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Civil society and democratic deficit in the EU: theoretical flaws and empirical reality

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Introduction

As the process of integration advances and the final result approaches a “finalité politique”, the EU finds itself in the limelight of debates about democracy. It seems that the question as to whether or not its policy-making process satisfies the criteria for a democratically organized process has recently become one of the major puzzles for scholars of European studies. Several misfortunes that the EU has been through lately, namely, the failure of several referenda accompanied with several major gridlocks in decision-making and decline of public support in some member states, posed the question of whether it is its undemocratic character that causes these problems. Ever since the problem has been formulated as “lack of democracy” the search for appropriate remedies began.

Apart from institutional reforms that the EU embarked on recently, additional tools to enhance the EU’s overall democratic character have been proposed and discussed. One of the “mantras” that has often been on lips of those particularly concerned about the EU’s insufficient democracy is civil society and its potential contribution to the reduction of the so-called democratic deficit. Help arrived from the normative political theory that treats civil society as a necessary component of any democratic polity referring to its function of channeling citizens’ aspirations about appropriate direction of policy-making process and the contents of those various policies. As a result, certain EU institutions (the Commission, first of all) directed their attention to civil society with the aim of improving their democratic record. This attention shift has resulted in the gradual opening of the EU’s system of policy-making to potential contribution from civil society, namely, to participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) as the major empirical manifestation of civil society. In the present day one can find quite a developed system of dialogue with “organized civil society” (the term most preferred in Brussels) which continues its path to further institutionalization and complication. CSOs from all over the EU have take these signals positively and have been
actively Europeanising by involving themselves in elaboration and implementation of common EU policies and taking part in various EU initiatives.

At first sight the problem of having low democracy in the EU seems to have been significantly improved through Europeanisation of CSOs. However, on closer examination the question remains unanswered. The present paper attempts to analyse whether one can speak about any positive effects of the active Europeanisation of CSOs on the reduction of democratic deficit in the EU by reviewing existing theoretical assumptions and empirical practices of the EU/civil society relations. The main argument is, however, that the answer to the central question is more negative than positive or, in other words, that one can hardly judge whether the active involvement of CSOs on the EU policy-making improves democratic credentials of the Union. There are multiple reasons for this.

First and foremost, the answer would be much easier to find (and there are many good reasons why the answer would be exclusively positive) if the EU, civil society and democratic deficit were approached from one of several potential theoretical approaches. Here the framework elaborated by B. Kohler Koch, though a bit refined, is of great help to structure thinking about these three highly contested concepts. Her main assumption is that depending on how one conceptualises the EU, democratic deficit appears in different light and civil society takes on absolutely different functions. Viewing the EU as a political system would result in approaching democratic deficit as the lack of input legitimacy, while approaching CSOs from a purely participatory angle as contributors to the overall input legitimacy of the EU political process. In this respect Europeanisation of CSOs has definitely made the EU more democratic as one may come across numerous instances of their active involvement in policy design through lobbying and amending EU legislation. Alternatively, one can regard the EU as a new mode of governance (multi-level governance) characterized by horizontality, networking and resource interdependence among all interested stakeholders. In this type of governance previously strict divisions between the levels of governance no longer exist. The deficit arises from the lack of output legitimacy and efficiency which, in its turn, has a different implication for
CSOs. Their Europeanisation would be seen as a contribution to output legitimacy and efficiency of governance. Democratic deficit is therefore reduced as the EU empowers other actors by involving them in policy implementation and monitoring and, thus, becomes controlled by citizens concerned about the quality of policies or. In other words, it approximates the ideal of “government for the people”. The role of CSOs expands beyond mere participation: being members of emerging policy networks, they facilitate mutual learning and deliberation which in the end leads to an upgrade of the common interest in the EU (Kohler-Koch 2009).

There is the third approach to the EU which would look at CSOs completely differently. The EU might be regarded as a polity-in-the-making or emerging entity which, first of all, requires a European political constituency or citizenry (European demos) for its existence. The reason why the EU suffers from democratic deficit lies in the absence of a truly European public sphere where communication and deliberation on issues of vital political importance could take place. Scholars who work in this tradition assign to CSOs the role of providing connections between citizens and the EU, securing communication between private and public interests by transmitting signals from the private sphere and, thus, contributing to the emergence of a European public sphere where political communication and deliberation can occur (Ward 2001). CSOs encourage citizens into dialogue, leaving little room for nationalism, while permeating borders and getting localized at the higher, supranational level. In this approach to civil society and its role in the EU, the links between CSOs and their constituents become the focus of scholarly attention. In order to conclude that CSOs successfully form a European public sphere and European demos (citizenry aware of common problems and ready to participate in public political debates), one shall focus attention on the CSOs’ links with their target groups in terms of efficiency of feedback between organisations and constituents. In the context of the EU, this function becomes more of an informing of constituents about developments at the EU level which directly affect them and spreading knowledge of the EU among members and target groups. What is particularly
important is that the CSOs’ actions at the EU level are supposed to be informed through close links and ties with their constituents and not be the result of pure inner organisational deliberation and decision-making among trustees and members of their Boards.

However, structuring our thinking about the above-mentioned central question in terms of these approaches, first of all, creates normative and analytical problems, and, second, goes against the empirical reality of the relations between the EU and civil society. Among the most obvious flaws of this three-pillar approach is that civil society is considered as a residual category which is defined by and through approaching the nature and form of the EU differently. Moreover, each of the approaches appeals to different kinds of civil society which makes it impossible to merely use the term “civil society” as its completely different faces are called upon by every approach. In the first approach one inevitably cannot draw a line between interest groups and CSOs as both provide room for citizen participation. In the second approach it does not seem possible to include CSOs dealing with anything different from service production and delivery. Finally, the third approach appears to be the broadest, as not only organisations but individuals may be seen as manifestations of civil society and, thus, partake in the creation of the public sphere. Moreover, it also excludes certain types of organisations which by default do not emphasize the necessity of feedback with their constituents and, therefore, are not involved in knowledge transfer/popularization or education. Apart from explicit normative problem of treating civil society residually and fragmentally, there is an analytical problem of defining is as the object of research. The argument developed throughout this paper and confirmed by the empirical findings is that due to these imperfections the answer to the question whether CSOs reduce the democratic deficit in the EU is really hard to find: it would require taking different self-exclusive theoretical stances.

