thousands of eastern Jews fled from pogroms and discrimination to large European cities, such as London, Berlin, Vienna, Paris, and also Prague and Warsaw.

In the years before the First and Second World War migration from Central and Eastern Europe was constituted largely by labour migration, which was regulated by special recruitment initiatives of the receiving states. The main sending countries were Poland and Czechoslovakia, while France and Germany, where the states were very active at recruiting and channeling cheap labour force in the developing industrial sites, became the main receiving countries. This was a start of contract labour recruitment, used intensively by Western countries to boost their industrial development in the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

The second phase of the East-West migration was linked with the Second World War, which caused displacement and forced migration for millions of people. During this phase, this migration included flows from East Germany to West Germany and also the movement of ethnic Germans which were expelled from the majority of Eastern European countries. By rough estimates more than 12 million Germans were repatriated.

In the 1950s, European East-West migration entered a new phase. The 40 years till 1989-1991 were characterized by the polarization of Europe into two political blocks, the borders of which were hard to transgress. Despite the severe emigration restrictions, several emigration streams remained. Fassmann and Münz emphasize that these years witnessed ethnically characterized migration, which reflected structural channels of migration opened by bilateral agreements between specific countries:

Since the Second World War the overwhelming majority of all European East-West migrants has stemmed from ethnic or religious groups with an ethnic or religious

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.
groups with an ethnic ‘mother country’, or at least a ‘foothold’ or a strong lobby in the West. [...] This is linked to the fact that until 1989/90 European East-West migration relied to a large extent on bilateral agreements between eastern and western European countries, while spontaneous waves of migrants remained the exception\textsuperscript{21}.

Here we come upon a very important matter. What is evident is that ethnic migration has constituted a structural channel for migrants from Eastern Europe, in the same way as colonial legacy has been a structural migration opportunity for migrants from the South. Revealing its importance for the migration history of Europe, Fassmann and Münz propose to distinguish it as a third pattern to be added to the major South-North and East-West dichotomy. They define it as is “migration between the main countries of destination and their demographic hinterlands”\textsuperscript{22}, and indicate strong links between the host and sending countries as the major cause of migration in European history: “European migration clearly shows “privileged” relations between sending and receiving countries, linked by cultural, economic, and/or political affinities rooted in history”\textsuperscript{23}. It is clear that this ‘privileged’ migration reflects not the geographical orientation of migration flows, but rather the existence of structural channels of migration which opened for particular groups both in South-North and East-West European migration.

Ethnic migrants constitute an ethnic minority in their country of residence and are usually assumed to leave due to persecution and discrimination there. Their ‘mother’ nations invite them to migrate and join their ethnic co-nationals and grant them all rights of common citizens. The two most obvious cases of ‘privileged’ ethnic migration for Europe are Jewish and German ethnic migrants. According to the constitution of the FRG, they received special treatment upon their arrival. This structural channel of migration is very important for our study, for the Soviet Union and later the countries of the CIS became of the major sending countries for these ethnic migrants. However, many modern scholars (Joppke, 1992) posit that ethnic migration reached its peak in the late 1980s and continuously lost its importance at the end of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
Another trend in East-West migration has been the migration of refugees and asylum-seekers. ‘Sudden waves’ of asylum seekers came to Western Europe before 1989. They took their chance to move from the Eastern European countries during the short periods of political instability.

The third trend of migration in East-West migration is labour migration. This involved Eastern and Central Europe in the first half of the 20th century, but then the flows were interrupted by political division, from which a vacuum in economic interactions also ensued. Thus, the workers for contract labour recruitment were brought from other regions, such as Southern Europe and Northern Africa. For instance, Germany developed a ‘guest-worker’ recruitment system in the 1960s.

However, Central and Eastern Europe also got involved in this type of migration after political changes in the region, and in the late 1980s –mid-1990s it started to gain importance for this region. In the 1990s and after the start of the 21st century labour migration has turned into a very important structural channel for East-West migration. It is, according to the nature of contract recruitment, usually limited in time and offers restrictive conditions for workers.

Bilateral agreements between eastern and western European countries exist in the form of quotas on admitted seasonal or guestworkers. These programs usually try to channel the labour force into such low-skilled sectors as agriculture construction, and services. Each European country has different programs and different ‘favoured’ regions of recruitment in this area. Legal labour migrants have always been complemented by large numbers of illegal migrants performing undocumented work. Due to the lack of programs in Western Europe aimed at legalizing their status, they prefer to stay ‘underground’, performing casual undocumented work on black labour markets of Europe. Such migrants are often concentrated in urban areas.

Labour migration is linked with the notion of ‘economic’ migrants, which have acquired negative connotation. While labour migrants were favoured during the periods when they were needed and especially invited, their excess is usually perceived as highly negative, as they constitute a threat to the labour markets of West European countries. Restrictive measures on ‘economic’ migrants are to be found in the laws of every European country. Also, the revelation of economic grounds for migration of people pretending to have other statuses (refugees or asylum-seekers) usually leads to their rejection as ‘bogus migrants’.
However, another side of East-West labour migration, which has been developing since the early 1990s and has gained importance in the 21st century, is the recruitment by the Western European countries of highly-qualified specialists in specific areas (IT, medicine, business, and banking). The migration of the elites has become an important trend in East-West migration in the last decades, and includes students, academics and scientists, highly-qualified professionals, independent entrepreneurs, artists, media people.

Today the internal differences in the field of labour migration are hard to identify:

Many highly-skilled workers, such as managers, financial experts and technicians migrate on temporary employment contracts. It is hard to draw a precise line between the privileged ‘professional transients’ moving within international labour markets and the vulnerable low-skilled migrants.

Here globalization trends have been undoubtedly influencing the picture of East-West migration. Different forms and patterns of migration become fused with the development of technology and transport, and “old distinctions between labour migration, settler migration and movements of asylum-seekers are breaking down. Movements can no longer be separated into permanent or temporary, and migration chains are becoming two-way streets”.

Since the 21st century Eastern Europe and the countries of CIS have been fully drawn into the whirlwind of international migration. The involvement of these regions was further intensified in 2004, after the EU –enlargement included the majority of the countries representing this region into the common European legal and economic space.

2.1.2. Peculiarities of East-West migration

There are some features that differentiate East-West migration from South-North. This migration has not been perceived as ethnically and culturally complex as the one from the South, as the peoples from Eastern Europe shared a phenomenological type, and a religion (that of Christianity) with Western Europeans. The other reason why East-West migration wasn’t perceived as a cultural threat was because historically ethnic groups and nations on the European continent had experienced many encounters with

25 Ibid.
each other. Moreover, East-West migration often presented a return of historic migrants to their homelands in the West, the most prominent cases being that of ethnic Germans. The presence in Eastern Europe of ethnic minorities originating in Western Europe has led to high-profile existence of ethnic migration on the arena of East-West movements.

However, it is more economic issues, such as the impact of low-skilled and cheap labour force from the East, and related legal aspects, such as the undocumented work and overstaying of visas that concerns Western European states today. Differences in economic development between the two parts of Europe formed the basis for the assumption that the potential for economic migration is incredibly high in the region. Ethnic migrants are also suspected of having ‘economic reasons’ for migration.

These fears on the part of Western Europe were revealed in 2004, when the migration from Eastern Europe acquired a new level of topicality due to the recent enlargement of the European Union. It was feared that citizens of the new member-states would take advantage of the right of free movement of labour and flood Western labour markets. The fears of a ‘massive exodus’ of Eastern Europeans from the new member-states were not realized. The reality proved that, although the supply of seasonal labour increased, and the citizens of Baltic States and Poland indeed increased their presence in Western countries, the massive exodus did not happen, while many Eastern Europeans who were already working in the UK were now given legal rights to stay. It turned out, in fact, that many of them had come, stayed on a different basis and for various periods of time even before the EU-enlargement.

It must also be remarked that, although Eastern Europeans do not normally constitute ‘visible minorities’, they usually are bearers of different social, political and cultural ‘habitats’ than Western Europeans. In this difference the historical division to the two political blocks plays not the least role. Individual histories of countries also leave their imprint on people, which is not easy to discard even after dramatic political transformations, as has been the case of the Soviet Union and its successor states. Experiences of displacement due to economic instability and overhaul of all previous social and political values is also a feature of self-identity viable for people from Eastern Europe and lacking in western Europeans. These social and cultural differences can not be easily overcome, as cases of ‘privileged’ ethnic migrants from the former Soviet Union in Germany show. On the other hand, ‘transnational spaces’ (Hannerz) of today cause the appearance of new ‘cosmopolitans’ who seek to challenge their links to the cultural heritage of their country and adapt to their new countries by constructing a
pattern of habits of their own choice. These people have more chances of successful 
adaptation and public approval and success in the West, but the risk of breaking ties 
with their country of origin is also high. Such type of migrants is expected to originate not 
from structural migration channels, but more from individual migration initiatives.

2.1.3. Conclusion

In this sub-chapter of the first part an analysis of its historical development and 
current trends in European East-West migration has been made. It constitutes a second 
geographical line along which Europe receives its migrants, and has witnessed two 
intensive periods – after the Second World War and then in the 1990s, during the period 
of political transformation of Eastern Europe. Ethnic migration has been a decisive 
component of East-West migration due to strong historical links with specific ethnic 
groups in the East. However, labour migration has continuously gained importance for 
the region. After the 1990s both low-skilled and elite professional migrants have been 
coming to Western Europe. This sudden intensification of labour migration alerts 
Western Europe which expects a massive economic exodus from the East as an 
addition to ethnic migration which remains a viable reality for East-West migration.

2.2. Historical overview of emigration from Soviet Union and Russian 
in the 20th century. Current trends in emigration from the CIS and 
Russia.

2.2.1. General overview

Emigration from Russia (and the Soviet Union during the previous years) reflects 
general patterns identified for East-West migration. Citizens from the former Soviet 
Union (mainly Russia and Ukraine) were involved in displacement migrations in the 
years after the Second World War. Also, during the years between 1950 and late 1980s 
emigration flows were highly restricted and limited, and were constituted only by 
migration of ethnic groups (ethnic Germans, Soviet Jews) or politically persecuted 
persons (dissidents forced to emigrate). The late 1980s and early 1990s marked a new 
turn in the history of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, when political and economic
overhaul of the region brought to life new stimuli for emigration for the citizens of the FSU and Russia. As Frejka writes:

The early 1990s have witnessed an increased level of international migration in central and Eastern Europe and in the CIS countries in comparison with the previous period of communist rule. The gradual disintegration of the communist authoritarian political systems, which culminated in 1989-1991, gave rise to circumstances generating this high degree of international population mobility […]. Furthermore, under the regimes that emerged after the historic changes in 1989-1991 legal restrictions on citizens who wanted to travel or emigrate were lifted (…) 26.

The patterns of emigration from the CIS and Russia underwent a process of diversification, which reflected the appearance of positive migration factors, such as the existence of new opportunities to move abroad, intensified personal mobility and awareness of new chances, which developed on the background of pertaining negative ‘pull’ factors, such as economic hardships caused by transition, political and legal instability, continuous polarization of society, multiple risks and social insecurity. Towards the late 1990s channels of emigration for ethnic or political reasons ceased to reflect the dynamics of contemporary migration, and gave way to economic and social reasons. Thus, emigration from the CIS and Russia at the present time is less controlled by state initiatives, but is more dependent on individual initiatives, and, consequently, very diversified. It includes both low-skilled labour migration and ‘brain-drain’ of academics and specialists, contract labour in the service sector as well as in managerial positions. It also involves independent entrepreneurship and representatives of transnational companies, as well as students in secondary and higher education. Another feature is the continuous intensification of temporary migration, which gains appeal as it doesn’t presuppose cutting ties with the country of origin. On the other hand, patterns of permanent migration, such as ethnic migration, asylum-seeking and marital migration still remain a part of the general picture.

2.2.2. Waves of migration during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century

The history of emigration from Russia is usually divided into several ‘waves’. The First Wave of Russian migration was caused by the October Revolution of 1917 and, though its main flows took place in the late 1910s and 1920s, lasted till 1938. The numerical estimates for this wave are 4-5.5 million people. During this emigration Russia witnessed cultural drain; emigrants belonged to the upper social groups. They were marked by their opposition to the new-established Socialist, and later Communist regime.

It was from this time that the Russian culture started to develop its small but influential islands of intellectual thought in such cities as Paris, Berlin, Prague, and London. Emigrants in these centers created a ‘parallel Russia’, considering themselves as the only remnants of the true Russia (\textit{istinnaya Rossia}) and waiting till the severed ties with their motherland could be restored. This type of migration came to be known as ‘exile emigration’.

The Second Wave of migration involved the displacements brought by the Second World War. Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya\textsuperscript{27} frame it by the time period between 1939 and 1947. This time was characterized by the expulsion of 1.5 million ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and the forced movement of 1,496 thousands of ethnic Poles and Polish Jews from the territories which now belonged to the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{28}.

The Third Wave can be put into the time frame between 1948 and the late 1980s. It was limited due to severe political restrictions on emigration, reflected in the notion of ‘iron curtain’. Before the Khrushchev political era (the 1960s) emigration from the USSR was, in fact, virtually impossible. However, in the late 1960s the USSR witnessed relative liberalization of official attitude towards emigration. One of its factors was a pressure from the Western countries (USA, Germany, and Israel) on the Soviet political


authorities ‘to abandon their traditional antipathy to voluntary emigration’ supported by the promise to offer trade incentives in case the Soviet Union agreed to liberalize its emigration regime. The internal factor was the development of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union. Channels of emigration which opened at that time were predominantly for ethnic migration. Such groups as ethnic Jews, ethic Germans, and also ethnic Armenians, Greeks and Poles had a potential opportunity for migration. However, it was linked with exhausting bureaucratic red-tape, such as applications for emigration, collections of signatures at places of work and residence, receiving the right to emigrate. This period was itself divided into several waves, when the opportunities for migration suddenly appeared for a limited time and for a limited number of people and then closed again. Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya (1994:240) give a table of ethnic emigration where these smaller waves can clearly be seen:

Table 1. Emigration from the former Soviet Union, 1948-90.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Germans</th>
<th>Armenians</th>
<th>Greeks</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948-70</td>
<td>25,200</td>
<td>22,400</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-80</td>
<td>248,900</td>
<td>64,300</td>
<td>34,100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>347,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-86</td>
<td>16,900</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-90</td>
<td>301,300</td>
<td>308,200</td>
<td>31,700</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>20,200</td>
<td>684,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1948-90</td>
<td>592,300</td>
<td>414,400</td>
<td>84,100</td>
<td>24,300</td>
<td>20,200</td>
<td>1,135,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of total (%)</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Heitman (1991)

Besides ethnic grounds for emigration, opposition to the existing political regimes was also an important factor for emigration. In this regard, this wave bore some resemblance to the first one. Firstly, it consisted of people who stood in opposition to the Soviet Union, or were not tolerated by the regime for other reasons, such as their nationality. Secondly, the majority of migrants were highly educated and belonged to cultural, intellectual and professional elites, this fact is especially stressed in research on

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Soviet Jewish emigration. It is not surprising that emigration during this period usually emanated from such agglomerations as Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, and Odessa. The Soviet Union again experienced a ‘brain-drain’ similar to that which occurred during the after-Revolution years and which would occur again in the late 1990s.

One interesting feature of the emigration waves discussed above is mentioned by Kopnina: ‘… the earlier waves of Russian migrants had ‘common themes’ – either ethnic, religious or political – that kept them together’\(^{31}\). They were usually helped in their integration by international émigré communities and depended in their adjustment on keeping strong links with these communities. Also, a strong anti-Communist attitude marked migrants coming from these waves, which was supported by their host countries, which saw their emigration as proof of the unbearable conditions under Communist rule.

The new impetus for the third emigration wave was marked by *perestroika* in the late 1980s. As Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya (1994: 241) write,

... a fundamental change took place in 1988 when almost free emigration of Jews, ethnic Germans and Greeks and travel to the West by private invitation were allowed. The population quickly reacted to the greater freedom of movement\(^{32}\).

The main flows of emigrants in the late 1980s came from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In Jewish emigration, there was a shift in geographical destination of emigration, which started during the late 1970s. Jewish migrants moved less to Israel, but more to the USA. The beginning of the 1990s opened a new destination for them – Germany – as they came to be considered by this country as quota refugees received as moral retribution for Nazi atrocities.

The characteristic features of the third wave were, firstly, its ethnic nature, and the support of lobby groups in the West. Many scientists, however, remark that ethnic emigration, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was only a structural channel for economic migration, as migrants seemed to take this ‘ethnic’ opportunity as a chance for better life in the West. Codagnone writes on this subject:

(...) especially since the mid-1980s, these ‘ethnic’ migrations have also been largely of an economic nature, even though they can be distinguished from simple

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economic migration by the advantages (pull factors) deriving from the absence of
barrier to entry and entitlement to citizenship in the destination countries.\footnote{33}

\subsection*{2.2.3. General trends in migration from contemporary Russia}

This move to economically-motivated and more diversified migration, which
included other forms along with older patterns of ethnic emigration, became a specific
feature of the fourth wave of migration which started in the 1990s and is continuing now.
Its legal background is defined by lifted limitations on emigration from the CIS and
Russia. The Law on Emigration from and Immigration to the USSR, which came into
effect on 1 January 1993,

\begin{quote}
 guarantees freedom of travel and migration as a basic human right that will enable
citizens of all CIS countries, regardless of their ethnic origins, to emigrate for
economic and other reasons, such as to search for work.\footnote{34}
\end{quote}

Restrictions now arise from immigration policies of the receiving countries, which
intensively regulate the migration flows by issuing different forms of visas and work
permits. While ethnic Germans and ethnic Jews still have the ‘privileged’ position, their
numbers are continuously restricted by introduction of quotas. Other citizens of the CIS
and Russia can’t take advantage of any particular structural migration pattern defined by
their nationality and belong, in the eyes of the receiving countries, to a general pool of
migrants from Eastern Europe.

During this period fears spread in the West that a ‘mass exodus’ would follow the
collapse of the Soviet Union. This fear revealed Western anguish about the migration
from the whole central and Eastern Europe. Codagnone (1998) remarks that the
intensity of such fear had to do with processes that occurred at this time in Western
Europe itself.

\begin{quote}
(...) potential emigration from such troubled areas rose to the top of the political
agenda in Europe precisely at the time when European media and policy-makers
were laying down the foundations for the construction of ‘Fortress Europe’. In this
context, the Soviet Union was seen as a potential source of massive ‘new’
\end{quote}

\footnote{33} Codagnone, C. (1998) \textit{New Migration and Migration Politics in Post-Soviet Russia}. - Centre for
European Migration and Ethnic Studies for The Ethnobarometer Programme 1998, Rome:

\footnote{34} Vishnevsky, A., and Zayonchkovskaya, Z. (1994) ‘Emigration from the former Soviet Union:
The fourth wave’, in H.Fassmann and R.Münz (eds). \textit{European migration in the late twentieth
immigration towards Europe. Western media resounded with statements by officials and gloomy journalistic forecasts about unprecedented inflows of immigrants.\(^{35}\)

These predictions ‘were based on the assumption that worsening economic conditions and rising unemployment would be followed by waves of economic migrants’\(^{36}\). However, these expectations didn’t prove to be true.

