Natalia Nefedyeva

Factors of shaping discourses on European Integration and Europeanization in Britain
CGES Working Papers series includes publication of materials prepared within different activities of the Center for German and European Studies both in St. Petersburg and in Germany: The CGES supports educational programmes, research and scientific dialogues. In accordance with the CGES mission, the Working Papers are dedicated to the interdisciplinary studies of different aspects of German and European societies.

The paper is written on the basis of the MA Thesis defended in the MA SES in June 2012 supervised by PhD Elena Belokurova. The publication of this MA thesis in the CGES Working Paper series was recommended by the Examination Committee as one of the five best papers out of fourteen MA theses defended by the students of the MA programme “Studies in European Societies” at St. Petersburg State University in June 2012.

Natalia Nefedyeva graduated from the faculty of sociology of the St. Petersburg State University in 2010 and went on to pursue the MA programme, “Studies in European Societies” at St. Petersburg State University. Her academic fields of interest include the European integration, national and European identities, and enlargement of the EU.

Contact: nathalienef@gmail.com
The double nature of the EU as an intergovernmental organization and supranational institution is a reason for its unresolved contradictions with certain independent members. The aim of this paper is to find out how the discourses on European integration and Europeanization are constructed in modern Great Britain and to categorize factors of ambivalent discourses on Europeanization and European integration in Great Britain. As a result of the discourse analysis of speeches of UK politicians, it was discovered that British discourses about Europe are constructed on European integration differently than on Europeanization; they are constructed within special dimensions of politics: economy, identity and citizenship, sovereignty and trust, the national role on the world’s arena, security and foreign affairs, public awareness. Generally, discourses on European integration are more positive and look into the future of EU-British relations, whereas discourses on Europeanization are mostly related to negative attitudes toward domestic changes. The factors explaining the discourse construction are formulated on the basis of secondary data analysis; they include historical, geographical, cultural, economic and religious factors.

**Key words:** European integration, Europeanization, Great Britain, discourse analysis
# Table of contents

**Introduction** .................................................................................................................. 4

**Part 1. Theories of European Integration: Social Constructivist Approach** .. 7

1.1. Identifying European Integration .............................................................................. 8
1.2. Identifying Europeanization ...................................................................................... 11
1.3. Social Constructivism as a Methodological Approach ........................................... 16
1.4. European Identity ..................................................................................................... 18

**Part 2. Discourse Analysis** ............................................................................................. 20

2.1. European Integration Constructs .............................................................................. 21
2.2. Europeanization Constructs ..................................................................................... 26

**Part 3. Explaining the British Case** .............................................................................. 30

3.1. British Euroscepticism .............................................................................................. 31
3.2. Historical Prerequisites of Special EU-British Relations ...................................... 33
3.3. British Identity Issues ............................................................................................... 37
3.4. The Europeanization of UK Policies ........................................................................ 40

**Conclusion** .................................................................................................................... 45

**References** .................................................................................................................... 47
Introduction

Today, the European Union is one of the major actors in the world’s political and economic arena. Being able to compete with other actors, the EU, however, faces problems in coordination with all 27 members’ positions. Further development of the Union in the field of interrelations of its members is seen as one of the determining forces of reallocation of world power. Contemporary debate over Europe’s future is mostly dedicated to questions like how Europe will be governed, how to distribute power and reform institutions. To this extent the relations between the EU and its member states are vital.

The double nature of the EU as an intergovernmental organization and a supranational institution are reasons for its unsolved contradictions with certain independent members. Traditionally, one of such opposing members is Great Britain, which is well-known for being an ‘awkward partner’ for Europe (George, 1990). The British are usually called Eurosceptics. Such a nickname is a result of a whole range of historic, cultural, economic, and political factors. However, governmental changes, namely, when the Labour party came to power in 1997, provided a significant shift in EU-UK relations, showing a much more positive attitude toward Europe. On the other hand, some obvious features, i.e. membership in the Eurozone, are still not adopted. Such selective politics of European integration are determined by a number of factors, which are to be studied, formulated and categorized. Questions like “Is Britain European?” or “What does Europe mean for Britain?” are important even for Russia: understanding of these relations is vital for forming foreign policies towards strong and influential economic partners.

Britain has a long history of acting in the international arena. Its relations with the European Union are appealing in the sense of bilateral influence. This influence might be seen as a threat or a challenge to traditional national institutions, identities, and cultural norms, therefore; the carriers of these identities and norms, and structures by institutions might enter the public arena in order to protect their traditional way of living from institutional changes provided by Europeanization. These actors have mechanisms to deal with changes that threaten the stable domestic mode. The more salient Europeanization becomes to them, the louder their concerns in the public arenas will be. Hence this public perception is immensely powerful in the way of accepting the changes. This is the point where discourses can become vital in decision-making and its approval. Elites play a central role in shaping the discourses on European integration and institutions, their approval and acceptance.

The British have expressed fears about EU policies that prescribe changes in domestic structures. The European super-state is seen as a threat to national democracy, sovereignty and identity. Concerns about European economic policies are voiced in order to prevent reduction of flexibility and competitiveness.

The debate over British attitude toward the European Union has been lively since the first proposal of membership in 1961. The issue has been vital
since World War II when the political and economic power in Europe was redistributed. The British skeptic mood and alienation toward further integration are also results of the British elites’ failure to legitimize the process and discuss its advantages. Moreover the press also supports and develops skeptical views highlighting the weak points of membership. In Britain traditional elites have been more favorable toward Europe, than the population. This skeptic opinion is heavily supported by anti-European press and groups, who argue with pro-European agencies and supporters.

It is obvious, that for British integration into Europe is a question of power, autonomy of the state, and identities. The relationships between Britain and the EU have become central for many scientific works, articles, and research. The impact of these relations on domestic and international politics is undoubted. And as far as this effect is profound, the issue is highly sensitive. The scientific literature provides us both with pieces on interrelations of the EU and Britain (Ash 2001, Bach and Jordan 2006, George 1992 and 1998) and on domestic impact of membership (Bulmer and Burch 2003, Howarth 2004, Schmidt 2006).

The case of European-British relations has already been studied in various aspects. One of the finest complex analyses that study this issue is George’s “An awkward partner: Britain in the European community”. This book is widely used as the basis for further research of factors and prerequisites of specific relations. Another generalizing work is a collection of reviews provided by British representatives in the EU (Menon 2004). The book introduces analysis of thirty years of history, underlining the most crucial points of shaping EU-British relations. More specific studies show interest in British domestic adaptation (Dyson, Featherstone 1999, Schmidt 2006), parties attitudes (Russel 2001, Ludlam, Smith 2004, Aspinwall 2004), conflicts that arise from European integration (Marks 2004), and the phenomenon of Euroscepticism in Britain (Foster 2002). British relations with the EU are also studied in perspective of economic and monetary policies (Dyson, Featherstone 1999, Eltis 2000). In addition, a range of books and papers are devoted to the comparison of British-American relations to British-European ones (Dover 2004, Watanabe 2005, Cornish, Edwards 2001). However, there is a section of literature that introduces a view of overrating the issue in general. For example, Young (2000) states that British exceptionalism has too much attention whereas other member states also went through a very specific processes of integration and adaptation. He emphasizes the misfit between British membership in the community and its long-term goals. When speaking about the topic of foreign relations in Great Britain in regard to the EU one should mention Sanders (1990), Mangold (2001) and Williams (2005).

There are traditionally mentioned factors that shaped this kind of relationship between the EU and Great Britain. Among them are a range of historical, cultural, geographic and economic factors. Going with its roots back to early emergence of the nation-state, establishment of a unique legal system and strong monarchy, British history preserves its exceptional path after World War II, choosing a different way of economic and social development. Moreover, British
self-understanding and perception of their own role in the world’s arena is extremely strong due to its imperial past, with special relations with the USA and countries of the Commonwealth. Even though the Empire does not exist anymore, the feeling of world’s leader and great power remains vivid among the nationalistic moods of the British. Another important prerequisite of its “awkward” relationships is Britain’s late membership to the EU, which led to the necessity to play by already established rules by other founding members. I will elaborate on these factors later in the paper.

The theoretical grounds for my research are theories of European Integration and Europeanization. These theories allow to analyze both top-down and bottom-up processes of mutual influence between the EU and member state. The intergovernmentalist approach within theories of European integration is chosen for this case due to its focus on the nation-state, its role in decision-making and the primary role of its interests and preferences. Many definitions and conceptualizations of both notions are studied in the first part of my paper in order to determine the meaning of terms widely used in the literature.

The methodological approach, chosen for this paper is social constructivism. This sociological approach focuses on discourses, ideas and opinions; it underlines the symbolic aspect of European integration and Europeanization.

**Goals and Objectives**

The aim of this paper is to find out how the discourses on European integration and Europeanization are constructed in modern Great Britain and to categorize the number of factors of the ambivalent discourses on Europeanization and European integration in Britain.

These discourses shape public opinion and elites’ views on future policies in Britain towards the EU and therefore determine future relationships between these two actors.

The objectives of the paper are the following:

- To identify and theoretically categorize Europeanization and European integration;
- To study British identity issues in order to explain the ‘awkward partner’ relations;
- To analyze the latest discourses on Europeanization in Britain in order to identify, how they are constructed;
- To describe the historical context and reasons of specific relations between European continental countries and Britain and to outline the list of historical factors that shape modern British discourses about Europe.
The paper has the following structure: the first part covers theoretical understandings of Europeanization and European integration. It includes definitions and conceptualizations of the notions, and mentions various theoretical approaches. It also presents methodological approach, which is based on the social constructivist perspective of the European integration and used during the research in order to explain the choice of method. The theories of European identity-building are also considered in order to understand further its role in the British discourse and identity construction.

The second part is genuine research – discourse analysis, which provides data and helps to elaborate on factors that shape discourses on Europeanization. The research focuses on a number of speeches and lectures by British politicians, who present both political parties and speak about Europe and European Union. The speeches date to last 12-15 years (it covers recent shifts in the Office) and address the most important European events – introduction of Euro, Constitution debate, Lisbon Treaty, economic crisis and others. The research results in a number of dimensions, where these discourses are constructed. The dimensions should not be mistaken for factors: they describe the field where discourses are constructed, while factors determine their shaping.

The third part is dedicated to the explanation of the British case specifically, analyzing previous works and identifying historical prerequisites, reasons and the modern adaptation of British institutions to Europeanization. The analysis results in the list of historically based factors that shape modern discourses in Britain.

Part 1. Theories of European Integration: Social Constructivist Approach

The notions of Europeanization and European integration are widely used in contemporary social sciences. However, they are also usually mixed. While describing processes of relations between the EU and its member states, scientists refer to both of these notions and start with the conceptualization of them. Scholars try to identify and describe the changes that occur on political, economic, and cultural levels due to the development of the EU. In this part, I will try to collect various definitions and conceptualizations of Europeanization and European integration, compare and contrast them, and study some theoretical approaches that cover these notions.

Being rather fashionable terms, Europeanization and European integration need exploration and explanation. A lot of authors have already devoted their works to these aims. One can see Bomberg and Peterson (2000), Börzel (1999; 2002), Börzel and Risse (2000), Buller and Gamble (2002), Bulmer and Burch (2001), Dyson (2000; 2002), Featherstone and Kazamias (2001), George (2001), Ladrech (1994), Olsen (2002), Risse et al (2001) and many others. All these authors use the terms in various perspectives, sometimes narrow, sometimes wide, sometimes as a process, sometimes as a theory. To come closer to my
research question, I will consistently give definitions to both of the notions using previous works done in the field.

1.1. Identifying European Integration

Theoretical analysis of European integration came from international relations and is mainly presented by of two most influential contradicting theoretical camps: neo-functionalists like Haas and Lindberg (see further explanations later) and intergovernmentalists (like Moravcsik). Both camps are interested in explaining the phenomenon of stable cooperation between states with the creation of institutions on a supranational level. The rising and flourishing European Communities and later the European Union determined academic interest in research and analysis of interrelations between the EU and domestic national policy-making.

One should start from realizing that definitions of European integration sometimes are difficult to distinguish from ones of Europeanization. Some literature even finds these two notions identical. However, later in this paper I will distinguish between the terms and explain the difference.