Moreover, as will be shown below, the discussion about the democratic deficit in the EU is far from being resolved as such. Even if one takes a particular view of the EU (as a federal state, an unknown type of political system, or merely a mode
of governance) this would structure the thinking about the democratic deficit and force a researcher first to decide whether it exists or not and, second, to suggest an appropriate remedy. The problem is that CSOs may not be an ingredient in any of those remedies.

Additionally, these theoretical flaws and shortcomings are accompanied and reproduced by the empirical reality of the EU/civil society collaboration. The reality of the EU dialogue with civil society is multifaceted and contradictory and these contradictions are of both institutional and rhetorical/discursive nature. First of all, the discourse of civil society in the EU has formed and is dominated by the beliefs and ideas shared within the European Commission. In recent decades the Commission has appeared as an institution responsible for the overall advancement of relations with civil society. However, being responsible for agenda-setting, decision-making and implementation the Commission contributed to the co-existence of several completely different understandings and visions of civil society adjusting each of them to practical needs and reality. The Commission also created different institutional spaces for each type of “civil society”: a system of input participation, mechanisms for output co-production and co-delivery and mechanisms of support for public sphere “creators”. The problem with the Commission’s approach is the same: its discourse and institutional spaces are exclusionary. With regards to input participation the Commission consultation dialogue privileges pan-European umbrella associations and interest groups based in Brussels that are expected to have wide resources at their disposal. The mechanism of output co-production and co-delivery limits CSOs to organisations dealing with gender, equal opportunities and environment. Finally, institutional mechanisms of financial support are largely designed to aid youth and educational CSOs as major propagandists of the EU among Europeans. The overall result is the existence of very limited number of opportunities for the majority of CSOs to make the EU more democratic regardless of the stance on democratic deficit or the cure for it they may take.

This paper starts with an endeavor to present theoretical and analytical shortcomings of the problem of democratic deficit and CSOs’ role in its reduction.
It then proceeds with a brief analysis of the EU discourse with regards to civil society and existing institutional mechanisms of EU/civil society relations.

**The problem of and with the EU, democratic deficit and civil society.**

The present section seeks to analyse the approaches to conceptualisation of the democratic deficit problem within the EU. It suggests that the whole debate on democratic deficit is intrinsically linked to the debate on what the EU is and therefore how one can regard it, namely, whether one sees it as an approximation to a political system in a conventional sense, or as a completely new phenomenon (new mode of governance, emerging polity with new characteristics etc.). It goes without saying that general evaluations of the problem of democratic deficit and possible solutions thus depend on the stance regarding the nature of the EU (Kohler-Koch 2009).

**The EU as “nearly a state”: how do CSOs cure democratic deficit?**

B. Kohler-Koch made an attempt to summarize existing debates around the cluster “EU-democratic deficit-civil society” by offering a quite exhaustive analytical framework. The baseline for her classification is the existence of three different conceptions of the political order of the EU around which contemporary political and academic discourse revolves. The views of proponents and opponents of the idea of democratic deficit are also tightly linked to how the EU is pictured in terms of political order.

The first portrait of the EU is painted in the traditional colors of a political system. The Union is attributed all the features of a classical political entity with autonomous political institutions which serve the same functions as domestic parliaments and executives do. The policy-making process at the supranational level resembles domestic processes and is better understood in terms of Easton’s well-known scheme. Due to the EU being almost a mirror reflection of a system consisting of an input “black box” of decision-making and output, there is
a similar set of requirements to its functioning, namely, the requirement to be legitimate in the eyes of citizens, first of all. The policy-making process is expected to reflect the interests and values of the citizenry, incorporate them through a number of channels and make them part and parcel of its decisions. In order words, the major requirement for the EU to be considered legitimate is to secure proper representation of citizens. It is clearly seen that legitimacy in this approach is understood as emerging through and as a result of representation as opposed to the classical Weberian reading of legitimacy as recognition (Banchoff and Smith 1999). The central idea is that political power is legitimate if it is authorized, representative and transparent and, thus, the importance of the design of governance structures and institutions securing proper representation and satisfying the requirement of accountability and transparency is stressed.

The EU and the power it exercises do not meet the above-mentioned requirements. Scholars note that one of the major reasons why the EU can be considered as lacking legitimacy is that the EU enjoys a purely derivative legitimacy, i.e. the one which is derived from the constitutive treaties only and is based on the principle that “a system of authority is legitimate whose authority is recognized and confirmed by the acts of other legitimate authorities” (Nentwich and Weale 1998). However, it is clear that such a measure of legitimacy is not enough inasmuch as the EU is the entity whose authority and competence expands far beyond the provisions outlined in the treaties and successfully competes with the standard competences and functions of the nation states composing the Union. As for the other requirements necessary for its authority to be seen as legitimate, EU institutions and its decision-making process are also below conventional standards.

This flaw is usually taken by scholars as a point for further criticisms and accusations. A. Follesdal and S. Hix develop the idea of the EU democratic deficit from this angle. In their opinion the EU is totally undemocratic for following reasons: there is an obvious misbalance in favour of unelected executives in the EU, the Parliament still remains a weak institution in terms of participation in decision-making processes and its control over the actions of Commission
officials, the “comitology”, the prevailing mechanism of putting the EU decisions into action, is insulated from the control of the European and national parliaments, there is no European elections in a real sense etc. (Follesdal and Hix 2005). As clearly seen the policy-making process in the EU is only partially taking place through channels which allow citizens to participate and is only indirectly and remotely subjected to citizens’ scrutiny, be it through national parliaments or the supranational Assembly. Additionally, the EU is too distant from its citizens: Europeans know little and understand even less. As a result, not only the above-mentioned institutional imperfections but also the psychological effect of alienation nourishes democratic deficit (Follesdal and Hix 2005).

