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The Ethnic Identity of Russian Germans. Theoretical Approaches and Methodology of Research of the Multiple Ethnic Identity.

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The paper is written on the basis of the PhD Thesis defended in the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO-University) in June 2011. The author summaries the data of the series empirical researches of German minority in Russian Federation, which were hold in 2008-2011. The paper has both theoretical and practical value.

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Introduction

**Topicality of the subject.** Ethnic identity is one of the most significant issues in contemporary sociological theory. The persistent interest and close attention given to the issue of interethnic relations by both foreign and Russian researchers alike is strong evidence of the significance of this topic. We would like to note that the processes of globalization that have been taking place over the past few decades have brought about marked changes in the nature of the phenomenon of ethnic identity. Intensive mixing and blending of cultures makes the issue of preserving traditional ethnic identities even more urgent. The number of people who identify with more than one and sometimes more than two ethnic cultures, and who have more than one native language, is steadily increasing. The growing social mobility of the population is making groups of such people more and more numerous.

Ethnic and cultural polyphony is a distinguishing feature and social resource of today’s Russia. Given that currently there is no separate department or administration to deal with the “nationality issue,” the close attention of both researchers and society as a whole to the given topic is vital. There is a scientific demand to provide a diagnosis of the situation in this sphere, carry out monitoring surveys on the main issues of inter-group interaction and contacts with the aim of avoiding negative scenario of development in the future.

The high degree of Russia’s involvement in global migration flows is forming new ethnic groups with multiple ethnic identities alongside traditional diasporas (such as Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Germans and so on). Research on the identity of representatives of the “old” diaspora groups is becoming a significant intellectual resource for the optimization of the adaptation process for new migrants. Based on the logic of the given thesis, the practical part serves as proof of the heuristic significance of the methods we have used in researching multiple ethnic identities.

It is by no means accidental that Russian Germans were selected for verification: as one of the largest ethnic minorities in the country (numbering 597,0001), they have a long and varied experience in interacting with an alien culture. At the same time, empirical data has an importance and value in its own right, especially in light of the fact that the theme of the ethnic German minority’s revival continues to be relevant in the context of Russian-German intergovernmental cooperation.

In Russia, there is a historical tradition of the formation of multiple ethnic identities. Migration processes and interethnic marriages provide for overlapping of cultures and ethnic areas, thus forming a particular category of Russians who possess a multiple ethnic identity. The theoretical relevance of this thesis is connected to the vital need for a conceptual understanding of this phenomenon.

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1 See the results of the Russian Federation’s 2002 census – [http://www.gks.ru/PEREPIS/t5.htm](http://www.gks.ru/PEREPIS/t5.htm)
The state of knowledge on the issue under analysis.

Ethnic identity is an interdisciplinary issue. Apart from sociology, the topic also receives a great deal of attention in the fields of philosophy, cultural anthropology, psychology and other social sciences. The distinctive features of the sociological approach include specific empirical methods and techniques of research, as well as the treatment of ethnic identity as a social phenomenon and process.

The established approaches to interpreting the nature of ethnicity can be divided into three different schools:

1. Essentialism (primordialism). Supporters of this trend (P.I. Kushner, S.A. Arutyunov, Yu.V. Bromley, L.N. Gumilev, V.I. Tabakov, V.D. Solovey, N.N. Tselishchev, A. Smith, C. Geertz, C. Calhoun and others) subscribe to the view that there is an original, innate (primordial) ethnicity of man. Within this approach, two main trends stand out: the socio-biological and the evolutionary-historical. Proponents of the former suggest that the phenomenon under analysis should be viewed as an extended family of people or a particular form of human interaction with nature, a certain landscape. The evolutionary-historical trend regards ethnicity as a product of culture and history, and defines ethnos as a historically formed human community characterized by a whole set of objective attributes: territory, language, religion, daily life, culture, etc.

2. Constructivism. This approach is preferred by most western sociologists and anthropologists, as well as some contemporary Russian scientists. The main role here is given to the subjective rather than objective aspect of ethnic existence (territory, culture). The essence of constructivism lies in the fact that ethnic communities are defined as imaginary, existing only in the minds of people and emerging as a result of the concerted effort of individuals and the institutions created by them; ethnicity, correspondingly, is viewed as a social construct. Proponents of this school of thought include B. Anderson, E. Gellner, M. Billig, E. Hobsbawm and F. Barth, and among Russian scientists, B.A. Tishkov, B.M. Voronikov, B.S. Malakhov, O. Brednikova. One of the main themes of research in this school of thought is the process of reproducing ethnicity, the role of elitism in the construction of communities and the maintenance of their borders.

3. Instrumentalism is one of the variants of constructivism. Proponents of this school of thought include L.M. Drobizheva, M.N. Guboglo, Yu.V. Arutyunyan, V.A. Yadov, A. Cohen, K. Deutsch, J. Ortega y Gasset, and other researchers. Membership in an ethnic group is viewed by these researchers as a means of achieving a more comfortable condition, a way of overcoming alienation and as one of the most powerful resources in the political mobilization of a given group, helping the ethnic elite (ethnocracy) to advance

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their own private interests. The study of ethnic identity as a significant instrument of political struggle and economic competition is represented in a number of large-scale field works and surveys.\(^6\)

The given approaches all have certain limitations, which is precisely why we are seeing the emergence of analytical work aimed at the integration and synthesis of primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist methodology. Many researchers have written about the necessity of such an integrated interpretation of the phenomenon. These include M.O. Mnatsakanyan\(^7\), I. U. Zarinov, B.E. Viner, A.M. Monakov, J. Fishman and others.\(^8\) However, we should note that the integrated methodology is only in the initial stage of its formation.

Since our thesis research is focused on the identity of Russian Germans, we provide a description of the state of knowledge on this issue. Several major research centers and institutes\(^9\) are engaged in the study of Russian Germans, among them: International Association of the Researchers of Russian Germans’ History and Culture, the German Historical Institute in Moscow, Institute for the Culture and History of the Germans in North Eastern Europe, European University Viadrina (Frankfurt Oder), and others.

A large amount of research has been devoted to the linguistics and dialects of Russian Germans. In the 1960-1980s, the Omsk Research Center for the Study of Russian Germans carried out a great deal of successful work on the subject. The center’s successor, the Krasnoyarsk Dialectological Center\(^10\), was opened on the initiative of V. A. Dyatlova\(^11\) in 2008. In Barnaul, the Altai School of Philological Research is known for its efficient work on the topic, with L.I. Moskalyuk\(^12\) as its recognized leader. At the same time, in Novosibirsk a social-psychological trend has emerged (inspired by E.R. Barbashina\(^13\)), and in Omsk an ethnographic school for the study of the problems of Russian

\(^10\) Official website of the Regional dialectological center for the study of the language of Germans in Siberia. – http://dialcenter.boxmail.biz/cgi-bin/guide.pl?id_razdel=164014&action=article

An analysis of the publications and books on Russian Germans revealed gaps in the study of the German diaspora in Russia. Although the history and religion of various groups of the German population have been considered quite comprehensively in academic literature, the actual sociological issue of the construction and reproduction of identity has not received sufficient examination.

The purpose of this thesis is to substantiate sociological methods of research on multiple identities in diaspora groups on the basis of an analysis of theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of ethnic identity. The study of Russian Germans is a way of verifying the suggested methodology. In doing this, we are faced with the task of most fully and thoroughly describing and analyzing the ethnic identity of Russian Germans as a complex social process involved in constructing a "self-image."

In order to do this, the following tasks have been set:

1. Systemization of the categorical-conceptual framework and definition of multiple ethnic identity in a globalized world;
2. The definition of a methodological approach to the study of multiple ethnic identity based on a critical analysis of theories of identity;
3. The development of research methods for multiple ethnic identity;
4. The identification of key markers of multiple ethnic identity among Russian Germans;
5. The study of various types of self-identification among individuals with a multiple ethnic identity;
6. An analysis of the functions of national social organizations.

The object of the thesis is multiple ethnic identity. The methodology of research on multiple ethnic identity serves as the subject.

The hypothesis of the thesis is as follows: The methodology of research on multiple ethnic identity is based on the principles of constructivism, which allows the key characteristics of this phenomenon to be taken into consideration (its situational nature, relativity, dynamism and instrumentality).
Theoretical-methodological background of the research.

We can single out three components of the theoretical-methodological background of research:

First, the concepts of nature and the key characteristics of ethnic identity formulated by Russian and foreign sociologists and social anthropologists (E. Gellner, B. Anderson, Yu.V. Bromley, M.O. Mnatsakanyan, B.A. Tishkov, B.S. Malakhov, Yu.V. Arutyunyan, L.M. Drobizheva, A.A. Susokolov, T.G. Stefanenko).

Second, the methodological approaches to the study of migrants and ethnic relations used by early American classical sociologists of the Chicago School, including R. Park, D. Levine, E. Stonequist, A. Antonovsky, M. Goldberg. We have adapted their concepts for contemporary Russian conditions. The phenomenological approach of A. Schutz complements the methodology of research.

Third, the methodology for the study of diaspora communities\(^\text{18}\): Azerbaijani (N.R. Malikova, O.E. Brednikova, O.V. Panchenkov), Koreans (G.N. Kim, O. Natsuko), Ingrian Finns (O.E. Davydova), Greeks (U.V. Ivanova, M.A. Astvatsaturova), Poles (E. Novitska, L.R. Skreminskaya), Chechens and the Ingush (M. Pol), French (S.V. Prigozhina), Croatians (J. C. Žmegač) and many others. There are also numerous materials on the topic of "traditional" diaspora: Jews (Ts. Gitelman, V.V. Chervyakov, V.D. Shapiro, M.O. Mnatsakanyan) and Armenians (M.O. Mnatsakanyan, L. Abrahamyan, E. Melkonyan).

**Methods of research.** The main methods used in the theoretical part of the thesis include historical-sociological and valuation-normative approaches, systematic and scientific methods: synthesis, comparative analysis, comparison, typology and generalization. Methods for collecting empirical data include questionnaires, semi-formalized (semi-structured) interviews, focus groups and the study of specific cases (case studies).

The results of the sociological survey “Germans of Contemporary Russia” (2009), conducted with the participation of the author, serve as the empirical basis of the work. The program for the project (supervised by Dr. T.B. Smirnova and V.S. Kurske) includes an analysis of the key markers of ethnic identity of Russian Germans, their language practices and migration potential, as well as the development of recommendations for the governments of Russia and Germany, relevant departments and organizations that provide support to the ethno-cultural revival of Russian Germans. A total of 1,500 people were interviewed using target-oriented quota sampling.

**The scientific novelty** of the thesis lies in the following:

a) A definition of multiple ethnic identity is provided.

b) Research potential of the constructivist approach to the sociological study of multiple identities is revealed.

c) The author's concept of empirical study of multiple ethnic identity is developed and verified.

d) The main ethno-consolidating and ethno-differentiating markers of multiple ethnic identity are identified.

e) The types of self-identification of individuals with multiple ethnic identities are determined.

f) The new functions of "ethnic" organizations and their significance for the reproduction of groups with multiple ethnic identities are identified.

The practical significance lies in the fact that the materials of the presented thesis can be applied within the framework of pedagogical activities: in courses on ethnic sociology, cultural studies, social anthropology and ethnography.

Understanding the experience of Russian Germans is extremely useful for a balanced national policy. Their version of the construction of "multiple" identities can serve as a model for other ethnic groups.

The verification of results of the research consists in the fact that the theses on the subject were presented at German youth forums in Russia (2003, 2008, 2009, 2010), Summer school of sociology at Moscow State University (2004), Summer school of humanities at the University of Halle-Wittenberg (Halle-Wittenberg, 2004) and the Summer school for postgraduate students of the Center for German and European Studies (2008, 2009). Presentations at regional, national and international conferences have also been given on this subject. Among them: "The Germans of the New Russia: Problems and Prospects for Development" (Moscow, 2009), "Historical and Cultural Heritage and Modern Ethnology" (Moscow, 2010), "Religion and Text: From Practice to Theory" (Minsk, 2011). In 2008-2010, we conducted trainings, sessions and seminars on issues of ethnic identity in a number of public organizations of Russian Germans.