Official data do not support the theory of large-scale emigration from the former USSR to Western countries, as feared by some observers. Migration from the CIS countries is very moderate and even tends to diminish. Since 1990, a total of 760,000 official permits to leave Russia on a permanent basis have been issued – about 100,000 each year from 1990 to 1995 and only 62,000 in 1998.\(^{37}\)

Ethnic migration still tends to be important in the flows of permanent emigration: ‘ethnic Germans and Jews moving to Germany (55% in 1997), Israel (1.9%) and USA (12%) dominate the flow of those leaving Russia’\(^{38}\). However, Russians constitute the second largest group of emigrants after ethnic Germans.

Due to continuing impact of ethnic migration on the constitution of emigration flows in the 1990s, Germany, USA and Israel remained main countries of destination during this period. Here it is important to mention that these destinations received the status of the old abroad, as the newly-independent states of the CIS came to be called the new abroad.

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\(^{36}\) Ibid., p.15.


\(^{38}\) Ibid.
Table 2. Emigration from Russia to the old abroad by main destinations, 1988-1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>8,088</td>
<td>21,956</td>
<td>61,023</td>
<td>38,744</td>
<td>21,975</td>
<td>20,404</td>
<td>16,951</td>
<td>15,198</td>
<td>14,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9,990</td>
<td>21,133</td>
<td>33,754</td>
<td>33,705</td>
<td>62,697</td>
<td>72,991</td>
<td>69,538</td>
<td>79,569</td>
<td>64,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>2,322</td>
<td>11,017</td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>14,890</td>
<td>13,766</td>
<td>10,659</td>
<td>12,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1,832</td>
<td>4,184</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>1,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>2,411</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>3,372</td>
<td>3,836</td>
<td>4,108</td>
<td>3,609</td>
<td>4,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,800</td>
<td>47,619</td>
<td>103,694</td>
<td>88,298</td>
<td>113,913</td>
<td>110,313</td>
<td>96,665</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Codagnone\(^39\), author’s elaboration on data from Goskomstat Rossii.

During the late 1990s and with the turn of the 21\(^{st}\) century, as has been noted, ethnic migration tended to lose its importance, giving way to economically motivated emigration. As Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya write,

> Despite the prospect of new waves of “ethnic migration”, it is unlikely that they will determine the nature of the fourth wave of emigration. [...] The main motives for the (...) fourth wave of emigration are economic and to a certain degree social, i.e., the opportunity for improving living standards, individual incomes, working conditions, etc.\(^40\)

After the ‘shock wave’ migration of the first years of free movement regime, migration from Russia and the CIS has stabilized and diversified. Zayonchkovskaya mentions the following ‘reassuring trends’ here:

- freedom of movement among the CIS countries and their external neighbours
- the emergence of temporary employment migration;
- the strengthening of economic factors as determinants of migration\(^41\)

Indeed, freedom of movement has opened alternatives to the ‘no-return’ migration, permanent emigration, which until 1994 was ‘the only category of international

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migration recorded in Russian statistics\(^{42}\). Lifting of limits and relative stabilization of economic situation in Russia brought temporary migration to the fore as the most attractive type of migration. This temporary migration has a character of labour migration, in comparison to a strong ethnic component of ‘permanent’ migration. Ethnic Russians constitute 90\% of this labour migration, which indicates that this type of migration has much larger potential for today’s Russia than permanent ethnic migration.

Labour out-migration from Russia can be divided into two phases. Up to 1993 labour migration remained very limited, selective and elite. For people in general the road to labour migration was still closed; only highly qualified people could avail themselves of this opportunity. The legal basis was meager and the institutional structures very scarce\(^{43}\).

This period witnessed the ‘brain-drain’ of Russian scholars and scientists in large extent to the USA, but also to Western Europe.

Since the mid-1990s temporary labour migration has developed into an opportunity open to a larger range of the population. Here, the potential for migration is defined by two mutually complementing factors. Firstly, social and professional characteristics, such as higher skills, good education, play an important role. Secondly, by geographical residence of future migrants, because ‘the populations of (...) western regions are much better prepared to adapt to the Western way of life, they are more spatially and occupationally mobile, and they have a better knowledge of West European languages’\(^{44}\). In general opportunities for migration opened for mass population:

Russia began to integrate with the international bodies in the field of migration and labour exchange. Information concerning migration is widely available thanks to large commercial campaigns and advertisements in the mass media.

As a result labour migration has become more massive and less selective than before. It has become possible for people in general to migrate, or to work abroad temporarily\(^{45}\).

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In the last decade Russian scholars tried to estimate the potential of migration from Russia to abroad. According to estimates of the research led in 1991, for the turn of the century the expectations varied from 400,000 to 2 million, although half of the experts limited their estimates to 400,000-800,000 per year.

Most of the experts agreed that the “ethnic” feature of emigration will weaken, and that the level of skills and education will be the basis for the next wave of emigration. Most experts think that in the future emigrants will be dominated by representatives of specific professions with high and very high professional skills.\footnote{Vishnevsky, A., and Zayonchkovskaya, Z. (1994) ‘Emigration from the former Soviet Union: The fourth wave’, in H.Fassmann and R.Münz (eds). \textit{European migration in the late twentieth century: historical patterns, actual trends, and social implications}. - Aldershot : Elgar, p.252-253.}

Another study of labour migration potential was conducted by Eugene Krassinets and Elena Tiuriukanova in 2000\footnote{Krassinets, E., Tiuriukanova, E. (2000) \textit{Potentials of Labour Out-Migration from Russia}. - Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 92 (1), pp. 5-17.}. This research was conducted first among the sample of Muscovites and then among the scholars with PhD degrees. According to the results of the first poll, while only 6\% of men and 4\% of women expressed positive intention to migrate in the near future, active positive orientation towards migration was shown by 20\% of men and 16\% of women, and passively positive or neutral disposition was revealed by 22\% and 30\% respectively. The poll also revealed that migration has come to be associated with such positive characteristics, as ‘rich’, ‘active’, ‘enterprising’, ‘highly-educated’, ‘skilled’, ‘adventurous’, in opposition to the notion of ‘betrayer of the motherland’ and ‘dissident’ common at earlier times. Temporary migration is today considered as ‘a real and normal strategy of social behaviour’. The scholars also reveal the readiness to take up work abroad, if it will be advantageous for them. While 8\% of scholars definitely intends to work abroad, for 12\% a job abroad is highly probable, and for 24\% a job abroad is not excluded. 50\% of the scholars would recommend working abroad temporarily to their younger colleagues, while only 9\% envisage this work as an opportunity to move permanently.

Thus, it can be seen that temporary labour migration has high potential for Russia and, in its continuously diversified forms, shows signs of becoming a major trend in out-migration of Russians to Western Europe and the USA. To this trend such patterns as individual entrepreneurship, self-employed artistic, literary and journalistic work, migration for education purposes, which in many cases also represent temporary
migration, can be added. A new type of permanent migration that has been developing since the 1990s is marital migration, and Russian women have effectively used this opportunity. Diversification of migration patterns in opposition to previously dominating ethnic migration brought the diversification of countries of destination. While the USA and Canada, and Germany in Europe still remain important countries of destination, in the Western Europe almost every country receives today migrants from Russia. The number of Russian migrants in the UK, for instance, has grown dramatically since the mid-90s. This country is immensely attractive to Russians, especially the rich and financially independent, due to its business and professional, and educational opportunities.

Illegal migrants constitute the last category of Russians abroad. In this regard Zayonchkovskaya remarks, that ‘the actual number of emigrants is much higher than officially reported. Many irregular emigrants from the CIS receive student, tourist or visitor visas and hide their real intentions to stay abroad’\textsuperscript{48}. In the sphere of control of illegal immigration and work policies and measures applied by the EU countries vary considerably, which accounts for unequal distribution of illegal migrants between specific Western European countries. In this respect some countries, due to lack of measures aimed at internal control of legal status, present higher opportunities for illegal stay. The UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands can be named as the examples of such countries.

\textbf{2.2.4. Conclusion}

In the second sub-chapter historical waves of emigration from the Soviet Union and Russia have been presented. Afterwards a special focus has been made on specific trends of out-migration from contemporary Russia. The analysis shows that, as for Eastern Europe in general, ethnic migration has been a prevalent component of migration from the Soviet Union in the course of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, and also from Russia in the early 1990s. However, although ethnic migration continues to constitute an important share of out-migration today, modern scientists posit that the dynamics of the fourth migration wave lie in labour migration. Economic factors have often been decisive for ethnic migration as well, and today they define a decision to move abroad for many

Russians. Labour migration is open not only for an elite and professionals, as it was in the early and mid-1990s, but also for mass population. It becomes a source of diversification of modern migration and also introduces an attractive alternative to permanent emigration – temporary migration. However, despite the fears about mass inflows of ‘economic’ migration from Russia, its numbers remain moderate.

3. Part II. Immigration and citizenship policies of the UK and Germany. Structural migration channels used by Russians in migration to the UK and Germany in the 1990s.

3.1. Immigration and citizenship: theoretical concepts

Recently several steps have been made for the creation of a common immigration policy where respective policies of European states would converge in order to create a strong external border to ‘hold the foreigners out’. Indeed, Europe has been faced with increasing flows of migrants whose presence presented a challenge to the internal integrity and national homogeneity of the countries.

Countries of Western Europe as a specific geographical area have had similar experiences in the area of migration. Some trends can be named here. Migration forms a legacy of colonial past for such countries as the UK, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Migration flows were structurally encouraged by specific Western European states at different periods: at the end of the 19th century by France and from the 1950s of the 20th century by Germany. Western Europe had a common experience of intensification of international migration flows in the second half of the 20th century. The countries of Western Europe became much-desired destinations for labour migration, as well as asylum-seeking. And, logically, intensification of restrictive measures towards immigrants has been characteristic for Western European countries.

However, the realities of immigration practices show that the responses of countries to challenges caused by migration have been different. Moreover, such areas of policy as controlling external borders and granting citizenship have always been the sphere where each state could define its own policies. Nowhere, as Brubaker argues, are the powers and authority of the state more pronounced than in the sphere of
citizenship, which ‘remains a bastion of national sovereignty’\(^{49}\). Joppke also posits that, in spite of globalization and intensified flows of people and goods caused by it, state power still matters much in defining who may enter its borders: ‘As nations, modern states are political communities invested with the right of self-determination. An expression of this right is the admission, or rejection, of new members’\(^{50}\). As specialists argue, the main concepts that have been at stake as far as immigration is concerned, and, moreover, have been challenged by it in the 20\(^{th}\) century, are state sovereignty and citizenship.

Sovereignty defines a measure of state control over its territory and populace:

- Sovereignty makes territory, rather than persons, the basic reference point of rule.
- This implies control over access to and stay within territory, which is the domain of immigration policy. Every state divides the world into ‘nationals’ who have a right of entry and stay, and ‘aliens’ to whom entry and stay may be denied.\(^{51}\)

Another concept which is crucial for the self-identity of a state as a national entity is citizenship. Citizenship refers more to membership than territoriality. Citizenship is a universal feature of belonging to a national community: ‘Every modern state formally defines its citizenry, politically identifying a set of persons as its members and residually designating all others as noncitizens, or aliens’\(^{52}\). Citizenship, as Brubaker posits, is ‘internally exclusive’ and ‘externally exclusive’. Internal inclusiveness is reflected in guaranteed rights to citizens, and persistence of these rights even if the citizen has been living outside of the state for a long period. Internal exclusiveness is also interpreted on a level of shared historical past and culture, which result in membership and belonging, and not simply residing together.

External exclusiveness of citizenship keeps ‘aliens’ from benefiting from the rights offered to citizens. External exclusiveness can be expressed, according to Brubaker, in territorial and national closure. Territorial closure may occur at the beginning of interaction with outsiders. It is usually reflected in immigration policies of the states, presenting barriers to entry and measures of enforcing selective admission of

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foreigners. Territorial closure is consequently of high importance both for noncitizens and for the state itself:

From the point of view of the noncitizen (...) territorial closure has a decisive bearing on life chances. (...) The modern state has a fundamental interest (...) in the principle of territorial closure – that noncitizens may be excluded or expelled from the territory – and in the administrative capacity to bar the entry or continued residence of noncitizens.53

However, the power of state to exclude the persons it is unwilling to have is limited by external reasons. The first limitation lies in the state’s embeddedness in the international political system, where the states are responsible for excluding persons before other states, where these excluded will be bound to go. Secondly, it is limited by the international human rights regime, which defines certain categories of foreigners who have to be admitted for asylum. Thus, the non-refoulement rule obliges the state to admit a refugee who, if expelled, will be faced with life threat and persecution. However, the human rights regime does not have binding force on state decisions in immigration issues.

There are also, as Joppke explains, internal limitations on the state’s powers to keep migrants out of its borders and restrict immigration. First of all, there are legal constraints, when, although the executive side of the state would have liked to keep migrants out, its own legislation in the sphere of individual and family rights reduces the state’s power in applying restrictive measures. Also, there are moral obligations of a state to immigrants from certain countries. Such internal constraints have varying salience for Western European countries. German immigration policy is the one which is highly influenced by these internal constraints.

The second type of closure, national or ‘domestic’ (Brubaker) happens ‘inside the interaction’ (Brubaker). Here it is not the territorial aspect that comes to the fore, but the national one, which involves aspects of membership, community and belonging. This aspect is reflected both in immigration and integration policies of nation-states. Immigration policy defines different forms of limited residence rights and conditions of stay for individuals who have entered a nation-state. There are limitations on their rights to work, or apply for welfare benefits. Integration policy reflects state decisions on such aspects of citizenship, as a right to vote, a right to undertake military service or to hold a position in a public administration.

53 Ibid., p.24.
This internal closure divides the nation into insiders and outsiders. This division, as Brubaker shows, can be formal or informal.

Formal techniques include the elaboration of explicit and unambiguous criteria of insiderhood or outsiderhood (...); exhaustive enumerations of individual insiders or outsiders (...) and formally administered identification routines (...). On the other hand, insiders and outsiders may be defined and identified informally through the use of tacit, uncodified, internalized classificatory schemes, the practical mastery of which is distributed among participants in an interaction rather than monopolized by specialized administrators’. 54

The immigration policy of a state usually reflects the formal side of this division, while the integration policy tends to combine formal and informal cues for this dichotomy. Modern situations of immigration, however, no longer present clear-cut lines in this division to citizens and aliens, insiders and outsiders. In many European countries there are groups of residents who enjoy all rights and privileges granted to citizens, apart from the right to vote. As Hammar posits, these ‘privileged noncitizens are a large and growing group, especially in Continental Europe’. 55 Hammar proposes a new term for this category, which stands in-between ordinary foreigners and citizens – *denizens*.

Denizens are foreign citizens who have secure permanent residence status, and who are connected to the state by an extensive array of rights and duties. They have their legal domicile or effective residence in the host country (...). Some may have been born in the country and never lived anywhere else; they may speak the language of the country with perfect fluency, and may perhaps speak no other language. 56

In such cases the realities of integration into society can supersede the formal process of granting citizenship. However, there can be an opposite situation where formal belonging to the society as a citizen does not guarantee effective integration for a migrant. These issues become matters of concern for integration services of European states. Usually the quality of integration measures is defined by the number of incoming

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migrants. Therefore, many European countries proclaim that they aim at a reduction of new inflows in order to guarantee real integration for people who have already been formally included in the society.

**Conclusion:** Despite tendencies towards policy convergence in modern Europe, the sphere of immigration policy is delegated to each state’s autonomous decisions. Sovereignty is the first area of realization of a state’s autonomy, and is implemented in control over external borders of the state. Citizenship complements sovereignty, reflecting the state’s power to grant membership in a closed national community. While external border control is realized with regard to a migrant as a gateway and a filter, the granting of citizenship brings about a deeper division of state residents into insiders granted with social rights and outsiders lacking them. However, in the modern world this division becomes blurred, as a new category of denizens appears who enjoy all social rights without being citizens. Another controversy can appear when formal citizens do not succeed in becoming true members of society due to failures in their integration. These matters call for a more detailed analysis of the integration process of the chosen migrant groups.

### 3.2. Immigration policies of Germany and the UK

In comparing the two immigration policies, especially when aiming at finding differences between two European countries, one can start from an overview of the similarities, at least, evident ones, that exist between these two countries. Here the ‘convergence hypothesis’ proposed by Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield may be of help. These authors argue that there is ‘growing similarity among industrialized, labor-importing countries’ in the following aspects:

1. the policy instruments chosen for controlling immigration, especially unauthorized immigration and refugee flows from less developed countries
2. the results or efficacy of immigration control measures
3. social integration policies
4. general-public reactions to current immigration flows and evaluations of government efforts to control immigration

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Also, these authors indicate that the immigration policies of Western countries have been to a large extent ineffective, creating a gap between the goals of national immigration policy and its actual outcomes. The result of this gap has been increasing public discontent with the presence of immigrants, and the spread of anti-immigrant attitudes. While, in the middle of the 20th century, immigration increases corresponded to industrial and business cycles of Western European countries, as labour was pulled in from other countries, it was no longer the case at the end of the 20th century. This situation can be explained by political developments in industrialized countries, namely, ‘the rise of rights-based politics’.

The development of rights-based liberalism, as Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield argue, did not prevent a nationalist backlash against immigration in the 1980s and 1990s. Its presence, ‘particularist, and exclusionary in character’ is also a common feature of Western European countries. ‘Its principal target is immigrants, but criticisms are also leveled at liberal parties and politicians who support the expansion or preservation of civil and political rights for ethnic minorities’.

Despite these similarities, there has been a distinction in the effectiveness of immigration policies, which is particularly clear in the cases of the UK and Germany. Germany, as many scholars argue, has been much less effective in controlling immigration than Britain for three reasons.

Firstly, the UK has never in its history launched large-scale ‘guestworkers’ initiatives, while Germany, starting from the mid-1950s, channeled workers from southern Europe and Turkey. The reason for such situation is that ‘Britain possesses a built-in supply of “immigrant” labor, in the Republic of Ireland, which has long performed the role of an industrial reserve army for Britain’.  

Secondly, Germany, as Joppke masterfully explains, has been the only country in post-War Europe that has been burdened with moral obligations, which were lacking in British national self-perception. Firstly, Germany until recently had the most open asylum regime in Europe, which was regulated by Article 16 of the Basic Law:

Germany's unique asylum law has been a response to its negative Nazi past. The fathers of the Basic Law, many of them exiled during the Nazi regime, conceived of

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58 Ibid., p.10.
59 Ibid., p.21.
an asylum law that went far beyond existing international law as a conscious act of redemption and atonement.\textsuperscript{60}

The result of this ‘moral burden’ reflected in asylum policy was that every asylum-seeker rejected in another European country went to Germany. In the course of the years, the asylum legislation was restricted, as it could not, as German politicians argued, forever be defined by the notion of guilt. However, there still remain specific categories of quota refugees (\textit{Kontingentflüchtlinge}), such as ethnic Jews. The second sphere where Germany felt moral obligation was towards ‘guestworkers’ invited in the 1960s, for whom the German state considered itself responsible.