Opponents of the idea of democratic insufficiency of the EU largely remain within the paradigm of the EU as a political system but appeal to another side or function of the EU as well. G. Majone, for example, argues that approaching the EU with the notion of the deficit is not justified enough due to the nature of the EU (Majone 1998). When the EU is tested on its democratic character it is usually equated with a classical state which results in the application of standards which are more relevant for the evaluation of the democratic nature of a state. From this perspective, the EU a priori will not satisfy any democratic legitimacy criteria applied to assess its democratic character. The problem, according to Majone, is that EU institutions are seen as analogies to national institutions, the EU democracy is being compared to an ideal “Westminster” type of democracy and, thus, it is seen as contradicting the majoritarian ideal of democracy and that the Union is presented as an agent of distributive policies (like social policy for failure of which it is often blamed) (Majone 1998). However, the EU is a “regulatory” type of state and its agenda is composed of functions delegated by the member states to the supranational institutions so that they are better performed in terms of credibility and transactional costs. The design of institutions was also determined by the desire to render the EU as effective a regulatory body as possible. In this light, for regulatory policies to be effective they must be insulated from the realm of adversarial politics unfolding on parliamentary arenas and have to be performed in an undemocratic way. This, as
Majone thinks, makes irrelevant the application of standards requiring the EU to meet the criteria of legitimacy and it makes the problem of democratic deficit, formulated in terms of a traditional vision of politics as adversarial, inadequate for the EU.

By and large, Majone argues for a depoliticized view of the Union, speaking about its functioning in Pareto-efficiency terms. Consequently, the headache of the reformers should not be the problem of how to make it more democratic from the perspective of better representation, participation and accountability but rather to make it work better in procedural terms: transparency, greater professionalism, technical expertise, scrutiny, etc.

What does civil society have to offer in this approach? Since all the cracks in the political order of the EU are believed to be caused by improper representation and scarce participation these two aspects require significant improvement. First and foremost, civil society is viewed from a purely empirical perspective or, in other words, as an empirically observed realm of voluntary associations created by citizens and existing in the space between the state and the market. Basically, the problem of the definition of civil society and the eternal question of “what to include” do not bother researchers standing on this position. What matters is that CSOs provide citizens with a platform to raise their voices and influence agenda-setting and decision-making in the EU¹. Against the background where traditional institutions for aggregation and articulation of interests are either weak, like the Parliament, or virtually non-existent, like the European parties, CSOs serve these functions. Diverse interests of the EU citizenry can be represented by multiple CSOs, which also appear as additional channels for participation. In the absence of full-fledged mechanisms of direct legitimation and given that the liberal democratic idea of proper representation cannot be fully realised in the EU due to the absence of a European demos, civil society organisations can be the “second best” solution for input legitimacy problems (Greenwood 2007). The EU political process which is often seen as an “inter-institutional scramble” can be

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¹ Formally and procedurally, though, CSOs have no rights to take part in decision-making. To put it differently, they have no vote.
significantly rearranged and transformed to make it closer to the citizens given that CSOs are provided with opportunities to become a part of this scramble (Ruzza and Della Sala 2007). The added value of CSOs to input legitimacy and overall input performance of the EU also includes CSOs role in providing decision-makers with reliable information on existing problems and shortcomings in the EU policies, make policy-making in this highly differentiated polity more coherent thanks to their broad agendas and expertise and in doing so improve the quality of decisions (Kohler-Koch 1999; Smismans 2006).

**Democratic deficit in a multi-level system: CSOs and output legitimacy.**

The only problem with this approach is that there is an ongoing debate as to whether one can, in principle, portray the EU as a political system. In contrast to this approach, the second one applies a more amorphous vision of the EU and sees added value of the EU not in copying national political systems at the supranational level but in giving birth to a new mode of governance, most often referred to as multi-level governance. The approach appears to look at the EU as a hitherto non-existant phenomenon. The EU has never enjoyed any capacity to steer or govern, which could be compared to the capacity of a state in a habitual sense. Instead its authority has always been heavily dispersed across territorial levels, its policies have always been the result of the cooperation of multiple actors and the major mode of policy-making has always been non-hierarchical and emanating from negotiations and deliberation. Cooperation with actors is inherently aimed at better policy-making and is very much needed to render policies more efficient in terms of the quality of outcome. Therefore, the focus within this approach and the attention of those who criticise the state of democracy in the EU shifts to another kind of legitimacy, the one that F. Scharpf convincingly demonstrated is gaining more importance in the present time (Scharpf 1999). The ability of the Union to deliver efficient policies and to reach

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2 The term “network governance” can also be met in the literature on the EU. However, it is not the aim of this paper to deal with terminological or definitional differences among these notions.
set targets is the most important criterion against which its legitimacy is tested. In other words, considering the nature of the EU and the content of its actions, the idea of “government by the people” is replaced with the ideal of “government for the people”, and it is this formula, if imperfectly realised, that is seen as the source of democratic deficit.

This approach is more than merely friendly towards civil society. Some scholars attribute to this approach the merit of breaking with the past when state/civil society relations were analysed through a rigid and inflexible dichotomy structuring our understanding of state/civil society relations as inherently conflicting and unfolding within a hierarchy topped by the state (Borzel 1997, 1998). As focus has shifted from input to output legitimacy, so has the focus of existing modes and patterns of governance (Rhodes 1996). They have gradually found their new location in horizontally organised policy networks in which actors are not linked to each other in a hierarchical way but are dependent on each other because each of them possesses resources the other needs. The main purpose of such networks is to design and deliver efficient policies. What is more important is that CSOs are among the “usual suspects” who populate these networks. The reason is that in order to reach the ideal of efficient policy state actors, who are formally responsible for policy design and implementation, they are expected to cooperate with the whole spectrum of non-state actors. Thus, it is this necessity which brings state and civil society together, this time as natural partners.