1. The Issue of Multiple Ethnic Identity in Contemporary Sociology

This chapter analyzes the main theoretical approaches to the study of ethnic identity, as well as the methodology of the study of this phenomenon. We provide a definition of multiple ethnic identity and proceed to analyze its key characteristics. In addition, we systematize and refine the conceptual-categorical mechanism of thesis research. We also analyze the sociological approaches to the study of the nature of ethnicity. A thorough analysis of the theories allows us to offer our own concept of the study of groups with multiple identities.
1.1. The Sociological Interpretation of the Concept of “Multiple Ethnic Identity”

Ethnic identity is not regarded by us as a given, but as a dynamic process that continues throughout a person’s life. This assumption allows us to characterize ethnic identity not as the result of natural determinism, but as a dynamic phenomenon that is constantly changing, always subject to the influence of various social factors.

Ethnic identity has a certain structure. It is common practice to divide it into three main components: cognitive, affective and behavioral.

The cognitive (from the Latin word “cognitio” – knowledge, cognition) component includes a body of knowledge that an individual has about the ethnic group he/she belongs to: self-designation, the particularities of the group’s history, traditions, elements of the material and spiritual culture, national symbols and other distinctive features of its people. This element answers the question: "What do I know about my nation and myself as a representative of that nation?"

The affective, or emotional (from the Latin word “affectus” – emotion, passion), component reflects the individual's personal attitude toward his/her own ethnic group and membership in that group, as well as the significance of the given group. Depending on the vector of this relationship, we can single out both positive and negative ethnic identity: a person can positively relate to their own origin and feel proud of belonging to a particular nation or, alternatively, be ashamed of their ethnic group and treat it with contempt. There is also, of course, the possibility of a neutral attitude, without a strong emotional response. This element provides an answer to the question: "What do I feel for my nation and for myself as a representative of that nation?"

The third component, behavioral, is based on these first two components. It manifests itself in the organization of everyday life and social life, standards and activities. This element provides an answer to the question: "What and how am I doing as a representative of a particular nation?"

For example, at the mere thought of his nation, a young Bashkir swells with pride for his own ethnic group, its glorious past, traditions and history. Therefore, he finds a suitable life partner, adheres to a particular cuisine and raises his children like proper Bashkirs. For another example, consider a teenager who knows the Roma folk song "Gelem, Gelem," and performs it for his family, but is ashamed of his ethnicity and makes no mention of it in his broader social environment.

The behavioral component is a graphic manifestation of ethnic identity; it is the easiest one for an outsider to watch and observe. But it does not always adequately reflect the degree of knowledge and emotional attachment that an individual has for his/her ethnic group. The traditional way of life is being increasingly replaced by an industrial way of life. Globalization has blurred the
boundaries and distinctions between cultures. The Kalmyks no longer live in nomad tents and wander over the steppe. But that in no way means that they are no longer Kalmyks. Although Russian Germans might have no knowledge of German, they still know the history of their nation and their people, and treat this historical heritage with reverence and respect the culture of their ancestors. In other words, there is no direct dependence in the triad of "knowledge-emotion-behavior." The correlation between the components is very situational and is determined by many external and internal factors.

The notion of ethnic identity also has another structural element, namely ethnic boundaries. Ethnos as a social group exists thanks to the fact that there is an objective possibility for the "recognition" of this group among others. Recognition is only possible if there is a possibility to measure one community against others, to distinguish it somehow: "The ethnic 'We' is able to manifest itself precisely because there is an ethnic 'They' that differs from the 'We' in terms of language, culture, customs and other characteristics." Thus, it is precisely the existence of ethnic boundaries based on ethnic markers that determines the formation of ethnic identity: since ethnos is a social group, it follows that it is the totality of the members of this social group being conscious of belonging to it, that is, ethnic identity is "recognition of one's own group members," which is possible only if this ethnic group has certain distinguishing characteristics. The distinguishing features of an ethnos are the ethnic markers that define ethnic boundaries.

Norwegian social anthropologist F. Barth pointed out that ethnic differences continue to be preserved despite the number of interethnic contacts increasing and their intensity growing. Moreover, ethnic differences persist even after a person has an opportunity to change his or her membership of the ethnic group. The fact that many social relationships become opposed after passing through ethnic boundaries also proves the importance and stability of an ethnic group. Moreover, despite the fact that many different ethnic groups often exist in a single social system, the differences between these groups do not get erased. Barth argued: "Interaction [between ethnic groups] in such a social system does not lead to its liquidation through change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence." Culture is the main consolidating factor in an ethnic group. In Barth’s view, cultural unity should not be viewed as the main characteristic of an ethnic group but as a result of its existence, or more than that, possibly as the meaning itself. An ethnic group, according to Barth, is a particular social group whose hallmark is that it is based on categorization. Categorization involves the juxtaposition of one’s ethnic group with another.

20 Ibid. – P. 859.
categories (markers) can permeate the entire social life, or operate only in limited sectors of reality.\textsuperscript{23}

**Multiple ethnic identity** implies the ability of an individual and / or group to identify themselves as belonging to two or more ethnic cultures at the same time. Multiculturalism and multilingualism are the most common manifestations of multiple ethnic identity. That said, people with full-fledged multiple identities have a high degree of competence in both "parent" cultures, thus becoming natural mediators.

In order to discuss this complex issue adequately, we will provide several independent commentaries describing the phenomenon of multiple ethnic identities. These examples are not confined to Russian Germans; they can be applied for the analysis of other ethnic groups as well.

1. **Multiple ethnic identity is relative, not absolute.**

Identity is more or less explicit. The degree of its manifestation is reflected in adverbs, such as: he / she is *strictly* Anglo-Roman, ... *typically* French, *deeply* rooted in Spanish culture. In cases of multiple identities, the question is not whether an individual does or does not possess a certain identity, but how to determine the extent to which the individual has this identity. An individual acquires an ethnic identity to a certain degree and possesses that identity to a greater or lesser degree. For example, a young man from Mexico who moved to and lived in the United States may discover that he has actually become American. When he returns to Mexico, he may experience the feeling that he no longer belongs in this community (at least in part), and that he has lost his Mexican identity to some degree. It follows then that the question, “Are you Mexican?”, which tends to arise from time to time, can be seen as inadequate or unfair, since it implies a yes or no answer, thereby forcing the person to make an unreasonable or forced choice.

2. **Identity is not a permanent, static quality of a person, but an active, dynamic process.**

Identity, defined as a socially oriented form of behavior, is predominantly a dynamic phenomenon. To a large extent, it is an active process of self-determination, a struggle for self-perception, an analysis of one's self and social environment. This observation leads us to the conclusion that anyone who lives in a foreign country and seriously tries to accept the culture of this country (including the language, the most important and fundamental form of culture), becomes a member of that community in some degree. Efforts to adopt and attain the culture serve as the condition for the adoption of identity in the given community. Such efforts are experienced individually, on the one hand, in order to become a member of an ethnic group. On the other hand, however, the whole group must also endeavor to ensure its survival and self-respect.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{24} Tajfel, H. Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour // Social Science Information, 13. – P. 65-93.
\end{flushleft}
3. Multiple ethnic identity is not an exclusive, but a cumulative value. "Partial" identities are in no way mutually exclusive.

   a) This is obvious for hierarchically organized identities involving subordination. Thus, for instance, an individual can be a Rhinelander, Western European and German all at the same time. However, it is obvious that in the course of the empirical study this issue is currently not examined closely enough, which is clearly shown by a question like: "Do you consider yourself Bavarian, German or European?" In addition, these questions are just not accurate enough, because they do not determine the context in which the respondent is to be considered.

   b) It is wrong to ask a person with multiple ethnic identities to answer the question, "Are you German or Russian?" ("A Frenchman or a Spaniard?"). This question is often a matter of great unease. The reason for this (which the respondent is often unaware of) is that the question is simply formulated in a wrong way. It forces the respondent to give an answer that for him/her is unsatisfactory and choose only one group instead of rejecting the question outright or answering "both." In actual practice, bicultural people tend to try to merge the two identities together and integrate them consistently in mind, behavior and emotions. This difficult situation also demonstrates that people with multiple ethnic identities have more cultural capital than those who belong to only one culture.

   In a survey of people identifying themselves as Sorbs, the respondents, were asked to show the extent to which they feel Sorbian and the extent to which they feel German by denoting the boundary on a line representing 100 percent. This task is misinforming, because it implies that:

   • Identity is a situation with a zero-sum;

   • A "normal" German possesses a 100 percent German identity, so the Sorbs may not have a full German identity.25

   This is reminiscent of the mistrust that prevailed toward bilingual people who were thought to have no real motherland and thus were regarded as unreliable. In our opinion, the existence of multiple identities implies the possibility for an individual and / or group to identify themselves as belonging to two or more ethnic cultures. Moreover, a person with full-fledged multiple identities is involved in interactions with both "parent" cultures, and plays the role of a natural mediator. There is a real danger, however, that the multiple identities can be a source of emotional stress and frustration for the individual. In conditions of "uncertainty," the person may begin to experience psychological discomfort. The inability to relate fully to just one ethnic culture often makes the individual vulnerable. Such a situation arises if there is external pressure, when people are forced to make a clear choice between these "partial" identities.

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4. Multiple ethnic identity is situational and instrumental in nature.

Drawing on his/her own experience, a person shows various elements of his/her ethnicity in different situations, and in doing so he/she is most often guided by practical goals. For instance, in the case of ethnic repression, the desire to hide one’s own affiliation to the persecuted ethnic group is quite natural; this is done in order to avoid sanctions. Individuals and groups with multiple ethnic identities can switch from one "partial" identity to another, guided by necessity, advantages or other causes. Changes in the social context can also modify the ratio of "partial" identities.

Finally, multiple ethnic identity has a dual perspective on each "part" of identity: self-description and ascription. It is the “parent” ethnic cultures that serve as reference groups that have the right to offer ascription. People in the “multi-ethnic” category are situated in a complex social frame of reference, the centers of which are: the country of historical origin of their significant ancestors or their own birth, country of residence and their own group.

The process of the formation of ethnic identity among children from ethnically mixed families is characterized by greater variability and difficulty. In this situation, the identity is actually chosen by the child, and he/she can choose either the identity corresponding to the nationality of one of his/her parents, or create a new bi-ethnic identity, or become a bearer of a diffuse, marginal identity. For example, a child with a Spanish mother and a Dutch father can form either a Spanish identity or a Dutch identity, or even some integrated identity of "Spaniard with Dutch roots," or simply remain in a situation of ethnic ambiguity.

The following factors may influence the individual’s choice of ethnic identity:

1) The social status of the ethnic group. For example, N.A. Aleksakhina writes that during the Soviet period, in ethnically mixed families the child often adopted the Russian identity. Changes in the political situation often lead to a revision of the hierarchy of ethnic groups. For example, after the former Soviet republics won independence, the prestige of the titular ethnic groups increased significantly. This made the Latvian, Uzbek and Georgian identity more attractive and competitive compared to the Russian identity. Now, children from mixed families are increasingly oriented towards the culture of the titular ethnic group.

2) The preference for ethnic traditions of one of the parents in the family. There are three basic scenarios: 1. The child is brought up in the ethnic traditions of one of the parents; 2. The cultures of both parents in the family are respected; 3. The child is brought up within the framework of another culture that is foreign for both the mother and the father. For instance, a child in a Chuvash-Udmurt family may be raised either: 1. only as a Chuvash or only as an Udmurt, 2. as both an Udmurt and

Chuvash at the same time, or 3. as a Russian (since this culture is familiar to both parents and is thus “shared”).

- The sex of the child and the significance of this for the parents. For example, T.A. Akopyan, who studied mixed Russian-Armenian families, showed that girls often feel that they are half Russian and half Armenian, while boys exhibit an Armenian identity.

E.M. Galkina notes that instability is a common feature in the ethnic identity of children from mixed families. This means that, depending on the context, various identities can be actualized.

Can ethnic identity change after adolescence? If a person discovers certain information about his/her ethnic origin, it may subsequently lead to a transformation of his/her ethnic identity. A man who always considered himself a Russian, for instance, may become interested in the Polish language and culture after discovering that he has Polish roots. He may even gradually shift to a Polish identity.

The significance of ethnic identity is also a dynamic variable. For example, if the social environment becomes more heterogeneous, this might very well lead to an increase in the importance of identity. For instance, the acceleration of migration processes results in a more diverse ethnic and cultural composition of the regions that were previously largely homogeneous in national terms, which, in turn, leads to the actualization of the inhabitants' ethnic identity. The appearance of "Turkish," "Yugoslavian" and "Russian" neighborhoods in Berlin gave rise to a growth in ethnic consciousness among the Germans themselves. This is reflected in public debates, political programs and school courses.