The UK had none of these moral scruples. Although since 1948 it was faced with massive inflows of migrants from the New Commonwealth countries, Britain never felt responsible for receiving and accommodating them on its territory. If some of them stayed, it was by unwilling consent of the UK, which aimed its several immigration bills (the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, the Immigration Act of 1971 and the British Nationality Act of 1981) precisely at stopping this immigration by stripping migrants of a status of legal belonging to the former empire. Joppke remarks on this peculiarity of the British immigration regime:

\begin{quote}
Immigration policy has essentially been about restricting the entry and settlement of the former subjects of empire […]. Accordingly, the peculiarity of British immigration policy is that it is directed not against aliens, but against formal co-nationals.\textsuperscript{61}
\end{quote}

Thirdly, the difference between the immigration policies of Germany and the UK is rooted in the variations in the distribution of power between legislative, executive and judicial branches in these countries. The rights-based regime in the form of ‘legal constraints’ (Joppke) had much more impact on regulation of immigration flows in Germany than it did in Britain, due to the control of the Constitutional Court over the state in Germany and unbidden executive power of the government in Britain. The force of individual rights in the German case has been most pronounced in the case of family reunification and asylum seeking. Joppke writes about this difference as follows:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}
A legal-constitutional system protective of immigrant interests has been the key to Germany’s expansiveness toward immigrants, undermining the zero-immigration intentions circulating in the political system. In Britain, there has been little blockading of the political branches of government by recalcitrant courts. Sovereignty is firmly and unequivocally invested in Parliament, which knows no constitutional limits to its law-making powers. In immigration policy, this institutional arrangement entails a dualism of extreme legislative openness and executive closure, which is detrimental to the interests of immigrants.\(^6\) (Joppke, 1999: 103).

As a result, and, in spite of its much-repeated mantra of being a ‘no-immigration country’, Germany became one of the largest immigrant-receiving countries in the world: between 1950 and 1993, the net migration balance has been an astounding 12, 6 million (…)\(^6\) (Joppke, 1999: 62). Meanwhile Britain stands out as the Western world’s foremost ‘would-be zero immigration country’ (Layton-Henry), displaying an exceptionally strong and unrelenting hand in bringing immigration down to the ‘inescapable minimum’ (Joppke).

Apart from the constraints on immigration controls discussed above, one of the main reasons for increased presence of immigrants who originally come from other countries in Germany, and their relative lack in Britain lies in different national self-definitions, which go back into histories of the two countries. Two countries, as the scholars of nationalism argue, represent two different cases of nationhood. Using the dichotomy proposed by Liah Greenfeld\(^6\), Germany represents a case of ethnic nationhood, while Britain is an example of civic nationhood. Let’s look at these two cases in more detail.

### 3.2.1. Germany

The much-discussed German ethnonational understanding of nationhood was developed by Rogers Brubaker in his comparative analysis of France and Germany\(^6\). The specifics of the formation of German nationhood were that ‘the national feeling

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\(^6\) Ibid., p.62.
developed before the nation-state’. Consequently, the German nation ‘was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community – as an irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft’\textsuperscript{66}. After the Second World War ‘the Federal Republic defined itself as a vicarious, incomplete nation-state, home for all Germans in the communist diaspora’\textsuperscript{67}. West Germany had to implement measures for national reunification, especially when ethnic Germans were being expelled from Eastern Europe or relocated to Kazakhstan and Central Asia in the USSR.

Article 116 of the new Constitution of the FRG defined as Germans every person who lived on the territory of the German Reich as it existed on December 31, 1937. This provision provided an open possibility of entry for German citizens (residing in GDR and Poland) and ethnic Germans (\textit{deutsche Volkszugehörigen}) without official German citizenship, who were eligible for identical rights and duties as citizens. In 1953 the \textit{Bundesvertriebenengesetz} (BFVG) was issued which applied to these two main categories of people who could freely seek German citizenship. The statute presumed that the ethnic Germans who had been residing in Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR were discriminated against and persecuted because of their ethnic origin, and were seeking to return to their \textit{patria}, Germany.

Article 116 of the Grundgesetz and corresponding BFVG statute were drawn at the time when no substantial flows of labour immigration to Germany existed while the number of ethnic Germans who could actually use their right to stay and live in Germany was limited by internal limitations on emigration in their countries of origin (Poland, Romania, and the USSR). This was the reason for initial provisions for Aussiedler, aimed at successful financial and social integration, to be very generous and to remain so till the late 1980s, when suddenly, due to political transformations, masses of people started to claim their ethnic German belonging. In the late 1980s, the massive influx of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the USSR coincided with the move of Übersiedler from the GDR and with a dramatic increase in the number of asylum applications. ‘Taken together, the Federal Republic had to absorb three million new migrants between 1989 and 1992 (…\textsuperscript{68}) This situation brought a round of frantic political debate in Germany. The opposition insisted that the unconditional openness of the


country for all who could claim German ethnic roots was outdated, and called for introduction of quotas on these immigrants. The misbalance between the status of ethnic Germans, who received citizenship automatically on their arrival, and the guestworkers, who were denied it even in third generation was also brought into light. The situation where Germany preferred some immigrants over others was criticized by foreigner and refugee advocates. Presenting these debates of early 1990s, Joppke, in counter-position to Brubaker, who showed the unchanging nature of German nationhood as reflected in its reception of Aussiedler, insists, that this time marked a change German perception of itself as a ‘country for all Germans’ which was reflected in a set of restrictions towards ethnic Germans.

Not only the political debate about Aussiedler, but also the sheer fact of their unprecedented influx which could add up to 400,000 people annually if ran unabated, caused the German government to introduce restrictions aimed at regulation of ethnic immigration. Firstly, the Integration Adjustment Law of 1989 reduced social benefits to these migrants, while Ethnic German Reception Law which came to force in 1991 limited their free choice of residence (from now on they were allocated to Länder which could provide housing for them). Secondly, since July 1990 potential migrants had to apply for a reception certificate (Aufnahmebescheid) in their country of residence and no longer could do it after arriving in Germany on a tourist visa. The applications are processed by the authorities of the Länder and only then an invitation to come is issued. Applicants have to prove that they share ‘Germanness’ – in descent, in upbringing, in some knowledge of language and German traditions. Thirdly, the 1992 Law on Removing the Consequences of the War (Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz) postulated that the expulsion pressure experienced by ethnic Germans was no longer taken for granted. This law also legislated that only persons born before 1 January 1993 could apply for Aussiedler status and introduced a quota of 225,000 ethnic Germans to be admitted annually.

These changes, in the view of Joppke, show that Germany is now moving from an ethnic-priority to general immigration policy:

(…) the peculiarity of an incomplete, vicarious nation-state for all Germans in the communist diaspora is no more. In a nutshell, Germany is no longer like Israel.
Contrary to current diagnoses of German nationalism reborn, there are signs of increasing denationalization (…). 69

Along with restrictions towards ethnic migrants, modifications in asylum law also tightened the possibilities of entering the country through asylum applications. In 1993 Article 16 of the Constitution was amended, introducing the notion of ‘safe third countries’, entry from which meant immediate deportation. Asylum application procedures were shortened, and asylum seekers whose application was under consideration were deprived of the right to seek employment. However, special categories of quota refugees still remain ‘privileged’, such as ethnic Jews, who are received as asylum seekers as a sign of moral retribution. There is no annual limit on the reception of Jewish migrants as their numbers remain relatively low. In this respect it can be said that Germany once again followed the rule of ethnic channeling of migrants (Jewish descent in at least the first generation is a precondition for a visa 70), rather than through other objective characteristics such as professional proficiency, age, education.

However, beside these main channels of immigration, since 1990 Germany has signed bilateral agreements on seasonal short-term labour with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Four types of short-term workers come to Germany through these initiatives: project-linked workers, guestworkers, seasonal workers and local commuters. Also Germany, in competition with other European countries for human resources, has been interested in attracting highly-skilled labour (Green Card initiative). It also offers possibilities of higher education for foreign students and has retained a leading position among other European countries in state-fostered attraction of foreign students and allocation of financial resources in educational initiatives (DAAD).

3.2.2. The United Kingdom

The UK perceives citizenship as a universal, civic concept, based less on the sense of ethnic belonging and more on the idea of democratic individual rights along the lines of the American tradition.

Joppke remarks that Britain has never in fact possessed a strong concept of citizenship, which has, through the country's history, been substituted by subjectship to the Crown. 'In absence of a meaningful concept of citizenship, British immigration policy had to operate on a proxy. This proxy has been race'. Measures at stopping the immigration from the New Commonwealth have defined the main course of the country's activities in this sphere, which brought accusations of 'racial discrimination' on the UK. However, proponents of restrictions argued that they were trying to defend the rights of their own nation, and this nation was predominantly white, thus the immigration policy had to exclude the non-whites. Even though, in the longer run, Britain accepted many unwanted ex-colonial migrants, this migration has never been encouraged. However, the presence of minorities has been incorporated into the country's idea of nationhood, which now perceives itself as a multicultural society.

As far as ethnic groups from Eastern Europe are concerned, Britain never had historical ties with any of them. Only two communities originating from Eastern Europe have long histories in Britain: the Jewish and Polish communities. The presence of the former can be traced back to the 16th century, while the latter were given a right to stay after the Second World War, as many Polish pilots had fought on the British side.

Britain, being restrictive almost in all spheres of its immigration policy, has however been very attractive to illegal immigrants due to lack of controls inside the borders. After the initial entrance is made, further identity checks inside the territory are rare, which distinguishes this country from Germany. This lack of internal controls, combined with a liberal economic system with expanded service sector, lures masses of illegal workers into the country. While the UK lacks efficient legislation to stop shadow work, the structure of its labor market offers many opportunities in service sector and in other low-skilled spheres. The total number of illegal migrants is hard to measure. For instance, many citizens of new EU member-states (especially from Poland and Baltic States) had been working in the UK illegally years before their countries joined the EU, and their story is now being repeated by citizens of the CIS and Russia.

In the attempt to stop this tendency, Britain opens legal channels for temporary work through special programs for seasonal employment. It also positions itself as a world center of business and finance, and tries to attract self-dependent and self-employed migrants, for whom restrictions on entry are lifted. As Germany, it also attracts

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highly-qualified specialists in IT, medicine, banking (through a Highly Skilled Migrant Program and through contracts that can be held up to 5 years). Britain has a high profile as a country of education, which also constitutes a channel for temporary migration.

3.2.3. Conclusion

Although some overarching similarities, common for developed countries, exist in the immigration policies of the UK and Germany, several distinctions can be remarked upon. The first variation lies in the basic construction of national self-perception. The ethnic concept of nationhood for Germany has defined its active policies in attracting its co-ethnics to its territory, and only in the 21st century there is a chance for the country to restructure its immigration policy by shedding its strong ethnic component. British reliance on civic, universal national concept, based on individual citizenship, has been overarching principle in creation of multicultural Britishness which today includes different races and religions. Secondly, the strength of Constitutional Court in Germany presents legal constraints for the government to realize restrictive measures in immigration, while Parliament in Britain enjoys unprecedented executive power. Presence of moral obligations to certain groups adds to German incapacity to restrict immigration, while Britain has never assumed responsibility for its former colonial dependants. And finally, relative weakness of inside-border controls, combined with labour market structure, has increased Britain’s attractiveness for illegal labour, while this problem is not as acute in Germany.

3.3. Patterns of migration from Russia to the UK and Germany.

3.3.1. Germany

As we can clearly see from the overview of immigration policies of Germany and the UK, Germany offers two structural channels of ‘privileged’ ethnic migration for people from the former Soviet Union: CIS and Russia. They are ethnic German and ethnic Jewish migration. Other migration opportunities are linked with asylum seeking, initiatives of inviting seasonal and temporary labour force, as well as with contracts in professional fields, and student migration. However, the first two channels outnumber
other possible paths dramatically, a fact which has had a strong influence on further integration of people from Russia and the FSU in Germany. Here are several statistics on presence of migrants who have Russia as country of origin in Germany. As in ethnic out-migration Ukraine and Kazakhstan presented important sending areas, the figures for these countries are also given.

1) Statistical figures on the inflow of Aussiedler show that this channel of immigration remains strong, and the former Soviet Union space is the main sending area, accounting for 95 percent of all immigrants. However, the tendency at diminishing of migrants’ numbers is also clear, which is linked, firstly, with quotas and restrictions of ethnic immigration established from the early 1990s, secondly, with natural exhaustion of potential pool of migrants, as those who wanted to move realize their decision, and, thirdly, with the end of ‘shock waves’ and the stabilization of economic situation in Russia and CIS, when permanent emigration looses attractiveness in the eyes of potential migrants.

| Table 3. Inflow of Aussiedler to Germany, by Country of Origin, 1990 to 2000 |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Total                          | 397 073     | 221 995     | 230 565     | 218 888     | 222 591     | 217 898     | 177 751     | 134 419     | 103 080     | 10491 95 615|
| Poland                         | 133 872     | 40 129      | 17 742      | 5 431       | 2 440       | 1 677       | 1 175       | 687         | 488         | 428         | 484         |
| Hungary                        | 1 336 952   | 354         | 37          | 40          | 43          | 14          | 18          | 4           | 4           | 2           |             |
| Romania                        | 111 150     | 32 178      | 16 146      | 5 811       | 6 615       | 6 519       | 4 284       | 1 777       | 1 005       | 855         | 547         |
| Former Czechoslovakia          | 1 708 927   | 460         | 134         | 97          | 62          | 14          | 8           | 16          | 11          | 18          |
| Former Soviet Union            | 147 950     | 147 320     | 195 576     | 207 347     | 213 214     | 209 409     | 172 181     | 131 895     | 101 550     | 103 599     | 94 558      |
| Former Yugoslavia              | 961 450     | 199         | 120         | 182         | 178         | 77          | 34          | 14          | 19          |             |             |
| Other countries                | 96 39 88 8  | 3 10 6 ___ 3 | 3 ___ 6    |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office)\textsuperscript{72}

2) Jewish immigration

\textsuperscript{72} presented at the site [www.migrationinformation.org](http://www.migrationinformation.org)
Jewish immigrants don’t receive citizenship on their arrival; they have an entirely different status of ‘quota refugees’, which was applied to them in absence of other appropriate immigration status. The status of a ‘quota refugee’ makes these migrants eligible for financial support to facilitate their integration, gives them a right to work and a right to apply for welfare benefits. As Marshall writes, there is no limit on annual intake of these migrants, probably because their numbers remain relatively low. In the early 1990s 10,000 migrants came to Germany on overage. From the mid-1990s the numbers rose to circa 20,000 a year, culminating in 30,000 in 1998. By 1999 102,311 Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union were admitted to Germany.73

3) Asylum seekers

Although the laws on asylum-seeking have been restricted in Germany, and Russia and the CIS are considered by the international human rights community as ‘safe countries’, some people especially from areas of the CIS where conflicts take place, apply for asylum in Germany. The status of individuals migrating with this path is rather precarious. They don’t have a right to work when and after their case is considered, and either seek for welfare benefits or get involved in shadow work.

Table 4. Annual number of asylum applications by nationality, 1980 – 2001

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,337</td>
<td>5,690</td>
<td>5,692</td>
<td>5,361</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>1,647</td>
<td>1,592</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>2,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,603</td>
<td>4,510</td>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>1,763</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,763</td>
<td>4,523</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>678</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge74

4) Seasonal and guestworkers. Germany is quite active in its new effort to bring seasonal workers from Central and Eastern Europe, and according to the agreement of 1994, the contingent of guestworkers from Russian Federation constitutes 2,000.75

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74 Presented at the site www.migrationinformation.org
5) Professionals coming through Green Card Initiative, academics, students, businessmen. Germany develops initiatives of attracting highly-qualified specialists, and tries to re-focus its immigration incentives on these groups, while they seem to be still overshadowed by main ethnic migration channels.

Generally, Russia remains at the top of the main sending countries, along with Poland and Turkey, its impact of immigration situation in Germany being reflected both in figures of foreign population in Germany and in annual influx numbers.

### Table 5. Top Ten Sending Countries, 1994 to 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Place of Russia</th>
<th>Place of Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Place of Ukraine</th>
<th>Number of immigrants from Russia</th>
<th>Acquisition of citizenship by Russian migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33,443</td>
<td>60,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32,986</td>
<td>60,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31,882</td>
<td>62,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24,815</td>
<td>65,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21,336</td>
<td>39,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27,777</td>
<td>4,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32,071</td>
<td>4,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36,554</td>
<td>3,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35,816</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31,009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office)

However, one may notice that Russia (especially) and Ukraine as sending countries intensified migration outflows towards the late 1990s, which was the opposite of Kazakhstan. This tendency is linked with ceasing intensity of ethnic German migration, in which Kazakhstan was of the main sending areas, and points to the development of new migration patterns. Also the numbers of German citizenship acquisitions reduce dramatically after the year 2000. Judging by the analysis of general tendencies in out-migration from the CIS and Russia, this can indicate the growing importance of economic and temporary migration, where Russians are the most active ethnic group in the CIS (Zayonchkovskaya, 2000), and where acquisition of German citizenship ceases to be a final goal. In temporary migration such patterns are the most

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76 Presented at the site [www.migrationinformation.org](http://www.migrationinformation.org)
prominent: academic and highly-qualified migration and migration for educational purposes.

### 3.3.2. United Kingdom

In this country there are no specific immigration opportunities for people from the CIS and Russia, so the patchwork of migration patterns becomes more individualized and can not be reduced to main structural migration patterns. However, two tendencies can be identified. Firstly, migrants from Russia copy major patterns developed by migrants from the Eastern Europe (Poland and Baltic states), that is asylum applications, seasonal low-skilled work in service and agriculture, shadow and illegal work.