Approaches to European Integration: Intergovernmentalism and Neo-Functionalism

As I have already mentioned earlier, there are two theoretical approaches to European integration: neo-functionalist and intergovernmentalist. Both these theories are macro-level theories of international relations. As such their goal is to describe and explain the integration process. The European Community was founded with the federalist ideas in minds of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. However, in 1943, David Mitrany published his book “A Working Peace System. An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization” where he opposed these federalist ideas with functionalist theory. To understand contemporary state of the art in the theoretical discussions on European integration, it is relevant here to elaborate on both theories.

The first approach, neo-functionalism, focuses on the interests of participating actors, especially on non-state actors – private actors, firms, public officials - who seek for solutions within the region. From a functionalist point of view, integration is a process, which will result in the shift of loyalties and in a new political community that is an institutional change. Functionalism was created as a theory to explain, how institutions and agencies, instead of nation-states, could address the needs of the people, putting actors’ interests in the first place.

Earlier scientists tended to see both processes as analogous. For example, Haas (1958) explained European integration through supranationality, supranational interests and spillover. He stated that actors “… in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction
over the pre-existing national states" (p.16). It means that at some point nation-states chose collective, joint decision-making over their own ability of conducting key foreign and domestic policies themselves. As Lindberg (1963) said, they even delegate their decision-making to a third body, to a new central organ. Following Lindberg, nation states will, therefore, “shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre" (p.6) under certain circumstances. To summarize such early scholars, European integration is seen as a process of shifting decision-making along with loyalties and expectations to a new political center, which is a supranational institution.

Neo-functionalism, which continued on this path, was established by Haas and was first presented in his book “The Uniting of Europe” (1958). In this book, functionalist theory was adapted to be precise about the European integration process and the challenges faced by the European Communities. The general idea is that the states forgo conducting their key policies independently, and seek for a new central body to delegate the decision-making to. Jean Monnet emphasized the specific role of supranational institutions within this approach. These institutions were planned to serve as the basis for common policies, starting from economic policy and then spreading further along with integration. This process is explained through the concept of spillover within the context of European integration. This concept is central for the neo-functional theory of integration and means a process where “a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more, and so forth” (Lindberg, 1963). Miles defines spillover as “…a process whereby successful integration in an area of lesser salience would lead to a series of further integrative measures. The success of these measures would eventually lead to a progressive and gradual altering of attitudes amongst these elites in favor of further European integration” (Miles, 1995). However, the neo-functional theory was criticized for a lack of explanation of the factors: being strong at explaining the processes themselves, it failed at explaining the origins of changes.

On the contrary, intergovernmentalism is presented by scholars who claim the importance of member states themselves over European institutions, and focuses on governments as actors. Andrew Moravcsik and his companions emphasized the state’s willingness to integrate and to delegate some power to newly established institutions and the crucial role of member states’ interests in decision-making. Since no autonomous power is given to these institutions, all decision-making is done within states' interests. Intergovernmentalism sees states as independent rational actors with their own goals and objectives. Miles claims “at the core of assumptions of intergovernmentalism are an acceptance of rational state behavior, a liberal theory of formulating national preferences and an intergovernmentalist analysis of inter-state negotiation” (Miles, 1995).

Moravcsik suggested economic factors to be the driving force for the states to incorporate the integrating process. The states’ understanding of the need to establish a common market and monetary policies provided the basis for
integration and, therefore; acceptance of the need to give away some power to supranational institutions.

The strong position of member states is based on their legitimacy due to being democratically elected and on their legal sovereignty, therefore; the autonomy of the states is extremely high. The decisions made within the states then form the arena for both states and supranational institutions.

For my study the intergovernmentalist approach is more suitable due to its focus on domestic politics rather than the neo-functional one. Precisely within this approach European integration is determined and driven by the decisions of nation states, which aim to protect their own national interests, protect sovereignty and preserve security. In my research I study Britain as an independent actor with its interests and preferences, whose actions are reasonable and rational.

**Approaches to European Integration: State-Centric and Multi-Level Governance Models**

Apart from the theoretical understandings there are two basic models of European integration presented in the literature. The models are well described by Marks, Hooghe and Blank (1996). One is state-centric, and argues that European integration does not challenge the autonomy of nation-states. The other is the model of multi-level governance, where institutions from different levels are given equal powers.

- **The state-centric model** focuses on the willingness of nation-states to preserve their power and sovereignty. The model underlines states’ central role in the decision-making process, while only some limited part is given to the supranational institutions in order to achieve some specific goal. Moreover, these supranational institutions are designed by nation-states and, therefore, are designed in a secure and not threatening way. In general, within this model, nation-states’ governments determine the overall policy making of the EU in regard to national interests and preferences. Within this model, the state remains the center of decision-making, which is determined by political interests and pressures from outside. This model does not claim that the state determines all decision-making processes, but emphasizes that the general control over it belongs to the state. Marks stated it as follows: “The core claim of the state-centric model is that policy-making in the EU is determined primarily by state executives constrained by political interests nested within autonomous state arenas that connect subnational groups to European affairs” (1996, p.345). This model is usually used by intergovernmentalists like Moravcsik, Garrett, Hoffman.

- **The model of multi-level governance** explains the emergence of the EU as a result of weakening of nation-states due to global processes. This model presents the autonomous role of EU level institutions. It
claims that despite the strong role of state authorities, new European level actors are independent. Moreover, they are as important as the states themselves. According to the model, decision-making at the EU level is shared between actors from different levels, and does not exclusively belong to the nation state executives anymore. Moreover, the model presupposes loss of control for individual states, because single state executives do not have deciding power anymore. It is important to see the state as one of the range of actors within the multi-level governance model. The model reveals the European level of policy-making as a special level, where only supranational institutions can operate. The scholars who developed this model were Marks and Hooghe.

1.2. Identifying Europeanization

'Europeanization' is a very popular term to use in academic literature today. But it is obvious that different authors use it in many variations, understanding and labeling different issues. Some authors even argue that the term is useless in the way that it has no precise meaning. But one should look closer before abandoning the notion.

Back in 1994 Ladrech started this discussion arguing that Europeanization is a result of the EU political dynamics becoming a part of the logic and norms of domestic policy-making. He identified Europeanization as "an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national logic of national politics and policy-making" (p.70). The most important feature by Ladrech was emphasizing the top-down character of the EU influence on domestic policies. This approach was followed by Börzel and Risse (2000), Buller and Gamble (2002) and George (2001), however, widened further by them. Thereby, Buller and Gamble stated that Europeanization is "a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics" (p.17).

An interesting concept of Europeanization is provided by Borneman and Fowler (1997), who distinguished between the historical, ethnological, and practical features of the process. Starting with history, they start their Europeanization analysis long before European institutions – in the 15th century, bringing us to the common identity of Europeans in opposition to “Oriental” countries, based on opposition of Christianity to other rising religions. They draw Europeanization to common values of freedom, liberty, and progress later during the 18th century. From here it’s easy to say that for these scientists Europeanization is a much wider notion than just a process connected to ‘EU – member state’ relations. They deal mostly with identity issues, mentioning royal families, two world wars, and fascist and soviet regimes that existed in certain countries. Moreover, they emphasize that the EU and Europeanization are not elided, posting examples of Norway being Europeanized but out of the EU, and
Britain resisting Europeanization within the EU. Basically, Borneman and Fowler speak about two historical directions that contradict each other: supranational unity based on economic and military cooperation and revival of nation-states based on sovereignty, identities, and territoriality. The most interesting part of the paper is dedicated to practices of Europeanization. The authors start their analysis of practices with language issues. European Union’s multilingual societies are now competing for dominance of their own national language. However, global exchange, freedom of movement and other features of supranational institutions reveal the need for increasing the number of people speaking other languages. Therefore the states support their citizens to learn other languages to compete in the labor market through changes in the educational system. This means that amalgamation of languages within the EU is unlikely and national languages will retain their full functions on the domestic field, however the political, economic and labor exchange will require more and more people with two and more languages. Another practice that, in comparison with languages, turned out very differently is money. Member states started from making their own national currencies convertible and exchangeable, and now stand at a point with a single currency for sixteen states. Borneman and Fowler continue with sports, tourism, sex, and come to the conclusion, where they suggest “dealing with the EU as a continental political unit of a novel order, and with Europeanization pragmatically as a spirit, a vision, and a process” (p.510).

However, later Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) argued that Europeanization includes not only downloading, meaning both the domestic and EU levels of policy-making stress the interdependence between these two levels. They mentioned both EU institutions expanding their policy-making and also change within domestic institutions. Risse et al (2001) followed this combination, identifying both downloading and up-loading. They stated that Europeanization is the “emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political legal and social institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules” (p.3), where ‘emergence and development’ underline Europeanization as a process of both downloading European rules and norms and uploading development of institutions.

Moreover, there are even more broad conceptualizations: Radealli referred to Europeanization using many other broad concepts: “processes of construction, diffusion, institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (2004). However such definitions leave enough space for criticism of futility and difficulty of usage due to conceptual stretching. Radealli explained his position with the idea that everything, touched by Europe, became Europeanized, and, therefore, it is hard to identify the notion. And in this case, the term becomes even more meaningless. Therefore, there is
a need to define one notion through other ones, distinguishing them from each other.

In the introduction to their book “The politics of Europeanization”, Featherstone and Radaelli presented a concept of four types of Europeanization. Firstly, Europeanization as historic phenomenon is used by scholars to describe the process of exporting cultural norms, institutional practices and patterns of behavior. This export was widely seen during colonial times, when Britain, Spain, France and Portugal spread their way of life on other continents and civilizations. The second approach presented by the authors sees Europeanization as increased transnationalism. This means that within European boundaries cultural norms, values and patterns are diffused. This usage is very wide and covers cultural, political and even daily life levels. Analyzing the literature on Europeanization, Featherstone and Radaelli came to the conclusion that the most widely used understanding of Europeanization is adaptation on the domestic level. This is an adaptation to institutional challenges and other pressures from EU regulations that the member state should comply with. And the last type of Europeanization is bottom-up influence: the inputs of domestic politics on the European level are classically seen as integration.

Such difficulties in defining the notion led to Olsen’s idea, that it is not so important to identify the term, but to understand how it can be used while describing European processes and policies (2001). He stated that we need the term to understand “how it eventually may help us give better accounts of the emergence, development and impacts of a European, institutionally-ordered system of governance” (2002). While explaining the term it was important for Olsen to distinguish between various uses of Europeanization on the basis of what is changed (ibid, p.923):

- Changes in external boundaries: This involves the territorial reach of a system of governance and the degree to which Europe as a continent becomes a single political space. For example, Europeanization is taking place as the European Union expands through enlargement.

- Developing institutions at the European level: This signifies centre-building with a collective action capacity, providing some degree of co-ordination and coherence. Formal-legal institutions of governance and a normative order based on overarching constitutive principles, structures and practices both facilitate and constrain the ability to make and enforce binding decisions and to sanction non-compliance.

- Central penetration of national systems of governance: Europeanization here involves the division of responsibilities and powers between different levels of governance. All multilevel systems of governance need to work out a balance between unity and diversity, central co-ordination and local autonomy. Europeanization, then, implies adapting national and sub-national systems of governance to a European political centre and European-wide norms.
• Exporting forms of political organization: Europeanization as exporting forms of political organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory, focuses on relations with non-European actors and institutions and how Europe finds a place in a larger world order. Europeanization signifies a more positive export/import balance as non-European countries import more from Europe than vice versa and European solutions exert more influence in international fora.

• A political unification project: The degree to which Europe is becoming a more unified and stronger political entity is related both to territorial space, centre-building, domestic adaptation, and how European developments impact and are impacted by systems of governance and events outside the European continent. A complication is that there is not necessarily a positive correlation between the four types of Europeanization mentioned above, and between each of them and a politically stronger Europe.

Further Olsen asks, how these changes occur. Theoretically we could distinguish between various mechanisms that in practice appear to be mixed. However, Olsen suggests mechanisms for each of the five aspects of Europeanization mentioned above. Thereby Europeanization in its territorial aspect is “interpreted as rule application” (ibid), creation of institutional frameworks on the European level is seen as “purposeful decision-making” (ibid). Accordingly, domestic institutional changes are adapted in two ways: “experiential learning and competitive selection” (ibid). Furthermore, diffusion identifies the influence of European models, and institutional mutual adaptation describes Europeanization as political unification. However, the mixture of these mechanisms in reality should be stressed once again: Olsen does not speak about pure interdependence, but about the mutual influence of adaptation of institutes.