Ethnic groups are in constant interaction with each other. Consequently, the development of ethnic consciousness in some people can provoke similar processes among their neighbors. The Yakuts' ethnic renaissance of the 1990s stimulated the actualization of the ethnic identity of the Buryats, the Nenets, Russians and other peoples living in adjacent territories. One of the most significant factors in the transformation of ethnic identity is migration. Moving to another country takes a person out of familiar settings and puts him in an unfamiliar environment. This kind of stressful situation requires the individual to develop a strategy of interaction with the host society, which, in turn, has an impact on the ethnic identity of the migrant. As we have seen, ethnic identity is not formed instantly. Despite the huge variety of factors that influence ethnic identity, it nevertheless remains the result of personal self-identification. Knowledge of all the above-mentioned and many other theoretical concepts will not help us predict what ethnic identity a specific person will develop. It will, however, allow us to understand some general patterns of this process.

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1.2. The Theoretical-Methodological Approach to the Study of Multiple Ethnic Identity

Identity is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon; its various aspects are studied by a wide range of different disciplines, including psychology, sociology, pedagogy, philosophy and so on. In this section, we present a critical review of the basic theoretical concepts of ethnic identity, which will allow us to get a clearer idea of the issue.

In order to use the concept of identity, it is essential to have a clear definition of the basic categories of ethnic sociology: ethnos and culture. A detailed analysis of various interpretations of these phenomena is beyond the scope of this thesis; instead, we present the most compact and practically applicable description of these phenomena. Modern science has developed a number of theoretical concepts that reveal various aspects of the formation, functioning, and transformation of ethnic identity. The concept of ethnic identity started to be widely used in Russian sociology only in the early 1990s; it was a period of actualization of the ethnic factor in the political and cultural life of Russian society. For Soviet ethnography, and later ethno-sociology and ethno-psychology, it was much more traditional to study ethnic consciousness, a notion that is basically similar to ethnic identity. The following Soviet researchers studied the subject: Yu.V. Arutyunyan, Yu.V. Bromley, A.F. Dashdamirov, R. Sh. Dzharylgasinova, L.M. Drobizheva, B.I. Kozlov, M.V. Kryukov, M.M. Kuchukov, P.I. Kushner, G.U. Ktsoeva, V.P. Levkovich, L.P. Martemyanov, N.G. Pankova, V.V. Pimenov, B.F. Porshnev, K.V. Chistov, K.N. Khabibullin, V. Yu. Khotinets and others. The nature of ethnic identity, along with its structure, functions and levels of manifestation, was analyzed in great detail in the works of these researchers. 28

Current Russian and western approaches to the interpretation of the nature of ethnicity can be divided into three schools:29

1) Essentialism (primordialism). Proponents of this line of thought believe that there is an innate (primordial) ethnicity of man. There are two versions of this approach. In the first one, ethnicity is defined as a natural biological phenomenon. This trend is represented by P. van den Berg, D. Filiman, G. Keyes, K. Kwan. Among Russian scientists, L. N. Gumilev supported the socio-biological interpretation of ethnicity, viewing it as a “biosocial organism” that arises from exposure to extra-atmospheric impulses and geographical factors.

The second version views ethnicity as a product of culture and history, and ethnos is defined as a historically emerging human community with an entire set of objective attributes of belonging: territory, language, culture, etc.

Yu.V. Bromley, V.I. Kozlov, V.V. Pimenov, E. Smith, K.V. Chistov and others worked within the framework of this approach. In Soviet ethnography, the historical-cultural version of primordialism was more prevalent. Yu.V. Bromley cited ethnic consciousness as a characteristic of ethnos, emphasizing that, like any other form of consciousness, it is a secondary phenomenon, a derivative of objective factors.30

2) Constructivism. Most Western anthropologists, as well as some modern Russian scientists, adhere to this line of thought. In this approach, the main role is given not to the objective aspect of ethnic existence (territory, culture), but to the subjective one. The essence of constructivism is that ethnic communities are "imaginary" and that they exist only in people’s minds as a result of concerted efforts by individuals and the institutions created by them. Correspondingly, ethnicity is understood as a social construct. Proponents of this theory include B. Anderson, E. Gellner, F. Barth, and among Russian scientists – V. Voronkov, O. Karpenko, O. Brednikova, V.A. Tishkov. A common theme of research within this trend is the reproduction of ethnicity, the constructivist role of the elite in national processes.

3) Instrumentalism. The main proponents of this line of thought posit that the main thing in the existence of any ethnic group consists in serving some particular purpose and interests. Membership in an ethnic group is seen as a means to achieve a more comfortable condition in life, a way of overcoming alienation and as one of the most powerful resources in the political mobilization of a group, helping the national elite to act in their own interests. J. de Voss, N. Glaser, M.N. Guboglo, L.M. Drobizheva, and V.A. Yadov all worked within the framework of this school of thought. The study of ethnicity as a significant instrument of political struggle and economic competition is represented in several major fieldworks.

We shall now turn our attention to a detailed analysis of the methodology. Adherents of essentialism believe that ethnic differences are determined "by blood" and ancestry, as well as other objective characteristics (language, life, religion, etc.). According to essentialism, ethnos is defined as a group of people who are united by persistent objective attributes: a common history, origin, language, territory, etc. The dominance of this position in Russia’s political and intellectual discourses developed for historical reasons. This paradigm was developed in Soviet science and is deeply rooted in both formal and everyday practices.

However, this approach is not always productive. In describing an ethnic group like the Roma, for instance, it turns out that one cannot rely solely on these objective attributes, since the Roma possess several native languages, including Sinti, Roma and the languages of their current or previous residences. Interestingly enough, the Roma population in Hungary speaks Romanian, Hungarian and Roma (Gypsy). Some of the Gypsies are Orthodox, while others are Catholics, and some pagans.

We run into the same difficulty when describing ethnic Russian Germans. Does the “nation” or even “community” still exist as a single whole if its representatives belong to different faiths, have different origins, and almost no young members of the group speak German?

The main essentialist methodologies are objectivism and positivism. Within this approach, an ethnic group refers to a group of people united by persistent objective attributes: a common history, origin, language, territory, etc. Ethnic identity is seen as an innate characteristic of man that cannot be changed by the will or personal choice of the bearer. It remains unclear how many factors there should be to characterize an ethnic group: is one enough, say, language or religion? Or does it require an entire set of features? How many markers should an individual or group possess in order to be affiliated with a particular ethnic culture? Within the framework of this approach, it is precisely the researcher who ultimately ascribes an identity to the respondents. The given methodology does not presuppose the presence of a situational and relativistic nature in ethnic identity, which allows us to conclude that there are certain limitations inherent in the application of primordialism to study of multiple ethnic identities.

It remains unclear how many factors are necessary for the characterization of an ethnic group: is one enough, for example language or religion? Or is an entire set of different attributes necessary? Consider the case of the Serbs and Croats. These ethnic groups are similar in every aspect apart from religion: They do not differ from each other in appearance; they speak Serbo-Croatian and live in the same region. But the Croats are Roman Catholic, while the Serbs are Orthodox Christian. In this case, the distinction between ethnic groups is based solely on this criterion. But if we turn to the Germans, we find that in the north, German Protestantism prevails, while in the south Catholicism does. That does not, however, mean that the Germans in the north and those in the south are different peoples.

Instrumentalism considers ethnic identity as a means to achieve a more comfortable condition in life, a way of overcoming alienation and as one of the most powerful resources in the political mobilization of the group to help the ethnic elite to promote their own interests. The excessive pragmatism and rationalism attributed to the respondents is a methodological limitation in this approach. Instrumentalism has made a significant contribution to the study of the mechanisms of ethnic mobilization. But it only partially describes the nature of multiple identities, which allows us to regard this line of thought as one of the variants of constructivism.

Proponents of the constructivist approach believe that the main unifying factor in an ethnic group is the members’ belief in the existence of the group and their sense of belonging to it. In other words, the similarities between the members are not so important. It is more important that they believe in the existence of this similarity. For example, the Germans, despite regional differences, perceive themselves as one nation, and they have faith in their own
community. The situation is similar for Jews and Armenians. Whether consciously or unconsciously, individuals define their own ethnic identity, and therefore can change it to fit the social context. At the heart of constructivist methodology are the principles of relativity, situationality and instrumentality, all of which most closely match the objectives of the study of multiple ethnic identity. Such a design presupposes delimitation between members of the group and outsiders. One can use any factor to do this, even the most insignificant: the style of dress, language features, specific rituals, etc. Thus, according to constructivism, an ethnic group is a group of people united by a faith in the presence of their own similarities. Obviously, within the framework of essentialism, there are practically no resources for the stimulation of ethnic self-determination: if ethnic characteristics are indeed objective and are assigned a priori, then we are powerless to change anything. Constructivism, in contrast, emphasizes the importance of man's awareness of his belonging to a particular ethnic group, thus promoting ethnic identification and influencing ethnic consciousness.

Culture has traditionally been viewed as one of the attributes used to describe an ethnic group. It might seem to some that this term cannot cause any difficulties. Typically, the word is used with reference to either rules of behavior in society ("cultured man," "doing that is uncivilized") or material objects ("cultural heritage," "cultural asset"). Very often, culture is narrowed down to refer to folk customs, folklore and traditions. These notions are also true, of course. Yet, culture is actually a much more complex and profound phenomenon. In order to better understand the diversity of cultures, the phenomenon can be likened to an iceberg.

The tip of the iceberg is made up of those cultural elements that are easiest to notice (See Figure 1.). First and foremost, it is precisely these elements that are referred to when speaking of cultural differences. They could include language, customs, folklore, cuisine, crafts, traditional costumes, dances, songs and games, etc. This level of the iceberg does not, however, explain why people who belong to different cultures sometimes have difficulties in understanding each other. Human behavior affects mainly the lower, submerged part of the iceberg, which consists of the values and norms that are hidden from direct observation.

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Fig. 1: The theory of culture as an “iceberg”

At the bottom of the iceberg, there are phenomena such as:

- Unwritten rules of behavior (how to treat one’s elders, how to properly welcome guests and greet each other, and so on). In Japan, for example, students bow when the teacher enters the classroom. In Russia, they stand up in this situation. For Russians, it is common practice to address someone you do not know well using the formal version of "you," while the Spaniards almost immediately start addressing everyone with an informal “you.”

- Social norms (what is wrong, what is right). Exposing the shoulders of a young girl will not cause any complaints in France or Italy, for instance, but it will in the United Arab Emirates.

- Values and their hierarchy. For Americans, individual success is important, for Swedes social mutual aid is, and for the Japanese, an absence of conflicts takes precedence. Most values are universal and are represented to some degree in every culture. However, their significance and interpretation differ.

It should be noted that all these features are perceived by members of a culture as completely natural, and any deviation from them is a cause of surprise or irritation. Friction and clashes between various systems of rules and regulations lie at the root of most intercultural conflicts.

Changes at the top of the iceberg happen much more quickly than at the bottom. Ethnic groups often borrow external elements of culture from each other, but this does not always lead to an inner transformation. For example, in England, the widespread presence of Indian food in no way affects the hierarchy of British values. Likewise, the spread of European clothing in Southeast Asia had no impact on the residents’ notion of "right" and "wrong." With that in mind, in modern social sciences, culture is understood as a system of norms, rules and values that unite the group. The group members view these rules and regulations as something that goes without saying. Just as a fish swimming in a lake does not understand that it is in water, people in their own culture do not realize the degree of that culture’s impact on them. Only when
faced with different cultures can we truly understand the peculiarities of our own.

Ethnos and culture are interrelated. People who perceive themselves as one ethnic group share a common set of values and rules (i.e., culture), which ensures the stability of the group. However, every individual member of the group does not necessarily fully meet all of the norms. But, first of all, the representatives of a given culture are aware of how to behave in particular situations, as well as what is expected of them in their environment. And second, no one can be completely free from the influence of the in-group culture.

Let us have a closer look at the phenomenon of ethnicity in more detail. There are four elements at the heart of the phenomenon: ethnic culture, psychology, sociality and solidarity. Ethnicity is not "inherent": it has a variety of historical forms. As a special qualitative form of group life, it emerges during the decomposition of mechanical forms of solidarity. We should also emphasize that ethnicity is not confined to organic solidarity, and it has an integrated nature: it is comprised of both rational (relating to interests) and irrational (associated with emotions and the unconscious) factors.

Ethnic solidarity is organically linked with a sense of pride in the achievements and virtues of the group, as well as a sense of responsibility for the tragic conflicts in its history.