The statistics for asylum seekers show that their number in the UK has been minimal:

#### Table 6. Applications received for asylum in the United Kingdom, excluding dependants, by nationality, 1996 to 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other FSU</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>2,235</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td>2,275</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Office Bulletin: Control of Immigration: Statistics UK

Secondly, from the beginning of the 1990s Russian academics and scholars, students, and independent artists and writers, and media people have been drawn to the UK in search of opportunities for development. Also, from the mid-1990s Russia has been making its presence felt in the UK through entrepreneurs, oligarchs and new Russians. Here the image of London as a cultural and financial centre plays a major role. Development of business opportunities in Russia, as well as continuing polarization of the society are also reflected here. Migration through marriage is an important trend in the UK, as well as in Germany. The main categories of entrants are represented in the following statistical table of 2004:

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Table 7. Passengers given leave to enter the United Kingdom by purpose of journey, and passengers refused entry at port and subsequently removed, by nationality, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Total admitted</th>
<th>Visitors</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Au pairs</th>
<th>Work permit holders</th>
<th>Dependents of work permit holders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>business</td>
<td></td>
<td>≥ 12 months</td>
<td>≤ 12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>193,000</td>
<td>78,500</td>
<td>39,300</td>
<td>13,200</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>53,300</td>
<td>14,700</td>
<td>6,680</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other FSU</td>
<td>54,700</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>9,600</td>
<td>4,680</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>As a husband or fiancée</th>
<th>As a wife or a fiancée</th>
<th>Asylum related cases an depends</th>
<th>Accepted for settlement on arvl</th>
<th>Refused entry at port</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the UK the prevalence of temporary migration is a very evident trend, ensuing both from the lack of structural state-initiated channels of permanent migration and from the restrictiveness of British ‘zero-immigration’ policies. The patchwork of migration pathways represented above shows that the majority of them represent temporary migration. This situation is reflected in dramatically low numbers of grants of settlement and citizenship for Russians:

Table 8. Grants of settlement by nationality, 1994-2004

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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former USSR, of which</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other FSU</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>830</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Home Office Bulletin: Control of Immigration: Statistics UK\(^79\)

\(^78\) Ibid., p.30-31.
\(^79\) Ibid., p.72.
Table 9. Acquisition of citizenship by nationality, 1990-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>1,185</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>1,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>470</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Immigration Research and Statistics Service, Home Office, Government of the United Kingdom

3.3.3. Conclusion

We can make several final remarks based on these statistical figures. Firstly, the numbers of people from CIS and Russia in Germany outnumber by a large proportion those in the UK. Secondly, Germany represents a more developed and structurally channeled country of immigration for people from the former Soviet Union and Russia, while the UK doesn’t encourage any out-migration from Eastern Europe or from Russia. Thirdly, the presence of Russian migrants in Germany in numbers sufficient for them to constitute an ethnic minority can be identified as a relatively ‘old’ phenomenon (starting with the third wave and continuing now), while the same cannot be said about the UK, where Russians are far from establishing an ethnic minority as we know it. Fourthly, new migration patterns, such as labour and business, education and scientific migration are developing in Germany only as a background alternative to two-fold ethnic migration, while in the UK these diversified patterns, although complex, are the core of Russian migration. These differences have had an impact on the integration of migrants from Russia and the CIS in two receiving societies and their perception of themselves, and are also reflected in the general image of Russians that exist in Germany and the UK. In the third part of the work we will try to trace these differences, using two Russian-language newspapers, *Londonsky courier* and *Russkaja Germanija/ Russkij Berlin* as sources of information. We will try to find evidence of the impact of structural immigration channels on the respective integration stages, cultural practices and self-identities of migrants who originated from the same country but continued their lives in two different countries, the UK and Germany.

80 Presented at the site [www.migrationinformation.org](http://www.migrationinformation.org)


In this part we’ll analyze patterns of integration of Russian migrants in the receiving societies, the UK and Germany. This study puts out a hypotheses that structural differences in migration, which are reflected in different state inducements to special categories of migrants and neutrality (or restrictiveness) to the others, have a strong influence on further stages of integration of migrants. This hypothesis has a theoretical base in the theory of path dependency, which is used in comparative social, political and economic studies. The path dependency approach presumes that choices made at earlier stages influence the results of later stages, and, moreover, narrow the range of possible choices at these later stages. Thus, the reversal from a chosen path might prove rather difficult for an actor, in our case, for a migrant. This methodological approach is invoked by Faist in his analysis of state of the art in migration research:

A path-dependent approach seeks to specify how a sequence of choices by actors drives (...) developments. [...] The basic idea here is that once actors such as persons or organizations have started down a certain track, the costs of reversal may be very high. There will be other choice points, however, at which decisions have to be taken [...]. A path-dependent effect occurs when a previous decision, norm or rule reinforces itself, when it determines in part the subsequent development of events. \(^{81}\) (Faist, 2004: 346).

Faist further compares this approach to the cumulative causation approach in its positive feedback variant. Cumulative causation happens when ‘each of the factors identified has an influence on all other factors either directly or indirectly, and each factor

is influenced through other factors. The positive feedback type of cumulative causation exists when 'the cumulative effects propel a development to depart more and more from its origin.'

Both concepts share in common this pattern-like vision of social actions. Faist applies the metaphor of a ‘funnel’ to describe this notion: 'once an actor such as a state has taken certain decisions, it eliminates, by that very act, other possible courses of action' (Faist, 2004: 346).

This study also presumes that once a structural migration opportunity has been chosen, it defines to a large extent the peculiarities of further stages of integration. This study attempts to trace the differences in integration of Russian migrants in the UK and Germany. The differences in countries’ immigration policies have indicated that different groups and different numbers of migrants can be found in these two countries. Thus, it is highly possible to reveal certain integration paths for migrants in UK and Germany, and, moreover, to differentiate the groups inside the countries to such different integration patterns.

In our study of we will follow the multi-variate approach which has been used firstly by Gordon, a classic of assimilation theory, and then re-interpreted and modified by Harmut Esser. Bommes presents the system of Esser, which divides the integration process into four different stages or spheres: cognitive, structural, social and identificational assimilation. A similar approach was proposed by Anthony Richmond, who calls it a ‘multivariate approach’, and presents it as an alternative to purely linear approaches, such as assimilation theory, or purely structural, such as neo-Marxist theory. (Richmond, 1988: 31-37). Richmond distinguishes new particular aspects of integration and posits that they are not developed in one linear way, but reflect an uneven process of a migrant’s adaptation:

A multivariate approach to immigrant adaptation in receiving societies was required, which distinguished the factors influencing economic integration from

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82 Ibid., p.345.
83 Ibid.
those determining acculturation, social integration, identification and satisfaction. These were not necessarily correlated with each other, nor could they be represented as a linear process leading to eventual assimilation (…).

The implications of this multivariate approach to immigrant adaptation (…) was further developed in terms of education, occupational status, acculturation, ethnic identity and social conflict (…).  

This division has been widely used for a multi-dimensional study of modern integration of migrants. For instance, Wolf (2005) in his presentation on integration of migrant youth in Germany mentions almost the same four aspects of integration as Esser (1980): cultural, structural, social and identificational. He also gives concise definitions of these stages, which are of importance for this research and should be quoted here.

Cultural integration – processes of cognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitudinal change in individuals.

Structural integration – the acquisition of rights and the access to positions and statuses in the core institutions of the receiving society by the immigrants and their descendants.

Social integration – membership in the new society as reflected in migrants’ private relationships and group memberships (social intercourse, friendships, marriages, voluntary associations).

Identificational integration – membership in a new society on the subjective level, expressed in feelings of belonging and identification, particularly in forms of ethnic or/and national identification.

This multidimensional, or multivariate approach will be used in our analysis of Russian migrants’ integration as it will allow us to trace the existence of path dependency. If our supposition is true, than the effects of the chosen migration strategy will be reflected in all or in some stages of migrant’s integration. We can expect to find differences in adaptation of Russian migrants in Germany and the UK and search for factors accounting for these differences.

87 Ibid., p.36.
4.2. Media as a source of integration analysis.

The major source for empirical research, which will be supported by theoretical evidence found by previous research in the area, will be Russian-language press in London and Berlin. The choice of Russian-language press as the source of information seems very adequate for the purposes of this study. The press in this research would be seen in its two-fold function, as a reflection and a representation of reality. Scientists argue which of these two functions prevails for the press. In my point of view, media uses these two functions in different situations: for where the sharing of information is needed and objective reports of situations are required, the realities call for objectivity, while on other issues the media is expected to address value orientations of its public and present new discourses which could help the orientation of the reader in the reality. To some extent, the media, as a re-interpretation of a reality, wholly consists of constructed notions and frames, as the reality and its coverage in the press are divided by such actions as choice of the news, framing of the news, presentation from a certain point of view, omission of details which are considered needless, features of style. This is why for our analysis of Russian-language press the use of constructivism as a methodological base and of discourse analysis as a method will be important. But the aspect of media as a reflection of reality would be also of importance, as we would seek details of migrants’ integration in host societies as represented in the press.

The choice of newspaper articles as primary sources of information methodologically offers us several advantages. Firstly, it is in the press that the researcher would be able to find reflections of general tendencies in integration which are representative of migrants and specific groups of them. Grasping these general tendencies through individual interviews would be much more time-consuming, as it would take much more individual histories to have a representation of general trends of integration. For our research, which is limited in its scale, the press would present a sort of a filter for topical information in lives of migrants. Of course, understanding the fact of the filtering, we would be alert not to take it as reality as a whole. Nevertheless, we would try to see how much can be known about the facts we want to know from the press.

Secondly, the choice of Russian-language press, which belongs not to the mainstream press, but the so-called ‘ethnic press’ will allow the researcher a view from the inside, which is so hard to achieve in research. This press is written by immigrants for other migrants, and supposedly appeals to their interests and presumes identification
with their opinions. In the case of Russian-language press Anderson’s imagined community is also created from the audiences of the newspaper, and we can presuppose that the rhythms, the topical issues and daily details are the ones which are to a certain extent common to our ‘imagined community’ of migrants. This presupposition will allow us to make conclusions about the realities based on their reflection in the media.

Thirdly, it is in mediated spaces where discourses of social group identities are the most pronounced. In this respect, one of the media’s most important functions is its role in shaping these group identities by several means: by implicit or explicit juxtaposing of in-groups and out-groups, by highlighting certain categories which are of importance for group self-identification and by transgressing certain boundaries of separation from unwanted linkages. These processes were described by Barth\(^89\) and can be understood with the use a constructivist approach, where the press is regarded as a means of shaping and forming identity discourses and negotiating social and cultural boundaries.

Pfetsch in her research on media use by Aussiedler from Russia highlights the importance of publicly negotiated identity in the media:

(…) mass communication gains its relevance in processes of integration by creating a social and political reality that provides a reference system for both majority and minority communities. The second argument to focus on mass communication lies in the role of mass media as institutions in the sense that they can serve as communication channels (or mobilization agents) for groups in voicing their issues and creating a discourse within the minority community itself as well as within the majority culture.\(^90\)

This mobilization function of ethnic media is revealed in its role as a source of creating socio-cultural fields within its audiences, when readers of a particular edition become drawn to a certain circle of shared discourses, attitudes and self-identities. This shared cultural field is created and pro-created, as the readers wish to find their values reinforced in the edition they subscribe to, while the media men come to know their audiences and present material in the way appropriate for this field.


\(^{90}\) Pfetsch, Barbara (1999) “In Russia we are Germans, and now we are Russians” – Dilemmas of Identity Formation and Communication among German-Russian Aussiedler. – Science Centre Berlin for Social Research, Working paper FS III 99-103., p.5.
Fourthly, for our particular cases the newspapers used by migrants in the UK and Germany will be the most appropriate type of the media for this research, as, while migrant-produced Russian TV stations are not a wide-used phenomenon in either country, existing radio stations, which are more oriented at leisure fulfillment, cannot be regarded as a true means of representing migrant communities and shaping their group identities. Newspapers have a long history of uniting Russian communities abroad, and traditionally are regarded by Russians as the most preferable source of easily accessible information.

In our wish to conceive of Russian-language press as a source of primary information about integration pathways we must take notice of several aspects, which will make us more alert to constructive aspects of this press. Firstly, we must be aware that, although journalists are migrants themselves, they may be not be fully representative of a pool of migrants, and this fact will surely cause a framing of presented information. Some aspects can be left behind. The articles are surely not discourses of migrants per se, but their representation by intellectuals, writers, journalists who, in their personal histories, may have not experienced certain migration situations.

Secondly, we must realize the presence of an entertainment aspect in newspapers. One of their functions is leisure which assumes pleasure to read, the media, as a business enterprise, cannot be expected to be full of detailed practical reports on integration. We could expect positive aspects to be highlighted and negative downplayed and entertaining stories dominating the reading materials, as the media tries to cater to its audiences’ interests.

Thirdly, a specific of ethnic press is that not only professional journalists are invited to contribute, and, also, slight changes in practices of material presentation (varying according to the degree of professionalism of editions and its intended audiences) can be expected. We must bear in mind that ethnic press sometimes overlooks professional media aspects while focusing on practical things as information sharing. However, these amateur aspects would be reduced by our choice of long-established media editions – Londonsky Courrier and Russkaja Germanija /Russkij Berlin. But before proceeding to the analysis of chosen articles from these newspapers, it would be appropriate to give a general overview of the main newspapers printed in Russian in Germany and the UK.
4.3. Russian-language press in the UK and Germany: an overview.

4.3.1. The United Kingdom

In the UK, as we have discussed, the numbers of people from Russia and the FSU are dramatically smaller than in Germany. However, Russian-language media, both printed and digital, has been actively developed by migrants. The majority of the editions are concentrated in London, which has the largest Russian presence among other British cities, and has been historically a cultural centre where previous waves of immigrants also launched press editions (Alexander Herzen’s *Kolokol* could be named as the first of them). Press editions of different style and content are published in London. The *Russian London Courier & RussianUK* company publishes a fortnightly newspaper *London Courier* (Londonsky courier) and a quarterly glossy magazine *RussianUK*. The newspaper London Courier is the first newspaper of the fourth-wave immigration in the UK. It was launched in 1994, and has been gaining popularity with Russian-speaking community ever since. It is subscribed by 3600 firms and individuals, and is sold through a WH Smith and World Press network of 250 newsagents. The magazine *RussianUK* is devoted to the Life Style of the Russian community in London. It focuses on property, fashion, interior design, shopping, travel, leisure, eating out, health and beauty and investment opportunities.

An intellectual magazine *Kolokol* is another press edition appearing in London, and it can be distinguished from all other press by its specific format close to that of The New Yorker. Its contributors are mainly intellectuals from Russia and it covers the issues of Russian cultural life in past and present. The realities of Russian migration and life in the UK are virtually not touched upon.

Another important Russian-language edition presenting analytical information on political and social events in Russia and the UK, as well as covering integration realities of Russian migrants, is *London-INFO*. It is a product of a publishing house with the same name. The newspaper is issued every Friday in 20 000 copies, each containing 28 pages. It has about 10 000 subscribers, and is sold at newsagents in Great Britain and Ireland91.

A Russian-language magazine *Russian London* focuses on business and lifestyle information and entertainment. London-Info and *Russian London*, besides the

91 [www.london-info.co.uk](http://www.london-info.co.uk).
press edition itself, have additional Internet sites, which not only include digital variants of printed editions, but are interactive portals in their own right. They feature a lot of advertisement-related information, the latest information on cultural events of interest to Russian communities and also have Internet forums. An international edition of the popular Russian monthly newspaper *Argumenty I Faktory* is also issued in London, as well as in Germany.

Outside London, the Russian-language newspaper *Dostizheniya* is published in Manchester and also claims to be the oldest Russian newspaper in Britain by tracing its first edition to the year of 1927. It has articles on British and Russian politics and economics, on British culture and traditions. The division of material between Britain and Russia is highly oriented towards Britain, but without mentioning the realities of migrants’ lives in the country.

For the purposes of our research it is the *London courier* and, partly, the *London-Info* which present the most interest. *Kolokol* tends to focus fully on Russian historical and cultural past, and contributions to it are made by Russian intellectual figures. Problems of integration are hardly mentioned at all here. The orientation of Russian London on practical information and advertisements reduces its value as a source if information about identities of immigrants. In comparison to these editions, *London courier* seems to suit our purposes, because they touch upon present issues of immigration and include in their content value-charged opinion articles, which can be used as important sources for our research. In this research digital variants of articles were used, which are located in the archive of *London courier* on the site www.russianuk.com, and on the site of London-info www.london-info.co.uk.

### 4.3.2. Germany

The nature of Russian-language media in Germany reflects both more diversified areas of migrants’ settlement (as compared to the UK) and the larger number of migrants leaving in the country. Overall, more than 30 newspapers and magazines in the Russian language are published in Germany, and there are several radio and TV stations as well. Places where newspapers are published reflect the most popular regions for settlements of migrants: Berlin, Frankfurt-on-Main, Stuttgart and North-Rhine-Westphalia. In starting an overview of existing newspapers in Germany, one instantly notes the presence of two types of editions absent in the UK due to the reason that they
reflect the realities of immigration characteristics of Germany. Firstly, there are a number of newspapers oriented especially on Aussiedler. Firstly, it is the Pereselenets (Aussiedler), which is ‘a monthly journal in Germany about Aussiedler and for Aussiedler’\(^92\). It has regional editions in North-Rhine-Westphalia, Bremen and East North Rein-Westfalia/ North Hessen. The journal is distributed for free in Russian shops in Germany. In its address to readers the papers states that the success of successful adaptation of migrants from the CIS depends on their sense of community and on sharing common problems and experiences. It also mentions the fact that many migrants have kept Russian as their main language\(^93\). The paper invites letters and feedback from Aussiedler, and provides expert advice in legal, financial, welfare, labour and every day matters. Secondly, it is two affiliate newspapers published in Kalletal: Zemlyaki (The Countrymen) and Voprosy i Otvety (Questions and Answers). Two monthly newspapers printed by one publishing house focusing on the life of Aussiedler from Russia. The newspaper Questions and answers has a corresponding format where problematic issues of adaptation in Germany are explained, and the questions of readers related to life in Germany are answered. The newspapers have a circulation of 300,000 copies.

There is also a newspaper Evreyskaya Gazeta (Jewish Newspaper) reflecting the presence of powerful Jewish community in Germany. It is published by Werner Media Group holding, whose other press editions are oriented on migrants from the CIS. This monthly newspaper has been published since 2002 in Berlin, with circulation of 50,000 copies. It is distributed to subscribers in Europe, USA and Israel. It is oriented to all people interested in Jewish life and culture, and, along with presentations of national Jewish themes, covers main political and social news from European perspective\(^94\).

The most professional and popular among migrants, as well as one of the earliest newspapers launched during the fourth wave of immigration, is Russkaja Germanija/Russkij Berlin. This monthly newspaper professionally covers political, economical and social events in Germany (mostly) and Russia (under a special heading ‘One Sixth’). It has these regional editions: Russkij Berlin (Russian Berlin), Reinskaja Gazeta (Rein Newspaper), RG/Frankija, RG/Hamburg-Sever (Hamburg-North), RG/Hannover. It has the most developed supporting Internet site, which features all articles of the past years with photos of high quality. Its editor is Boris Feldmann.

\(^92\) http://www.russiaeurope.com/ru/countries/germany/achern/pereselenets
\(^93\) http://www.pereselenec.de/
\(^94\) http://www.evreyskaya.de/about/
There is also a particular type of Russian-language press edition not specifically oriented on Aussiedler, but specializing in expert advise on various aspects if life in Germany. These are magazines *Neue Zeiten Frankfurt* in Frankfurt-on-Main, *Partner* in Dormund, *Consultant* in Berlin.

*Neue Zeiten Frankfurt* is Russian-German magazine. It has been printed monthly from 2002 in Frankfurt-on-Main. The magazine contains, according to its own statement, “analytical articles on legal issues, professional consultations in law, materials about business, finance, enterprises and labour markets in Germany, matters of adaptation, information about medical insurance and news of culture and science”\(^95\). The paper states that in spite of the differences in goals and future plans that migrants from Russia may have, they strive for communication with compatriots in common language. The newspaper is distributed in CIS consulates in Frankfurt, in Russian shops, law agencies, at Russian concerts and on board air flights from/to Russia.