Moreover, the very presence of CSOs organisations in various manifestations of multi-level governance is meant to solve the problem of democratic deficit. The first assumption here is that those affected by the policy have every right to participate in implementation and monitoring over policies designed for them. CSOs, becoming members of networks which emerge to deliver policies, thus, provide citizens with channels to influence the implementation and monitoring of these policies. This naturally contributes to the overall efficiency of a policy and, consequently, legitimizes it. Another assumption is that CSOs’ contribution is their expertise and knowledge. It is their experience and wide knowledge that
increase the quality of policy content and, accordingly, efficiency. Therefore, CSOs are often transferred a big pool of responsibilities in policy implementation in the form of outsourcing and contracting out which is believed to significantly increase the quality of outcome. The EU appears as a laboratory of these modes and practices as it intensively develops various forms of cooperation with CSOs as important stakeholders (often referring to these forms as public-private partnerships) in the process of co-production of services. By working with CSOs on solutions to numerous problems the EU reproduces its image as a mode of horizontal, multi-actor and multi-level governance.

“Unknown” EU and “unknown” civil society.

As opposed to the first two, the third approach is, perhaps, the most difficult to grasp, as is the corresponding idea of democratic deficit linked to the image of the EU within this approach. The EU is denied any status of an objectively existing or frozen entity, subject or phenomenon, be it polity or a mode of governance. Instead, it is seen as a still developing “beast” of its own, an emerging system of authority which is difficult to approach with well-known definitions and concepts. Its main distinctive feature is that if previously it used to derive its authority and legitimacy from its units, i.e. member states (national governments as well as national political communities), now it has become a system in its own right and acquires its own sources of legitimacy (Kohler-Koch 2009). The EU becomes a polity as it undergoes the process of constitutionalisation or, in other words, polity creation through the creation of rules and institutions. However, this process will not be completed without the existence of the EU’s own social constituency as a necessary component or a truly common European community of citizens whose claims and aspirations are derived from, closely linked with, and directed to the EU. The question of polity-building therefore is, in fact, secondary in this approach – the construction of a citizenry, a truly European demos or European public, is of primary importance as it is citizenry that confers subjectivity on the EU and completes the process of its becoming a polity. E. Fossum and H.-J. Trenz conceive of the process of
constituency building as “all kinds of concerns, claims-making and collective actions that are mobilized (or simply articulated) in relation to European governance” (Fossum and Trenz 2005). This idea is also closely linked to the Habermasian idea of political public sphere on the arena of public deliberation and communication against which the most important political issues unfold. The birth of a citizenry is taking place alongside the emergence of this very arena which unites individuals (Europeans) into a European demos through participation in deliberation on common issues and problems. The absence of this arena, aggravated by the absence of the European demos, is, therefore, the source of democratic deficit in the EU as it naturally results in lack of linkages between produced policies and citizens’ feedback.

What role is attributed to civil society in this approach? It is quite difficult to capture as scholars working within this approach operate with two different concepts, mingling them and applying them based on research needs. Fossum and Trenz, for example, expound the role of civil society claiming that the mere fact of various expectations, claims, opinions and attitudes becoming a part of daily experience of Europeans already signifies the emergence of civil society in its classical sense as a particular type of social interaction and communication (Fossum and Trenz 2005). “It is the activated citizenry that demands to be included in EU policy-making and it is the imagined community of Europeans” (Kohler-Koch 2009). On the other hand, in both academic discourse and practice civil society’s role is also perceived traditionally in empirical terms. It is also viewed as a community of organisations who serve the function of linking private and public spheres or, in the context of debates over EU constitution-making and EU public spheres, who act as arenas on and through which the above-

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1 Fossum and Trenz further develop the idea of how European citizenry is emerging and link this to the process of deliberation on the constitutional present and future of the EU. What they call constitution-making is the process of “deliberation and reasoning over the kinds of desirable institutional-constitutional designs of the EU” (Fossum and Trenz 2005). Quoting C. Calhoun and other scholars, they argue that it is through this deliberation that European society is imagined and becomes real or, to put it differently, constitutional debates make Europeans a political community and stimulate them as collectivity. I argue that their approach is a bit narrow as it attributes the function of production/creation of collectivity out of Europeans to debates on the constitutional basics of the EU, whereas deliberation and reasoning over aspects other than the fundamentals of the EU constitutional order but, nevertheless, residing in and belonging to the sphere of politics, can also render Europeans a collectivity or political community.
mentioned opinions, attitudes, expectations and claims with regards to the political side of the EU functioning are transmitted upwards to the EU itself. In this respect, CSOs’ links to their constituents and target groups become more important when one evaluates whether they serve this function. Both interpretations, nonetheless, agree that civil society’s role in reduction of democratic deficit in the EU should be analysed from the perspective of whether or not it (regardless of the forms it takes) contributes to the emergence of an EU-wide public sphere, transcending national borders (and becoming a truly transnational dialogue), and European citizenry accordingly.

Has anything been missed in these approaches?

All three of these frameworks look at the problem of democratic deficit and the role of CSOs differently. However, this “three-pillar” framework is far from being flawless if one is to adapt it to the needs of concrete research. The model suffers from several shortcomings. To summarize them: civil society appears as a residual category deprived of its self or, to put it simply, its independence and, therefore, it cannot be taken as an integral research object. This is caused by viewing and defining civil society through the EU, which leads to adapting the notion of civil society to the way the EU is conceptualized. Changing of one’s stance on the EU inevitably entails the reformulation of the whole concept of civil society by endowing it with different attributes, functions and strictly delineating its empirical borders. Each of the approaches to the EU employs a particular, most often very narrow, vision of civil society (which, basically, happens due to the overall narrowness of the approaches themselves) by detaching certain functions of civil society and making them the focal point of analysis. As a result, these three approaches dismember civil society and draw strict lines between its images and empirical manifestations to the point at which operating with any image runs into criticisms of being exclusionary and unable to analytically capture the idea of civil society, let alone empirically embrace it.