In the opinion of M.O. Mnatsakanyan, ethnicity never manifests itself in a "pure" form. In the searches for ethnicity, we always encounter it in its concrete historical form, called a tribe, ethnic group or nation. But in any case, it will be based on the cultural-psychological complex, whose main feature (and function) is the integration of people and the establishment of solidarity by means of psychological agents – agents of symbolic interaction. Ethnic groups and nations may in the course of history lose their statehood or be exposed to persecution or forced assimilation, but the deep traditions preserve the crucial cultural and psychological complex. Under favorable conditions, ethnicity, in all its manifestations, can then be restored. A classic example of this is the Jews.32

By its very nature, ethnicity is integrated: It connects not only people by means of mechanisms of solidarity, but also factors of ethnic life (language, culture, territory, forms of social, political and governmental organizations, etc.). It combines all of this into a single complex, making all the different aspects the source and basis of people’s self-actualization. Ethnicity integrates individuals into a single group, connecting them through shared values, norms, rules, symbols, and historical memory.

In the process of growing up, each person solves two main tasks for himself. First, he seeks to understand, express and define his own uniqueness and originality. Second, he must orientate himself in the variety of groups surrounding him, and then determine his place in the sociocultural space. He

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seeks answers to the questions: Who am I, what am I, how do others see me, and what sets me apart from them and/or brings me closer to them?

The sum-total of an individual's representation of himself is precisely what makes up his/her identity. In accordance with the above tasks, a personal (individual) and social (group) identity is formed with each of us. The personal identity is an individual's realization that he/she is special and different from any other individual, with a unique life experience and unique personality structure. Social identity is the perception of one’s self as a member of a particular group, a sense of belonging and emotional attachment to that group. Neither kind of identity is inherent; they develop over the course of socialization. Personal and social identities are interrelated and together determine the specific personality of an individual. They perform very different functions, however. Social identity provides a sense of security, satisfies a person’s need for community and provides an orientation on the rules and norms of behavior. The personal identity allows you to feel your own self-worth, integrity and stability in life’s changing circumstances.

It should be understood that in a complex social structure, which includes a large number of groups and institutions, the individual has a set of mutually compatible social identities. Some identities begin to replace each other over time (the identity of “graduate,” for example, eventually replaces the identity of “student.” Yet, there are also more stable identities related to gender, race, language, etc. Each social identity fulfills a certain function. Some of them are used quite often, while others are used much less frequently. Depending on the environment and situation, a suitable social identity comes to the foreground. One good example is meeting with representatives of other professions: in this situation we tend to focus on our professional identity, while if we were visiting a temple, we would be shifting to our religious identity.

What determines the development of one or another social identity?

First and foremost, the social groups themselves make efforts to form a separate identity. The state, for example, strives to instill a sense of patriotism and a stable identity in its citizens.

Second, an important factor is the degree of homogeneity in the social environment. The more heterogeneous a society is in an ethnic, linguistic and religious sense, the more varied the arsenal of identities is, and the more pronounced those identities are. The greater the cultural differences are between the groups, the more the social environment encourages their awareness of social identity. If a Catholic person is surrounded by other members of his own faith, for example, his religious identity would be considerably less significant to him than to a Catholic living among Muslims.

Among the whole range of social identities, there are three that hold the greatest interest to us: civil, ethnic and regional.

Civil identity provides a sense of self as a citizen of a particular state. We can say that a citizen of the Russian Federation, for instance, considers himself a Russian, while citizens of England, Scotland and Wales, in this sense at
least, would consider themselves British. This identity is shaped by and maintained by state institutions: the education system (schools, universities), the media (television, radio and newspapers), the military, etc. The main instrument to do this is propaganda, though its explicitness can vary. The actualization of civil identity is a part of public policy, sometimes successful, sometimes not. The Czechs and Slovaks are one example of this public policy: They were unable to form a stable Czechoslovak identity and this led to the division of Czechoslovakia into two parts.

A person’s citizenship in a certain country is not, however, a guarantee that he will have a corresponding civil identity. In the nineteenth century, while formally citizens of the Austrian Empire, the Serbs, Croats, Poles and Ukrainians dreamed of independence and refused to be loyal to the state of Habsburg. Another example is when a Pakistani man moves to London, receives British citizenship and yet still does not possess a British civil identity.

Ethnic identity is a sense of one’s self as a representative of a particular ethnic group. For example, Russian, Jewish, Tatar and Udmurt are all separate versions of ethnic identity. This identity is shaped by institutions such as family and ethnic community, as well as by participation in traditional holidays and by means of language, folklore, customs and the group’s values.

It may seem that ethnic identity is actually the same thing as what is meant in Russian by the term “natsionalnost” or “nationality”. However, ethnic identity is a phenomenon of a different order entirely. This concept of “natsionalnost” is conceived of as an external characteristic attributed to a man by society (an entry in his birth certificate, marriage certificate, in various questionnaires, etc.). Ethnic identity, on the other hand, is an internal, psychological characteristic, the result of an individual’s self-identification in the ethnic space. In most cases, the two coincide, but this is not always true, especially when children come from ethnically mixed families. For a child whose parents are both ethnically French, for example, the resulting ethnic identity of the child will most likely be French, while for a child with a French mother and an ethnically English father, the formation of ethnic identity will be more complicated.

An interest in another nation and its languages, customs and traditions does not imply the presence of that particular ethnic identity. For instance, you can take an interest in Irish history and culture but still have a distinct Russian ethnic identity. Acquaintance with the lives of other ethnic groups more likely contributes to a better understanding of one’s own identity rather than a rejection of it.

How are civil and ethnic identity connected? In each separate case, there are various possible combinations of these elements.

In today’s world, there are both mono-ethnic (which are in the minority) and multi-ethnic states. In the first case, ethnic and civil identity may coincide. For example, in Japan, 98% of the population can be regarded as ethnically Japanese. In the second case, civil and ethnic identity may coexist. Flemings
and Walloons, for instance, share a Belgian civil identity.

Often, civil identity is connected with the ethnic identity of one of the ethnic groups living in a country. For example, the basis for British civil identity is formed in some senses by the historical development of English ethnicity.

The ethnic identity of the minority and the majority is formed in different ways. As a consequence of that, people who belong to the ethnic minority become aware of their ethnic identity much earlier and tend to attach more significance to it than the ethnic majority. For example, Russians living in Russia think about their ethnicity much less often than Russians living in America.

Regional identity is a sense of one’s self as a resident of a specific location: city, state, region. For example, Siberian, Muscovite, Saxon – these are all regional identities. The institutes that shape regional identity are essentially similar to those that maintain civil identity, the only difference being that they function at the local level. For example, in a Russian school, such subjects as history, literature, social studies and regional studies contribute to the development of civil identity (e.g., Moscow Studies for Moscow, and the history of Tula for the Tula region).

Regional identity’s connection with ethnic identity can be quite complicated. In many cases, it is actually absent: for example, a “citizen of St. Petersburg” as an identity has no ethnic background. Regions often unite areas that are geographically connected (the "Bavarian Forest" is located in a single forest; "the Carpathians" form a single mountain territory), or historically connected ("Silesia", which is located on the territory of a medieval sovereign state). The size of the region may vary, but it does not influence the intensity or importance of regional identity for its residents. As we explained above, civil, ethnic and regional identity all coexist within the structure of personality: one person can have a Russian civil identity, a Tatar ethnic identity and a Siberian regional identity. Different situations cause different identities to come to the foreground for this person. For example, while meeting with a Yakut, he may feel his Tartar identity more acutely, and while meeting with residents of Saratov – the Siberian one.

Apart from such situational preferences, however, these three identities form a kind of hierarchy that is in line with the state’s national policy. The state can either support ethnic and cultural diversity among its citizens or cultivate one specific identity as the main one. For example, Poland has a policy aimed at achieving cultural homogeneity and therefore makes efforts to assimilate Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Silesians and others living in the country, while Canada has opted for a different approach and recognized that cultural differences are quite important and valuable. There, the government allocates funds for the maintenance and development of culture, not only for English-speaking Canadians, but also French-speaking communities of Quebec and small indigenous peoples. Diversity is perceived as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society. Such a policy aimed at preserving ethnic
and cultural diversity in the state is called multiculturalism. We should emphasize that both this policy and other policies have certain drawbacks: it is impossible to say that any one is better than another. The choice of a strategy depends on the specific problems facing the state, as well as specific conditions.

How significant are civil and ethnic identity in a world where globalization is actively taking place, thus increasing the volume of migration and intensifying inter-ethnic interaction? It would seem that people all across the globe watch the same movies, read the same books and eat the same food, and this should inevitably diminish the importance of ethnic and cultural diversity. In reality, the changes are not so clear-cut, and they concern appearances more than anything else, without affecting the underlying layers of culture. The emergence of worldwide McDonald's restaurants and jeans in no way makes all the consumers of these goods Americans. Individuals still need value reference points, norms and rules, which only a stable group can provide effectively – namely the state, ethnos and region.

1.3. The Concept of Empirical Research on Groups with Multiple Ethnic Identities.

In recent years, researchers have been increasingly focused on the phenomenon of globalization, which is primarily related to the rapid expansion of transnational corporations, the emergence of a unified world market, the free movement of goods and capital, the spread of mass culture, and the widespread use of new information technologies. Globalization processes determine the growth of the universal interdependence of nations and peoples, as well as the integration and universalization of human practices and behaviors. In connection with this, the issue of identity in the scientific discourse is particularly important. In many cases, the "ethnic renaissance" is associated specifically with the negative aspects of globalization and universalization, becoming a form of answer to these challenges. At the same time, globalization objectively facilitates the formation of multiple ethnic identities in a large number of groups. In the modern world, the historic heritage of peoples, their languages, traditions, customs are eroding, but at the same time there is a revival of some elements of culture and identity. The sociological understanding of these contradictions is a significant theoretical and practical task.

Global social changes of the last decades of the 20th century changed the quantitative and qualitative parameters of migratory movements. These processes have become mass in scale. Annual migration in its various forms (repatriation, immigration, labor migration, etc.) across international borders is measured in millions of people. Researchers speak about the formation of "nations" of migrants, a variety of ethnic groups with a complex ethnic identity. Russian Germans are one of the most striking examples of this process. In

Russia, the formation of multiple ethnic identities has a long history. Numerous inter-ethnic marriages form a favorable situation for the formation of multiple identities for a large number of Russian citizens. In connection with this, V. V. Tishkov, director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology at the Russian Academy of Sciences, has expressed confidence that in the near future the scientific community in Russia will accept the concept of multiple ethnic identities, and Russian-Armenian, Russian-Jewish, Tatar-Bashkir, Evenk-Yakut, Avar-Andi, Dargwa-Kubachini identities will be officially recognized. That is, such instances when an individual is equally fluent in the language and culture of his father and mother and has a complex identity.34

In this section we would like to offer our own method of researching groups with multiple ethnic identities. Earlier, we described ethnic identity as a complex social phenomenon. Now we will try to systematize this material. Within the framework of ethnic identity we select separate markers and divide them into cognitive, affective and behavioral components. In essence, we formulate operational definitions of the concepts in a system of subject and object. Our task is to bring the theoretical concepts to measurable variables. Having selected blocks of questions that are of interest to us, we will be able to use them during questioning, interviewing, observation, and other types of sociological research.

Chart 1: Markers of Ethnic Identity

The division of the elements helps us structure the data we obtain. It should be remembered that the reflection of the elements of ethnic identity and

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34 Tishkova V.V. “Pyaty punkt” Vserossiiskoi perepisi. – http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2002/065/perepis08.php
culture at the individual level has three interrelated aspects: cognitive (knowledge), affective (emotions) and behavioral (action). This somewhat complicates the picture, but at the same time makes it more detailed. Such is our research model. The matrix of the survey allows us to identify the needs of the Russian Germans, make an analysis of the existing state of affairs, and then make a conclusion about the degree to which these two parameters correspond. This procedure allows us to analyze the key markers of multiple ethnic identity of Russian Germans.

The following elements are part of the **cognitive** component:

- Self-identification (through self-designation) – ethnonym;
- Identification of the basis of ethnic identity;
- The content of auto- and hetero-stereotypes.

Elements of the **affective** component include:

- A sense of belonging to an ethnic community;
- Expression of ethnocentrism, which is manifested in ethnic attitudes and stereotypes;
- The place of ethnic identity within the structure of personality and the hierarchy of values.