*Partner* is a Russian journal published in Dortmund. It has a corresponding Internet server “Partner Info – Integration Centre, which offers expert advice in all spheres: labour, law, finance, schooling, education, housing, and has a special heading on integration issues. The journal is published from 1997, and has a motto: “Objective – integration”, which reflects its main concept. According to this concept, the information needs of migrants are revealed and then satisfied.\(^96\)

*Consultant* is a fortnightly Russian-language magazine published in Berlin since 1998. It offers information and expert advice in various spheres: immigration, taxes and finance, labour.

Another type of Russian-language newspaper in Germany are the regional editions of Russian newspapers, such as *Moskovsky Komsomolets Germanija* (MK Germany), *Komsomolskaya Pravda Germanija* (KP Germany) and *Argumenty I Fakty Europa* (AiF Europe).

*Moskovsky Komsomolets Germanija* (MK Germany) is printed weekly in Frankfurt-on-Main in 35,000 copies. It is promoted in the Bonn consulate, at Russian concerts, and can be received by subscription. The paper states that its strength is in the combination of orientation of realities of German life and professional coverage of life in Russia (politics and economics and exclusive interviews with stars and intellectual figures. It also notes that the basis for its existence is the wish of incoming migrants from

\(^95\) [http://www.russiaeurope.com/ru/countries/germany/frankfurt/neuezeiten](http://www.russiaeurope.com/ru/countries/germany/frankfurt/neuezeiten)

\(^96\) [www.partner-inform.de](http://www.partner-inform.de)
the CIS to receive news from places they left and to communicate in their native language. The paper combines information with entertainment.

Werner Media Group owns a number of editions: Evropa-Express, an illustrated weekly newspaper with circulation of 120,000 copies, Berlinskaya Gazeta (Berlin Newspaper), a regional edition of Evropa-Express for Berlin and Brandenburg, Evreyskaya Gazeta (Jewish Newspaper), Vsya EVROPA (All Europe), a glossy magazine published 6 times a year with a circulation of 90,000 copies, and TV-Arena, a supplement of Evropa-Express und Berlinskaya Gazeta with TV programs.

Germanija Plus, Munchen Plus, and Augsburg Plus are newspapers in the Russian-language published in Munich by a Verlag Terterian publishing house (founded in 1998), specializing in products for Russian-speaking German residents. Concern Alex Group in Löhne publishes Anons and Labirint.

Vesti is a Russian-language newspaper published in Frankfurt-on-Main since 2002 by Interpress Media company, which was founded in 1995 as a branch of the Russian media holding Sovershenno Sekretno.

There are specific editions that stand out of any group. The international newspaper Emigrant is a monthly newspaper in the Russian language which has a motto: “One world, one language, one newspaper” and covers the lives of Russian emigrants in different European countries and America. A magazine Literaturny Evropeetz (Literary European) is a monthly Russian-language magazine dedicated to literature and writing. It is an official journal of the Writers’ Alliance in Germany, and is published in Frankfurt-on-Main.

Other newspapers combine coverage of news with entertainment, life-style and advertisements. Here could be named U nas v Gamburge (Here, in Hamburg), Eure Zeitung, a Russian-language paper in Bavaria, specializing in arranging marital contacts, Panorama, a weekly magazine in German and Russian published in Hanover, Novy Image (New Image) in Berlin.

For the research on Germany the following newspapers were used as sources of information: Russkaja Germanija/Russkij Berlin which has a broad range of articles on Russians in Germany and their self-identification, as well as articles where the integration problems of special groups of migrants are covered, Evreyskaya Gazeta (for more inside information on Russian Jews as an important category of migrants from

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97 http://www.mk-germany.de
98 http://www.wernermedia.de/de/medien/index.htm
post-soviet space) and Partner-Inform, a newspaper featuring articles with expert advice on many aspects of integration and adaptation.

4.3.3. Conclusion.

The preliminary conclusions about different situations in the two countries can already be made on the basis of this overview. The more dense and developed mediascape of Russian-language newspapers in Germany is undoubtedly a reflection of the fact that the number of immigrants from Russian and the FSU is much higher in Germany, and the establishment and expansion of Russian audience for these newspapers is a respectively older phenomenon than in the UK. The difference in the numerical presence of migrants was already brought to light by statistical figures. Its importance cannot be underestimated, because, as we will see later, the larger presence of Russians has an influence on the content and character of articles appearing in newspapers in the two countries. No conclusions can so far be made about the social diversity of migrants, however. Another important difference is geographical. The media in Germany are spread across the country, and reflect the most developed immigration destinations for people from Russia and the CIS (Frankfurt, Berlin, North Rein-Westphalia, and Bavaria). Their location proves the remarks of Marshall (2000) on geographical trends in migration settlements: “Foreigners in Germany have tended to concentrate in large urban centers (...). In certain districts of some of the big cities foreigners make up over 50 per cent of the population (...). Seventy-five per cent of foreigners in Germany live in the four big states (Baden-Württemberg; Bavaria; Hesse; North-Rhine-Westphalia).” (Marshall, 2000: 40-41). Thus, for instance, Russkaja Germanija has regional branch newspapers which properly reflect the main areas of migrants’ settlement. The fact that on later stages of immigrants’ arrival they were allocated to certain destinations (so, for instance, they couldn’t all stay in Berlin) has also affected the geographical distribution of Russian-language press in the country. In the UK, as immigration is in no way affected by special state measures aimed at channeling the immigration, the concentration of Russian-language media in London reflects the centripetal patterns of settlement developed by migrants. The city, which was attractive as a business, cultural and scientific centre, was the first choice place for migrants to stay, as Berlin was a first-choice place for Russian migrants at the earlier stages of their arrival. Also, salience of contractual professional migration makes London the major
place of settlement, as many firms inviting specialists from Russia are also situated in London.


The first important difference which is obvious to trace is the degree and nature of coverage of immigration matters, and, more precisely, the extent of coverage of existing strategies and ways of moving, temporarily or permanently, the UK or Germany.

On the pages of two studied newspapers, London-INFO and London Courier, immigration issues invariably constitute one of the most developed and extensive columns, with articles presenting information on existing pathways, programs and related legal issues. The range of existing programs appears to be large, catering for migrants with different social characteristics and different motivations. Presented information has a tendency to be oriented on potential migrants with either high financial resources (investors, individual entrepreneurs, bankers and representatives of foreign companies) or developed specialized skills (specialists, researchers, engineers, doctors, etc.). The objective of articles is to provide information on existing visa regimes and required documents in order to enable a person to make an individual decision as to which strategy is the most appropriate to him or her. Migration, temporary or permanent, to Britain, is constructed on the pages of London Courier as an action potentially possible for everyone who is persistent and well-qualified enough: “(…) every case, even the most hopeless, may bring to a person the acquisition of immigration status”\textsuperscript{99}. Migration gradually loses its characteristics as a challenging and risky enterprise: “At the present moment immigration to Great Britain is not an extremely complicated or costly enterprise”\textsuperscript{100}. The possibility to migrate, as the Russian-language press posits, is strengthened by the range of available migration programs: “Great Britain has today become one of the most promising countries in regard of diversity of offered immigration programs”\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{100} Открытие бизнеса в Британии как способ иммиграции (Часть 1). – Лондонский курьер. - № 230, 2005, p.11.
\textsuperscript{101} Обзор иммиграционных программ Великобритании (Часть 1). - Лондонский курьер.– № 226, 2005, p.11.
Migration, therefore, is presented as an individual action, where the existing social and cultural capital of a migrant, coupled with legal expertise play crucial role. The need on the part of Great Britain for highly qualified specialists is frequently brought to light and the migration of such specialists, as well as students and business people, from Russia and the FSU, is presented as a process which is highly positive and beneficial for the UK.

On the contrary, in Russian-language newspapers in Germany, the fact that only two major immigration channels exist is frequently mentioned: “The majority of us have come to Germany as “Russian Jews” or “Russian Germans”¹⁰². Immigration issues are virtually not present in the most influential newspaper, Russkaja Germanija, as well as in Evreyskaya Gazeta, apart from some information on expected restrictions on Jewish immigration. Other possible pathways of migration to Germany are not covered at all. Only newspapers focusing on expert advice, such as Pereselenets, or Partner-Inform, feature special columns on legal advice on immigration issues, and here the lion’s share of information is on immigration issues related to two major groups of potential migrants. Only one article in Partner-Inform provides an overview of the existing possibilities of migration to Germany. Among studied sources only the Internet site Vorota v Germaniju (Gate to Germany) presents an exception. Under the heading “How to get to Germany” it gives information and posts remarks on such migrant categories as Kontingentflüchtlinge, Spätaussidler, contract workers (including green-card holders), spouses, au-pairs, students and asylum seekers¹⁰³. In general, articles in this sphere don't encourage individual initiative and present immigration information as related to groups rather than individuals. Moreover, lack of articles on immigration in Russkaja Germanija can be attributed to the fact that Russian immigration to Germany is a relatively old and stable phenomenon, which to a large extent has already taken place. While vivid and active discussions on migration in London Courier and London-INFO indicate the existence of momentum and diversification of migration to the UK, lack of coverage of these issues in Russkaja Germanija points to the rigidity of the immigration situation, which is assumed to have already taken place, at least along its two major structural channels. Another important difference is that, while the eligibility for migration to the UK is based on individual characteristics of a migrant, belonging to a special ethnic group provides a right for migration in the German case.

¹⁰³ www.vorota.de
Let us take a look in detail at specific details of immigration issues coverage and representation of migration from Russia in studied newspapers.

4.4.1. The United Kingdom (London Courier)

Both newspapers feature a special column dedicated to immigration pathways and legal help in these issues. A wide range of migration strategies is presented and explained, most of which envisage temporary migration and only after that possible permanent settlement. For instance, the London Courier in its issues 226 and 227 (2005) gives an extended overview of existing immigration programs. These programs don’t include any pathway based on ethnic background and can generally be divided into low-skilled immigration programs, highly-skilled specialist programs, programs related to business and entrepreneurship, and migration opportunities for specific categories. Low-skilled immigration programs include the Low Skilled Migrant Scheme, or Sector Based Scheme in Hospitality and Manufacturing Industries (SBS) intended for young people between 18 and 30 who can work for a period of 12 months in the above mentioned spheres. A similar program is the Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Scheme (SAWS). Workers are received according to quotas. Recent EU-enlargement has diminished the chance of using this program, as places in the low-skilled labor market are now filled with citizens of new member-states. This is why these programs no longer, as London Courier posits, constitute a good choice for Russians: “So, drastic quota shrinking and growing competition of work migrants coming from European Union countries make SBS and SAWS less and less attractive and promising for Russians.”

In this regard Britain is positioned on the pages of London Courier and London-INFO as a country with opening opportunities for highly-specialized and educated specialists, and the image of Britain appearing on their pages is that of a country welcoming migrants who could contribute to its economy. So, London Courier writes: “…according to information on immigration issues presented by the Home Office, legal migration of work force is vitally important for the country’s economy, because today Britain doesn’t compensate its lack with its own resources.” Another quotation supports this image of Britain as a country benefiting economically from the inflow of...

104 Обзор иммиграционных программ Великобритании. – Лондонский курьер. - № 226, 2005, p.11.
105 Ibid.
migrants: “According to the UN, Great Britain is one of 13 industrially developed countries of the world, which urgently need the inflow of youth, as its native population grows old. […] Input of immigrants to the British economy is in the fact that they work earnestly and scrupulously. Natives of other countries work at average 10% more, than local residents”\textsuperscript{106}.

Most attention on the pages of the London Courier is paid to programs aimed at highly-qualified specialists and businessmen. Among possible migration pathways in this sphere are the Highly Skilled Migrant Program, Businessmen, Investors or Sole Representatives of a foreign company programs, Innovators program, Science and Engineering Graduate Scheme, Sponsored Researchers Program, FT-WISS Fresh Talent, Training and Work Experience Scheme, as well as classic work permits and student visas.

These programs are not oriented specifically at Russians, but are aimed generally at foreigners with high financial, scientific or professional capital. Thus, the Training and Work Experience Scheme enables a person to pass through a paid training period in a British company, while classic work permits give Russians an opportunity to be hired by a British company in cases when EU-nationals do no or cannot fill the position. Migration with a work permit, as the London Courier writes, “is open for a very limited number of Russians. Basically, it is a category of specialists whose professionalism is unique or is already known and called for on the side of a British employer”\textsuperscript{107}.

There is also a range of programs aimed at talented scholars and scientists: the Innovators Program, Science and Engineering Graduate Scheme, and Sponsored Researchers. Innovators are invited to put to use their inventions in prioritized fields (such as e-commerce, for instance), while Sponsored Researchers can conduct their scientific research in any field under the sponsorship of either a British or foreign (Russian) company. Also, special privileges are allocated to graduates in exact sciences and engineering, who are allowed to search for work in the year after graduation. The same rule applies to graduates of Scottish Universities in any field, who under the FT-WISS Fresh Talent program can remain in Scotland for 2 years after graduation. Another important field where migration is promoted is in business. Provided they can prove they

\textsuperscript{106} Необходимость иммиграционной поддержки: информация для украинцев. – Лондонский курьер. – № 228, 2005, р.11.
\textsuperscript{107} Обзор иммиграционных программ Великобритании (Часть 2). – Лондонский курьер. - №227, 2005, р.11.
have a certain amount of personal capital, foreigners can come to the UK as entrepreneurs establishing their own businesses, or as investors, or sole representatives of a foreign company. And finally, the HSMP is the most popular scheme of all. This allows a migrant to settle and work in Great Britain provided the acquisition of a certain number of points (for education, achievements, work experience and financial capital). Applications to this program are constantly rising, from 2,000 in 2002 to 7,000 in 2003 and 11,000 in 2004.

In respect of this elite migration, an image of mutually beneficial relationship between the migrant and the British government is created on the pages of London Courier. On the one hand, Britain is aware of its need for specialists and introduces new programs for their attraction: “Great Britain (…) is leading an active policy of attracting qualified specialists and particularly talented people from all over the world. Specialists who are considered most important for the county’s economy receive an invitation to stay in Great Britain, make this country their permanent place of residence, work here and bring into use their innovations”

The London Courier informs its readers of the fact that the UK experiences a lack of specialists in specific research spheres: “It is known that Great Britain indeed experiences high demand in such specialists as engineers, physicists, chemists, mathematicians and other intellectuals. The problem is caused by the fact that in the British universities the above-mentioned sciences are, as a rule, studied by foreign specialists.” This image is somehow rhetorically inflated (or generalized) to a construction of the country as some sort of a paradise for specialists: “Great Britain offers mutually beneficial cooperation to the most talented people of any nationality and gives them an opportunity to live and work in a free and open country, while realizing their brilliant ideas.”

In this respect the imagined community of Russian citizens potentially eligible for migration is constructed as large, as references are made to skills and knowledge of Russians acquired during the Soviet period:

“(...) we must take into account the fact that the majority of people coming from the countries of the former Soviet Union have a higher education and work...”

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experience on qualified posts. It means that virtually every our compatriot who is in Great Britain getting a postgraduate degree or just improving his English language proficiency, in fact receives enough points for getting a permission to work in his sphere of specialization for a year“.112

Given the diverse choices open for Russians in the UK the factor of availability of information on possible choices receives utmost importance: “It is important to pay attention to the fact that, given the abundance of information on the question [immigration], you will not manage without qualified help of a lawyer or immigration consultant for the achievement of your sacred goal – emigration to Great Britain”113. Responsibility for choosing the right program which will in future affect a migrant’s fate rests individually on the migrant: “As any undertaking about to change a human destiny, immigration requires a responsible approach in the choice of a program and in choice of those who will accompany you on this way”114. An image of the ‘ideal migrant’ can be inferred from these publications, who must be independent, self-sufficient, active and professional: “If you don’t intend to rely on benevolence and financial support of British government, if you have qualification, resources and health, and, most importantly, a strong wish to live and earn your living in Great Britain, then the state policy in immigration sphere is changing to your favour”.115

Finally, it can be remarked that the immigration process as it is seems to be fully-fledged and further expanding, as it is presented on the pages of Russian-language press. The above-mentioned tendencies are important for future analysis, as they indicate the general attitudes adopted by the Russian-language press in the UK towards the issues of immigration and integration of Russians.

4.4.2. Germany (Russkaja Germanija and Partner-Inform)

Quite a different situation can be observed on the pages of the Russian-language press in Germany, In fact, articles on immigration issues in the sense of information of existing migration pathways and their details appear to be absent from the pages of Russkaja Germanija. Immigration as a process of coming into the country is represented by this newspaper as one already accomplished, so the bulk of articles important for

113 Обзор иммиграционных программ Великобритании (Часть 1). – Лондонский курьер. - №226, p.11.
114 Ibid.
115 Новая иммиграционная программа — Sponsored Researchers. – Лондонский курьер. - #223, p.11.
research cover the integration of various migrant categories, but not their immigration to Germany *per se*. Only a few articles on this theme can be found, and they present an overview of major migrant categories already present in Germany, such as articles *Ворота в Германию*¹¹⁶ and *Сколько в Германии русскоговорящих?* The first overview doesn’t pretend to be objective; it rather represents general knowledge about migrants present in Germany. Two major groups of ethnic migrants are presented with humorous tones: “The first and, probably, the most numerous, category is Spätaussiedler, called in Russian slang “spati”¹¹⁷, and later:

The group which is second in numbers (they have now exceeded one hundred thousand) is the so called ‘Jewish refugees’, who have a nickname “conti” which is a transcription from German – ‘Kontingentflüchtlinge’¹¹⁸.

Their immigration to the country is presented as already having taken place and their presence in the country is presented as taken for granted. Another large group of migrants which is mentioned is “Russian wives”, and then, in passing, other migration pathways are mentioned:

Some time ago “green-carders” appeared which means the people working on contracts. Sometimes they leave when their contracts are over, but many of them stay and reinforce the patchy Russian diaspora. There are also students and girls working with children in families under “Au-pair” programs…¹¹⁹

The second article, on the contrary, aims at the objective estimation of numbers of Russian-speakers in Germany and of the major categories of migrants present in the country. In this sense this article corresponds directly with the goals of this research. This article starts with the presentation of figures on ethnic Germans and Jewish migrants. The numerical estimations for these groups are 2.17 million (at 2003) and 164 thousand respectively. The article gives an overview of the social structure of Spätaussiedler, trying to counter-prove the prejudice about these migrants being under-educated:

The most popular professional category among them is employees: 22 503, or 43%. This is a rather vague category: it is constituted by people employed in sales, transport, medicine, law, administration. The administration staff is the most

¹¹⁷ Ibid.
¹¹⁸ Ibid.
¹¹⁹ Ibid.
numeros sub-category (4388), and almost the same number (4369) is made by social workers, teachers and scientists. 5431 (or 10,4%) of migrants have technical professions (engineers, mathematicians, physicists, chemists, technicians). Additionally, 19 544 persons have professions of industrial profile (37,3%), and 4046 (7,7%) – agricultural. This data doesn’t prove the thesis (or prejudice), that the present Spätaussiedler are mainly ‘yokels’ (derevenshina) and ‘kolkhozniks’: it shows their modern professional structure. But only 0,07% came as individual entrepreneurs, while others as wage workers (...)\(^{120}\).