The last question to answer following Olsen is why institutions adapt. Having in mind that institutions are rather stable structures that assist in the preservation of social order, one should identify the needs strong enough to affect institutions. In the case of Europeanization it’s obvious that institutional change was a response to the redistribution of power after World War II. As long as the shifts in power were likely to happen, the talks about Europeanization gathered strength. Therefore the need to face challenges of these shifts led to adaptive institutional changes. For further analysis of institutional changes due to Europeanization see Olsen (2002).

Bache and Marshall in their paper, “Europeanization and Domestic Change”, provided a short and clear definition of Europeanization from the perspective of domestic adaptation: “the redirection or reshaping of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect the policies, practices or preferences of the EU level actors/institutions” (p.6). Within this definition they distinguished between direct and indirect Europeanization, where a direct one deals with intended change provided by the EU and an indirect one deals with unintentional
influence. Moreover, they distinguish between voluntary and coercive Europeanization, and, therefore, get four types of effect (Bache, Marshall, 2004: 6):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voluntary</th>
<th>Coercive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct</strong></td>
<td>intended impact of an EU initiative unopposed by dominant member state actors</td>
<td>intended impact of an EU initiative opposed by dominant member state actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect</strong></td>
<td>unintended or inadvertent impact of an EU initiative on the member state unopposed by dominant member state actors</td>
<td>spillover consequences of coercive-direct Europeanisation in one area to another</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to more clearly explain the domestic impact of European policy-making Knill and Lehmkuhl developed three mechanisms of Europeanization. In spite of this distinction being analytical and not empirical, it might be useful while understanding the nature of the process itself. The authors directly explain that, in reality, adaptive processes have features of different mechanisms and usually look like a mixture of these. They mention, that the domestic impact of Europeanization varies a lot both from country to country and from institution to institution. Different authors refer to compatibility of European and domestic institutions, some to opportunity structures and interests while identifying the focus of their Europeanization research. Another important group of central notions involves identities, beliefs and expectations to determine national response to the process. However, Knill and Lehmkuhl have developed a more comprehensive framework while describing the domestic impact of Europeanization. Defining Europeanization as the impact of EU regulatory policies on national policies and institutions (2002), they distinguished three mechanisms of Europeanization: institutional compliance, changing domestic opportunity structures, and framing domestic beliefs and expectations. In its most explicit way, the EU may apply the institutional model, which has to be applied by national institutions in order to fulfill certain requirements. This ‘institutional compliance’ mechanism is usually referred to as ‘positive integration’ (Taylor 1983) and includes environmental policies, working conditions, and health policies. In cases where a domestic institution does not reach the requirement, it needs reshaping and reforming. The second mechanism uses the EU’s right to influence domestic legislation which in turn influences actors. In this case the EU provides inner challenges for institutions, but leaves them the opportunity to adapt in their own way. Therefore the mechanism allows regulations to be provided indirectly. The last mechanism is the weakest form of influence, where the EU neither prescribes certain requirements, nor provides the need for some
institutional changes. In order to reach the objectives in the most indirect way, the EU regulatory policies alter the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors and that alteration, in turn, may influence strategies and lead to changes.

In conclusion to this part, I understand Europeanization in this paper as a process of downloading policies from the EU level to the domestic one. It includes adaptation of domestic institutions in order to fit EU regulations, directives, norms and rules. The extent to which these domestic changes occur, varies from country to country, from institution to institutions, however, the direction of the process remains top-down. In my paper such understanding of Europeanization means the analysis of domestic changes in Great Britain, provided by the EU policies, and the discourses, constructed around this adaptation.

1.3. Social Constructivism as a Methodological Approach

In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to establish a methodological approach for the research. This methodological approach must determine the method of research and its object. Since I am studying discourses and their construction, the most appropriate methodology is social constructivism. It is not only useful for discourse analysis, but also suits well for European integration studies and is very well elaborated in this field.

Since the 1990s, the version of the new institutionalism, social constructivism or sociological institutionalism, has presented a social scientific alternative for the study of European integration. In contrast to previous approaches, social constructivism underlines the symbolic aspects of European integration, that is, discourses, norms, words and symbols that construct Europe on both supranational and intergovernmental levels.

Social constructivism does not commit itself to either a intergovernmental or supranational point of view. As soon as the EU becomes a changing political body, sticking to only one of the approaches, this might introduce a bias, and lead to a non-complex understanding of the phenomenon. The European Union requires understanding of its structures on all levels – supranational, intergovernmental, national, regional, and even private.

The key question of a social constructivist approach to European integration is through what mechanisms political agents reproduce and transform the European political order (Kauppi 2003).

In this paper, the social constructivist approach is used due to its focus on discourses, importance of the public and elites’ attitudes toward Europeanization. Within this approach common beliefs, ideas and norms influence identities, and the related interests, and, therefore, determine decision-making process.

Social constructivism within European integration is about norms, discourses, ideas, debates and socialization. As a theoretical approach, one might distinguish between three types: conventional, interpretative, and
critical/radical (Checkel 2006). Conventional constructivism focuses on norms and their influence in shaping political outcomes. Interpretative constructivism deals more with language and speech acts, and their role in constructing social reality. Critical constructivism preserves the focus on linguistics, but adds “researcher’s own implication in the reproduction of the identities and world he/she is studying” (ibid: 6). When used for analysis of the EU, interpretative and critical constructivism focus less on the norms that made the EU as it is today, but more on speech acts that anticipated those norms.

In addition, social constructivism is very helpful in analyzing learning processes and socialization on the European level. Checkel (1999) argues that social learning includes a shift in interests and preferences while interacting with other actors and institutions. Following Checkel, who lists four hypotheses as to when social learning is more likely to occur, I would like to emphasize the period of crisis: “Social learning is more likely where the group feels itself in a crisis or is faced with clear and incontrovertible evidence of policy failure” (Checkel 1999: 549). While elites provide the public with the idea of crisis and political failure, they are more successful in influencing shifts in norms, values, believes, and interests.

Moreover, another assumption underlines the position of direct political pressure and exposure, which is also applicable for my research. Domestic changes that occur on the national level under pressure from new EU regulations cause additional ground for social learning and therefore, shift interests and preferences that can be used by political elites through speech acts.

Another issue Checkel addresses is socialization – the process of adopting the new norms, common believes, and understandings. Within European integration two questions are raised: where do these norms come from and how do they interact with agents on the national level. As for the emergence of norms, one way is individual agencies with the necessary skills to distribute their ideas in public. These agencies are more successful when the policy window is open – when a problem exists and no certain answer is provided. As for acceptance of norms there are two paths. The first is societal mobilization – “non-state actors and policy networks are united in their support for norms; they then mobilize and coerce decision-makers to change state policy” (ibid: 554). The second path is social learning which was mentioned earlier.

This paper will use interpretative constructivism to more successfully answer questions about background conditions and linguistic structures that constructed modern public moods on Europeanization and integration. I assume that these discourses are important enough to influence decision-making and future development of EU-British relations through social learning, shifts in interests, and preferences. In order to prove or refute this assumption the method of discourse analysis is used. This method is widely used among constructivists and therefore proved its accountability while reaching the goals of research.
1.4. European Identity

To reach the goal of this paper, identity issues need to be raised. European integration and Europeanization influence and change not only institutions, policies, and borders, but also self-perception and self-understanding of people. Being tightly connected to the institution of citizenship, the modern concept of identity within Europe is polysemantic. Today scholars speak not only about national identity, but also about the emergence of a European identity. In order to clarify the British case from identity perspective, I elaborate on the European identity phenomenon.

A United Europe created by diffused borders, a common market, freedom of movement and other important features of the EU should have resulted in some kind of new identity. A peaceful existence with no armed conflicts between members is changing, shaping or even creating new identities. However, the question of existence of European identity is quite sharp and doesn't have any definitive answer. The answer to this question is a recipe for successful or failed integration. The understanding of contemporary national identities, including British, is also interesting in comparative prospective to a European identity, if there is such. While speaking about European integration, the idea of a common European identity will be crucial from institutional and people’s points of view. The support of a big group with such common identity would be vital for institutions, when it comes to changes and sacrifices. However, it is still to acknowledge, what people identify themselves with and what is specific about this kind of collective identity.

There is a long history of studies dedicated to comparison of European and national identities (see Schlesinger 1999, Meier-Pesti and Kirchler 2003, Bruter 2003). Many of these studies showed that European identity is weak in comparison to national ones, however, they also showed, that there are wide differences in reasons for supporting European integration. Such differences led to acceptance of the idea of the existence of different European identities (Pichler 2009). But to prove the existence of at least one European identity we should determine why people are willing to feel belonging to a certain European group. Being a strong economic, political and cultural entity, the EU is a body toward which specific identity is likely to be developed.

There are various theoretical approaches to the emergence of a European identity as such. Ruiz Jiménez et al. distinguishes three such theories: cultural, instrumental, and civic. The basis to distinguish these theories is the relations between a person’s European and national identity. The scholars, who support the cultural approach to European identity argue, that this identity is not based on the same elements as national one (such as common heritage, symbols and so on). It may emerge as a result of a process similar to a nation-building process, but on the European level. However, due to cultural, linguistic and other differences, such emergence will take time. Moreover, followers of this approach argue, that such identity will replace the national one. This approach claims, that national identities are based on cultural links, and, therefore, European identity
would be weaker, if national one is strong enough. The common European culture in comparison to a national one is still under consideration, when it comes to identities. However, cultural attachments to Europe exist, and, therefore, it is relevant to speak about an emerging European identity.

Another approach is called instrumental and is promoted by scholars who believe that European identity is consciously chosen due to some specific personal interest. They claim that people’s feeling of belonging to a certain group is based on analysis of potential gains and losses, connected to membership in the group. The example is the weaker the nation-state is in decision-making process, the stronger a person’s identity with Europe is. Therefore, the more successful European policies are, the more likely people are to feel European. However, critics of this approach argue that even if European identity is instrumental, a national one is not, and, therefore, they cannot even be compared. It means that it is unlikely for people to shift their loyalties from a national to European level due to different basis of these identities.

The last theory of emergence of European identity presented is civic and is based on common peaceful political rules, cultural norms and civic duties (Mancini 1998). From this perspective European identity is tied to EU shared values, rights and duties expressed in the documents; however it is obvious that these bases are not enough and therefore within this framework European identity could only be an addition to the national one.

The talk about a European identity has gained urgency in view of new challenges to national identities. Violent ethnic conflicts in France and the Netherlands revealed the issues of the treatment of immigrants that need to be solved. The threat that was earlier seen coming from the EU, today is shifted toward minorities and immigrants.

To summarize, this modern conceptualization of European identity becomes a unique factor to influence discourses around European integration and Europeanization. Being a touchy subject for the public and elites, the issue of identity is often used to address legitimacy and illegitimacy of the political processes.

In conclusion to this chapter, it is important to underline, that in this paper I distinguish between European integration and Europeanization. The first notion deals with domestic decisions that to some extent influence the supranational arena, while the second defines domestic changes that occur due to EU regulations. There is a difference between the direction of the process: while European integration is described by bottom-up process, Europeanization is top-down influence. Following this difference, the construction of discourses will be divided into constructs based on integration and constructs that react to domestic changes. Social constructivism is used as a methodological basis for the empirical research in Part 2. Empirical research with the method of discourse analysis will result in dimensions, around which the discourses are constructed. The research will be supported by secondary data analysis (Part 3), which will provide the factors of shaping these discourses. Theoretical concept of European
identity is presented in Part 1 in order to explain separately the British identity factor of shaping discourses.

**Part 2. Discourse Analysis**

The meaning of words and their understanding depends heavily on the situation and is contextually determined. Therefore, the choice of words may also be determined by the context. Discourse analysis, as a method of studying text, allows analyzing the words from a linguistic point of view in addition to social and contextual predisposition of words’ choice. In this paper discourse analysis is used in order to understand how language about European integration and Europeanization is constructed. Following Potter and Wetherell (1987), there are thee features of discourse as construction: the first underlines discourse being constructed on pre-existing linguistic background; the second presents cognitive selection of certain words from a number of possibilities; and the third generalizes constructive functions of the language as an aspect of social life. Another important feature of discourse that is vital for this paper is its action orientation.