Elements of the **behavioral** component include:

- Participation in the social life of a given ethnic group;
- Everyday practices (taking place in the daily life of an individual);
- Symbolic practices (religious or other ritual actions with an episodic character and having high importance).

The given system is applicable to the study of other diaspora groups. In the course of research we need to analyze the following topics:

**Questions on the topic of personal identity (individual ethnic identity):**

- declared identity
- basis for its determination
- importance in the structure of identity
- importance in the selection of behavioral strategies (marital and other contacts)

**Questions on the Russian Germans as a group (group ethnic identity):**

- definition of the group as such
- ethnonym
• ethno-differentiating factors (what brings Russian Germans together?)
  • identification of the common values of Russian Germans
  • emotional attitude towards the group (pride, indifference, etc.)
  • boundaries of the group (what distinguishes the Russian Germans from Germans and Russians) and distance from other people (the Bogardus social distance scale)
  • what allows me to consider myself a Russian German (there may be a mismatch with the first block!)

**Questions on language and communication practices:**
• declared degree of fluency (respondents indicate it as "native")
• spheres of application
  o in daily life
  o to satisfy cultural and informational demands
• frequency of use
• language forms (literary or dialect (which one?))
• emotional attitude to the language
• degree of importance
• forms of improvement of language work

**Questions on history:**
• degree of knowledge
• historical memory (identification of the major unifying historical moments)
  • desire to know history better / learn it at school
  • degree of interest in the history of the people or family

**Questions on religion and religious affiliation:**
• declared religious identity
• knowledge of rituals
• degree of significance for the individual
• participation in religious life

**Questions on culture:**
• awareness of the cultural peculiarities of the Russian Germans
• everyday cultural practices
• symbolic cultural practices

**Questions on inter-ethnic relations:**
• condition (in the opinion of the respondent)
• recommendations for improvement
• outlook for the future

**Questions about the homeland:**
• idea of the homeland (the place where one was born / the place where life is better)
• symbols of the homeland
• emotional component

**Questions on emigration:**
• assessment of one's migratory potential (the desire to leave)
• attitude to emigration of other members of the same ethnic group
• personal/group reasons for emigration
• assessment of German emigration policy
• assessment of Russia's emigration policy

**Questions about ethnic organizations:**
• awareness (do they know about them? sources of information)
• attitude towards the activities of organizations (evaluation of effectiveness)
• degree of involvement
• recommendations for improving the performance

**Questions to assess the assistance of Russia:**
• awareness of the existence of federal programs (forms of support)
• evaluation of their usefulness
• degree of necessity for extension (until what time?)
• recommendations for improvement

**Questions to assess the assistance of Germany:**
• awareness of the existence of special programs for Russian Germans (forms of support)
• assessment of their usefulness
• degree of necessity for extension
• recommendations to optimize work

As we have seen, the majority of question blocks have a universal character and can be used to study the identity of many other ethnic groups living in Russia that have what R. Brubaker has termed an "external" homeland.35

We propose the following algorithm for the analysis of ethnic identity of diaspora groups:

1. Description of models of ethnic identity that are common among representatives of a given ethnic group;
2. Characteristics of various markers at the given moment and in comparison with previous periods, an attempt to identify key trends;
3. Assessment of the relationship of the given ethnic group with the state and society in the country of current residence and the "external" homeland (for the Russian Germans it is Germany);
4. Study of "ethnic" organizations as institutional forms of ethnic identity.

We would like to emphasize once again that in today's world the idea of "complex" or "multiple" ethnic identities is widespread. These are sometimes also referred to as "mixed," "hybrid" or "marginal." In order to talk specifically about the borderline / hybrid status of a particular ethnic group or community, it is necessary to clarify the necessary categorical apparatus. The problem is that in determining the content of the concept of marginal identity, there are many difficulties: 1) in practical use of the term several disciplinary approaches have developed, which gives the notion a fairly general interdisciplinary or even extra-disciplinary character; 2) in the process of clarification and development of the concept, it acquired several meanings that apply to different types of marginality; 3) the vagueness of the concept makes it difficult to measure the phenomenon and analyze its role in social processes. At the same time, the frequent and often arbitrary use of the term leads to the need for the clarification of its content and the systematization of the different approaches and aspects of its use.36

The concept of "marginal identity" was introduced into the sociological discourse by Robert Park in the essay "Human Migration and the Marginal Man" (1928).37 In the development of modern civilization, Park particularly singled out the general process taking place when races and peoples overcome various types of isolation: geopolitical, economic and cultural. The result of this global ethno-social process at the individual level is the formation of the identity type characteristic of the development of modern civilization – marginal identity. Like any other social reality, a "marginal identity" is a product of the natural cultural process that intensifies the interaction of cultures: "The

marginal man is a type of identity that appears at the time and place where new communities, people and cultures begins to appear as a result of the conflict of races and cultures. Fate dooms these people to exist in two worlds at the same time, forcing them to take on the role of a cosmopolitan and an outsider in both worlds. Such a man inevitably becomes (as compared with the immediate cultural environment) an individual with a wider horizon, a more refined intelligence, and a more independent irrational point of view.38 The concept of "marginal person" is a concrete and "natural" reflection of the process of social change. According to Park, the marginal person is an immigrant, a half-breed who lives simultaneously in two cultures. The main thing that determines the nature of the marginal man is a sense of moral dichotomy, bifurcation and conflict, when old habits are discarded and new ones have not yet formed. The identity of such an individual is not whole, but falls divided into separate, sometimes conflicting segments. The identity of the Russian Germans can be quite successfully described within the framework of this concept as the identity of individuals living at the crossroads or border of two cultures, Russian and German. This will be discussed in more detail below in the analysis of the possible models of the identity of Russian Germans.

E. Stonequist, a follower of R. Park, carried out an analysis of marginal people from a socio-psychological perspective in his work "The Marginal Man." In contrast to Park, who considered the marginal person as an individual existing on the boundary between the two cultures and two societies who will never be accepted into a new society and will remain a person with a split consciousness, Stonequist believed that the process of adaptation could lead to the formation of identity with new properties over a long period of time. Stonequist distinguished three phases in the evolution of the "marginal man": 1) the individual is not aware that his own life is enveloped in cultural conflict, he just "imbibes" the dominant culture; 2) the person consciously experiences the conflict; 3) successful or unsuccessful attempts are made to adapt to the situation of conflict. If you extrapolate the model and algorithm to an ethnic group, it could be argued that the Russian Germans in their history have passed all these stages and currently are in the third stage of "evolution" (i.e., trying to form an identity that would be internally consistent and non-conflicted).

Another American scholar, M. Goldberg, thought that Park and Stonequist gave too broad a definition of marginal identity and offered his own definition.39 He wrote that in a number of cases, people may not experience internal conflict, despite the fact that they belong simultaneously to two cultures and inhabit a dual social position. Identity is marginal in the following cases: 1) if the individual exists at the boundary between the two cultures from birth; 2) if he shares his position with a group of other individuals like him; 3) if the group carries out institutionalized activities; 4) if the marginal position of an individual does not lead to frustration and blockage of his/her main expectations and needs.

Narrowing the concept of marginal identity, Goldberg introduces the concepts of "marginal area" and "marginal culture." A marginal area is a region where the two cultures overlap and where the population borrows features of both cultures. A marginal culture is a synthesis of elements of two different cultures. According to Goldberg’s concept, a person born in a marginal area and brought up in a marginal culture is no longer an outsider, because he does not display the main features of a marginal person - a painful dichotomy between two cultures. The hybrid culture for him is a native and whole culture, whatever internal contradictions it may contain. Most importantly, it performs all the functions of culture, provides the individual with standardized norms and patterns of behavior, and determines his situation in the same way as any traditional culture does. Marginalization of identity occurs only when the notions and attitudes instilled in the person by the primary group in early childhood are in conflict with the values of another culture. This approach is very interesting because it allows you to assign the community of Russian Germans the status of marginal culture / hybrid community in the sense of its uniqueness and originality. In other words, the culture of the Russian Germans is neither Russian nor German, but Russian-German.

Following the concept of marginal culture, the concept of a marginal situation appeared. According to the definition of its author, A. Antonovsky, the essence of a marginal situation consists in the following situations and processes: 1) two cultures experience long-term interaction; 2) one of them is dominant, its representatives have power, prestige, and are not subject to exclusion; 3) the representatives of the subordinate culture have free access to the dominant culture; 4) the way of life and way of thinking of representatives of the cultures in contact with each other are not highly compatible; 5) members of marginalized groups introduced to the dominant culture and hoping for encouragement by its representatives want to be accepted into their midst as equals; 6) barriers between the two cultural groups do not disappear because of discrimination, on the one hand, and the factors holding them in the previous socio-cultural framework, on the other; 7) conflict, lasting for generations, enhances and reinforces the marginal situation. In assessing the status of Russian Germans it is difficult to determine whether they are currently in a marginal situation, because a number of characteristics listed above do not apply to them (including items 4, 5, 6). But certainly all of these factors were present in the past (during the 1940s and 1990s), and this is essential to the identity of the group as a whole: the Russian Germans feel that they are an ethnic group in a marginal situation.

In the next chapter we will look at various types of the identity of Russian Germans and how they are reflected in the social status and well-being of this group. Empirical research data serves as our basis: transcripts of semi-structured interviews and focus groups, as well as the results of our questionnaire survey of Germans in various regions of Russia.

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Conclusions from chapter 1:

1. Ethnic identity is not formed instantaneously. This is a complex process of creating an identity that depends on many external and internal factors.

2. Ethnic identity has a particular structure. It includes three components: cognitive, affective and behavioral. The relationship between these elements is situational in nature and unique to each individual.

3. An individual can have multiple identities simultaneously: professional, gender, ethnic, religious identity, age, etc. These identities successfully co-exist with each other. Actualization of this or that identity depends on specific circumstances.

4. In the structure of identity, civil, ethnic and regional identity can co-exist without conflict, although a conflict is possible.

5. The current balance of civil and ethnic identity of Russian Germans is influenced by both historical legacy and the current socio-political situation.

6. Globalization has intensified the processes of cross-cultural interactions, leading to hybridization and marginalized cultures, primarily at the level of external manifestations, but also at the level of values.

7. Multiple ethnic identities of diaspora groups can be studied by applying the following algorithm:
   - Description of models of ethnic identity that are common among representatives of a given ethnic group;
   - Characteristics of various markers at the given moment and in comparison with previous periods, an attempt to identify key trends;
   - Assessment of the relationship of the given ethnic group with the state and society in the country of current residence and the "external" homeland;
   - Study of "ethnic" organizations as institutional forms of ethnic identity.

2. The Characteristics of the Ethnic Identity of Russian Germans

This chapter deals with the task of verifying the author's concept of exploring multiple ethnic identities, using the example of German minorities in the Russian Federation. It also presents the results of a countrywide opinion survey conducted among representatives of German minorities in Russia on the issues of identity, language, religion, history, migration etc. Further, the author provides a classification of the most common types of German ethnic identity in Russia.
2.1. **Russian Germans as the community of the Others (based on Donald Levine’s theory)**

At this point, it is necessary to consider ethnic and civil characteristics of Russian Germans. Quite often, one may see the statement that the history of Germans in Russia stems from the times of Princess Olga (10th century, Kievan Rus). But the mere fact that Germans came to Russia at this time did not signify the emergence of Russian Germans as an ethnic group. Russian Germans themselves think that they emerged as a separate ethnos in the epoch of Empress Catherine II when large numbers of Germans populated newly acquired territories. But at the same time, they preserved their ethnocultural uniqueness and reproduced it in their new area of residence by adapting to new conditions without blending into the surroundings.

It is the dynamics of Russian Germans’ ethnic identity rather than their history that interests us. In order to analyze it, we will use the concept formulated by an American scholar D. Levine. This sociologist offered a classification of the types of interaction between alien and host populations that was based on two factors: the goal of “aliens” in regard to a local group (a short-term visit, shared residence, or full membership) and the attitude of a host party towards “aliens” (positive or negative). Levine outlined 6 types: the Guest, the Sojourner, the Intruder, the Inner Enemy, the Marginal Man.