With regard to Jewish migration, the article indicates the main characteristics of socio-legal status of the migrants, such as an unlimited residence permit, a right to work and receive welfare benefit and, a right for housing and re-training. The absence of granted citizenship is the factor that differentiates this group from the first one. It highlights the fact of intensified presence of Jewish migrants among Jewish communities:

In 1989-2003 a number of Jewish communities’ members has risen from 29 089 to 98 335, that it has tripled in the course of 13 years. During the same time a number of migrants from the FSU among community members has multiplied ten-fold – from 1008 to 83 603, and their share has increased from 3,5 to 85% \(^{121}\).

The article also overviews other existing categories of Russian-speakers in Germany, such as asylum seekers from the CIS and Baltic States (about 20,000), students (10,000), figures of culture and science (5,000), spouses (men and women, at least 10-15,000), diplomatic officials from the CIS and Russia (5,000), Russian-speaking illegal migrants (at least 20,000 – 30,000). The overall estimation of Russian speakers in Germany is around 2,4 million.

The majority of the articles in Partner-Inform cover problematic spheres related to the legal statuses of Jewish and Russian German migrants. The only article which attempts to overview the existing scope of migration pathways is a review of a new immigration law published on August 1, 2004. It mentions the main grounds, apart from ethnic ones, that can serve as a basis for migration: “Education, work activity in Germany, family reunion, humanitarian reasons – these are the grounds which make a foreigner eligible for laying claims on residence in Germany”\(^{122}\). This article also

\(^{121}\) Ibid.
\(^{122}\) Принят новый иммиграционный закон. – Partner-Inform, August 1, 2004.
indicates that Germany is undergoing similar trends in the attraction of skilled specialists as the UK: “Highly–qualified scientists and specialists in computer technologies may receive an indefinite leave to remain in the country even upon their arrival to Germany. Also foreigners who invest in the country’s economy at least one million Euros and who can create at least 10 working places in Germany are eligible for a residence permit in Germany”\textsuperscript{123}. A trend of enforcement towards low-skilled migrants is also mentioned: “Migrants with low qualifications and unskilled workers who wish to go to Germany will be faced with closed doors”\textsuperscript{124}.

4.4.3. Conclusion.

Several conclusions can be made in this respect. While recent general tendencies in German attitudes to migrants seem to go along with British ones i.e. interest in the attraction of highly-skilled workers and the closure of doors to low-skilled migrants, these issues don’t receive wide coverage in the Russian-language press and are overshadowed in number and in public attention by the two channels of ethnic migration. For popular newspapers, addressed to the ‘general public’ among Russian migrants in Germany, newly developing migratory pathways seem not to be of interest. So, in media discourse migration, which in reality can be more varied than seen on the pages of such newspapers as Russkaja Germanija, is reduced to two prevalent pathways, which are presented as the ones which have to a large extent already taken place. One explanation can be that the Russian-language press reflects the reality of the immigration situation and is addressed mainly to already established migrants who have used either of the two ethnic migration pathways and constitute a large percentage of the Russian-speaking population. The other explanation is that the edition responds, or reflects, the division from above, or official perception of migrants coming from Russia as only belonging to two possible groups, Russian Jews or Russian Germans. The process was called ‘re-tribalization’ by Darieva (Darieva, 2004: 71) and its salience for migrants’ integration in German society will be studied further in application to articles in Evreyskaya Gazeta and Russkaja Germanija.

\textsuperscript{123} Принят новый иммиграционный закон. – Partner-Inform, August 1, 2004. \\
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
4.5. Integration issues on the pages of Russian-language press in the UK and Germany (London Courier, Evreyskaya Gazeta, Russkaja Germanija)

4.5.1. Ethnic migrants in Germany: problematic and positive trends.

In the case of Germany, the integration of migrants was to a very large extent defined by the existence of two structural channels of migration and by state initiatives aimed at the integration of these respective categories of migrants. The existence of these channels produced strong contradictions between integration measures offered by the German state for ethnic migrants and their real social status among their new compatriots which was often marked by alienation. This sub-chapter is aimed at understanding the causes of this problematic situation, drawing upon the distinction between the primordialist and constructivist views of ethnicity. It will also invoke the social arguments of a conflict between the established and outsiders presented by Elias and Scotson.\footnote{Cited in Žmegač, Jasna Čapo (2005) Ethnically Privileged Migrants in Their New Homeland. – Journal of Refugee Studies Vol.18, #2, pp.199-215.}

Firstly, to understand this phenomenon we can follow Tishkov, who revives the distinction between the essentialist (posited by Geertz), or primordialist (developed in Russia by Lev Gumilev) and constructivist (articulated by Barth) views of ethnicity. The former approach regards ethnicity as something which is ascribed to a person and defines their essential, unchanged cultural characteristics. Tishkov finds the latter approach more fruitful for modern research: “Ethnicity is also increasingly seen as a part of the repertoire that is calculated and chosen consciously by an individual or a group in order to satisfy certain interests and to achieve certain goals. Such an approach resembles what is called the constructivist view of ethnicity, which also regards ethnicity as a modern phenomenon. It posits a process of identity formation in which cultural elites play a significant, but not necessarily manipulative, role. Ethnic identities frequently develop out of recognition and articulation of a shared experience of discrimination and subordination”\footnote{Tishkov, V (1997) Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union. The Mind Aflame. Sage publications, London, 1997, - p.12}.

In the integration experiences of ethnic migrants, contradictions between the essentialist and constructivist views of ethnicity were to be found in the integration practices adopted by the German state towards new ethnic migrants. The migrants, in
tune with primordialist attitudes to ethnicity, were expected to identify strongly with their Germanness or Jewishness. Integration measures available for migrants were offered only if a migrant joined either a German Landsmannschaft or a Jewish community. Here, migrants were expected to freely express and revitalize their Germanness or Jewishness, becoming in this way truly integrated members of their new country. However, once having used an ethnic channel of migration, migrants were expected to identify very strongly with their ethnic backgrounds. Darieva gives two examples. Russian Germans were expected to know the basics of the German language, to be religious and to keep the traditions of German culture. Jewish migrants were also expected to have a strong allegiance to the Jewish religion and culture, despite the allegedly strong anti-Semitism in the USSR.

Consequently, integration measures aimed at mixing new migrants with old ethnic communities in Germany were seen as the most effective. This is why the phenomenon of ‘re-tribalization’ (Darieva) takes place in Germany. Ethnic belongings were re-enforced from above, through the integration of newcomers in respective German and Jewish communities. Migrants were expected to express their ethnicities as valid and the most important concepts of their self-identification in Germany. The German government assumed an essentialist approach to ethnicity, presuming that common ‘Germanness’ or ‘Jewishness’ can serve as the best linkage between migrants and their new compatriots.

However, as Darieva shows in her analysis of the integration of Russian-German and Russian-Jewish migrants in Germany\textsuperscript{127}, these state measures were in contradiction with the identities of migrants developed in the USSR, in which ethnic components played a minor role. Belonging to a certain natsionalnost was less of a privilege and more of a social drawback in Soviet Russia, leading to discrimination in professional and public life. This division of nationalities was in contradiction with the Soviet melting-pot project, in which different nationalities were expected to melt and produce a homogeneous Soviet people through sovietization and russification. In this atmosphere people with Jewish or German ethnic backgrounds preferred to refer to their belonging only in private circles, while socializing in the society with all-Soviet values based on Russian language, Russian culture and belonging to Russia.

While ethnicity was ‘an empty signifier’ in Soviet Russia, it became instrumental in view of the migration channels offered by Germany, and was revitalized. From the side of migrants, such a situation produced an exaggerated self-identification with certain ethnic categories for the purposes of migration.

For instance, Tishkov talks about the instrumental use of ethnicity by ethnic Germans and Jews:

It is precisely in order to become rich, or at least better off, and to provide better social well-being for their children, that individuals in the former Soviet Union are opting to identify themselves as ‘Germans’ to be able to emigrate to Germany, or as ‘Jews’ to leave the country for the USA or Israel. Culturally they are Russian, but contemporary descendants of 18th-century colonists from the area which is now called Germany purposefully cultivate their German roots and identity, which until now were painful reminders of deportation\(^2\).

Darieva, in her presentation of individual migration cases, also highlights the presence of economic and social motives hiding behind ethnic migration: a move to Germany is perceived by Jury, a Russian of Jewish ethnicity, as a chance to improve living standards and achieve a better financial status. It is an action linked with the fall of the Soviet Union, and the instability and insecurity in Russia. The migration act is a logical, thought through decision, not a refugee action for Jury. He doesn’t bring up his Jewishness as a motive for migration\(^3\).

So, as a result, while migrants were expected to identify strongly with their ethnic ‘brothers’, this process proved problematic, firstly due to contradictions in the real and publicly assumed self-identification of migrants. Also there was a conflict in relationships with local residents, who complained about migrants’ unwillingness to be real ‘Germans’ or real ‘Jews’ and started to feel alienated from newcomers.

The phenomenon of alienation during ethnic migration was touched upon in previous studies concerning ‘ethnic unmixing’ (Brubaker) and ‘ethnically privileged migrants’ (Münz and Ohliger). During the 20th century it was noticed that “the encounter of co-ethnic migrants and the local population ended in mutual estrangement and antagonism. The fact that both groups had a common national allegiance and spoke the same language did not make the encounter easier. Nor were the significant state


measures, as in Germany, conducive to better relations with the local population\textsuperscript{130}. Žmegač remarks that the explanation of this antagonism in Germany is often based on an essentialist presumption of internal differences in culture between migrants and their local co-ethnics: “Culture is (...) taken by the German researchers as the most important factor in creating experiences of foreignness, the separate identity of migrants, and problems of integration”\textsuperscript{131}. However, studies of other cases of ethnic migration presented by Žmegač show that there has been a continuous construction of differences and boundaries between migrants and locals even in spite of minor cultural differences between them. As a result, a separate identity is constructed by migrant communities under the impact of several reasons:

It was a mutually reinforcing circle in which indifference, neglect or rejection by the local population promoted the enclosure of the migrants, and in which the feelings of excellence and victimhood among the migrants produced distancing and estrangement from the locals and the construction of a separate migrant identity. The states had their share in the construction of the boundary between the two groups for, even when they incorporated the migrants as citizens and catered to their economic needs, they underplayed the need for official recognition of their plight. (...) A further factor in the creation of a separate migrant identity was the very fact of their migration, which became the founding event around which they constructed their separateness\textsuperscript{132}.

In addition to these socio-cultural explanations of antagonism, Žmegač proposes another, more sociological look on this conflict, drawing upon the work of Elias and Scotson (1965) *The Established and Outsiders*. According to their view, the case of ethnic migrants falls under a more general case of a meeting between the locals and new arrivals, where the latter are always regarded as a threat to an established social setting. Division of roles and power therefore took place:

The migrants were expected to adapt to the role of ‘newcomers’. They were cast in the role of outsiders with respect to the established and more powerful old inhabitants. By keeping the newcomers at a distance, by rejecting them or

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p. 208.
assigning them a lower status, the established inhabitants wanted to preserve their status and entrenched power positions\textsuperscript{133}.

While for locals the newcomers were intruding on their established social life, from the migrants’ point of view, re-definition of their identity was needed for further incorporation into a new society. By rejecting them, the local populations opened the way for a formation of a new migrant identity. And this formation included a specific process called by Žmegač the ‘rejection of a stigma’:

Co-ethnic migrants did not accept the role of outsiders ascribed to them by the established citizens. They did not internalize the stigma imposed upon them by the local co-ethnic population. Rather, they rejected the symbolic code by which they were cast in an inferior position and they replaced it with their own code, which stressed the superiority of their own group\textsuperscript{134}.

As can be seen, Žmegač also rejects an essentialist explanation of antagonism between ethnic migrants and the local population as based on irreducible cultural differences, but explains its social nature as a fight for social power between insiders and outsiders. Moreover, this research indicates that this conflict becomes a source for the creation of a specific migrant identity constructed as a buffer to the inferior role imposed on them by locals:

The co-ethnic migrants develop a discourse of their own superior identity which they buttress by real or perceived cultural differences. Both processes—the closing of ranks by the old settlers and identity-building among the migrants—lead to mutual construction of the symbolic boundary, with the end result that a sub-ethnic/sub-national identity emerges among the co-ethnic migrants\textsuperscript{135}.

These theoretical explanations find proof in the empirical research of integration experiences of the Russian migrants as represented in the articles from Russkaja Germanija and Evreyskaya Gazeta. They will also be helpful in analysis of discourses developed by Russian-language media.

As was remarked by Darieva\textsuperscript{136}, after immigration, the members of the two Russian-speaking groups were faced with a difficult task, which was to integrate into

\textsuperscript{133}Ibid., p. 211.
\textsuperscript{135}Ibid., p.214.
German society, and to do it only along the lines of specific cultural integration offers, either as “Germans”, or as “Jews”. The practices of these cultural integration offers consist of offering migrants help with their integration through either Jewish communities or Landsmannschafts, which are intended to develop their integration with the use of traditions of ‘Jewishness’ or ‘Germanness’. This ‘tradition’ is based on the notion of continuous care about one’s cultural integrity, which is realized through archaic cultural traditions and religious ideology.

Integration through special ethnic communities became most prominent in case of Jewish migration. Here, the integration process in many respects mirrored the experience of Soviet Jews in America, where new arrivals were at first warmly welcomed, but then were accused of lacking religious and cultural traditions characteristic of Jewry. Vivid descriptions by Orleck of encounters between older Jewish communities and migrants show the trends which were to be mirrored in similar encounters in Germany:

These new neighbours fell into a strained sort of intimacy, like estranged cousins bound to one another by bloodlines in the distant past, related but uncomfortable. (…) there were inevitable disappointments, turf wars and misunderstandings over the new immigrants’ relationship to Jewish religion and culture; (…) over the newcomers’ flashy style of dress and the non-kosher foods they lined up to buy; over the old-timers’ jealousy of the financial subsidies that the new immigrants received; over the perceived gruffness, unfriendliness and aggressiveness of the new immigrants.¹³⁷

This situation is perfectly mirrored in an article in Evreyskaya Gazeta, where controversies between migrants and local Jewry are evoked:

Thanks to the inflow of “Soviet” Jews the former proportions and stability, mode and tempo of life have been disturbed inside local communities. Along with this, other specific demands and claims, value orientations and attitudes, expectations and intentions have appeared. As long as substantial differences in social status, life experience, mentality, culture and language exists, at a certain stage confrontation of old and new members if the community comes into play. By all means, this confrontation reveals itself in different ways, not always and not everywhere. In some communities the first “Russians” were met as “younger” brothers, which were assumed to feel gratitude for support. But as talks in Russian

became louder and more frequently heard, and differences between newcomers and old-timers were realized more distinctly, both groups felt mutual negation and estrangement.\(^\text{138}\)

In the case of Germany it should be noted that migrants from Russia and the FSU joined Jewish communities in large numbers and soon began to constitute majorities in many of them: “Today there is more than one thousand members in the community of Bochum-Herne-Hattingen – almost as much as in the beginning of 1933. The absolute majority of them have come from the post-Soviet space.”\(^\text{139}\) Membership in Jewish communities led to a situation where migrants’ ethnicity became more pronounced than in Russia, at least in the public sphere. As one of migrants speculates:

Here, in Germany, I would not say that my self-perception changed, but the Jewish community was the easiest way to socialize – it is a community after all! […] Paradoxically, in Germany I became ‘more Jewish’.\(^\text{140}\)

However, in many religious and cultural aspects migrants from the post-Soviet space are virtually illiterate, as their upbringing bears the signs of assimilative and anti-religious Soviet culture. Special measures need to be introduced in order to get migrants acquainted with ‘their’ culture, and this has to be done in Russian, as migrants usually speak neither Yiddish nor German. For instance, a representative of the liberal Jewish movement Habad Lubavich in Hanover remarks:

‘It is not a secret that the Jews who have come from the countries of the former Soviet Union have very little knowledge about Judaism and feel as wordless extras in synagogues. In order to amend the situation we hold weekly courses in Russian with adults, youth and children where we touch upon topical themes of Judaism, providing everyone with translated and transliterated literature’\(^\text{141}\).

However, such attention to the needs of Russian migrants is more an exception than a rule in the activities of Jewish communities in Germany, and such a situation lessens the motivation of migrants from Russia to get involved in religious and cultural practices, and puts at risk their Jewish identity:

\(^{138}\) Конфликты в еврейских общинах: абсолютное зло или относительное благо. – Еврейская газета. – December 2006, №2 (42).
\(^{139}\) Второе рождение. – Еврейская газета. – December 2005, №12 (40).
\(^{141}\) Открывая двери. – Еврейская газета. – January 2006, №1 (41).
only a few people come to the service. Elderly immigrants from the former USSR hardly understand German language. After the meeting some people said that they would participate in services if the community had a Russian-speaking rabbi who could be addresses for all issues regarding Jewish life, as it must be in a Jewish community. And if this doesn’t happen, then who and for what purpose will come to a Jewish community in a decade or so?! The elderly will get very old, while the young, who had not conceived of their belonging to Jewry, will be left wondering in the world as “persons without a distinct nationality”!

Thus, the numerical presence of migrants from the FSU and Russia in Jewish communities, which could be taken as a sign of successful integration, in fact doesn’t prove that the process of re-vitalization of migrants’ religious and ethnic belonging is under way. In many cases, membership in the community becomes the easiest way of socialization with other people from former Soviet Union sharing the same migration experiences and memories related to Russia. For instance, this is how a journalist describes the social life of the Jewish community in Münster: “Clubs are indeed functioning! The only thing that people who gather there are for the most part elderly ones who are united by Russian language and memories of the Soviet past rather than by Jewish tradition”.

Another problem is the suspicions of locals as to the real motives of migration of Jewish migrants, which are presumed to be economic, rather than ethnic (we talked about this attitude to migrants from Eastern Europe in the chapter about East-West migration). Migrants are suspected of economic motives both by local Jewish communities and by other migrant groups from Russia and the FSU. For instance, an article ‘Vorota v Germaniu’ remarks that this immigration group is called ‘colbasnaya’, which is a hint at their expectations of a good life in a new country. Another article mentions similar attitudes: ‘Locals’ accuse ‘newcomers’ of greed, hypocrisy and consumerism in regard to national traditions […]. Communities with many Russians (…) become reception halls of Sozialamt’.