Thomas Diez in his article “Speaking 'Europe” provides an introduction to discourse analysis in European studies. He promotes three theoretical approaches, which explain the role of language, and how it can be used in analyzing European processes. The first approach is called Austinian (after Austin) and presupposes that there should be linguistic explanation of any phenomenon on Earth. European integration also should be conceptualized in words. However, there are cases, when language goes beyond its primary function. Austin with his students elaborated a lot on the concept of speech acts – acts that are tightly connected to words. The traces of this concept can still be seen in analysis of European citizenship in common politico-communicative space (further see Habermas 1992). Within the trend of these speech acts one could trace politics through discourse (note the difference between through and by). The influence of negotiations, statements, sayings and treaties in politics is uncontested. Through language interests and purposes might also be expressed in politics. The most important issue of Austinian discourse analysis is an understanding of the connection between words and action. The second approach is called Foucauldian and assists in understanding of the political force of language. It follows Foucault’s idea, that reality cannot be known without discourse. Moreover, the reality and phenomena can be constructed differently through different words.

As presented in the first chapter of this paper, constructs of discourses will be divided into those based on European integration and those based on Europeanization. The first group of constructs will cover those discourses that describe processes within Britain and focus on Europe – therefore bottom-up processes. The second group includes discourses that are born as a reaction to European regulations that cause certain changes on the domestic level. I start with European integration and then proceed to discuss Europeanization. Within
each of these parts various dimensions of policies will be analyzed. However, it is important to mention, that the same dimensions can be used in both groups of constructs and arguments for and against integration and Europeanization may be seen in both groups. I am not saying that one of these groups of constructs is positive and another is negative. I’m providing the dimensions where discourses are constructed. These dimensions are the result of discourse analysis of speeches and lectures, given by British politicians from both political parties that focus on Europe and the European Union. The time period of analyzed literature is determined by recent important changes within the EU – over last 12 years, and the focus of the speeches is determined by the same important changes – introduction of Euro, Constitutional debate, Lisbon Treaty, Euro crisis and others.

2.1. European Integration Constructs

In their speeches politicians provide arguments for their claims. These arguments address issues that are relevant for the audience and will get some response from them. During my research I categorized a number of dimensions that appear repeatedly in the speeches as such issues or arguments. The repetition of the same units means their importance and key role in argumentation and, therefore, determines their place in discourse formation. These dimensions are not the reason for discourse construction, but the ground, where this construction happens.

**Economic Dimension**

The first dimension, where European integration discourses are constructed, is the economic one. Representatives of elites use economic arguments in order to promote or discourage further integration. It is obvious, that within the economic dimension the main issues to discuss are monetary union and the single market. In the recent times, the Euro crisis is in the center of many debates.

Back in 2005 Mr. Cameron gave a speech at the Centre for Policy Studies, where he pointed out five threats that hold Britain back from becoming wealthy and prosperous. Under number three in this list goes the danger of European Union’s regulatory culture. In addition, he proposes three components that EU regulations should provide:

For Britain, the first priority must be the return of powers over employment and social regulation. This would be the strategic imperative of my European policy. Second, the EU must abandon the hubristic constitutional project once and for all. Third, we must give the EU a clear remit to enforce free trade and open markets. [5]

Mr. Cameron here allows himself to announce how European reforms should be conducted in order to develop British national wealth. In his third priority he announces the need for further development within the EU toward open market and free trade that is profitable for Britain.
In the former pro-European Labour government Peter Mandelson, Privy Council and Labour politician, in his speech in the Centre for European Politics in 2007 addressed the issue of the single market in the following way:

Europe has been working on it for over six decades, and today one can say that they reached the goal. However, it appeared to be only beginning. Globalization led to huge changes in the economy of the whole world. Europe has built something that is competitive enough on the world’s arena. In comparison to world powers like USA, China, India European countries cannot be judged differently, but by the level of “small”. And only in strong Europe can they compete with others. As I say, in a world of continental powers, the EU is the way we bring together the power of European states to shape globalization and set global agendas. [13]

What he says here, means that the British have to understand and recognize the global market, where European nation-states are not competitive enough on their own. In order to be on the same level with the USA, China and other world powers they need to cooperate. The argument about profit of cooperation in the sake of competitiveness is often seen in the words of pro-European politicians. This argument is very strong and can be seen in words of other politicians. David Miliband, MP, in 2009 put it this way:

But, above all, we would be demonstrating visibly that the best way to secure national interests at a time of economic anxiety is through cooperation. [14]

Moreover, the further the crisis goes, the stronger the need to act together is seen in the ideas of elites, who promote European integration. Mr. Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister, stated in 2011 in his speech to European Parliament, cooperation to be the first focus:

While our domestic situations vary, re-launching the European economy is our common endeavor. So what are the principles that must now guide us? First, we must move together. The greatest danger we face is division. [9]

Following such pro-European approach, he emphasizes it by prioritizing economic growth and openness of markets, declining protectionist policies. However, it is important to mention, that this promotion of integration has the selective features of former governors: Mr. Clegg openly says that he supports integration because and to the extent that it’s profitable for the people; he underlines pragmatic profit of European integration to decrease concerns about sovereignty and identity that will be studies later.

In addition, European integration is promoted as a cure from economic crisis. The Federal Trust Report of 2011 states the following:

The global financial crisis in its turn will force the European Union states to engage in increased political and economic integration, which will oblige the UK to rethink its place in Europe. [17]
Moreover, they directly point out the need for stabilization of Eurozone as British economic interest due to interdependency of nation states economies and banking systems. In this perspective the argument is ambivalent: there is a need for mutual support in rehabilitation after crisis, but as Britain is not in the Eurozone, they look at this support and cooperation from aside. Britain is tightly connected to the European economy, however it is still ‘they’, who should stabilize the Euro.

**Dimension of world powers and the role of nation state**

The next dimension I study here is related to world powers and the role of nation states in the global arena. As it was already mentioned earlier, Britain has a long imperial history, which is very hard to get rid of. Therefore, the arguments that deal with the role of the state within United Europe or outside of it are widely used to form the public moods towards Europe. Peter Mandelson in the same speech posted it very clear:

> Often the anti-European case in this country is based on the argument that the alternative to European membership is a sovereign Britain setting its own course. But the real alternative is a nominally sovereign Britain under-equipped to influence the global debates that really matter and detached from its core economic and political hinterland. [13]

One can see in this sentence, that the idea of Britain influencing the global debates is taken for granted, and the threat of losing it is seen as a strong argument for cooperation. Issues of British sovereignty are commonly used as opposing argument to integration. The first reaction to any European regulation in Britain deals with sovereignty. This issue will be addressed in the second group of constructs later, but here it’s important to note, that pooling of sovereignty may be seen as a positive way to preserve British global influence. It is important for elites to show the public the place of Britain without Europe and to explain that this place is not the one Britain is worth.

When Britain lost its Empire, the need to find a new place and a new role within post-war Europe was obvious. Back in 2004 Chris Patten, Conservative politician, CH PC and Chairman of BBC Trust, said that

> To most of the American and European Founding Fathers of the post-war world, it seemed obvious, that our role should be leading and driving the integration of Europe. But that is not how it seemed to us. [16]

Here he addresses to British late membership in the European Community as a root for modern disposition. However, such feeling of leadership needed to be left at some point, and advantages of integration with the ‘others’ needed to be promoted. That’s why in his lecture at the University of Cambridge he tried to convince the audience that everything is under control:

> To the sovereigntist, Europe comes like a thief in the night, pilfering and desecrating the national political symbols of our island home. Integration political and economic does involve pooling and sharing sovereignty…and
we certainly do it in Europe whenever we agree that we can cope better with common problems or augment our ability to pursue our national interest by doing things together and by establishing supranational institutions or rules to manage the policies that we have agreed to share. [16]

He finishes his point of pooling sovereignty instead of losing it with questioning traditional British national idea about Europe – “our consistent belief that whatever the others are up to is probably bad and will certainly not work” – and gives credit to European success in sharing national sovereignties. His argument is that Britain should not be as frightened of losing sovereignty, but instead see other European examples that are prosperous and flourishing.

Dimension of security and foreign affairs

Another dimension to construct discourses on European integration is related to issues of security and foreign affairs. These issues have increased attention after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which established the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This position created great resonance and debate and, therefore, required elites to respond. In this field the most important task for elites in promoting integration was connected to explaining, that European foreign policy does not take the place of the national one. In the British case especially some discourses had to be constructed in order to guarantee stability of UK-US relations and the special Commonwealth connections. And the general argument constructed emphasizes the advantages of cooperation. David Miliband summarizes his foreign policy arguments for European integration in the following way:

A strong British foreign policy, which embraces Europe, is the best way to project our values and interests around the world, not at the expense of our roles in NATO, the G20 and the Commonwealth, not at the expense of our relationship with the US, but as a vital partner to them. [14]

The value of British membership in other international organizations along with the value of British-American relations is obvious and not even questioned. Because the nature of these relations is clearly understood and the consequences are predictable. However, taking into account traditional British exceptionalism, Miliband continues to follow the path of British leading role within the alliance:

But I think that the choice for the UK is also simply stated: we can lead a strong European foreign policy or – lost in hubris, nostalgia or xenophobia - watch our influence in the world wane… Alone, we may be interesting; leading a group of 27 in common values and purpose, we have real sway. [14]

The same argument about leading Europe in its foreign policy is seen in the Federal Trust Report, which cites Lord Hannay saying “the United Kingdom’s absence from the single currency and the Schengen agreement should not prevent a significant British role in the Union’s external policies and in the
construction of the European External Action Service”. It is a wise idea of elites: to promote European integration emphasizing British leading role within the community. It is a response to the public's need to feel unique, powerful and in control of the major decisions that influence integration.

**Dimension of public awareness**

The last dimension, where I see construction of discourses on European integration, is linked to public awareness and understanding of the process itself. The image of European integration in Britain is negative, and one of the reasons for it is the lack of legitimizing discourses. David Baker, professor at Nottingham Trent University, points out that while people are not interested in the EU politics, their views and judgments are mostly based on national media. In the British case, not only British media has almost no representation in European countries, but also what is published in the UK is far from positive perspective. The results are the following: “At the popular level, the view is widespread that the European Union is a distinctly “foreign” body, all too ready to “intervene” in national affairs” (Baker 2002). During the last ten years since Mr. Baker stated it, nothing changed much. English writer James Kirkup and journalist Bruno Waterfield mentioned in their article, published in The Telegraph on November 3, 2009 relating to Lisbon ratification, that “despite the scale of the changes the treaty makes, the British people have never been directly consulted on the document, which was ratified in a Commons vote and signed by Mr Brown in 2007”. Those who promote negative attitudes toward European integration usually use the argument of public low awareness and knowledge about the process. And they use this lack of knowledge in their advantage. As the mentioned authors did, journalists often widen the gap between public and elites, making elites’ decisions illegitimate by opposing them to public.

In conclusion, the lack of positive promotion of European integration in the UK is obvious. I have presented the dimensions within which such discourses are constructed and continue to be constructed by British elites. The arguments that are used within these dimensions aim to legitimise European integration and preserve a great role in Europe and in the world or Britain. It is important to mention, that discourses constructed about European integration are mostly positive and underline advantages of further integration. In this way David Miliband generalized this idea:

I know that Europe is far from perfect. It needs reform. But it needs Britain at the heart of Europe not on the fringes. And for all the unpopularity of the European Union, it is a strategic imperative for our economy, our environment and our society, as well – as I have argued today - for our foreign policy, that politicians speak up for a leading British role in Europe. [14]

I will further proceed to discourses constructed about Europeanization and dimensions, where those are constructed.
2.2. Europeanization Constructs

As it was already said earlier, some discourses are constructed around Europeanization – as reaction and response to some EU regulations and therefore domestic changes. As Schmidt argues, “one of the major problems for all member states, and not just for Britain, is that while national governance practices have changed, sometimes dramatically, in the process of Europeanisation, national leaders persist in speaking as if the old ideas about democracy still applied, as if little has changed, though everything has” (2006: 26). She speaks about changes in perspectives of regarding the acceptance of Europeanization on the part of both elites and public that needs to occur in order to legitimize the process.