All these types of the Other are derived from the basic ratio the Host – the Other and its emotional characteristics (the degree of forced friendliness or hostility). In the case when aliens are not intending to stay in the host society for too long, the latter may regard them either as guests (and be affable and hospitable with them) or as intruders and, therefore, react in an aggressive and intolerant way. If aliens are going to stay for a long-term shared residence, provided that they preserve their identity, lifestyle, traditions, and customs, the good attitude of the natives towards them may enable the emergence of two neighboring communities, a kind of sojourners; whereas the negative attitude will create the image of the inner enemy, a foreign element in the body of the host group, an image of a “fifth column.” Finally, a group of aliens may aim to enter a group of the natives with the full membership in this host community, and if such intention is treated with goodwill, a group of aliens turn into newcomers; otherwise, it becomes a marginal group (not accepted by its new environment and rejected by the old). The typology of “aliens” suggested by Levine is presented in table 1.

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Table 1: Classification of the types of “aliens” by Donald Levine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude of a group towards the Other</th>
<th>Goal of the Other staying in a group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A short-term visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Guest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Intruder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russian Germans’ entering into Russian environment was a complex and an ambiguous process. Russian Germans were perceived differently at different stages of history – due to changes in the goals of their stay as an ethnic group in Russia as well as due to changes in people’s attitude towards them. It should be emphasized that the following chronological scheme is applicable first and foremost to German settlers in the area of the Volga River, since information about them is more detailed.

It should also be mentioned that the taxonomy offered here does not involve Baltic Germans. There are several reasons for it:

1. The mechanism of interaction between the Russian and German population in the Baltics had the opposite nature: Germans felt they were the owners of those lands annexed to Russia in the Baltics; they themselves played the role of a host community;

2. Baltic and Russian Germans did not share the same path that had deportation as its main landmark. Baltic Germans were repatriated to Germany in 1939 under an intergovernmental treaty.

3. Baltic Germans had their own complex identity in which ethnic and class elements were combined. Unlike Russian Germans, they were not peasants but belonged to the privileged class of the nobility. The pride of the “barons” was part of their ethnic identity. This set up barriers between German settlers and Baltic Germans.

Applying D. Levine’s concept to the analysis of German settlers’ ethnic and civil identity allows us to outline the following historical stages:

*The end of the 18th – the beginning of the 20th century*: the Sojourner. There were several waves of Russian Germans, invited by the tsarist government along with other peoples of the empire; they developed the territories of the Volga River area, Novorossiya, the Crimea, Siberia, and other sparsely populated regions. They were the colonizers of the new lands and aliens in regard to the nomadic Turkic population of the steppes. The settlers got assimilated in new geographic conditions; new identities connected with the attachment to the new places of living (such as the Volga Germans, Bukovina
Germans, Crimean Germans) were formed among them. But the majority of Russian Germans did not have a claim on entering the host group. At this stage, communities of Russian Germans preserved a degree of autonomy from the state authorities. Their interaction with neighbors was episodic, and their integration and assimilation was insignificant. Despite the fact that contacts with the surrounding population became more frequent, and the state’s efforts to abolish the independence of Russian Germans began to manifest themselves more actively (starting with the 1870s), the average relationship was characterized by benevolent “co-residence,” or “neighboring” with each other.

*World War I (1914-1918):* the Inner enemy. As relationships between Russia and Germany exacerbate, the negative attitude of the Russian state towards Russian Germans is being formed. In the time of the armed conflict, Germans are treated as the “fifth column” ready to “stab in the back.” This tendency becomes stronger as the crisis of monarchy progresses. The first acts of discrimination and repressions against the German population take place during this time when projects are being devised to evict Germans from the European part of the country to the areas beyond the Urals. At this time, a conflict between ethnic and civil identity emerges among Russian Germans. On the one hand, they remain loyal to the empire of the Romanovs, and their civic consciousness is growing. Many go to the front as volunteers and collect money for military purposes. On the other hand, their milieu constantly reminds them of their “unreliable” and threatening origin. Such attitude makes Germans experience a keen sense of their otherness and ethnic identity.

*The Interwar Period (1918-1941):* the Newcomer. The young Soviet state tries to win over Russian Germans in every possible way. The idea is put forward that all ethnic groups freed from imperial pressure may voluntarily join the new Soviet community, “the family of Soviet peoples.” Russian Germans obtain their own statehood in the area of the Volga River. Germans become very enthusiastic about this new policy. They eagerly join the processes of modernization having shown willingness to integrate into the Soviet society. As a result of the breakdown of the system of traditional education and religious way of living, the past insularity of this ethnic group is passing. At this time, a pronounced identity of the “first proletarian state in the World,” the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is being formed in the German population.

*The Great Patriotic War and the Post-War Period: the Inner enemy.* After Germany’s attack against the Soviet Union, the leaders of the USSR change their attitude towards the German population dramatically: the latter undergoes repressions, deportation, and is forced to work in labor armies. The regime of special settlements will be canceled only in 1955. The group trauma was painful for Germans. The stigma of being considered political criminals makes them want to prove actively that they are fully fledged Soviet citizens and true patriots. The “ethnic” issue is submerged for many years. Restoration of the republic is out of the question. The main consequence of the policy of persecution of everything German is the loss of family traditions. Due to public pressure and the ban on the use of the German language, the latter is replaced
by Russian everywhere. The attitude of the society towards German culture is extremely negative. To be a German is disgraceful and dangerous.

A generation gap appears. The role of family as an institution of ethnic identity is seriously weakened. As a result of the absence of other mechanisms (ethnic schools, religious communities and churches) and of focused efforts of Soviet authorities, the process of active assimilation commences.

The period of “The Khrushchev Thaw” and “the Era of Stagnation” (1955-1989): the Marginal man. Compared to the era of Stalin, the situation of the German population improves. It no longer suffers harsh persecution. Mass repressions come to an end. At the same time, Soviet Germans are not recognized as fully fledged citizens: their statehood is not restored. The charges of having been the “accomplices of fascists” are withdrawn only in 1961, and it is only in the 1970s that the ban on return of Russian Germans to the places of their previous settlement is repealed. Up until 1970, they are even not registered in censuses. In the late 1960s, Germans themselves undertake a number of unsuccessful attempts to achieve “territorial rehabilitation,” but the state does not support them. Simultaneously, step-by-step rehabilitation is happening at the individual level: restrictions on entering universities, joining the Party, etc. are lifted. But the prospect of career advancement is open only for those ready not to draw attention to their ethnic identity. Assimilation is gaining in strength. Endeavors to revive traditional culture are stigmatized by the state apparatus as nationalism. Meanwhile, religious life is becoming more and more significant: it is in this field that German traditions are preserved. Almost all parishes of the Lutheran and Catholic churches in Siberia include a growing number of Germans. Religious and ethnic identities merge.

The Post-Soviet Period and Modern Times (1989-2010): the Newcomer. Perestroika declared by M. S. Gorbachev affected the German population as well. Russian Germans’ centers of culture appear all over the country. Attempts to restore the Volga German Autonomy are made. But because of resistance on the part of local party bureaucracy they produce no result. A large part of the German population move to Germany for permanent residence. Emigration blurs the areas of compact settlement of Germans in Russia, as it is easier to prove their right to enter the Federal Republic of Germany for those bearers of German culture and language who are from Siberia and North Kazakhstan. Because of their traditional clanship, the process becomes avalanche-like. 2 million people leave Russia and the CIS countries during this period. But at the beginning of the 21st century, the number of the German population in Russia becomes stable.

It should be stressed that today’s Russian Germans reside not only in the territory of the Russian Federation. As is said in the Manifesto of the International Union of German Culture “We are Germans! We are citizens of Russia!”: “A large number of Germans and their family members live in Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Uzbekistan. Russian Germans also include those who stay in Asia. We do not divide our people into those who live in Russia and those who used to live in it … Russian Germans also include migrants to the
What are the factors that affect the formation of ethnic and civil identity among young Russian Germans at the present stage?

The key feature is that nowadays neither family nor church is able to cope with the task of forming a stable ethnic identity. Under these circumstances, public organizations that took up this function become even more responsible. Very often, Russian Germans' participation in the social movement of their people becomes a significant element in their ethnic self-identification.

The improvement of Russian-German intergovernmental relations has changed Russian citizens' attitude towards their German fellow citizens. As natural intermediaries between Moscow and Berlin, Russian Germans significantly contribute to the development of bilateral contacts between the two countries. They have transformed from people torn between the two poles into a “living bridge” connecting Europe with Russia. Skills of successful multicultural communication allow Russian Germans to realize their creative potential both in Russia and Germany. Numerous ethno-cultural projects supported by the governments of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany allow young Russian Germans to successfully develop both their ethnic and civil identity.

However, this process has had some negative consequences. Thus, Russian Germans use the symbols of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany (flags, maps, etc.) while their own independent symbols of Russian Germans are absent. The anthem and the coat of arms of the Volga Germans, for example, have not become unifying for Russian Germans and have lost their attractiveness. Very often, Russian Germans' culture and the culture of today’s Germany are blended. It is most pronounced in the issue of language. Russian Germans are native speakers of unique German dialects and sub-dialects, which maintained their originality and simultaneously were influenced by the languages of their neighbors. The older generation of Russian Germans still uses these dialects but the youth prefers to learn standard German. As a result, language as the factor of ethnic self-identification assumes a controversial status. It seems that Russian Germans are united by the German language, but it is seldom spoken in families, and even when it is, the youth try to use literary German and not the dialect. The autonomous identity of Russian Germans that had been formed for centuries experiences growing pressure of modern Germany’s mass culture. At times, young people know more about the history and culture of the Federal Republic of Germany than of their own ethnic group. These factors make self-identification of young Russian Germans more difficult.

At the same time, young Russian Germans possess a stable identity as Russian citizens. They actively participate in the country’s social life. They are

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characterized by openness and sociability. Russian Germans do not withdraw into their own ethnic community but try to contribute to promotion of the German language and culture among Russians. It has to be stressed that Russian Germans do not have double loyalty or a double civil identity: they are Germans, but they are also citizens of the Russian Federation.

Thus, one can see that formation of civil and ethnic identity of Russian Germans at this stage is determined by both historical heritage and the sociopolitical state of affairs.

2.2. Types of Self-Identification of German Minorities in the Russian Federation

Numerous studies have been carried out on Russian-German identity. Yet most of these works analyze the condition of Russian Germans upon returning to Germany, while the problem of Russian-German identity in Russia is almost completely neglected, with existing works being of a historiographical rather than sociological nature.

While working on this thesis, we conducted a series of non-formalized or semi-standardized interviews, the results of which formed the basis for the classification of Russian-German identity. The main issues covered in the interview were: "Who are the Russian Germans, and what distinguishes/unites them? Are the Germans a separate ethnic group? What are the concepts of ethnic boundaries and population limits? What criteria (common "blood", language, history, consumer culture) and their combinations should one apply for distinguishing a community of Russian Germans? What is the future of the Russian Germans (in your opinion)? Is it connected to a larger extent with Germany or Russia / the CIS?"

The interviews were carried out in Russian or German, in the form of a free flowing conversation during which respondents were not shown the questionnaire. The interviewees themselves chose the direction of the conversation within a given topic. Each interview was recorded on tape with the consent of the respondent. The duration of interviews ranged from one hour and a half to two and a half hours. 30 in-depth interviews were held.

The issue of the complex identity of Russian Germans has two levels. The first one involves the analysis of individual strategies. Here the most interesting thing is the respondents’ strategy for adaptation to different social environments: in Russia and in Germany.

The second level is that of the group; it involves considering Russian Germans as a "borderline" group. Here we are faced with the task of applying, based on the concepts of a "marginal group" and "marginal area" proposed by

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Goldberg. It will be necessary to characterize this group; in the case of Russian Germans this will indicate their hybrid identity. We would like to emphasize that we do not share the view that an ethnic group can be compared to an individual, with their own personal biography and character. The peculiarity of Russian Germans lies in the fact that this group is currently involved in an active, conscious search for its identity, in much the same way as modern individuals are. At present, the elite, guided by objective conditions and restrictions, has the ability to redefine the Russian German identity model.

In our view, a striking manifestation of the hybrid, borderline nature of the Russian German community is the uncertainty of its own image, borders, and markers that would distinguish members of this ethnic group from those that surround them. There are several approaches to the definition of the German ethnic group in Russia, all formulated by the intellectual elite of the Russian Germans. Depending on the model, ethnic boundaries are defined (notions of a "we"-group), as are distancing from the surroundings (notions of a "They"–group(s), forms, and mechanisms of interaction44.