On the other hand, there are positive trends, proved by accounts in Evreyskaja Gazeta, of the active participation of migrants from Russia in the religious life of Jewish communities. For instance, the election the former Leningrad resident Kuf Kaufmann as

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142 Чтобы община не опустела. – Еврейская gazeta. – February 2006, № 2 (42)
143 Чтобы община не опустела. – Еврейская gazeta. – February 2006, № 2 (42).
the leader of Jewish community in Leipzig shows that symbolic frontiers can be eventually overcome:

This is an exceptional case not only for Saxony, but also for the whole Germany: a former “Russian” is a head of Jewish community in the metropolis. But, on the other hand, for how long should a person be considered a “quota refugee” or a “coming from Eastern Europe”? Who defines where that sacred line lies, steeping over which a “former emigrant” is transformed into a “German Jew”?\footnote{Мы же не экзоты. – Еврейская газета. – March 2006, #3 (43).}

As press publications show, all-inclusive initiatives (such as services held in two languages) and liberal attitudes to Jewish belonging from the side of the community are effective in the integration of migrants:

One thing is clear: immigrants demand – and with good reason – equal rights, they insist on being treated equally to long-term community members. Immigrants and ‘old-timers’ have very different life routes, and a very different understanding of Jewishness. This may lead to severe frictions. But how must I explain to a person who had been discriminated as a Jew in the Soviet Union, and whose mother is non-Jewish, that he can’t become a fully legitimate member of the community? (...)

(...) We are glad to see everyone who comes to us and brings a feeling of belonging to Jewish people, to Jewish community. Non-Jewish spouses or persons with non-Jewish mothers may take part in a community’s life. (...) This helps in matters of integration a lot\footnote{«Будущее общин зависит от молодого поколения». – Еврейская газета. – March 2006, #3 (43).}

Even in the frequent use of the word ‘community’ a specific detail in the integration of Jewish migrants can be noted, which is the existence (or, pre-existence before their arrival) of a strong community which serves as a channel of socialization and integration for migrants into their new settlement. However, as the result of previous identification with Russian culture and Russian history during their upbringing, Jewish migrants identify not only with their ethnic community, but to a large extent with ‘Russians’ in Germany in general. For instance, the article \textit{Russian Jews and intelligentsia}\footnote{Евреи и русская интеллигенция. – Еврейская газета. – №2 (42), February 2006.} insists on a strong Jewish impact in the creation of a Russian intelligentsia by assimilation between the most cultivated representatives of the two ethnic groups. This vision is transmitted to migrants’ settlement in Germany, where they retain and promote Russian high culture and traditions. An additional factor which
accounts for the intensification of Russian self-identification along with the expression of Jewish identity is the fact that among the German-speaking population all people speaking Russian are regarded as Russians, from the outside, as well as from inside. This is true for all categories of migrants, and is a proof of a formation of specific identity of migrants. In this process both labeling from the outside and inner self-perception of migrants play a role in construction of a new identity.

This phenomenon is remarked upon by migrants themselves:

‘(…) here, when Germans are all around, ‘ours’ (svoi) are all those who speak Russian, whatever the nationality’; ‘I think that Russian Jews are more Russian, than Jewish. The most important are language, culture, mentality’; ‘Many locals just don’t understand, how one can be Jewish or German in nationality, if you came from the former USSR. If you are from Russia, you are Russian’; ‘I am half German (through my father) and half Jewish (through my mother). I came with Jewish line. What difference does it make? I am Russian for Germans, because I am from Russia’

The first factor in the creation of these specific migrant identities is labeling from the outside, or, in other words, Germans identifying as ‘Russians’ all migrant groups speaking Russian notwithstanding their migration pathway. Here state measures of ethnically channeled integration evidently come into contradiction with the public perception of migrants. While state measures are aimed at the assimilation of goal groups, Russian Germans in particular, reality shows that they tend to form a specific group with their own identity. As Žmegač has shown, “shared ethnicity/nationality (…) is not sufficient to prevent the local inhabitants from treating the co-ethnic migrants as some (unwanted) foreigners and, vice versa, for the latter not to construct a boundary vis-à-vis the locals”

Different discourse instruments are used by local populations in order to create this boundary. The first of them is the ‘criminalization’ of migrants, a phenomenon noted in Darieva (2004) in her study of German publications about the Russian presence in the country in the 1990s. This trend can be traced in publications of Russkaja Germanija, which reflects as wide-spread among Germans visions of Russians as prone to drug abuse and high criminality. While in the research of Darieva (2004) it was talk of the ‘Russian mafia’ with visions of developed criminal networks based in Russia that prevailed, present discourses of Russian criminality are relatively more

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149 From responses to a poll presented in Кто есть кто – Русская Германия. – 2001, № 36
practical, portraying Russians as petty thieves and drug addicts. These ‘Russians’ are most often Aussiedler, and for this group of migrants accusations of criminality and lack of integration, as well as identity controversies, become major characteristics in their adjustment to new country.

Several articles in Russkaja Germanija articulate the intensity of this discourse and this image of Russians as criminals in the German press and society. This attitude is particularly true for Aussiedler. The growth of criminality is linked in the eyes of German officials with the ‘forever increasing aggressiveness of our former compatriots’\textsuperscript{151} and the lack of integration into German society is stated as the main cause of this criminality. The Russian-language press writes about fears among the German population of Russian gangs (consisting of Aussiedler) who rob and harass residents on the streets. These fears solidify into an ‘iron-cast stereotype about maniac criminality of Spätaussiedler’\textsuperscript{152}, where ‘dubious fame of tough criminals has firmly stuck with migrants from the former USSR’\textsuperscript{153}. Even in youth prisons, where their inflow continuously increases, Aussiedler get a negative image compared to other delinquents. A prison ward relates:

\begin{quote}
It is impossible to deal with Germans from Russia. During three years they have managed to establish their own alternative culture with rules close to those of mafia. They have their own rules, they speak only Russian and refuse to cooperate with us. Sometimes they can be very cruel…”\textsuperscript{154}
\end{quote}

Another component of the negative image of Russians is their presumed liability to drug abuse. A German judge highlights this problem:

‘Now (…) only near Bitburg around 100-150 young people under 20 regularly take heroin. And this is the result of the inflow of Aussiedler. Russian Germans – as well as with alcohol – prefer strong drugs to soft ones. Smoking and then heroin are normal stages in their ‘career’. (…) It is undoubtedly true for 10-15\% of young Aussiedler\textsuperscript{155}.

Two strategies are adopted by Russkaja Germanija in order to create a counter-discourse to this stereotype, or stigma, mentioned by Žmegač. One consists of opposing this image as a subjective stereotype and presenting statistical figures to counter it. For

\textsuperscript{152}Крушение стереотипов. – Русская Германия. - №11, 2006.
\textsuperscript{153}Ibid.
instance, the article **Крушение стереотипов** (Breaking up stereotypes) presents a survey led by Hamburg police, where figures show that Aussiedler are involved in crime at the same rate as locals and less than foreigners: ‘This study doesn’t prove any particular liability of **Aussiedler** to violating laws: they are surely not angels, but not monsters, as they are so often depicted, either’\(^156\). The other strategy is in agreeing with the fact that some truth lies under such images and trying to look for the roots of widespread delinquency among young Aussiedler from Russia and the CIS: ‘Unfortunately, there is no smoke without fire, and now we should not fight with negative images in press, but save our children’\(^157\). Lack of integration into German society and a tendency to socialize in closed groups is mentioned by **Русская Германия** as one reason for this spread of criminality among young migrants:

... often our boys and girls communicate inside closed circles – between each other, on ‘language’ principle, especially those who don’t know German enough to socialize with German youth. [...] One can easily imagine how quickly any tendency can spread in such groups, even the most horrible, such as drug addiction\(^158\).

Another reason for this problematic situation invoked by the Russian-language press is the lack of understanding and interest from German society and state officials of the realities of integration as experienced by migrants:

Let’s talk about an average boy from Siberia or Kazakhstan. It is very hard for this teenager to adapt to a life in highly-developed Europe. [...] If he learned a language, he would cope in school. But additional classes, where newcomers develop their language skills during their first year in Germany, are rather an exception than a rule. [...] It has been written a lot about what comes next (...). And while such situation is typical not for him alone, such guys quickly find each other and form groups. One knows how they spend time: drink parties, grass smoking, disco fights and other ‘pleasures of life’, which end up in police\(^159\).

Alert to possible counter-arguments from German officials about provided integration measures, the Russian-language press shows that in many respects these measures prove inefficient, resembling ‘a dialog of the deaf with the numb’\(^160\). Here the

\(^{156}\) **Крушение стереотипов**. – **Русская Германия**. - №11, 2006.


\(^{158}\) Ibid.

\(^{159}\) О пользе словарей. – **Русская Германия**. - №42, 2003.

\(^{160}\) Ibid.
very fact of integration measures presuming ethnic closeness of Russian Germans to locals and disregarding specifics of their upbringing and mentality is criticized:

“... It is Russian-speaking specialists who should have worked with them [young Aussiedler], because they know the mentality of these youths and specifics of life in Germany. [...] But officials prefer to act on their own accord, using a thesis which is absurd from professional point of view. It posits that “Spätaussiedler are Germans, which means that one should work with them as with Germans”\(^{161}\).  

Integration measures initiated by the German state are being criticized as inefficient for what is exactly their objective – trying to help newcomers re-vitalize their ethnic ties with the local population.

On the other hand, more positive results can be found where Aussiedler themselves organize societies for the social and cultural integration of their compatriots. The factor of their success, as in the case with Jewish communities, is liberal openness for all groups of migrants. A representative of the Migration-Ost group says: ‘We give free consulting to all people who need help – I mean migrants from the former USSR. We don’t divide people according to ‘lines’ and ‘programs’ of their arrival to Germany’\(^{162}\). Such integration organizations try to avoid closed communities of Russians by being open to local Germans as well:

‘From the start we (...) were opened not only for ‘our’ people, but also for local Germans. Only this way creates optimal conditions for quick and efficient mutual acquaintance, respect and understanding. And in the end of the day – for efficient integration’\(^{163}\).

Another important factor in successful integration is the rejection of a ‘complaints culture’ and passive expectations and active steps towards local population:

‘... it becomes evident that they don’t know us. But we should blame ourselves in this situation. Why are we waiting for somebody to come to know us better? We have come here, and we should make steps towards them. [...] Let’s speak frankly: we have come to ‘other monastery’ (чужой монастырь), and we shouldn’t set our

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161 Ibid.
‘set of rules’ (устав). Yes, locals don’t like it when we speak Russian. (…) We should respect feelings of others¹⁶⁴.

Change of attitude is closely linked with changing the specific ‘Russian’ mentality which can become an obstacle to successful integration:

‘If a person is clever and competent, knows how to behave and respects other people – he or she will meet the same response. One will not go far with aggressive and demanding mentality, with initial purpose of self-assertion by confrontation. It is a vicious way. In a nutshell, all our problems are inside us. Local authorities are ready to help migrants where possible and necessary. The rest of the task is ours…’¹⁶⁵

It is evident that integration problems are closely linked with the transformation of self-identity. Flexibility in attitude to the ‘other’ and to the ‘self’ during a migration experience is posited as positive and leading to success in integration, whereas rigidity and self-closure lead to the stigmatization of a migrant group as ‘alien’. In this regard media serves not only as a mirror of the integration situation, but also as an instrument of identity discourses, which can be traced already in our analysis of integration. Our analysis of these discourses in the Russian-language press in comparative perspective will end this study. There we will try to see whether the formation of a superior migrant identity mentioned by Žmegač (2005) as a consequence of co-existence with the local population is the only development of self-perception in a migration experience. Now we will examine present issues of integration as reflected in Russian-language press in the UK.

4.5.2. Russians in the UK: invisible foreigners or ‘mighty Russians’?

As the previous chapters of this study have shown, Britain doesn’t have any specific structural channels open to migrants from Russia and the CIS, and for that reason their number in the UK has been historically low. However, when the migration flows intensified in the 1990s, it is this migration that reflected the tendencies of contemporary migration, such as its increasingly temporary and economic character, the presence of an illegal labor force, the intensification of elite migration and the diversity of migration pathways. In this respect migration to Germany is more rigid as it has been

structurally channeled and therefore formed artificially, while migration to Britain has more flexibly reflected the trends in international migration, while no specific regulatory stimulations have been applied to it.

Also, with respect to the Russian presence in the UK, the migration situation is as unstable and fragile as it is diverse and dynamic. The representation of immigration and integration issues in the Russian-language press gives evidence of the instability and relative novelty of Russian migration to the UK. The fact of intense coverage of diverse immigration programs indicates that while there is indeed dynamic and vigor in the present migration situation, it is in no way as regular, intense and developed as is the case with Germany. Patchy and in many respects controversial coverage of integration issues in the London Courier and London INFO is another proof of that. Firstly, the important thing to mention is that, while Russkaja Germanija widely reflects various spheres of integration of migrants, the media in the UK lacks such wide range of articles on integration issues and ceases to be an efficient and objective source of information on this issue. This important difference, it seems to us, finds its explanation in the different roles which Russian-language media have acquired in the two countries. While in Germany Russkaja Germanija and Evreyskaya Gazeta have succeeded in becoming a centre of the socio-cultural field for Russian migrants, where all details of integration are reflected and discussed, The London Courier and London INFO do not become such efficient unifying powers and limit themselves to practical information combined with subjective interpretations of individual migration experiences. In this respect it is easier for the Russian-language press to reflect tendencies and common problems touching a wide range of migrants exactly for the reasons discussed in the chapter on migration pathways. Channeled migration has produced common problems and common integration experiences which are easier to share and discuss in the press. By representing them, media in Germany becomes a center of the socio-cultural field formed by migrants from Russia, thus becoming one of the focal points of the Russian community in Germany. In the UK, diversified, individual migration pathways don’t stimulate the appearance of a strong community of Russians sharing the same interests. The newspaper may serve as a vital source of information on how to get to the country, but loses its uniting role afterwards, being unable to cater for the interests of all Russians. This absence of a strong Russian community in the UK is examined in detail by Kopnina (2005), who prefers to speak of sub-communities formed along professional, interest, or other lines.
Apart from these differences, some tendencies of migration to the UK can be traced on the pages of London Courier and London INFO. Firstly, issues touched upon by the media in the UK indicate that the initial stages of adjustment to a new country are still vital for Russians in the UK. Usually it is the initial adjustment, coping with restrictions imposed by a visa (or a work permit) and finding work and accommodation. Here it should be remarked that all these practical issues are virtually not present in Russkaja Germanija, giving place to cultural, social and identification issues. It can be suggested that it reflects the fact that Russians in the UK still have to undergo earlier stages of integration – cognitive, economic, related to practical issues, while in Germany further stages of integration, such as social and identificational, are in progress.

Here another specific feature of migration to the UK comes to the surface, and explains the remaining importance of earlier stages of integration for Russians in the UK. A specific feature of this migration, as could be inferred from the overview of migration pathways and immigration programs and is proved by further analysis of the press, is its temporary character. The Russian-language press focuses on experiences of people who have come as students, in search for work or on business. For many of them it is not intentional migration, but just a move in search of work, of new experiences and new perspectives, which is not final, and can always be reversed:

'It seems that I wanted to change something in my life, overcome some hardships, and prove something to myself. To earn money. To learn English. At home a lifetime wouldn’t be enough for all that. It is never late to return home. So, I am in London'¹⁶⁶

Only some of them are eventually successful in getting indefinite leave for remain. For the majority of migrants a stay in the UK is initially only a temporary experience which is extended for individual reasons. It is usually linked with difficulties which a migrant is about to meet and aspires to overcome. No state agencies or integration bodies are expected to provide help, and no family networks are invoked. This temporary migration being an individual migration without any ties to a group, a migrant is left to cope alone in a new ‘wild’ life full of extremes. Finding employment in a country where nobody appreciates your skills is the direst problem:

Some of our compatriots have been quite successful in finding a vocation far from their motherland, but many others experienced extreme difficulties, with some of

¹⁶⁶ Заграница – добровольное заключение. – Лондонский Курьер. – #208, р.31.
them still continuing to do so. On of the problems which a person abroad has to face is employment. And there are a lot of reasons which stand in the way of finding it.\footnote{Уравнение со многими неизвестными. – Лондонский Курьер. - № 208, p.21.}

Many articles in London Courier are based around the topic of the ‘thorny way of employment’\footnote{Ibid.}. This way is usually bound to consist of multiple changes of low-skilled jobs, as any previous experience in Russia is not valued in the UK:

Our protagonist expected to go and teach kids in school and get money for it right upon his arrival. But alas! No such luck. References are needed everywhere, as well as experience of work in this country, knowledge of English language. While he kept collecting all the needed documents, he tried to work as a waiter, a volunteer in Second Hand shops, a builder and in a public events support service. He placed adverts in newspapers in search for private lessons\footnote{Ibid.}.

Along with the search for legal work, shadow work sectors develop for illegal migrants who have overstayed their visas or work despite visa restrictions on work. Kopnina (2005) finds that the presence of high numbers of illegal migrants is one of the peculiarities of the UK, which makes it hard to estimate precisely the number of Russians in London. The development of illegal labour, started by migrants from Poland and the Baltic States has created a situation where Russian-speaking people coming from Baltic States find difficulties in being employed legally or illegally. Now, being members of the EU, they are not competitive with illegal labour force (coming from Russia and Ukraine as well), which is in abundance in London, while for legal employment they must provide an explanation of their previous presence in the UK and proof of legal work:

\(\ldots\) many ‘new Europeans’, who had been involved in non-qualified work, have found themselves in a sort of a vacuum layer. On the one hand, lacking qualification and spoken English, they don’t stand competition with normal employers. On the other hand, they are now discriminated in finding illegal work, as it often turns out that not all employers are interested in an official status and all required documents. Those who are still holding such jobs, retain their semi-legal status. In order to change it, they have to prove to the immigration authorities the fact of having worked for a year … legally\footnote{VITA NUOVA или судьбы «новых европейцев». – Лондонский курьер. - №214, p.6.}.
Only the fittest ‘survive in this ‘fight’, and the UK is presented in the London Courier as a country for the ‘fittest’, active and strong, where a freedom of action means taking all individual risks on yourself. Initiative and self-reliance are encouraged in every article about migrants’ experiences in London. The romance of ‘surviving in London’ populates articles presenting individual histories:

‘Abroad is (…) freedom. But I would say, it is a serious freedom. One has to be on the alert. Don’t lose your time – it is more valuable than money. (…). Don’t be afraid of uncertainty. There is nothing here to be afraid of. (…) Choose your skill and prove that you can do it best of all. There are no dead-end valleys in the world’

The encouragement of individual initiative as opposed to efforts inspiring group initiative in the German press can be remarked on as a difference of migration representation in the UK. It is also important to note once again the importance of earlier, practical stages of integration for this country, while for Germany they are presumed to have already been passed. Different integration stages are indicators, firstly, of relatively different timings of migration: while the inflow of migrants to Germany is a well-developed and structurally enhanced phenomenon, for the UK the presence of Russians is relatively new. Secondly, difference in integration stages reflects the prevailing type of migration, permanent in the case of Germany and temporary for the UK.