As one can easily notice, within the first approach the empirical image of civil society is, in the end, very broad and embraces all forms of uncoerced and
voluntary citizens’ organizational activity aimed at representation of their interests regardless of the sphere, of the interests at stake, or of any other details as to how this activity is carried out. The focal point here is voluntarism of people’s actions and self-organisation. Basically, one could hardly find any more relevant or parsimonious terms to describe the forms of that activity than “interest groups” or “pressure groups”.\(^4\) The tradition of studying interest groups as intermediaries in political processes is old and well-developed; furthermore, these intermediaries have always been seen as the form of civil society. However, it goes without saying that such an operationalisation is not indisputable as too many insist on dividing special and diffuse interests or interest groups and CSO’s. Scholars note that treating these two different types of associations as one object is incorrect as both forms of citizens’ activism are driven by completely different logics and that it is extremely questionable whether, for example, interest groups can be seen as civil society if they do not represent any public interest but pursue their own narrow ones (Beyers 2004; Beyers, Eising, and Maloney 2008; Maloney and Deth 2008; Mahoney 2004; Coen and Richardson 2009).\(^5\) In the approach, where the main accent is put on representation and participation, keeping this division, however, is of minor importance as both interests groups (pursuing their narrow private interests) and CSOs’ (believed to pursue public interests) successfully serve the function of articulation, aggregation and channeling citizens’ interests.

The image of civil society in the second approach is, on the contrary, quite narrow. Scholars working in the tradition of regarding civil society as co-producers of effective policy normally operate with the term “third sector”. They also view CSOs as the result of citizens’ self-organisation but this time the motivation behind it is far less about representation but rather about the satisfaction of needs (Salamon and Anheier 1992, 1997; Brandsen and Pestoff 2006). Therefore, one can also observe a terminological and operationalisation

\(^4\) One extreme, which is still seriously discussed by scholars, would be to include political parties.

\(^5\) Perhaps the contemporary view of interest groups is less than positive. They are often associated with lobbying which is seen as a process that can potentially derail democracy from its proper course whereas CSOs’ image is, undoubtedly, better from such a normative perspective.
conflict as in the first approach: the empirical reality of civil society is again limited to certain types of CSOs, namely, the ones dealing with production and delivery of services for their target groups.° Associations which would otherwise be included in the realm of civil society by proponents of the first approach are inevitably excluded by scholars working in the second tradition, as they do not satisfy the criteria of service delivery and, thus, cannot be seen as contributors to efficient policy. In empirical terms this implies that associations working on services for socially deprived citizens and, therefore, acting as partners of the EU (let us say as partners in the Open Method of Coordination) are treated as confirming the idea of CSOs contributing to the reduction of democratic deficit whereas those who deal with human rights protection get excluded from the set of empirical cases.

The third approach deviates to an even greater degree from the above-mentioned two: it does not limit civil society to associations at all. Instead it regards civil society as constituted by individuals linked to each other by common deliberation and reasoning, it views civil society as a social constituency and imagined community in which existence of associations, in a strict sense, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to be qualified as civil society (Kohler-Koch 2009). Associations are just one feature of civil society which, as such, cannot be boiled down to associational activity. Moreover, it turns out that associations are not the only devices and instruments for making polities like the EU more democratic. They do only part of the job, while the major part is being done by individual citizens themselves who may or may not be united within any loose or tight organizational forms.

The reason that one can observe such discrimination of other conceptions of civil society within each pillar of the above-described model lies in approaching the object not directly but through concepts of the EU and democratic deficit, which themselves are highly contested. As a result, civil society is deprived of the integrity so much needed in order to treat it as an object of research. Moreover, a

° Another often mentioned criticism of this approach is that it suffers from a heavy political economy prejudice as emergence and proliferation of CSOs (third sector organisations) is explained in political economic terms as the consequence of failed institutions (Salamon and Anheier 1998).
researcher can encounter the difficulty with using the term “civil society” itself and is faced with a necessity to choose between adhering to “interest groups”, “third sector organisations” or “social constituency” (if not “social movements”) when outlining his research goals. This all makes civil society sort of a secondary object which can never occupy a central position in any research due to the fluidity of its borders and the uncertainty with regards to its functions. Any appeal to civil society will inevitably provoke a vicious circle: in order not to be found guilty of concept stretch a researcher will have to strictly delineate the sphere of civil society and include a portion of it which, in its turn, will be a reason for criticism for excessive narrowness. This is the price one has to pay for such a normatively-laden and unspecific concept.

In the case of the EU democratic deficit the problem gets even more complicated. To avoid being heavily criticized a researcher will have to, first, take a side in the debates over the nature and form of the EU, second, to determine the source and localization of democratic deficit and, third, to suggest how and where the potential of civil society can be applied to eradicate the deficit. One could easily see that taking all three steps consecutively would require a researcher to leave a portion of the empirical evidence aside which, in itself, would automatically incur blame for the non-representativity of the findings and the impossibility of generalization.
Behind theoretical assumptions: the reality of the EU/civil society relations.

The theoretical inconsistency and incoherence one can encounter when studying EU/civil society relations is, in fact, supplemented by the quite controversial empirical reality of these relations. If one is to investigate how in practice the democratic input of CSOs in the EU is achieved, one will inevitably notice that they cannot contribute to the reduction of democratic deficit from any of the three above-analysed perspectives. They are unable to do so from the perspective of participatory approach, namely, participation for better input as the EU rhetorically and practically structures civil society in such a way that the connection between CSOs and their constituents is getting even more blurred. Neither is it possible from the perspective of instrumental/stakeholder approach (or better output) as this disconnection is even greater due to the practicalities of CSOs involvement, namely, quite strict limitations by the EU regarding whose help is welcome in policy delivery. As for their contribution to creating linkages between citizenry and the EU it is, to the contrary, on the periphery of most CSOs’ attention and is a focus for just a small portion of civil society, namely, youth NGOs who enjoy quite generous EU financial support.

CSOs and input legitimacy: who is in and who is out?