Economic dimension

Within this group of discourses the economic dimension is also present. Traditional economic confrontation to Europeanization is related to the single currency. Britain is not a part of Eurozone and joining it is not one of the priorities of British economic policies at the moment. Adoption of the currency requires severe transfer of sovereignty in the sphere of monetary and fiscal policies. William Cash, the Conservative MP, underlines it easily (House of Commons debate on European Affairs, 16 June 2009):

When we look at the comparisons between ourselves and the Eurozone, we see that, time and again, we have done better: on inflation, on employment and on a whole raft of measures. [8]

His position is very understandable in a way of comparison. He means that Britain does not need the Euro, because they can manage their economy more successfully themselves. It is not only about not being a part of something, but also about being better without. With the example of Greece and other countries that adopted the Euro recently, Britain is not willing to lose its comparative prosperity for the sake of integration. However, as Mr. Clegg pointed out in 2011, the UK is in crisis too, and there is no point in comparing, because everyone is in the same boat, and there is a need to establish a solution on the regional level.

But the global economic crisis hit the UK very hard. We now face a tough period of fiscal consolidation and that has been as humbling for us as recent events have been for Eurozone states. The truth is: we have all made mistakes. [9]

In the British case, the economic dimension of Europeanization covers much less than in other European states due to its opt-out from monetary union, and perhaps for this reason the discourses that are based on economic arguments are both positive and negative. The Greek case might be a good example for all other states, which consider entering the Eurozone. However, British monetary and fiscal policies are still under national control, which allows
elites to express their opinions openly until the decision of adopting the Euro is made.

**Dimension of sovereignty and trust**

Another dimension that is commonly mentioned within constructing discourses on Europeanization deals with sovereignty and trust. Any European regulation is seen as a threat to domestic sovereignty: “This ensured that any increase in the power of EU institutions would therefore be seen as a threat not just to executive autonomy but also to parliamentary sovereignty” (Pilkington 1995: 98).

Among the last regulations, the Lisbon Treaty has the biggest reputation as an enemy of sovereignty. The referendum scandal was widely discussed, when British politicians promised to have a national vote on ratification of Lisbon but failed to do so. This issue of failure to hold a referendum became the focus of many articles and speeches from both pro-Europeans and Euro-sceptics. Massive public discontent was shown, that needed to be dealt with. And, therefore, Gordon Brown announced in 2007:

> If we needed a referendum we would have one. But I think that most people recognize that there is not a fundamental change taking place as a result of this amended treaty. [4]

He was basically calming people down, saying that not much changes with signing of the Treaty. However, not everyone agreed with him. It was one of the strongest Conservative arguments for the general election, when Mr. Cameron argued:

> Never again should it be possible for a British government to transfer power to the EU without the say of the British people. [6]

He did not say, that the Treaty was bad. He said, that the nation did not take part in making this decision and therefore it is not legitimate. In his speech ‘A Europe policy that people can believe in’ in 2009 Mr. Cameron provides guarantees, that Britain should negotiate with Europe about. But it is not the guarantees themselves, that are important here, but the reasons why Britain needs them. In Cameron’s words:

> But success in these negotiations will establish an extremely important principle: that European integration is not a one way street and that powers can be returned from the EU to its member countries, a principle that was envisaged in the Laeken Declaration nearly a decade ago. [6]

With this sentence he announces that there is a need for some powers to be given back to nation-states, that too much was given to supranational institutions. He fights for British sovereignty, claiming that centralization is a wrong direction. The federal state is the worst-case scenario, which should not be brought into life. Cameron argues, that Britain’s best interests are within EU as an association of individual states. For Britain which has no written constitution the threat of controlling EU legislation is so important, that the
Conservatives introduced a new law – “United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill, to make it clear that ultimate authority stays in this country, in our Parliament” (ibid).

The Lisbon ratification was so crucial for the British public, that Daniel Hannan, MEP, British journalist and politician, posted in his blog on the Telegraph web-site: “At midnight last night, we ceased to be an independent state, bound by international treaties to other independent states, and became instead a subordinate unit within a European state” (2009). Hannan believes that modern European Union makes the member states poorer and less democratic. He sees the need of reforming current European cooperation. In the same blog entry he cites the article from 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States:

The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states. [10]

His point is that after Lisbon ratification the EU has all four qualifications. With the establishment of a European institution for foreign policy, the EU now qualifies to be a state. And, therefore, the Treaty brings the EU to a new level of surrender of national sovereignty.

**Dimension of citizenship and identity**

The dimension of citizenship and identity on the British national level has its own interesting features to construct discourse about. I have already studied the phenomenon of European identity in the first part of the paper. In the British case this idea is not popular. Richard Leming, the Chair of Federal Union committee, links British exceptionalism in the sphere of identity to the Royal Crown. Moreover, he points out that Britons prefer to feel attachment to the monarchy more, than to the United Kingdom itself. He ascribes this strange feeling to the absence of a written constitution which usually serves as basis for citizens’ rights.

Identity is also related to symbols and daily usage of these symbols. Among such European symbols the Euro plays central role for the Eurozone as a day-to-day real display of common identity. In continental European countries one can usually see the European flag or hear the European anthem. But not in Britain. Moreover, some common European projects, like educational exchange, are not as popular among Britons. The Federal Trust Report of 2009 gives the following, when it comes to European identity: “According to UK government figures, sixty-two per cent of the British population claim only to speak English. The British government avoids using the European flag unless it is obliged to do so”. The same Report, however, mentions, that in spite low level of attachment to the EU, there are European features that offer certain advantages for British: “This finding does not mean that British nationals do not wish to take advantage of benefits from the European Union such as cross-border consumer protection, the removal of border controls or the facilitation of trans-boundary family issues”.

28
The discourses that are constructed within this dimension traditionally are negative to Europeanization. When it comes to citizenship and identities the British people are nationalists and prefer to use as few European symbols in their daily life, as possible. The prerequisites of such strong feeling of belonging to the nation were already presented in part two of this paper. But the result is obvious: the British people are not willing to become Europeans and their identity means a lot for them. These feelings become a profound ground to construct negative discourses on Europeanization in the state.

**Dimension of threat to domestic political system**

One more traditionally negative discourse about Europeanization is constructed around the threat to domestic political system, which follows EU regulations. I have already studied the domestic change that Britain had to conduct in order to fit into the Union. And these changes are surrounded by the following concerns: “should Britain sacrifice further economic sovereignty for wealth creation and in so doing lose yet more vital political sovereignty and with it the fundamental core of Britishness?” (Baker 2002). Traditional British system confronts European approach in many spheres, and this misfit creates a field for negative discourses to arise: “Despite an initially positive approach to the European Union from Mrs. Thatcher, the conflict between the European model – higher tax, social welfare, managed economy – and the emerging “Thatcherite” policy model – lower tax, reduced social cohesion, more individualised US free-market values – became over time more pronounced, estranging the British government from the main currents of European thinking” (The Federal Trust Report 2009). However, Britain being a well-developed country suffers more from following someone’s path instead of choosing its own way, when it comes to domestic change. In comparison to other member states the degree of misfit between Britain and the EU is not as profound as Euro-sceptics try to present.

**Dimension of voters’ preferences**

British discourses on Europeanization are also constructed on the national level to effect voters’ preferences. There is a hypothesis about the connection between citizens’ preferences on European integration and Europeanization and their voting patterns. Voters are expected to give their choice over to the party that more closely represents their own views on Europe. This hypothesis has been expressed by Gabel (2000), Tillman (2004) and others. However, it is not generally about the EU membership – this is not under discussion now. It means that certain EU policies and issues related to EU regulations may serve as ground for campaigning. Parties and politicians express their views very sharply in order to benefit their election campaigns. And ambivalent public attitudes become an effective ground to construct discourses on. In 2010 when the general election took place in Britain and the government changed from Labour to Conservative, Europe was one of the most urgent agendas of debate. Cameron was blaming pro-European Labour policies for all British problems. In his speech on party’s policy toward the EU in 2009 he stated the following:
I know, from the many public meetings I've held around the country, from the huge number of letters and emails that I receive, how much the people of this country will resent the fact that we cannot now have the referendum we were promised. The decision to promise, and then deny, a referendum was taken by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The betrayal was backed and matched by the Liberal Democrats. I want to explain what a new Conservative government will do to protect Britain's interests in Europe and salvage something from the mess that Labour will have left us. [6]

The role that Europe plays in national election discourses is very important. It reveals the value of this issue in the British politics. Moreover, it is directly connected to the assumption of discourses being influential for decision-making: discourses present party policies, voters' preferences are based on these discourses, and, therefore, they determine future decision-making. And as far as Europe is so important for British domestic politics, it will continue to be the focus of discourses.

In conclusion to this chapter I would like to summarize, that British discourses about Europe are constructed differently when it comes to European integration and Europeanization. These discourses are constructed within special dimensions of politics. These discourses can be both positive and negative, depending on the aim. But generally discourses on European integration are more positive and look into the future of EU-British relations, whereas discourses about Europeanization are mostly related to negative attitudes toward domestic changes. An important dimension, where European discourses are constructed, deals with party competition and campaigns, therefore EU-British relations are used to shape voters' preferences.

The next chapter presents the analysis of literature and provides clarification and explanation for such discourse formation. It reveals the basis for construction of modern British discourses in the described dimensions. Moreover, the factors of shaping discourses will be listed according to synthesis of literature analysis and discourse analysis in chapter 2.

**Part 3. Explaining the British Case**

The UK does not have a bilateral relationship with the EU.

It is part of the EU. We are all in the same boat.

- Jose Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission

The position in which Europe is presented in British media made it necessary for the leader of the European Commission to state his clarification out loud. British views on Europe historically range from opposition to further integration to support for the ‘Europe of nations’. However, this latter concept is rather ambiguous in the sense of degree of integration.
The following chapter presents secondary data analysis – it studies literature and previous research on the issue of European integration and Europeanization in Great Britain. The chapter will result in a list of factors, that shape modern discourses on integration in Britain; it will explain how the modern discourses are constructed, taking into account historical, cultural and economic reasons. These reasons are considered to have the most influence on modern discourses and their shaping, presented in the dimensions described in chapter 2.

The effect of British membership in the EU is strong for both. Academic literature is full of analysis of both Britain’s relations with the EU (Baker and Seawright 1998; Buller 2000; Geddes 2004; George 1992 and 1998) and British domestic adaptation (Bache and Jordan 2006; Schmidt 2006, Ash 2001).

British public opinion is nowadays crucial for the process of integration. So it is important for elites to convince their electorate on either pro- or contra-European development of Britain. To some extent British voters have always felt less direct influence of European institutions on their daily life; but the further the Union develops, the deeper this influence is - and there is an obvious need to legitimize the institution and encourage acceptance of it. Ordinary citizens of Britain had only one chance to speak loudly on European issues – and that was referendum the of 1975, when Ms. Thatcher questioned continuance of membership in the EEC. But then Britain was much more concerned about domestic politics and issues, and was totally giving priority to the Commonwealth and the US relations. However, recently British people were denied the chance to have another referendum, on the Lisbon Treaty, and, therefore, elites need to work hard to prove positive outcomes of the document that was ratified without the promised referendum.

In the following chapter I will specify historical prerequisites of British-EU relations that became the basis for modern controversies. These prerequisites will be categorized as factors that shape modern British discourses on European integration and Europeanization. Further I will study British identity issues, analyzing complex process of constructing British national identity and the role of Europe in this process. The British identity issue will be classified as another very important factor to shape discourses on Europe. Finally, I’ll pay attention to changes in domestic policies of Britain that were dictated by EU regulations. This analysis will allow to ‘measure’ Europeanization in Britain, which later will be linked to discourses over Europeanization.

3.1. British Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism has been developing among the British for decades. It is certain that the EU in Britain is much less popular than in other member states. The attitudes toward European matters are ambivalent and do not have any single path. However, one does not have to explain that the EU is the best option for British people to preserve comparatively high rates of employment, growth and living standards. The role of elites here would be to assist in making the
choice between proud and history-based exclusivity and rational and objective economic prosperity. In order to identify the pros and cons of such a choice the interests of the nation, citizens and elites themselves need to be defined and coordinated.

British Euroscepticism as a term needs understanding. Being widely used in the literature it needs additional analysis in order to be used and understood correctly.

Skepticism in general means intellectual doubt in some doctrines. Here however, when we speak about national skepticism toward integration, one should also take into consideration emotional detachment from doctrines and ideas, promoted by Europe. Smith in his paper (2005) turns the attention of readers to the question of the nature of these ideas and doctrines that are doubted. He identifies two levels – political and cultural – where Europe has its influence. The institutional and systematic changes on political level are complemented with common identity trends – loyalty and identity on the European level.