The first model, which is related to the views and the works of A. G. Vishnevsky and V. N. Shaidurov45, argues that there is but a disparate group of individuals of German "nationality" (natsionalnost) in Russia and the former USSR; these are German immigrants who integrate into the host society and make the transition from the status of an outsider to a new member of society. Here we are certainly faced with a standard, well-studied problem, the integration of migrants, whose marginality is manifested only at the individual level without forming any kind of group identity. According to these authors, Russian Germans do not form a real group; instead, they are a community "on paper", as "the Germans in Russia in no way constitute an ethnos of Russian Germans."46

We would like to emphasize the fact that Russian Germans have never lived in the same geographical area, forming instead numerous local communities. Now, living dispersedly, they are undergoing a process of marginalization and subsequent assimilation not as an ethnic group, but rather separately (i.e. at an individual level). This approach, of course, does not allow for any cultural value of Russian German self-identity. An illustrative example is the Hauländer settlers on the Bug river. In 1940, some of them were repatriated to the Reich as ethnic Germans; others were deported to Siberia during the war. Since then, the Soviet authorities and the Russian statistical agency

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referred to them as Russian Germans. The community itself, however, vehemently upholds its non-German (possibly Polish-Ukrainian) identity.

We also encountered this model in the course of the interview. Some of the respondents indicated that despite their desire to consider the Russian Germans as a community, a single group, they could not do so:

"You see, I do not feel, and, in fact, do not believe that there may exist such a people (Russian Germans – V.K.). A people should have common characteristics, interests, similarities, while the Germans in Russia, and earlier, in the Soviet Union, by no means constituted a whole: the Volga Germans and the Germans in Ukraine are very different, in terms of both language and history .. The only thing that brings them together is deportation, but, having united them, it once again scattered the Germans across the country .. "

(female, 1966)

Another accent of an instrumental nature is reflected in the following passage:

"The representatives of one nation should help and support each other. The Germans have nothing of this kind. Russian Germans are not brothers to each other, they are neither comrades nor friends; moreover, they are competitors"

(male, 1973)

The respondent emphasizes the low level of social cohesion in the German population of Russia. This shows that “Russian Germans” as a category lack real content and internal interactions.

The second model recognizes Russian Germans as a young separate ethnic group, different from the closely related old German nation (V.A. Auman, V.F. Baumgertner). Here is what H. Wormsbecher writes on the subject:

"In fact, during a century and a half, a whole new nation had developed in Russia from a small ethnic group invited from various German lands (back then Germany was not a nation state). This nation carefully preserved in itself everything that its ancestors had brought with them to Russia: German dialects of that time, faith, the customs and traditions, a particular way of life, while in Germany itself most of these things were passing away.

However, as Russian Germans were involved in large-scale historical processes that took place in the state, a lot of new features were added to their national identity, and this is what made them much closer to the Russian people than to the people of Germany. (This is one of the major factors that nowadays make it difficult for Russian Germans to integrate in Germany.) This is why the opinion that the Russian Germans are a "non-indigenous" nation or a diaspora of the German nation may only be supported due to ignorance or so
as to prevent the solution of their problems, the latter reason being most often observed in recent decades. Russian Germans are a nation born in Russia and born by Russia, therefore they are one of its indigenous nations.\textsuperscript{49}

Here are some quotes from interviews illustrating this point of view: "The fact that the Germans of the former USSR constitute a separate ethnic group is proved by their own history: they were recognized by the central authorities, they were given the Volga German Republic, national districts, counties and schools. This is not just a token of respect for Germany; it really is a recognition of their special needs and achievements..." (male, 1982)

"Russian Germans moved to Russia before Germany became a nation state. Our ancestors came here as the Hessians, Prussians, Saxons, Bavarians, and Lorrainers, and not as Germans, and here they merged into a single community. More specifically, it was history that forged them into one community, especially the deportation" (male, 1975)

"Russian Germans are an independent nation, we stand alone, apart both from the Russian and the Germans in Germany. We have our own language, traditions, holidays and mentality, all ours" (female, 1967)

"- Well, we are neither "pure" Germans nor "pure" Russian ...
- Then who are you?
- We are on our own" (male, 1992)

This concept illustrates very nicely Goldberg's view of marginal culture, according to which culture itself is syncretic, but the internal conflict of its bearers is not inevitable. We see here an obvious attempt to overcome marginality by means of developing an original and distinctive group identity.

In our opinion, not only Russian but also Polish Germans use this kind of strategy. Being subjected to strong pressure from the authorities, most of them assimilated with the local environment by switching to Polish and converting to Catholicism. But the government authorities continued to view them as Germans. When arriving in Germany, they faced problems integrating, as in Germany they were perceived negatively, the main argument being that they are "Poles". Thus, in Poland they were regarded as Germans, while in their "historical homeland" they were viewed as Poles. Such an unfavorable situation can be avoided by creating the "Silesian" identity as a particular ethno-regional group equally close to and equidistant from both Polish and German culture and history. For many years it was believed that the Silesians as a sub-ethnic group had become part of the Poles, and dissolved in this nation. But the 2002 census showed that 173 thousand people identified themselves as part of this ethnic group. In addition to this, 152.89 thousand Polish citizens have indicated their nationality as "German". Experts believe that most of the people who called themselves German during previous censuses this time registered as

\textsuperscript{49} Wormsbecher H. G. K probleme rossiiskikh nemtsev
"Silesians"\(^{50}\). From the point of view of researchers, Silesia is rather a cultural borderland region with an extremely complicated history, and the definition of national identity of its inhabitants is a difficult and at times painful process of self-discovery and self-identification, the results of which may vary over the life of one man\(^ {51}\). Despite the statement by Polish ethnographers and politicians that Silesians are an "organic" part of the Polish nation, Berlin has included Silesians in the support program for German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on the EU policy of supporting the regions, Silesians have initiated several projects aimed at promoting the cultural life of the "historical Silesia", which includes areas of western Poland and of the eastern Czech Republic, with the financial and organizational participation of Germany. They have also won the struggle for recognition of the German language as the official regional language in Silesia. According to different surveys and studies, Silesians generally consider themselves a nation that is both German and Polish\(^ {52}\). In our opinion, this variant of the identification strategy illustrates one of the possible directions of development of the ethnos of Russian Germans.

We think it is important to look more closely at the theoretical issue of the very possibility of the existence of "borderline" communities with a composite identity. According to A.N. Gusev, "a marginal individual cannot form a group of their own kind. He lives on the border of different groups, and if marginal individuals do form a group they immediately lose the inherent characteristics of marginality, because they are within their new group. It is very important to bear this in mind, as in modern Russian sociological literature the term "marginal groups" is often applied specifically to ethnic minorities\(^ {53}\).

Despite the logical harmony of this statement, we are inclined to disagree with the view that a marginal group cannot exist. In our opinion, it is the communities which possess "two homelands", and therefore belong simultaneously to both of them (or do not belong to either of them), that constitute such phenomena. Encyclopedic examples include the Jews, and in our case, Russian Germans. They are, essentially, a special case of "paradoxical man," whose behavior, emotions and consciousness do not form a single whole\(^ {54}\). One way of identifying this group is through correlating oneself (i.e., as a group) with two worlds, two cultures simultaneously. But this is not always possible, as well-known essayist G. Bauman points out: "Russian Germans absorbed the culture and mentality of different people. But in the questionnaire one cannot write "Russian German" or "German Russian". One
has to make a difficult choice. Let us proceed to consider this aspect: the problem of choice, uncertainty and a search for identity.

Thus, the third model of ethnic identity is introduced through the concept of the "intermediate ethnic group", that is the recognition of Russian Germans as a special ethnic group akin to Germans and Russians. This model is endorsed by V. G. Dietz, a prominent representative of the German elite (Kazan), according to whom "the ethnos of Russian Germans is now actually a sub-ethnic group of (only and simultaneously) two ethnic groups: Germans and Russians." This approach most clearly illustrates the marginal status of Russian Germans, when even the development of group identity does not provide organic integrity. It must be emphasized that the distinguishing feature of Russian Germans is their borderline (marginal) position between two worlds. Their identity is defined as either "both Russian and German," or as "neither Russian nor German." Adopting a positive attitude towards their frontier status, perceiving it as an additional resource enables Russian Germans to develop a sense of themselves as a "bridge" nation. But among Russian Germans there also exists a type of identity which we interpret as negative: "We are hostages of Russian-German relations, neither one nor the other," moreover, a sense of conflict at the group level is extended to that of individual identity. That is, every Russian German who adopts this type of identity is forced to experience the cultural microconflict and identity crisis on their own intrapersonal level; it is a specific initiation fee (in a sense, a stage of socialization).

We would like to emphasize that among Russian Germans both types of marginal group identity, negative and positive, are present. The poetry of Russian Germans is, we would argue, a valuable source. Russian-German authors (both prose writers and poets) attach great importance to such themes as identity, homeland, memory and language in their works. This source of information can serve as an illustration of both concepts, but to a larger extent to the latter model of negative marginal identity: the creative community explicitly articulates the internal conflict, the contradictory nature of the elements constituting the Russian Germans’ identity. At the same time, the views of ordinary people and opinions of the respondents are somewhat less emotionally colored.

So, let us quote several remarks to illustrate a model of positive marginality:

"I do not feel any discomfort in relation to the fact that my mother is German while my father is Russian. On the contrary, it's the best of both worlds. I can read Pushkin and Goethe in the original. We, Russian Germans, are very lucky." (male, 1980)

"Russian Germans are in the care of two countries and two world cultures: Russia and Germany. Moreover, both our native languages are

majority languages (meaning over 100 million people speak them). This is a huge advantage... We combine in ourselves the qualities of both nations. Our greatest achievement would be to combine the best (not the worst) of these qualities.”

“Russian Germans have always helped the people of Russia and Germany find common ground; we are the bridge that unites the two countries in cultural, economic and political terms. We should let bygones be bygones and move on.” (male, 1970)

"- For me to be a Russian German is to be a “seam”.

- In what sense?

- Inside me are merged two peoples, their blood, their past and their future. I can safely say that I am both a Russian, and a German ... Well, a Russian German in any case ...

- Do you think that many Russian Germans will agree with you?

- Almost everyone, I believe ..." (male, 1985)

Other respondents spoke of a conflicting marginal identity, when the sense of belonging to a group does not prevent an identity crisis, but rather exacerbates it.

"You know, I have a feeling that I have no roots... "a rolling stone", no one to attach to. There are such a people – the Russian Germans, yet at the same time it is as if there were no such people; no one knows neither where their homeland is nor what to do with them, <...> When I realized that I am German ... later, my son taught me to say "Russian German" ... I felt I am a stranger among my own kind, began searching for fellows, but it turned out that this feeling of, well ... being neither fish nor foul, a feeling of worthlessness, searching, and... resentment is inside each one of us, every Russian German. I am very sad that my children are also stuck between a rock and a hard place: they do not want to be Russian and cannot be Germans. My son actively cooperates with Jugendring, various German unions, but he feels the same. This is largely my fault... for some reason ... I tried to instill a certain "Germanness" in them, telling them about the history of our family, our ancestors, our people ... I wish I had not. It would have been better if it had all stayed within me.” (female, 1965)

"It is extremely unpleasant to feel that we are all sitting on two chairs ... or rather, between them, in this sort of suspended state, ever-ready to break away and leave and move on and on. But you cannot run away from yourself – we are torn between the Motherland and Fatherland, between the mother and father, and we will now always carry this with us." (male, 1978)
The same feeling of painful ambivalence is expressed in numerous publications and poems by Elena Seifert:

“Speaking two languages, having two tongues.
Vater, Father, tell me whose daughter I am?"

The river’s destroying the church from underneath…

“All you can do is to be patient, Russlanddeutsche…”

I have two suffering souls in my breast.

Heart! Herz! “The heartbeat grows weaker”.

Voice! Stimme! “I am weak, all alone”.