While these realities of the ‘fight for life’ are linked in the media with migrants involved in sectors of low-skilled or illegal work, other, quite different integration realms are portrayed for rich Russian migrants. Here it must be noted that the phenomenon of ‘rich Russians’ in the UK is a third specific trend differentiating this migration from German one. And in this respect a strong element of constructed reality enters the Russian-language press. In the London Courier such columns appear as ‘Real estate’ and ‘Art gallery’ which are intended for people rich enough to buy property and art masterpieces in the UK. The newspaper re-enforces on its pages the image of a ‘rich Russian diaspora' which has been developing in the mainstream media. However, real-life histories of rich Russians, and also of a highly-skilled elite, are not to be found on the pages of the London Courier. For the ‘imagined community’ of rich migrants integration is presented as not a substantial process, but rather a superficial activity presuming not a migration, but rather a transnational experience of temporary presence in both

\[171\] VITA NUOVA или судьбы «новых европейцев». – Лондонский курьер. - №214, p.6
countries. Rich Russians buy houses in London as an investment, and not for a permanent life, as the articles with headings ‘Advance of Russians’\(^{172}\) and ‘Russians surprise Britons’\(^{173}\) show. Their presence in the UK can be established by the single fact of buying a house, or sending children to a private school, or coming on business. Here the UK ceases to be a country of migration full of unforeseen hardships; it ceases to be a country as a host society in the sense of methodological nationalism. It is presented more as a land of activity, investment, enterprise, or art collecting\(^{174}\), than as a final destination of migration. The extraterritorial and transnational nature of the migratory movement is intensified for this situation. However, the stages of integration as discussed in the beginning of this part are undergone by these migrants, it transpires, only on a superficial level. The migration experience loses its real impact on a migrant’s life and transforms into a sort of virtual game. Such situation is indeed a novelty for classic studies of migration, and is in sharp contrast with the seriousness and earnestness of attitudes to migration and its impact on the life projects of post-Soviet migrants in Germany.

4.6. Identity discourses in Russian-language media in the UK and Germany.

After comparing specific tendencies of integration of migrants from Russia as represented in the Russian-language media, the last point to be touched upon in this comparative research is the identity discourse on the pages of the London Courier (and London INFO) and Russkaja Germanija. The sphere is linked with the fourth, identificational, stage of integration into the host society, and touches such issues as self-perception and new identity formed by migrants as a group in contrast and in relation to the ‘significant other’, constituted by locals. Attitudes to Russia and to pre-migration life experience (often in the USSR) also constitute an element of identity formation for the post-Soviet wave of migration. These issues are very difficult to estimate and to trace, and this research doesn’t pretend to investigate them, as it could become a theme for separate research. However, the examination of similarities and

\(^{172}\) Наступление русских. – Лондонский курьер. - №233, p.11.
\(^{173}\) “Семи” в Лондоне… или вилла на теплом море?. - Лондонский курьер. - №224, p.8.
\(^{174}\) Что русские скупают в Лондоне. – Лондонский курьер. - № 209, p.10.
differences in the self-perception of migrants and their discourses of themselves as a group in a new country would be a useful finishing point for this research.

When comparing press articles in the Russian-language press in the UK and Germany, there are some similarities with regard to migrants’ identity discourses in both countries. However, they are outweighed by more substantial differences, which will be analyzed here. The first similarity is determined by a shared past before the migration experience. For both groups of migrants references to the past in Russia retain their importance as a contrasting point of reference with regard to the present situation. The articles about experiences in the host country are built on contrast with the ‘Soviet’ or ‘Russian’ past. In this respect, it is interesting to remark on the divergence between the two cases. For migrants in Germany, allusions to the Soviet past are quite common, and become a source of unity. Russkaja Germanija and Evreyskaya Gazeta have a special column – ‘one sixth’, which alludes to the size of Russia (but also of the USSR), and there are a lot of historical articles reviving the stories of famous people of the Soviet era. Migrants seem to experience nostalgic feelings towards these times, and this can be explained by the age of a large percentage of migrants coming by ethnic channels of migration. Interestingly enough, another point of historical reference of motherland for German migrants is the era of the 20s, which is linked with the revival of ‘true’ Russian culture in Berlin during the second wave of migration. These two points of reference become a symbolic substitution of realities in today’s Russia which were left by migrants. Combining the uncertainty with regards to their present situation and the need to justify their decision to migrate with the unbearable situation in modern Russia, migrants reformulate their ties to Russia in reminiscences about Soviet realities in self-association with emigrants of the ‘golden age’. These shared myths about Russia constitute a very strong symbolic ground for the creation of a new identity of migrants as a specific group different from the local population:

‘And all understood each other perfectly. […] We spoke the same language. No, not Russian – but the language of an emigrant from the former USSR. It is the language of an annoyed person who is tired of explaining his new countrymen the copy-book truths\textsuperscript{175}.

References to Russian realities are used in a quite different context by migrants in the UK. Firstly, in contrast with Germany, it is post-Soviet Russia of the ‘perestroika’

\textsuperscript{175} Крещенский мороз. – Русская Германия. - № 10, 2006.
period or modern Russia which is revived by migrants in the UK. It is usually done to highlight the negative realities which ‘were left’ in contrast to the ‘good life’ (despite all the problems) in the UK. References to Russia are often done using a specific discourse where ‘we, here’ means ‘in the UK’, while ‘they, there’ means in Russia. This kind of self-positioning indicates the willingness of migrants to associate themselves with the UK and to reject their past in Russia. While examination of the integration experienced by migrants in the UK shows that many migrants still have to pass the earlier stages of adjustment, this preposterous identificational integration would seem quite surprising. To my mind, this rejection of ‘Russianness’ by migrants in the UK should be taken for granted, and should be considered as a tool of overcoming the fragility of their situation as an ‘invisible’ minority in the UK. This phenomenon is remarked upon in Kopnina (2005) and is also reflected in migrants’ unwillingness to communicate with other Russians. This is how a migrant relates her first communication with other Russians in London:

‘Russian talk, when heard in the underground, made my heart beat violently. A young couple was discussing ‘this idiotic’ NHS. If you could see how their faces changed when I tried to talk to them! (…). I felt like having been spit over…'\(^{176}\)

The Russian community not being strong due to differences in individual migration pathways and an absence of unifying symbolic grounds, as well as this rejection of the ‘self’ as a Russian in a strive to mix with the local population, undermines the feeling of self as a group for migrants in the UK even further.

The second similarity in the discourses of migrants in the UK and Germany is the creation of contrasts between ‘we’ and ‘other’ in the press. However, they are also formed quite differently in the two cases. In Germany, where as we have seen, ethnic re-unification with locals doesn’t go smoothly and the boundaries which divide migrants and local pertain, a ‘superior migrant identity’ (Žmegač) is being constructed by migrants. Russians in Germany, in a counter-movement to oppose suspicions and negative attitudes of local population, launch discourses of Russians as educated, creative, gifted and pro-active people. Here is where the role of the media becomes vital. Russkaja Germanija features a high number of articles presenting ‘stories of successes’ of writers, drama writers, directors, artists, journalists and students with Russian cultural backgrounds who are now realizing their potential in Germany. Press articles promote

\(^{176}\) Ворон ворону глаз не выклюет? – Лондонский курьер. – #213, p.33.
an active attitude to life, and portray a picture of successes and stability which await migrants in future. A feeling of confidence is constructed on the fact of being a ‘special migrant’ – a ‘migrant from Russia’:

‘No, we can’t always gather cigarette stubs after the rich, we who are the powerful, clever, energetic, honest country. [...] It seems to me that we, who have come here to stay forever, are lacking the audacity. If we dare, we will go high into the sky of success’ 177

The ‘other’, which is the local population, is portrayed as a group which is still at a distance and lacks true understanding of migrants:

Some kind of idiotic mutual rejection happens between us - during years, centuries. We live close, we live together, we fight and love together – and still can’t get really close... But almost as a reflex a certain prejudice turns on inside us in any convenient case: “We know what they think of us!” 178

Special surveys are made to find out ‘what they think of us’, when, for instance, passers-by in Düsseldorf were asked what they think of Russians, and among neutral opinions there are extremely negative ones:

I don’t understand what they are doing here! [...] These Russians, they all receive public assistance! And then they proclaim being Germans by blood – well, if you have a German shepherd, you can say you are a German! They have built Russian villages in Bavaria! It is all piggeries! You say that there is Jewish emigration? Well, let it be...Let them come, we are guilty before them... But Russians have nothing to do here! Let them stay in their Russia! 179

The creation of a counter-discourse about ‘virtuous Russians’ to oppose the negativity of the local population constitutes, it seems, a clear example of the processes of a rejection of stigma and the formation of ‘superior migrant identity’, as explained in Žmegač (2005).

Though the elements of contrast between ‘we’ and ‘them’ also play an important element in the discourses of the London Courier and London INFO, this contrast is devoid of the stark controversy present in the German case. The articles present an inter-cultural comparison which features curiosity rather than a wish to divide. Articles in

the London Courier compare ways of celebrating Christmas and New Year\textsuperscript{180}, corporate culture\textsuperscript{181}, attitudes to women\textsuperscript{182} in Russia and the UK\textsuperscript{183}, and also touch upon characteristics of the English character. Moreover, in this comparison writers tend to identify and sympathize with characteristics and attitudes normal for the British. Britain as the present place of residence is often mentioned as ‘here’, in the contrast to ‘there’, in Russia. A concept ‘у нас’ (where we live) serves to indicate Britain, and ceases to become a reference to the Russian past, as it is the case in Germany. Russians in the UK show a tendency to eagerly identify with ‘being British’, showing easiness in picking valuable attitudes and norms of behavior. This tendency in migrant behaviour has been remarked on by Fox (2005):

Immigrants have the advantage of being able to pick and choose more freely, often adopting the more desirable English quirks and habits while carefully steering clear of the more ludicrous ones. (…) Immigrants can, of course, choose to ‘go native’, and some in this country become ‘more English than the English’\textsuperscript{184}.

In contrast to this quickly adopted loyalty to ‘all things British’, self-criticism and critiques of Russian behavior and Russian weak identity are frequent elements of Russian media discourse in the UK. Russian journalists write about their countrymen’s lack of national self-identity\textsuperscript{185}, lack of pro-activeness in life\textsuperscript{186}, the weakness of the Russian community as compared to others in London\textsuperscript{187} and the lack of general reciprocity and friendliness in regard to other Russians\textsuperscript{188}. The media also criticizes the superficiality of integration of rich Russians in Britain, for whom it is realized by adopting some external ‘British’ habits, living in isolated over-endowed mansions and gaining public attention by irrational expenditures. The metaphor for such integration has received the name of ‘Anglo-Russian salad’\textsuperscript{189} in the press. Recalling previous remarks about other migrants, this metaphor as a characteristic of identificational integration can be used in relation to other groups as well. This double, unharmonious character of life

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} Особенности национального рождества. – Лондонский курьер. - №225, p.10.
\item \textsuperscript{181} В поисках сомы. – Лондонский курьер. – №227, p.15.
\item \textsuperscript{182} О женщинах говорят все. – Лондонский курьер. - №228, p.12.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Обратная сторона перфидности Альбиона. - Лондонский курьер. - №231, p. 14.
\item \textsuperscript{185} Праздник Амбы, или рассуждения о национальном бессознательном. – Лондонский курьер. - №222, p.10.
\item \textsuperscript{186} Век живи – век учись. – Лондонский курьер. - №215, p.12.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Европейское общежитие. – Лондонский курьер. – №213, p.15.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Ворон ворону глаз не выклюет? – Лондонский курьер. – #213, p.33.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Англо-русский винегрет. – Лондонский курьер. - №212, p.13.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
in the UK for migrants is symbolically summarized in the article Двойной стандарт в британском контексте in the London-INFO. This article mentions rude manners and loud talking in the streets of Russians in London, unwillingness to help to other compatriots and a lack of historical grounds for morality. Interestingly enough, similar criticism was mentioned in the Russian press in Germany, but as the one originating from the local population and which the media tried to oppose. Additionally, the Russian-language press is characterized by its frequent negative remarks about Russia and an attempt to construct a negative image of its realities. For instance, the article Что с памятником моим стало criticizes the spread of the Putin cult in Russia. These accounts seem to justify migrants’ presence in the UK and construct a feeling of self-righteousness for those who are ‘here, in Britain’, far from Russia ‘where nothing changes for the better’. It strikingly resembles attitudes in the emigrant press during the ‘exile migration’ of the first half of the 20th century in its negation or realities of the country that has been left.

Conclusion

We can see that differences prevail despite the superficial similarities, which are based on the fact that migrants come from the same country and have been involved in similar processes of the formulation of self-identity in relation to the local population. There are several factors accounting for these differences, and here the parallels with factors accounting for differences in integration process can be traced. Firstly, relative differences in the level of stability and scale of migrants’ settlement in a new country accounts for differences in identity discourses. The fragility and temporary character of migration, combined with the attempt to adjust to a new situation by ‘hiding’ among locals brings about the effect of partial negation of their recent past, as well as widespread self-criticism of Russian identity in the UK. Migrants in the UK seem not to have acquired a new identity of ‘Russians in the UK’ yet and attempt to identify with the British life and mentality instead. Factors accounting for this are the weakened sense of community and individual nature of migration histories, which separate rather than unite people from Russia who have nothing more in common. In Germany, an established and large group of migrants shows signs of developing a new identity where internal

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190 Двойной стандарт в британском контексте. – Лондон-INFO. - #6 (258), February 2006, p.10-11.
191 Что с памятником моим стало. – Лондонский курьер. - №221, p.21.
differences between migrants coming along various schemes have been shed. This identity is linked with return to a notion of ‘Russian’ (though also charged with the Soviet unifying context) as uniting these groups socially and culturally. Migrants in Germany construct a positive image of themselves as a counter-discourse to public opinion in Germany, referring to the high cultural and professional potential of people coming from Russia and the CIS.
5. Conclusion

In this research immigration and integration patterns of migrants from Russia (and the former Soviet Union) have been analyzed, with the aim of finding out differences and similarities between migration into two Western European countries – the UK and Germany. Analysis of statistics on migration patterns from Russia to the UK and Germany has revealed that, though the migration potential in Russia shows general trends of dynamic diversification and an increase in professional migration, ethnic migration still plays an important part in the structuration of migration flows to Western Europe. Moreover, ethnic migration is still responsible for the creation of large and structured channels of migration, as is the case for Germany. Thus, the differentiation between ethnic and labour migration is correlated with either the existence or absence of structural and state-regulated migration patterns, which could be used by specific migrant groups. This differentiation finds acute reflection in migration from Russia to Germany and the UK. For Germany the continuing migration of two ethnic groups – Russian Germans and Russian Jews - still accounts for the leading role of Russia in the list of sending countries. This migration is only a continuation of mass ethnic migration which proceeded in several waves in the course of the 20th century, the last upsurge of which started in the late 1980s. Although this much talked-about migration is gradually decreasing, it still overshadows other migration patterns in public discourses and in the share of state attention in integration measures. Thus, migration from Russia to Germany becomes rigid in the sense that it doesn’t fully reflect the trends of modern migration and also the developing labour migration potential in Russia. The UK presents quite an opposite case, as it doesn’t have any specific incentives for migration from Russia and applies its general immigration regulations to Russians along with the pool of all possible overseas migrants. However, the UK expands opportunities for the migration of highly-qualified and professional labour, going in line with the general interest of developed countries in specialists and researchers. Thus, the streaming of potential migrants proceeds not along group characteristics, but purely on individual criteria. Consequently, migration patterns develop on a highly individualized basis, which accounts for their diversity. Migration from Russia to the UK presents a case of more flexible migration, where restrictiveness on low-skilled migration and increased interest in professional contract migration is combined with a growing migration potential for
temporary labour migration in Russia. Thus it reflects a growing tendency to substitution of permanent migration by temporary migration patterns and presents a number of diversified migration opportunities reflecting the needs of developed Western economies. Along with these major dividing lines in immigration patterns, it must be mentioned that, due to the relative weakness of inner regulation measures in the UK, and also because of its labour market structure, the country faces more acute problems of illegal work performed by migrants on its territory, a process from which Russians are not excluded.

The integration patterns of Russian migrants in Germany and the UK have been also analyzed in this study with a view to tracing casual links between structural immigration opportunities open for migrants and their consequent integration in their host country. This analysis has been performed on the basis of articles in the Russian press in the UK and Germany, namely the London Courier and Russkaja Germanija. The focus has been made an examination of various spheres of integration, such as economic, social and cultural, as well as on identity discourses formed on the pages of these newspapers. Our research shows that differences created at the threshold of a migration pathway continue and intensify through the course of further integration, permitting the researcher to talk about path-dependency and the nation-specific character of integration for the two studied cases. However, this dependency is more complex than we assumed.

In the case of Germany, state integration initiatives aimed at specific ethnic groups, such as Russian Germans and Russian Jews, overestimated the readiness of migrants to assume cultural and linguistic norms of their formal co-ethnics. Specific integration programs demonstrated rigidity in helping migrants to integrate, through an attempt at the ‘re-tribalization’ (Darieva) of incoming migrants by offering them only ethnically-related channels of integration into the receiving society. These integration measures were efficient insofar as the general welfare and first socialization of migrants was concerned. Thus, migrants’ economic situation is relatively stable and allows for recourse to public funds. Also, as ethnic migration presupposes a permanent move, migrants’ attitude to their integration reflects the intentional permanence of their settlement. However, in cultural integration dividing lines are produced between the local population and their co-ethnics despite integration measures from above. Although this division receives an essentialist interpretation in public discourse, our research brings indications that this division bears a constructed character, and is a reflection of
social controversy between insiders and outsiders. The formation of ‘Russians’ as an umbrella name for migrants from the post-Soviet space reflected a disregard for ethnic composition of migrants, but acute attention to their cultural and statutory differences. Migrants internalize this identity as ‘Russians’, but try to de-construct its negative connotations through presentation of success stories of gifted, talented and professional Russians in their mass-media.

In the case of the UK, the absence of immigration incentives for ethnic groups and relatively strong encouragement of individually oriented professional migration has also influenced the integration of Russian migrants. The absence of integration measures, doubled with the intensification of temporary migration as a more appealing alternative than permanent migration, has created a situation where migrants continuously find themselves passing earlier stages of integration, such as economic, welfare and cognitive. Migrants from Russia automatically get immersed in a pool of typical problems with employment and housing, with nobody but individual initiative and pro-activeness to rely on. Additionally, the individualized and diversified nature of migration doesn’t stimulate the appearance of strong migrant community in the UK, as migrants are not at ease to find the basis for group ties besides a shared language and country of origin. This fragility of the migrants’ situation is reflected in their identity discourses, which consist of individual voices rather than group opinions. In these discourses a tendency to rejection of migrants’ past in Russia and strong self-critique can be traced. Many Russians in the UK attempt to shed their Russianness by adapting loyalty to Britain and British life, and wishing to hide their Russian identity. This tendency, which could be interpreted as successful identificational integration, seems, however, to have a superficial and incoherent character, and doesn’t have a firm ground in other aspects of migrants’ integration. Additionally, an interesting phenomenon of Russian migration to the UK is the presence of super-rich migrants. They draw attention of both mainstream British and Russian press and become a cause of a distorted image of ‘Russians’ in the UK. It is used by the Russian media in an attempt to ‘jump on a bandwagon’ of exaggerated interest to this new elite, by supporting a positive image of migrants and suppressing problematic issues of illegal labour.
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