A considerable amount of research reveals Euroscepticism based on parties’ prerogatives (Taggart 1998; Marks and Wilson 2000; Batory and Sitter 2004). They underline that parties’ attitudes toward European integration are based on the national political system. Following Taggart, one can distinguish between hard and soft Euroscepticism: from total opposition to the idea of political and economic integration between European states in general, to contingent opposition to certain policies and decisions with the idea of defending national interests. Therefore, one should not understand Euroscepticism of some parties and agents homogeneously, but vary within the broad range of degrees of skepticism.

British Euroscepticism is traditionally connected to the right wing of the Conservative Party which revealed its concerns about further integration in the 1980s. However, the skeptic moods of Britain can be traced earlier to the period of first application for membership. Scholars connect it to competitive organization of the party system. Szczepaniak and Taggart identify two key features of Euroscepticism: “the first is that opposition to the EU brings together ‘strange bedfellows’ of some very different ideologies. Opposition extends from new politics, old far left politics through regionalism to new populism and neo-fascism in the far right. The second point is that opposition to the EU seems to be related to the positions of parties in their party systems. It differentiates between parties at the core and those at the periphery in the sense that wholly Eurosceptical parties are at the peripheries of their party systems while parties at the core are generally not Eurosceptical” (2000).

Ideologically British Euroscepticism in the Conservative Party is connected to its globalist views. The position is toward national independence within a global free market, which is contested by European integration. And in this perspective, Britain is exceptional, being the only member state where governing party and the majority of voters are Eurosceptic.
However, one should not concentrate on Conservative Party only, but note, that there is an obvious gap between elites and public in their views on European integration. The concept of populism was studied by Panizza (2005), Laclau (2005), Mouffe (2005) and others. They argue “populist processes of collective identity formation and articulation positing Britain against the ‘otherness’ of Europe and European integration have become typical of British post-imperial trajectory” (Gifford, 2008). Traditional Euroscepticism has its roots in historical prerequisites of British exceptionalism that are studied below.

3.2. Historical Prerequisites of Special EU-British Relations

It is obvious that British history had a significant influence on current feelings of inhabitants that they live in a separate and exceptional country. Starting from geographical separation and coming to idea of one of the major forces during European wars, British uniqueness turned out to be an unsolved issue for its foreign policies. Moreover, the Crown, the law and the Parliament appeared to be very special in the concept of steadily developing sovereignty.

However, historical exceptionalism is normal for any nation: each country is trying to identify how it is different from any other country during its historical development. Moreover, Ash (2001) argues that historically, Britain was the one to compare the normality of the country to: “Britain serves as a model for the ‘normal’ nation-state. Look at the literature of Germany’s so-called special way, the Sonderweg. It is all about the question of why Germany didn’t become a ‘normal’ democratic nation-state like – Britain. Every East-European national historiography has these elements too” (ibid, p.7). On the other hand, nowadays among 27 member states of EU the histories are so diverse that it’s hard not to be exceptional.

Historical prerequisites of these special relations may be traced a long way back. In this way Smith (2005) names among one of the reasons early emerged British nation-state: “Starting from the kingdom of Wessex, Alfred’s successors were able to hold the Danes at bay long enough to consolidate a specifically English state under an English king, rex Anglorum, buttressed by English law and custom” (ibid, p.5). Historians note that already by the 13th century English law was developed enough to shape Englishness itself and English political order.

However, the focus of this paper is on British-EU relations; and, therefore, I will switch to the history of the 20th century and time of emergence of the European Community. Some scholars argue that British post-war period can be described as a period of resistance to modernization. Gifford (2008) states that Britain with its imperial system lacks certain rationalization that is typical for other European states. However, to preserve its competitiveness Britain had to make changes and therefore the decision to join the Community was taken by the Conservative Party. This decision allowed Britain to save their economic and political order, but to come along with the rest of Europe.
The trend of development of Western European countries after World War II was pretty similar. The European Community allowed the states to modernize industries, economies and welfare systems. The common market sustained this modernization. However, a certain amount of national sovereignty had to be sacrificed. While continental European states modernized their economic systems within the EC, Britain was more reliant on cooperation with the USA, planning to take the second place after the States in the world’s global international economy. During the 1950s there was no doubt that Britain in any opposition would have chosen the States over the European Community. Scholars like Milward (1992) connect it directly to economic decisions made in Britain towards the global in preference over a European modernized economy. British imperial connections still remained more attractive than post-war European states. Britain counted strongly on imperial free trade to recover from its wartime financial dependency on the States. However the recovery of empire itself was financially supported by the US.

Gifford argues, that the welfare system, established in post-war Britain, lacked political and economic foundation in comparison to European continental states. The British welfare system looked more like state-based philanthropy, whose focus was on the white working man and his family.

By the time of signing the Paris Treaty, Churchill has already outlined the priorities for Britain. He made it in three circles: “the first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire... then there is the English speaking world. And finally there is Europe” (Churchill cited in Lord 1996, p.62). The general position was to support and cooperate with Europe as an equal partner, being in a wider Atlantic community and maintaining sovereignty and world power. However, such prioritizing created tension for European states to believe in British commitment. The French government was worried about the Commonwealth and the States that would influence British decision-making within the European Community.

When in 1950 the Schulman Plan was presented by France (the project of supranational Community in Europe), the Labour party responded with the ‘European Unity’ paper, which stated concerns about joining this project. They pointed out concerns about tensions that will appear within the Commonwealth if Britain supports the Plan. Moreover, Labour saw great threat to their economic system in processes of nationalizing industries. However the British government was diplomatic enough to recognize the necessity of the Schulman plan for reestablishing Franco-German relations. This proposal revealed a British strong rejection of uncontrolled loss of sovereignty and federalism.

This rejection was later fixed by the Foreign Office memorandum (1951), which stated the following: “The United Kingdom cannot seriously contemplate joining in European integration. Apart from geographical and strategic considerations, Commonwealth ties and the special position of the United Kingdom as the centre of the sterling area, we cannot consider submitting our political and economic system to supranational institutions... Moreover, although the fact may not be universally recognised, it is not in the true interests of the
continent that we should sacrifice our present unattached position which enables us, together with the United States, to give a lead to the free world” (Gowland, Turner 2000, p.29).

The next government was Conservative and appeared to be more supportive of European integration than their precursors. However, the feeling of superiority was preserved with adjustment for leadership in Europe. The willingness to cooperate was not so genuine and resulted in failure during the Messina Conference in 1955, when Britain rejected participation in order to prevent further integration. The concerns were drawn to economic security and the threat of German domination. In opposition to the Spaak committee, Britain proposed a European industrial free trade area, which would save British Commonwealth trade and would open the market for another six European states. It meant the end of protectionism, but also the vital modernization for the declining British economy. That is how Britain came to make its first application of membership.

The idea of membership in the European Community allowed preserving general geo-political objectives considering the decline of the imperial trend. The understanding that the imperial state cannot be saved was already an agenda, but was hidden both by Labour and Conservative elites. The government clearly saw the need to transform imperial political order. And finally after the Suez crisis in 1956, the first British membership application was proposed. In spite of institutional reforms adopted after the crisis, the modernization was selective. Aiming to turn an unsuccessful imperial state into a leading capitalist, one required cooperation with European nation states. Later in 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed and the European Economic Community was established, British Conservative government did not recognize its strategic role and refused to sign the Treaty. Therefore, Britain was not among the six founding members to create the initial rules of the Community. However when this understanding came and the application was submitted in 1961, the antagonism of British-French relations led to the veto from Charles de Gaulle in 1963. After the second rejected application, Britain was finally accepted to the EU only in 1973. During all this complex process of gaining the membership, British elites were to construct the discourses around it.

As a reaction to French veto on British membership, among politicians various views were presented. The Labour party in 1962 stated that “a Federal Europe ... does mean the end of Britain as an independent European state .... It means the end of a thousand years of history ... and it does mean the end of the Commonwealth” (Gaitskell, ‘Speech at Annual Labour Party Conference’, The Labour Party Annual Reports, London Labour Party, 1962, p.159). Later the same Labour party had to change the discourse in order to legitimize the developing integration: “we have a role: our role is to lead Europe .... It is our business to provide political leadership that for so long has eluded the democracies of the mainland of Europe” (Brown, In My Way: The Political Memoirs of Lord George-Brown, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1971, p.202).
While Thatcher definitely merited her ‘Iron Lady’ nickname in relationship with the US, her politics toward Europe were selective, but supportive. She was thoroughly choosing, which policies were useful for Britain. However, she was not able to reconcile her position within her own party, which led to her downfall and change in government. Her successor, John Major continued the awkwardness of the relations, being responsible for opt-outs of Maastricht Treaty, where the most important decision was not to participate in the Monetary Union, i.e. in the establishment of the common European currency Euro.

The unresolved European issues led to governmental shift to New Labour. For this government it was obvious, that in spite of all European issues, there is a need to protect and preserve Britishness. Arguments connected with national identity will be presented later. However, where it comes to law and order – Britain under New Labour becomes supportive and sharing with Europe; where it comes to single market and defense – British first glance falls on the US. In his manifesto in 1997 Blair committed to selecting only positive and not harming policies from the EU. He also announced the needed reforms to fit into these selected EU policies. These were reforms of domestic institutions including Westminster and Whitehall. Another important European step he took was granting more power to Scotland, Wales and Ireland in order to decrease centralization of power. Thus while staying ambivalent and selective about Europe, British New Labour government protects national identity and sovereignty, while choosing the best policies to adopt. Today, when the Conservative party is again in power, the discourses remain ambivalent, that will be shown in part 3 of this paper.

Another historical prerequisite of British uniqueness is its special constitutional system – one which has no similar examples within Europe. This system is based on English revolution and reforms of the 17th century, when the principle of absolutism was transferred from the Crown to Parliament. These processes resulted in the weak influence of democratization from the French revolution and therefore determined British separate development within European democratization. Moreover, it determined different names and structures for British institutions and, therefore, completely different language for describing the political system. In addition, the absence of a written Constitution is a ground for severe concerns of British people: when there are no boundaries of what cannot be changed, the essential British rules might suffer from Europeanization and integration.

In addition to what was already said, religion plays an important role in shaping relations of Britain and Europe. Protestant opposition to Catholics adds historical complexity to these relationships. While Europe is united by the idea of Christendom, common norms, values and beliefs, British Protestantism became a ground for nationalism and opposition to the Pope as the higher authority. Being a strong historical prerequisite, modern Britain and Europe are quite secular, when it comes to interrelations: “the twentieth century any English support for European federation had become purely secular, having been cut off from its Christian roots” (Smith 2005 p.3 citing Perkins 2004).
Historically, Maastricht Treaty was seen in Britain as a peak of European integration. However, today it is obvious, that the Union continues to develop toward common spaces not only in the market, but also in employment, taxation, defense and foreign policies. Such movement has obviously threatening effect for wide audience of citizens, and needs to be coordinated through elites and mass media.

Finally, there is Schengen agreement, that Britain is also not a part of. British strong willingness to preserve national control over borders results in economic costs, required by border management policies (Emerson, 2011). When Schengen started in 1985, Britain opted out mostly due to its island geography. It led to an obvious difference in number of visas issued for Schengen and Britain – which means, “the UK is missing out on the significantly expanding global market for tourism and business travel” (Emerson 2011, p.3). Since 2000 Britain and Ireland are partly supporting the Schengen – there is cooperation within the criminal investigation dimension and partial access to Schengen Information System. However the question of risks connected to security, migration and granting of citizenship is present.

In conclusion to this part it is possible to point out the main historical factors influencing the discourse as the following: British imperial past that forms not only special relations with the former colonies and the USA, but also a special self-understanding of the country’s role in the world arena. Moreover, early formation of nation state with specific legal system, absence of a written Constitution and Protestant religion had its influence on modern Britain. While the EU is willing to incorporate its members in similar systems for the sake of integration, Britain wishes to preserve its unique patterns. Another important issue is British late membership in the EU which led to the necessity of playing by already established rules.