EU working relationships with CSOs began in the sphere of overseas development in the 1970s when the EU tried to redefine and reform its development policy and render the process of aid delivery more effective. The establishment in 1976 of the Liaison Committee of Development NGOs, designed to coordinate aid provision with the biggest NGOs working in the sphere of development aid and to attract NGOs to the implementation of EU development policy, signifies the first signs of institutionalisation of the EU/civil society dialogue⁷. From the mid-80s the Commission periodically returned to the

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⁷ Later on this Committee was replaced by the CONCORD - the Confederation of European Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) for Relief and Development.
issue of civil society, gradually expanding its vision as to where and in what spheres cooperation with CSOs could be of greater benefit. One of the major landmarks was the Fontaine Report initiated by a group of French intellectuals outside the EU institutions and published in 1987. The report appeared at the impetus of one of the resolutions of the European Parliament, released in 1984, on the role and legal status of associations, although it was devoid of any specifications. The group of French policy entrepreneurs attempted to attract attention to the problem of legal status of various associations operating in between the market and the state in the EU, laying stress on that problem in the Report. Its provisions, in particular, included an appeal to create a European Statue of Associations which could serve as a major document for European associations putting them on an equal legal footing. Another proposal was to secure better representation of the European associations at the Community level (Kendall and Anheier 1999). The destiny of the first proposal was not very successful, due to conflicting views of member states on the necessity of this document, and in the end it was not adopted (Kendall and Fraisse 2005).

The relations have been given a new impulse for development more recently in the second half of the 1990s when the EU institutions put forward a number of ideas to civil society in several programme documents, symbolizing a U-turn in EU/civil society relations. Before this few initiatives towards CSOs, unlike those in the 90s, were not accompanied by any compelling arguments.

One momentous event in the further institutionalisation of EU/civil society relations was the establishment of the Social Economy Unit at the DG XXIII Enterprise Policy. This Unit was, basically, the first institution responsible for relations with “mutuals, cooperatives, foundations and associations” within the Commission. Despite its small size and location at one of the least influential DGs, the Unit was very supportive of the idea of European Statue of Associations. It was also this Unit which in 1997, a year called a “critical juncture” in EU/civil society relations, drafted and later presented the first EU document in which voluntary associations had been separated from other forms of citizens’ associations belonging to neither state nor market – a document otherwise
known as the Communication “Promoting the role of voluntary associations and foundations in Europe”. This document reflected the nascent discourse around civil society delimiting it to “voluntary organisations” which, to be called so, were supposed to satisfy five criteria very similar to those of the structural-operational approach (Salamon and Anheier 1997). This document also represents an attempt to treat CSOs complexly: it assigns all possible roles and functions to CSOs (promotion of active citizenship, democracy, service delivery, employment and representation) without accentuating any of them. One can notice that the function of social services delivery is a bit overemphasized, which is understandable considering the expertise of the body that prepared the Communication. Besides that, the Communication explicitly speaks about “political importance”, meaning that CSOs are supposed to be vehicles which help citizens to express their opinions and must promote democracy.

From 1997 the Commission began to periodically express its views and opinions on civil society from a narrow perspective. The discussion paper “The Commission and Non-Governmental organizations: building stronger partnership” prepared in 2000 can serve as an example of how the Commission began to frame the idea of civil society and what roles it assigned to CSOs. It focuses practically solely on the political contribution expected from CSOs, clearly distinguishing between “operational NGOs” as organizations that deal with service delivery and “advocacy NGOs” whose primary aim is “to influence the policies of public authorities and public opinion in general” (European Commission 2000: 1.2). More specifically, CSOs are seen as contributing to “participatory democracy”, “interest representation of specific groups and issues” and “policy making”. Thus, the paper initiated an official debate about civil society’s role in strengthening democracy in the EU. In particular, depicting the rationale behind cooperation between the Commission and CSOs, the Paper places “fostering participatory democracy” as the first rationale and states that “NGOs can make a contribution in fostering a more participatory democracy both within the European Union and beyond” (European Commission 2000: 4). The right to form and join associations is acknowledged as one of the fundamental
democratic liberties and membership in associations is regarded as a complement to other traditional types of involvement, like trade unions and political parties. Thus, the Paper states that CSOs shall be seen as vehicles of citizens’ participation due to the very democratic nature of the phenomenon of people’s self-organisation. Their role in fostering the representation of various groups is also underlined in the Paper as the second rationale. For the sake of justice it should not be forgotten that the Paper also presents contribution to policy-making in terms of expertise and counseling, “involvement in policy shaping and policy implementation” as the third rationale behind enhanced cooperation of the EU and CSOs. However, one cannot not fail to conclude that the Paper’s discourse revolves around the idea of CSOs’ contribution to a more democratic character of the EU in terms of input legitimacy. The official discourse began to shape around input legitimacy challenges.

Although not clearly specifying how these ideas can be practically implemented, the Paper, nevertheless, makes an important reservation referring to the so-called “civil dialogue” at the European level. It clearly refers to CSOs as aggregate EU-level NGOs, networks and umbrella associations. In the part describing the existing contacts between the Commission and NGOs the Paper explicitly refers to forms of cooperation between EU-level NGOs and the EU, and does not mention CSOs working at the national or local levels. One can clearly see that the idea of civil society born and spread by the Commission was largely an idea of a transnational civil society with a corporatist face or a community of CSOs operating across the borders of the member states and represented by huge umbrella associations and structures in Brussels. The idea of citizens’ participation has, thus, been “transnationally” framed.

This approach was backed by perhaps the most important document the EU has ever used to delineate its position on civil society - the White Paper on European Governance (Armstrong 2002; Geyer 2001; Dur and Bievre 2007). This document particularly underlines the importance of civil society for EU governance. The whole chapter “Better involvement” is devoted to describing what is meant by “civil society” and what it is composed of. Interestingly enough,
although not surprisingly, the Paper also sees CSOs’ “channels of communication between the EU and citizens” as instruments of strengthening democracy and adding more legitimacy from a purely transnational perspective. The Communication (which accompanies the Paper) outlines how CSOs are expected to participate in governance arrangements. Notably, access to agenda-setting, discussions and debates around policy proposals is given to those organisations that “exist permanently at the Community level…have authority to represent and act at European level…[and] have member organisations in most of the EU Member States.” (European Commission 2000). A similar message was presented as the central point in the Paper: it is relations with Community level NGOs that the Commission would like to improve and structure better, rather than relations with a more diverse and multidimensional civil society (Armstrong 2002).

Thus, the role of CSOs in resolving the problem of insufficient democracy the Commission attributes to EU-wide organisations, explicitly outlining the criteria according to which these organisations could be identified as the “right” ones. Such exclusivity would not be a problem if the Commission was not serious about its intentions towards civil society. Although mechanisms, described in the Paper, by which CSOs are expected to participate in the governance process remain unspecific, there are several innovations of a particular interest for CSOs. First of all, a system of on-line consultations was introduced through which CSOs could express their views on the EU legislation. To have access to the agenda of consultations CSOs are supposed to satisfy the criteria of “transnationality” set by the Commission. Furthermore, from that time CSOs (the ones organized at the EU level) were entitled to the EU financial support. In this light, the issue of who qualifies for that assistance is no longer insignificant and the question as to who satisfies the criteria of eligibility gains serious importance.

One can conclude that the result of these steps is a kind of European (neo)corporatism where only a tiny fraction of civil society is allowed and granted access to the policy-making agenda. Most of CSOs have no opportunity to take part in the agenda-setting and decision-making stages of policy process. In
reality this implies that the idea of providing citizens with additional channels of participation in the EU policy-making process through CSOs is not fully realized: the distance between EU umbrellas and ordinary Europeans has become even greater. It goes without saying that not only does this state of affairs not resolve the problem of democratic deficit but it aggravates it instead.

**CSOs in implementation: who is needed as stakeholders?**

It would be erroneous to suggest that apart from policy design CSOs have no access to the EU policy-making process. Some opportunities have been opened for them at the stage of implementation where they have most often been referred to as “stakeholders”. The Commission has had an special concern for engaging with CSOs in implementation of one of its policies, namely, cohesion (regional) policy. In particular, CSOs have been offered a door to the cohesion policy through the partnership principle which has, since 1988 when one of the biggest reforms of cohesion policy and Structural Funds was carried out, been the major policy instrument.

Initially introduction of partnership principle had nothing to do with civil society. The logic behind it was more about more efficient allocation of huge amounts of EU funds and adherence of the Union itself to the principle of subsidiarity. In this light, the reform of the Structural Funds of 1988 was aimed at giving subnational authorities the right to participate in cohesion policy implementation, namely, in final bargaining over allocation of Structural Funds and further distribution of monies. The innovation was of a very political character as it implied that national authorities lost their privileged position in dealing with the Commission regarding such an important issue as the distribution of the Community’s funds. Later on consequences and effects of this reform have inspired scholars to analyse emerged forms of collaboration between various levels of authorities and resulted in the emergence of the concept of multi-level governance (Hooghe 1996; Bache 2008, 2010). The overall result of the introduction of the principle was that it brought together national, subnational and supranational state actors into a
process of cohesion policy implementation revolving around decision-making on allocation of Structural Funds.

The reform of 1988 was not the last attempt to modify cohesion policy. Soon after pressure on the national authorities of member states to approach policy implementation together with subnational and local colleagues the Commission urged the inclusion of other partners as potential implementers.\(^8\) The reform of 1993 had corrected Regulations on Structural Funds as its main result. New provisions declared extension of the partnership principle to other competent bodies although “within the framework of each member state’s national rules and current practices” (European Commission 1993). Renewed Regulations did not contain any further specifications with regards to what was meant by “competent bodies” and this formulation assumed various interpretations. In 1999 the wording of the Regulations became more specific and “social partners” as well as “non-state actors” emerged under the label of other “competent bodies”. The 2000-2006 programming period was marked by member states’ effort to involve non-state actors, including CSOs. The application of the partnership principle, though, varied across member states and was not a success in new members due to their inexperience in cohesion policy (Bache 2010). Finally, updated Regulations for the 2007-2013 programming period present the most concrete formulation of what is meant by the horizontal axis of the partnership principle. According to the Regulations “… the competent regional, local, urban and other public authorities, the economic and social partners, any other appropriate body representing civil society, environmental partners, non-governmental organisations and bodies promoting equality between men and women” can be included in the process of planning and programming, operational management

\(^8\) In some publications, official EU documents and especially think-tank publications (interim and final reports on implementation of the EU cohesion policy), one can come across division between “vertical” and “horizontal” axes of the partnership principle. The first one implies cooperation of the Commission and national authorities whilst the second one implies extension of partnership among non-state actors (Commission 2005).

Thus, in the course of a series of reforms the Commission created a new window of opportunity for CSOs, this time an opportunity to take part in policy implementation. It should, however, be mentioned that how this requirement should be implemented in practice was left to the discretion of the member states themselves. As a result, the extent of involvement and, consequently, added value of CSOs significantly varies across the member states depending upon existing practices, legacies and experience (Batory, Cartwright forthcoming). Member states (both old and new) reacted differently to the requirement to include CSOs in policy implementation. In some of them there was not much need to change existing practices as CSOs had for a long time experienced the privileged status of partners. In some member states structures of cooperation with CSOs were an innovation in public administration and governance. However, one of the results turned out to be quite surprising. A provision in the Regulations limits a variety of CSOs that can potentially contribute to implementation of cohesion policy to three particular types, namely, CSOs dealing with gender equality, equal opportunities and environment. This automatically excluded a big portion of CSOs from contributing to better allocation of the Funds and the Commission ensured this requirement of the Regulations was met. The latter is especially surprising given that the money from the European Social Fund (ESF) could possibly be distributed with the participation of a wide range of social CSOs dealing with delivery of social services. However, this anticipation has not been met. Reports on allocation of ESF in the UK, for instance, rarely mention that decisions on how the money should be spent were taken together with those types of CSOs. Improper application of Article 11 of the Regulations even led to several important appeals of such EU-wide NGOs as the European Anti-Poverty Network and Europe Age CSOs can be invited to Monitoring Committees, the major institutional manifestations of the partnership principle. Committees play a central role in further breaking down of the Structural Funds’ money to thousands of projects by selecting the projects, adjusting of spending priorities and monitoring projects’ implementation through common decision-making and voting. In this respect, the extent of CSOs’ influence depends on whether they are given any voting rights or if their participation is purely nominal (Batory, Cartwright forthcoming).
to the Commission. They demanded that social NGOs be able to participate in decision-making on allocation of the Funds at every stage.\textsuperscript{10}

It is clear that in addition to the fact that many member states approached this provision quite formally and did not endow CSOs with any rights within any structures around allocation of the Structural Funds such limitation of CSOs which are entitled to take part in process of the distribution of the Funds cannot increase democracy in this stage of policy process in the EU. Some member states neglect even the requirement to include gender, equal opportunities and environmental CSOs let alone any other types. Not only has civil society again been limited to a small population of organisations but also to particular spheres as well as to particular policies as cohesion policy is, perhaps, the only one whose implementation is so openly linked to participation of CSOs by the Commission.