### 3.3. British Identity Issues

The question of British belonging to Europe is rather popular among European scholars. The question raised by Ash (2001), whether Britain is European, is just one from a range of questions: what is Britain and when it was (Ascherson 1996), does it still exist (Marr 2000), is it a nation state and how does it correspond with England then (Davies 1999, Barnett 1999), and so on. In a more general sense, it is also important to ask whether Britain wants to be European or could they possibly accept the fate of being just one of many European countries. And not only questions on British identity are that vague. The issues on British-European relations also vary widely: in what respect is Britain more different from European continental countries than they are different from each other? Is Britain more like other countries (for example USA or Canada), than like European ones?

English identity is one of the reasons for this fundamental predisposition toward Europe and further integration. Moreover, if twenty years ago the British
were the most sure about their belonging, today the question of identity in United Europe is rather diffused.

National identity as a sense of person’s belonging to some state or a nation plays a huge role in self-understanding and identifying others. For the state itself, citizens’ strong national identity means support and approval of decisions and policies, provided by the government. National identity is usually stronger when there is some kind of a threat – military, economic or other type of crisis. National identity requires some sort of political entity, common institutions and cultural codes, shared by members of the community. When the European project reached the level, when there is a political entity, institutions and certain shared values and norms, the possibility of European identity in opposition to national one arises. I have already described the concept of European identity, and therefore this chapter focuses on national British identity that serves as a kind of stepping stone for Europeanization and European integration.

As Olsen (2002) argues, it is important to notice not only political change, but also values and paradigms that are promoted within Europeanization. The changes in informal institutions, like norms and values, were later studied by Dyson and Goetz (2003), who distinguished between two generations of Europeanization studies: the first is to study institutional change, the second is to shift from institutions to norms and values. The first generation highlighted only top-down processes, whereas the second paid similar attention to the bottom-up direction. While the first generation of studies was focused mainly on institutional misfit between European and domestic level, the later studies shifted their focus more to beliefs, norms and values. Moreover, through time studies of voluntary adaptation processes appeared while earlier only involuntary adaptation was considered.

In the article “Is Britain European?” Ash distinguished between six dimensions of ‘European’: (a) white, (b) Christian, (c) geographical, (d) continental, (e) the EU, (f) normative. The first two are deeply rooted in history, but are still relevant. Following Oxford dictionary Europeans were those British soldiers sent to India with the white color of skin. And Ash supports it with the idea that the only place where British people were definitely feeling European was India. The same archaic meaning has a second dimension – Christianity. One of the first appearances of common European-ness was during Crusades and in opposition to other faiths. Ash emphasizes, that today we should understand this dimension more in the sense of post-Christianity or former-Christianity, which served as basis for the formation of certain norms and values. The question of Christianity is still at stake when it comes to Turkish accession. And this religious belonging is not religious any more – it is a question of values and norms today. As Perkins stated: “This secularised narrative of Christendom - which, I shall argue, not only survived but informed the Enlightenment - still has resonance with many Europeans at both conscious and unconscious levels. Despite the weakening of its spiritual roots, it has continued to shape European identity-consciousness and to influence perceptions of Europe in relation to its
'Others’” (2004, p.5). However, in the British case it is interesting to mention the Protestant Church in its opposition to the Pope as one more base for separation.

The third meaning is very direct – Europe as the second largest continent, which definitely takes Britain as its part. However, the fourth meaning mentions that British Isles are not part of a continent, since it is divided from other Europe with the water. Here Ash refers to British sayings “my friend is back from Europe”, where Europe is somewhere else to go to and to come back from. The separation from the continent is very important in understanding the homeland for the British. Such geographical position gives scholars an opportunity to state that Britain “lies virtually at the end of the world, towards the west and northwest... It is fortified on all sides by a vast and more or less uncrossable ring of sea, apart from the straits on the south where one can cross to Belgic Gaul” (Gildas 1978 cited in Howe 1989, p.39). This uncrossable ring of sea is the best boundary to build identity upon.

In political debate, the next meaning is predominant – Europe is the EU. Politically being European for the British means supporting the EU, and commitment to EU politics. The last dimension is the most unclear. Here we speak about a range of European norms, values and standards that countries should keep to. To clarify this normative meaning to the readers, Ash gives an example of Hitler being non-European as not sharing common humanity, intervening and undermining other states’ sovereignty. The work of answering the question if Britain is European could be as easy as just comparing Britain to each of these dimensions of Europe, but for some reasons it does not work. These dimensions are just ideal types and not the real conditions.

It is obvious that in 1997 when New Labour came to power, EU-British relationships had a new shift. This political process had its own influence on identity issues that was studied by Karvounis et al. In their article “Playing mother: narratives of Britishness in New Labour attitudes toward Europe” the authors examine nationalist narratives that appeared as a response to pro-European politics. They suggest three grounds for such narratives – conventional nationalist approach (where identity is based in opposition to ‘other’), historical perspective of nationalism (considering British history of Empire) and issues connected to rights of entry and settlement for migrants. These three grounds provide two main narratives of building identity against others – transcontinental and European. The first type of nationalism is connected to historically developed special relations with transatlantic partners like USA and other former colonies. It is determined by British domination in the Commonwealth that is considered as home. The second type sees British identity within European Union where Britain can sacrifice some sovereignty in order to preserve identity. It is hard to judge which of these narratives is stronger, but it is obvious that even today both of them are present in discourses on Europeanization, and, therefore, one should elaborate on each of them.

There is no use in explaining the special connection between Britain and other English-speaking former colonies. The legacy of the past is an honor that cannot be taken away from them. These kinds of relationship, especially with the
United States, dictate Britain a certain necessity to be an adhesive force between Europe and others. Also this transcontinental nationalism determines some features that Britain would like to upload onto the European level. Among those are labor market system and other social policies. In these spheres, the British approach is known as successful and should be transplanted to other European states in order to respond successfully to new economic challenges in a globalized world. It was one of the agendas in front of New Labour and Tony Blair for Britain to shape European social and economic models. This position of Blair’s was comfortable for both pro-Europeans and Euro-sceptics, because it gave space for fruitful cooperation with the super-state and preserved British special leading role within this relationship. In terms of enlargement, imperial nationalism underlines British family ties with the Western European countries, which treat East and Central Europe as younger underdeveloped brothers. In this family Britain is among the globalizers, among those who set the rules. Another example is defense policy, where Britain sticks together with the United States in ambiguous issues like Iraq and weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Another important issue for British identity is war memory, where Anglo-American cooperation serves a great ground for transcontinental identity.

What Karvounis et al. called Euro-nationalism is described as following. Globalization caused shifts in world powers, erased borders and therefore influenced the nature of the nation-state. In this perspective the European Union is seen as a rational response to these processes more, than a threat to national state sovereignty. The New Labour regime emphasized this meaning in order to legitimize the processes of change. As Blair said at the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2000, “we want a Europe where there are national differences, where we hold many of our policies in common, but keep our distinct, separate identities” (T. Blair, ‘Speech to the Warsaw Stock Exchange’, Poland, 6 October 2000, http://www.number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId1341&Section1d32). British specialness in social politics can be seen in the perspective of Euro-nationalism: Britain wants to shape it in order not to be shaped by it. In defense policy, Britain needs Europe to assist in controlling migrants and asylum-seekers. In terms of identity, Britain sees Europe as a partner who has the same problems and who is useful to cooperate with in order to solve them.

In conclusion, both of these nationalist approaches have sense in present-day discourses on Europeanization. It means that identity issues are very important in policy legitimizing and are usually addressed to by politicians. However this analysis reveals that these identity issues can be turned in both sides – pro-European and Eurosceptic. This means that the choice of nationalist narrative depends on circumstance and is issue-driven.

3.4. The Europeanization of UK Policies

The question of whether Europe matters doesn’t stand anymore. It is obvious today that one should focus on how Europe matters, what the degree of its influence is and what the national responses to it are. There is no doubt that
the impact of European Union on domestic politics exists; but there is also no doubt that it varies from state to state and from dimension to dimension. It is not only the kind of pressures that differs but also the response of institutions and actors.

The question of why is it so hard for Britain to be European is complex. As any other member state, Britain feels adaptational pressure from the need to fit the EU regulations. The incompatibility between EU-level processes and domestic level ones dictates certain degree of change. And, therefore, some response to these changes should be expected from institutions and actors.

Historically, the first empirical study of UK’s domestic adaptation to Europeanization was conducted by George in 1992. It revealed that Britain is ill-suited to European form of institutions and, therefore, has to be adapted. Among the reasons for this misfit were the following: “an aversion to ceding national sovereignty; an attachment to the United States; a pattern of economic activity that distanced Britain from other European states, particularly in the sense of having more global commercial links; and an impatience with visions of an ‘ever closer union’ to which other member states were attached” (Bache, Jordan 2006, p.11).

In order to study British domestic adaptation, Bache and Marshall (2004) present governance approach, which is based on three notions: Britain as a multi-level polity, policy networks and the core executive. Such approach facilitates studying of policy change during all stages from formulations to outcomes. Britain as multi-level polity stands for changes in the British political system including constrains on executive power. In comparison with the traditional Westminster model, this new multi-level polity is decentralized, described more by steering than by control, and it involves negotiated sovereignty and fragmentation of institutions. However, it is important to note that these processes are not entirely new, it is the degree of these processes that makes the crucial difference.

The second notion is policy networks and was presented by Rhodes within his policy networks model. In this model, a policy network is a set of resource-dependent organizations, and this resource-dependency shapes policy outcomes. This approach assists in mapping actors’ and institutional preferences and links them to redistribution of resources through power dependence. When speaking about Europeanization, it is important to see how resources are redistributed among domestic actors by EU regulations. The core executive approach deals with extending policy network approach by including government within these networks. Bache and Marshall use the governance approach as an instrument to evaluate the impact of the EU on the British institutional system. The result of their analysis is an understanding of vital importance of domestic institutions as mediators of Europeanization. They emphasize the need to study networks and steering that overcomes the issues of control and command.

Boerzel and Risse (2003) distinguish between two adaptational processes as response to Europeanization – sociological and rational perspectives. The first
one emphasized socialization and collective learning that result in development of new identities; while the second one deals with redistribution of resources on the national level, based on domestic changes.

Changes in domestic policies challenge national systems and structures and influence citizens’ daily life. There is no doubt, that Britain had to respond to the impact of the EU on its traditional governing structures. One could argue that this impact was mostly about the national attitude to democracy and historically formed political institutions rather than to precise changes. Therefore, the need for a legitimizing discourse is obvious. And the lack of such a discourse is also obvious.

Generally, the misfit between European regulations and norms and domestic policies leads to their challenging national values, goals and standards. This misfit is also crucial for instruments and techniques that are used to achieve these national goals and standards, namely institutions. Institutional misfit deals with rules and regulations on the domestic level. Here Boerzel emphasizes that it is not only about institutions themselves that are important, but also the collective understandings, attached to them. In their article Boerzel and Risse follow the rationalist approach and see pressures from Europeanization as giving an opportunity for some actors to develop within new regulations, and others are constrained from certain freedom.

The degree of domestic adaptation also varies. Following Boerzel and Risse, one distinguishes between three degrees of domestic change: absorption, accommodation and transformation. The first degree is low and is described with the state’s incorporation of European policies, norms and regulations without severe modification of national structures, institutions and processes. The second degree is modest and means adaptation of national institutions and processes without crucial changes in their nature – new policies are put into existing structures. The third degree represents a high degree of change, where states have to transform their institutions and structures or replace them with new ones. After short analysis of British domestic adaptation one would be able to judge which of the degrees above is applicable in British case.

However, Schmidt in her article “Adapting to Europe: Is it harder for Britain?” (2006) points out that Britain is not the only member state that had to adjust to European innovations. She argues that France, Germany and Italy had to do the same and in some cases even more. But Britain remains the one with the most Eurosceptic points of view among both elites and public.

The study of changes in domestic policies in Britain reveals, that the country was lucky enough to be obliged to provide only a small number of reforms to match the requirements of the EU. Schmidt links this success to British earlier economic reforms that were conducted due to the pressures of globalization. Among such reforms are general privatization in 1980s, deregulatory initiatives in spheres like telecommunications, gas and transportation, and others, which gave Britain the opportunity to simply accept EU regulations with slight adaptation, while other countries had to reconstruct
their economic systems. Schmidt’s comparison of Britain to Germany, France and Italy in terms of domestic adaptation reveals, that Britain was ready with reforms in spheres like electricity and air transportation, while other countries had to transform their industries entirely to privatize and liberalize them. Moreover, for Britain monetary regulations had no influence since the country did not join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.