**CSOs and the European public sphere**

Finally, do CSOs make the EU more democratic by contributing to the emergence of a common European public sphere? Do they channel the debates on constitutionalisation of the EU thus linking Europeans through common ideas and discourses? Do they perform this function and, if yes, how? It should be mentioned, first of all, that with regards to this issue the discourse and actions of the Commission coincide. Official documents of the EU directly address this issue. The earlier mentioned Discussion Papers state that “European NGO networks are making a vital contribution to the formation of a European public opinion usually seen as a prerequisite to the establishment of a true European political entity” (European Commission 2000). Additionally, the Commission actively supports CSOs dealing with education and promotion of knowledge on

\textsuperscript{10} It goes without saying that almost all types of CSOs can be beneficiaries of the Funds if they apply for the EU money. However, what is meant by “cohesion policy implementation” in the present paper is the process through which final decisions on allocation of the money are taken. Many would probably refer to this stage as decision-making and agenda-setting in itself. However, I assume that in the context of cohesion policy decision-making occurs when, first, the Commission and member states bargain over the budgetary allotment or, in other words, over the national shares of Structural Funds and, second, when national authorities of member states bargain with subnational (regional) authorities over transfers to subnational units (regions) (Kemmerling and Bodenstein 2006; Bouvet and Dall’Erba 2010; Milio 2007). The rest can be seen as the procedural stage, namely, spending of the transfers or, in my understanding, implementation.
the EU and European integration. The research carried out by K. Mahoney shows that youth CSOs, CSOs dealing with education, democracy promotion and citizenship and the so-called EU integration NGOs are the most funded ones (Mahoney and Beckstrand 2009). The authors accurately observe that it is in the interest of the Commission to support these organisations to serve as links between the EU and the citizens they are in charge of building a common identity and real community of Europeans among. CSOs, labled by the authors as “youth,” “cultural” and “civic” receive 11%, 19% and 26% respectively of all Commission funding available to civil society leaving out social NGOs with less than 2% (Mahoney and Beckstrand 2009). This proves that the Commission’s words are not at variance with its deeds.

However, these findings are not sufficient to support the argument that civil society in fact reduces the democratic deficit if one follows the argumentative logic of the above-described third approach to the role of CSOs in resolving this problem. To conclude one should have evidence that CSOs act as agents of such political socialisation and include the promotion of the EU, the spread of knowledge about the EU while informing their constituents about their actions towards the EU as an integral part of their activities (Warleigh 2001). However, existing research, although scarce, demonstrates that this function is rarely performed by CSOs even if they are heavily Europeanised in terms of participation in European policy-making. Europeanisation still remains an act driven by rationality rather than ideals and the EU is perceived and assessed in terms of the benefits it brings rather than through the prism of any abstract idea of belongingness to European civil society or common European destiny (Ruzza 2008; Bozzini 2007; Beyers 2002).
Conclusions

It goes without saying that the problem of democracy in the EU has long ceased to bother academic minds only and has become an important topic for debate among ordinary citizens too. Resorting to the help of civil society seems, in this light, an absolutely necessary and expected step to get the problem off the table. Civil society was never dismissed as bringing less democracy, rather the opposite: it has always been conceived as curing democratic deficit if indeed it is present. In his short paper P. Schmitter does not even discuss reasons why he included civil society as a necessary precondition for making “real-existing democracies” even more democratic against the backdrop of several forthcoming democratic revolutions. Civil society is by default regarded by Schmitter as making democracy work better. But does it bring the same effect in the EU?

I tried to show that attempting to answer this question any researcher risks being blown up by a theoretical mine: the excessively contested character of these concepts, the EU, democratic deficit and civil society, may lead to empirical exclusion or the dismembering of civil society as a way to get out of the theoretical trap. As a result, civil society gets deprived of its self and becomes an extremely residual category that a researcher every time adjusts, reshuffles and shakes up. This problem arises as a result of conceptualizing the EU first: a researcher defines what is meant by the EU and later defines civil society to look at changes in the democratic nature of the Union. It should not be forgotten that the above-described battles around the notion of civil society place it in the context of debates over democratic deficit of the EU. The concept of deficit itself adds complexity rather than relief to any research.

The solution to this problem would be simple. Research on civil society’s contribution to the reduction of democratic deficit is overloaded with too many unspecific concepts and the very formulation of the question leads to the emergence of a vicious cycle when the delineating of one concept inevitably results in the empirical adjustment of another which, in its turn, always has empirical exclusion and scarcity as a result. The whole project ends up being
constantly open to all kinds of criticisms and attacks which discredit the problem itself. Perhaps researchers should, instead, concentrate on the contribution of civil society without putting this question into the framework of debates on the democratic nature of the EU. An alternative might, of course, be the further elaboration of reliable operationalisations and measurements of both democratic deficit in terms of increase/decrease and civil society's role in it. But the point is that a huge preliminary work analysing how CSOs are linked to the EU, and through what policy areas, processes and mechanisms, is very much needed before big questions like their contribution to democracy can be asked.

Analysis of empirical reality, apart from illustrating that no clear concept of civil society gained ground in the EU, shows that there is great potential for further research. We still know very little about the mechanisms of EU/civil society cooperation from the perspective of input legitimacy. Clear criteria to assess whether EU-wide NGOs render EU-wide policy-making process more democratic are still missing. One still does not know much about whether participation of CSOs in policy implementation makes it more efficient let alone whether CSOs are responsible for the creation of a common European public sphere. Availability of data as a result of research in all three directions could later help to elaborate more reliable criteria to assess CSOs' contribution to democratic quality of the EU.
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