However, there are areas where Britain had to transform its policies entirely. One example is environment, where Britain always relied on voluntary and decentralized policies. Under EU regulations Britain had to implement a more active and transparent regime. The reforms started in mid-1990s. Later Britain even took part in modeling the new directives like 1993 Environmental Management and Auditing Systems Regulation. Another example is the social sphere, where Britain firstly faced gender-related decisions of the European Court of Justice in the 1970s. On the other hand, later John Major negotiated an opt-out from Social Chapter of Maastricht Treaty, but Britain still had to adapt after Blair’s opt-in.

Governing practices in Britain differ a lot from how the EU sees political institutions. Generally the EU trend for governing practices is to be compound, with federal or regional diversification, corporatist policy-making processes and proportional representation systems, while in Britain the system is more centralized in the hands of single authority, with unitary state and majoritarian politics (Schmidt 2005). The EU regulations led to significant redistribution of power between judicial and executive, central and regional, national and EU-level institutions. The British Parliament lost a great deal of autonomy, but British courts instead, being more independent than courts in other countries, retained their power due to higher compatibility to EU legal prerogatives. Schmidt argues that for unitary states like Britain or France it was easier to adapt to European regulations due to higher concentration of power in executive branch. However, it is important to mention that not only the possibility of adaptation, but also the will for this change must exist.

In addition, policy-making processes have also been influenced by the appearance of a wide range of decision-making actors on the EU level. However, Jordan argues that “they (the British) have increased their ‘steering’ of policy-making as longstanding policy networks have been breaking up while self-regulation has been replaced by regulatory agencies and legalistic controls in an increasing number of domains” (Jordan 2002). One more discussion rises over representation and party roles in Britain, where the electoral system provides the state with strong government with less negotiation and need for consensus, while EU-related issues are all about consensus. For systems that are used to more demarcated policies and decisions, like in Britain, EU’s negotiations cause problems. Schmidt states that the EU policies are without politics – that means that there are no parties or wings, but politics of interests represented by Council, Parliament and Commission. Generally electorate of countries like Britain with conflict-based political culture are not used to the new European system. And therefore, on the national level the EU-regulated policies appear without national
control and commitment. Moreover, there is no public trust in policies where the electorate has not had a say in their development.

While signing the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, some aspects were transferred from the Third Pillar to the First Pillar, which means the shift in control over some issues in the spheres of freedom, security and justice from nation states to the European Union. Obviously, for some states, including Britain, this was a great concern. Therefore, the system of opt-ins and opt-outs was established in order to negotiate the level of merging of Pillars. According to this system, any member state has a right to negotiate certain opt-out from European legislation not to participate in certain areas of EU policies. Currently Britain carries four opt-outs: Schengen agreement, economic and monetary union, charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union and area of freedom, security and justice. However, the last one was partially accepted later in 2005. Such selective participation in EU legislation is one more ground for ambiguous discourses on being a part of Europe.

In conclusion, I would argue that British case could be described as an example of accommodation to European norms and regulations, due to modest degree of domestic changes that were necessary to be made to fit European policies. In this paper the sociological perspective to adaptational pressures is more appropriate due to its understanding of the importance of public acceptance and identity issues. Influential discourses are also applicable in this approach more than in the rational one.

To summarize this part, I sort out a number of historical factors that shape modern British discourses on European integration and Europeanization. Among them are the British Imperial past that determined special relations with the United States and the countries of former Commonwealth; early formation of nation state with its unique legal system and absence of written Constitution; Protestant religion as an opposition to the power of the Pope; and late membership in the European Union that explains lack of possibility to influence general rules of the Community. Another important factor which shapes British discourses over Europe is related to strong national identity. In spite of the issue-driven nature of nationalist narratives, the British sense of belonging plays an important role in legitimizing decisions and policies; therefore, it is addressed usually in speeches and texts. These factors remain dominant in discourse formation. Dimensions, sorted out in the previous chapter, supplement these factors. These dimensions became units of discourse analysis. The dimensions do not substitute factors: they describe the field, where discourses are constructed, while factors determine their shaping.
Conclusion

Even though European integration and Europeanization are popular topics among scholars, the debate over definitions and approaches is still lively. Some scholars even doubt whether it is a topic of study, due to diverse understanding of key notions. In this paper I defined European integration as a process whereby the nation states are willing to cooperate on the supranational level in order to solve regional problems and delegate, therefore, some power to new institutions; within this process political actors are shifting their loyalties and interests to these new institutions. Europeanization is defined as a top-down process of downloading new logic and norms for domestic policy-making in accordance with EU regulations. Social constructivism was chosen to be the most appropriate methodology for the study. It focuses on ideas, norms and discourses, explains importance of public moods and attitudes in decision-making. The concept of European identity was studied in order to provide grounds for a special identity factor of shaping discourses on European integration and Europeanization in modern Britain.

As result of the discourse analysis of the speeches of the UK politicians it was discovered that British discourses about Europe are constructed differently when it comes to European integration and Europeanization; they are constructed within special dimensions of politics: economy, identity and citizenship, sovereignty and trust, national role in world’s arena, security and foreign affairs, public awareness, voters’ preferences. These dimensions reflect the factors, sorted out in part 2 of the paper. During discourse analysis no new factors were found, however, the described dimensions were found to fit the categorized factors. Discourses within dimensions of sovereignty and trust, national role in the world’s arena, identity and trust correspond with historical and cultural factors of British imperial past and early formation of the British nation state. The economic dimension is related to Britain’s late membership in the EU and, therefore, to its lack of influence in comparison to the founding nations. The same lack of influence is seen within the dimension of low public awareness.

In general, my research reveals that discourses constructed within European integration are more likely to be connected to feelings of belonging, national identities, issues of national sovereignty and trust. Discourses within Europeanization however are more likely to deal with more material issues, concerned with threats to domestic political and institutional structures.

The historical background of EU-British special relations plays an important role in shaping contemporary discourses. Among the most important factors are the following: British imperial past that forms not only special relations with the former colonies and the USA, but also special self-understanding of the country’s role in the world arena; early formation of the nation-state with specific a legal system and Protestant religion; late British membership in the EU which led to the necessity of playing by already-established rules. Economic, historical, cultural, geographic and religious factors influence the shaping of modern discourses around European integration and Europeanization. There is no one
determining factor, but the complex of factors influences British discourses about Europe. The strength of influence of each factor depends on agenda. The difference between shaping discourses on European integration and Europeanization is determined by the difference in the notions themselves. While European integration is a process of uploading the country’s influence onto the supranational level, the discourses are mostly attached to ideas of national superiority, greatness and power; or the lack of those mentioned above. While Europeanization is a process of downloading European principles on the national level, the discourses usually look like concerns about national sovereignty, threat to national governing system and economic prosperity. However, the grounds for shaping both European integration and Europeanization discourses are the same – economic, historical, cultural and religious factors.

To identify EU-British relations in the most complex way, one should first define Britain, Europe, their borders and self-understanding. However, my analysis reveals, that identity issues can be turned towards both sides – pro-European and Eurosceptic. This means, that the choice of nationalist narrative depends on circumstance and is issue-driven.

Today it is obvious, that Europe matters and it is important to identify the extent and the tone of its influence. As any other member state, Britain feels adaptational pressure from the need to fit EU regulations. There are various approaches to study British domestic adaptation, presented by scholars. Generally the EU trend for governing practices is to be compound, with federal or regional diversification, corporatist policy-making processes and proportional representation systems, while in Britain the system is more centralized in the hands of a single authority, with unitary state and majoritarian politics. Policy-making processes have also been influenced by appearance of wide range of decision-making actors on the EU level. I argue, that the British case could be described as an example of accommodation due to modest degree of domestic changes that were necessary for it to be made to fit European regulations. In addition, the shift in the changes of office did not cause severe changes in British policy-making towards the EU and the general direction of these policies remains careful and mild. Therefore, only urgent issues may require intense changes in this field. Until such issues come up, the discourse formation will preserve its path.

As the European Union is a changing developing body, studying of its relations with its members will continue. Moreover, new laws, treaties and further enlargement will continue to force nation states to respond and researchers to analyze. In the case of Britain, analysis should consider not only negative features of EU policies, but also about discourse, attitudes, and ideas, that do not find approval. British Euro-scepticism continues its existence and requires long-term structural work from elites to be eradicated. However, it should be bilateral work: both Britain and the EU should choose their policy directions in order to reach successful and win-win position for both actors.
References


Ash T.G., “IS Britain European?”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol.77, #1, 2001

Aspinwall M., “Rethinking Britain and Europe: plurality elections, party management and British policy on European integration”, Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 2004

Aspinwall M., “Preferring Europe. Ideology and national preferences on European integration”, European Union Politics vol. 3 #1, 2002


Bauer M., Gaskell G., “Qualitative researching with text, image and sound”, SAGE publications, 2000


Boerzel T., Risse T., “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP) vol. 4, #15, 2000

Boerzel T., Risse T., “Conceptualizing the domestic impact of Europe”, in ‘The politics of Europeanization’ ed. by Featherstone K., Radaelli C., 2003


Checkel J.T., “Constructivist approaches to European integration”, ARENA and Department of political science, University of Oslo, working paper #6, 2006


Emerson M., “Britain, Ireland and Schengen: Time for a smarter bargain on visas”, Centre for European Policy studies, #249, 2011


Howarth D., “Explaining British policy on the Euro”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP) vol.8, #17, 2004

Howell K., “Developing Conceptualizations of Europeanization and European Integration: Mixing methodologies”, ESRC seminar, Sheffield, UK, 2002

Jacquot S., Woll C., “Usage of European Integration – Europeanization from a Sociological Perspective”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), vol. 7, #12, 2003


Knopf H.J., “English identity and European integration: the categorization of Europe as Britain’s other”, Third pan-European international relations conference and joint meeting with the international studies association, Vienna, 1998

Larsen H., “Foreign policy and discourse analysis: France, Britain and Europe”, Routledge, 1997

Littoz-Monnet A., “Dynamic Multi-Level Governance – Bringing the Study of Multi-level Interactions into the Theorizing of European Integration”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), vol.14, 2010


Marks G., “Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and the Internationalization of Issues: The Implication for Legitimacy”, EUI Working Paper RSC #95/7

McGowan L., “Theorizing European Integration: revisiting neofunctionalism and testing its suitability for explaining the development of EC competition policy?”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 11, #3, 2007


Miles L., “European integration and enlarging the European Union: a theoretical perspective”, presented at the fourth biennial international conference of the European Community studies association, Charleston, USA, 1995


Ruiz Jiménez A.M. et al., “European and National Identities in EU's Old and New Member States: Ethnic, Civic, Instrumental and Symbolic Components”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 8, #11, 2004


Schmidt V., “Adapting to Europe: Is it harder for Britain?”, British Journal of politics and international relations, vol.8, 2006


Schneider H., “The constitution debate”, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), vol. 7, #4, 2003


**Discourse analysis materials**


5. Cameron D., “Making Britain the best place in the world to do business”, Centre for Policy Studies, 28 November, 2005

6. Cameron D., speech on his party’s policy toward the European Union, published at The BBC, 4 November 2009


8. Cash W., “Britain must have a referendum on Lisbon Treaty”, speech in a House of Commons debate on European Affairs, 16 June 2009


10. Hannan D., “At midnight last night, the United Kingdom ceased to be a sovereign state”, published at The Telegraph Blogs, 1 December 2009


12. Lidington D., “Engaged and attuned: Britain as a good European”, speech at the European Commission offices, Madrid, Spain, 18 November 2010


15. Morris N., “David Miliband: this is my ambition for Europe”, published at The Independent, 27 October 2009

16. Patten C., “Will Britain ever 'actually' join the EU?”, the Alcuin lecture at the University of Cambridge, 30 January 2004


19. Labour manifesto “Britain will be better with New Labour”, 1997
ZDES Working Papers

Arbeitspapiere des Zentrums für Deutschland- und Europastudien

Рабочие тетради Центра изучения Германии и Европы

Universität Bielefeld – Fakultät für Soziologie
Postfach 100131 – 33501 Bielefeld – Deutschland

Staatliche Universität St. Petersburg – 7/9 Universitetskaja Nab.
199034 St. Petersburg –Russland

http://zdes.spbu.ru/

info@zdes.spbu.ru