Liebe Heimat! “You can find me no more on the map”…” 58

Here it is also necessary to consider the notion of Russian Germans as a subculture (as a form of positive marginality) which unites people of German descent, their families and neighbors through cultural and educational activities of various unions and social organizations. This rather broad interpretation of the category of Russian Germans allows us to include representatives of other nationalities who declare an interest in the German language and culture into this category as well. We would like to emphasize that individuals, possessing elements of several ethnic identities, are often faced with the problem of a positive self-perception as a whole, that is they tend to idealize one of the national cultural identities and to develop it at the expense of others. Due to this, Russian Germans are faced with the challenge of creating a consistent ethnic identity. An answer to this question is, in our opinion, the manifesto "We are Germans, we are the citizens of Russia", published on behalf of the German Youth Association and the International Union of German Culture. This document defines and systematizes the hierarchy and algorithm of ethnic identification of Russian Germans. 59 It argues that the development of a German identity within the population, especially among the youth, should not be to the detriment of the Russian component. One could agree with this if it were not for the aforementioned fact that artificial measures to maintain the identity of the Russian Germans specifically as Germans are just as necessary. Given that it is mostly members of the older generation of Russian Germans that possess a "primary" German identity, meaning one inherited from parents and formed in a family of Germans, whilst the more active bearers of the German ethnicity among the youth are leaving the Russian Federation, the issue of generational succession is very critical for Russian Germans as an ethnic group. Many Russian Germans simply do not know who to draw their German identity from. One of our respondents made a noteworthy comment on this matter: "Looking at the kids from the German youth association, I got the impression that they have no natural "Germanness": they are simply playing it. I overheard somewhere that the 70th anniversary of the deportation of the

Russian Germans is not as important as the 250th anniversary of the coming of Germans into Russia (the celebration will be held in 2013). Today’s youth is lost for "Germanness". But it is important to involve them in our work: they can pass on to their children at the gene level a sense of belonging to the Russian Germans, the culture of the Russian Germans." (Male, 1948)

The approach of the International Union of German culture (IUGC), headed by H. Martens, allows us to reconsider the problems of Russian Germans in terms of citizenship and multi-level identity: according to this view, it is too difficult to be both Russian and German, which is why Russian Germans must be Germans, being at the same time Russian citizens. The influence of multiculturalism is evident here: it is an attempt to retain a particular identity (ethnic – German), while adopting a broader civil one (Russian). Due to this, the community of Russian Germans deserves an extended definition:

"Russian Germans are not just a national, but a polyethnic world where there is a place for everyone, where language and culture, habits of work and ways of life form an alloy of German and Russian origins.

Our wives and husbands, representatives of numerous nationalities living in Russia, are related to us precisely because they took us for who we are, came into our world and enriched it. Our wives and husbands are those who are not only close to us, but also those who are with us. Our families are also Russian Germans.

Many Germans and their families live in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. There are fewer of them than there used to be, but they are there, and they look towards Russia. Those who remain in Asia are also Russian Germans. We do not divide our people into those who live in Russia and those who used to live here. Those who left for Germany in the 90s are not cut off. They are our family and friends. Borders are not able to separate us – we still feel our unity. Russian Germans also include those who emigrated to the Federal Republic."

The respondents also commented on their primary civil positions, noting the similarity between the Russian "umbrella" identity and the Soviet one:

"I live in Russia, and I am first and foremost a citizen of this country; just as our parents used to be primarily Soviet citizens, now they are Russians, and only then would the national dimension come into play. The important thing is where you live." (male, 1986)

And finally, let us consider Schutz’s concepts of "estranged native" and “homecomer”60. According to one of the most prominent Russian-German public figures, Hugo Wormsbecher, Russian Germans possess a complex system of identity which consists of two elements: Russian self-identity and self-awareness as Germans. In today’s socio-political and cultural realities it is,

essentially, the second component that requires full support and, in fact, artificial stimulation, as the first one occurs naturally in the process of enculturation and socialization. Furthermore, the same author points out that when moving to a permanent residence in Germany, Germans from Russia should combine not two but three identities: Russian, German and, of course, Russian-German. This problem appears intractable. Based on the analysis conducted over the last decade of research in Germany, we can conclude that German authorities mostly state a stable expression of a "Russian-Soviet" cultural identity among immigrants, which indicates a lack of development of the Russian-German ethnic identity. By contrast, Russian Germans who before leaving possessed a high level of ethnic self-awareness (knowledge of the German language, customs and traditions of Russian Germans, participation in social life) go through the process of absorbing the "German" identity much more easily and with far less emotional upheaval. A predominantly negative type of identity is formed by later settlers who lived previously in the Russian/CIS countryside; these people experience significant hardships throughout the process of integrating into the host society. This group includes people of different ages, living in Germany at different times. They have in common a kind of ethnic identity which they formulate as follows: "We are russaks". It is not uncommon for Russian newspapers in Germany to use the already common term "rusachestvo", that is, unwillingness or inability to fully integrate into the host society, the formation of a special "russaks" social space, with a rather dismissive attitude toward the Germans. This group has formed the national identity of "neither Russians nor Germans": "In Russia we were "fascists", in Germany we became “russaks”. There is a feeling that we all have nowhere to go, that we are strangers everywhere..." (female, 1990)\textsuperscript{61}

The fear of the “estranged native" Russian Germans of not finding a place for themselves upon their return to their historic homeland is reflected in their folklore and art: “We are the Russian Germans / We do not know were is our home. / We have nowhere to go. / We have no choice” (female, 1949).

Another example of this is the song "Air transport" (Russian Germans themselves call it "Karaganda – Frankfurt"), which is widely known among Russian Germans and reflects their identity crisis and their tragedy.

Thus, the concepts of the identity of Russian Germans as a hybrid group differ in the number of elements (partial identities) and, accordingly, in the degree of recognition of the autonomy of this group (and its border status). The following models of ethnic identities of Russian Germans are possible:

1. German (a type of migrant) – Levine’s concept of stranger is applicable;

2. Russian and German at the same time (a type of sub-ethnic community) – The approaches suggested by Park and Stonequist are applicable (conflict-prone marginality);

\textsuperscript{61} Quot. from: Savoskul M.S. Rossii̋skie nemtsy: obraz Germanii i integratsiya v germanskoe obshchestvo. – http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2006/0251/analit02.php
3. Russian German (an independent ethnic group) – Goldberg’s approach is applicable (a marginal, but self-contained culture);

4. Russian, German and Russian German (the case of return of Russian Germans to Germany) – Schutz’s approach is applicable (“estranged native” and “homecomer”\(^{62}\).  

We would also like to offer a slightly different typology that is logically based on a sequence of questions:

1. Do Russian Germans identify themselves as a group?
   Answers:
   a) no – they identify themselves only as individuals
   b) yes – there is group identity (Proceed to question No. 2)

2. The identity of Russian Germans is individual/original or syncretic/marginal
   Answers:
   a) it is original
   b) it is marginal (Proceed to question No. 3)

3. Marginal identity is perceived positively (such as new opportunities, which appear thanks to the connection to both cultures, a feeling of being a “bridge” or “seam between two worlds”, “both German and Russian”) or negatively (obstruction, crisis of identity, conflicts of partial identities, not being accepted by either of the cultures, a feeling of being "nobody's", "a gap", "neither German nor Russian").
   Answers:
   a) it is positive
   b) it is negative

For greater clarity, we provide the following chart of the models of identity of Russian Germans living in Russia:

The identity of Russian Germans

Group

Individual

Marginal

Positive

Negative

At the same time, the syncretic character of the identity of Russian Germans is never questioned, regardless of the strategy. The question is how it will be interpreted and perceived, and how strong the inner contradictions will be. The self-perception of Russian Germans and the social practices of this ethnic group depend on the answer.

We do not rule out the possibility of shifting from one type of identity to another: the hybrid group identity is highly likely to evolve from negative to positive and, possibly, to a distinctive personal identity. In our opinion, this is the main trend in the shaping of the identity of Russian Germans. We would like to emphasize that we interpret the marginality of both the individual and the group first and foremost as a condition of belonging to two or more cultures, which results in a segmented (split) identity. We made an attempt to analyze the identity of Russian Germans in the context of the problem of a composite identity and its hybrid/marginal nature.

Russian Germans hold a special place in the system of international relations in the Russian Federation. The problem of ethnic identity of Russian Germans, their national self-esteem is not only a theoretical one, but has great practical importance, occupying an important place in the relations and diplomatic contacts of Germany and Russia. At the present stage of its development the ethnic community of Russian Germans is faced with a wide range of economic, political and cultural problems, the solution of which is a prerequisite for further revival of the nation. The ethnic intellectual elite constructs and models a variety of prognostic concepts. The most pessimistic of them state that in 15 to 30 years Russian Germans will have lost the last elements of national identity due to the continuing emigration of activists of the ethnocultural movement of the population and the acceleration of assimilation processes among the remaining people. Here is what Heinrich Martens writes on this matter: "Not only are we getting fewer, but the number of those who preserve the German language and culture is also diminishing. This is
especially evident among young and middle-aged people. It is already clear that in the next 10-15 years the threat of a generation gap will arise, as those who step over the threshold of life do not feel the need to maintain intra-ethical contacts, to maintain their own national heritage."\(^{63}\) According to researchers and analysts, optimistic scenarios are possible if the German minority integrates into the Russian society as a bearer of Western European democratic values while ensuring a high level of ethnic and cultural succession among the Russian Germans, which guarantees the preservation of their identity on the basis of self-organization. The author of this work believes that both of these predictions only apply to a certain part of the ethnos of Russian Germans: the first one to the Germans living dispersely in European Russia, the second one to the regions with a large share of German population living compactly.

We would like to emphasize that the structure of the ethnic identity of Russians of German nationality varies considerably. It has a significant age and geographical variations, differs significantly depending on the place of residence and the degree of urbanization.

2.3. **Characteristics of the Ethnic Identity of Germans in Modern Russia.**

While working on this thesis, we were able to collect data not only through qualitative (interviews, focus groups, interviewing experts), but also through quantitative methods (questionnaires). Between August and November 2009, with financial and organizational support from the Ministry of Regional Development and Ministry of Internal Affairs of Germany, we conducted a nationwide survey of the German population in Russia. The study was supervised by the International Union of German Culture. 1,500 Russian Germans were interviewed in all federal districts of Russia, taking into account the geographical distribution of the German population in the country (see Table 2).

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Table 2: Distribution of respondents by Federal Districts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal District</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Federal District</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern Federal District</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Federal District</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volga Federal District</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urals Federal District</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberian Federal District</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>53.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far Eastern Federal District</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, such factors as gender, age and professional structure of the German population in Russia were also taken into account, which ensured the validity of the data. The sample was based on census data as of 2002 (See Appendix 1, Appendix 2.) The sampling error is 3%. The program was drawn up in accordance with the guidelines provided by V. A. Yadov in his book "The Strategy of sociological research: describing, explaining and understanding social reality.”

The project’s main aim was to analyze the ethnic and cultural development trends of Russian Germans. The object of the study was the analysis of ethno-social processes in a multiethnic environment. The subject of the study was the mechanisms of formation and functioning of ethnic identity on a cognitive, emotional and practical level. The study was conducted based on the author’s methodology. The questionnaire included 76 questions divided into the following blocks: "Ethnic Identity", "Language", "History and Culture", "The migration situation" and "The work of ethnocultural centers." See Appendix 3.

The survey involved only Germans, in other words, only those whose German ethnic identity was expressed clearly enough. There are many people of mixed, multiple, unclear identities among those who identify themselves as Russian Germans. These are mostly people of mixed origin who in certain situations "choose" German nationality according to the situation or any emerging motives. Since the main strategic objective of the study was to develop a plan and recommendations for the preservation of the culture and identity of Russian Germans, only those who had clearly defined their ethnicity as "Germans" were interviewed. Thus, when asked, "Which nationality do you
belong to?" all 1,500 people (100%) answered, "Germans". Of these, 280 (18.7%) specified that they were "Russian / Russian German". The vast majority (81.3%), however, simply used the ethnonym "German".

In fact, the existence of multiple identities in Russian Germans is a very complex problem. A significant proportion of them are undecided, as they are half Russian and half German. Another group cannot accurately identify their ethnicity because, while having German roots, they have ancestors of various nationalities. Many admit, for example, that in Russia they feel that they are Germans, while upon arriving in Germany, where the Germans are different, feel that they are Russian. The situation becomes even more complex as certain groups of Russian Germans are of Dutch, Austrian or Polish origins and not German ones. Thus, many people who in some cases may be considered Russian Germans, and who described themselves as “Germans” in the census, are characterized by a multiple ethnic identity. Therefore, for the sake of the experiment only those who were clearly aware of being German took part in the survey.

The first question that the respondents were asked was that of what should be the principal criterion for determining the “nationality” (natsionalnost) of a person if he/she is of mixed origin, or is not living in his country of birth, or if there is some other reason why the question of his/her nationality must be raised and there is a need to choose between Russian or German, for example. The question was worded more narrowly: "In your family, what is the method of determining the nationality of a child?" More than half of the respondents (58.8%) answered that it is the nationality of the father. The nationality of the mother ranked second (35.5%). Many said that it was the "parents' nationality", it being of little difference whether it is the father's or the mother's. The child's own personal choice ranked third (24.8%). See Appendix 4.

Theoretically, given the Russian tradition to choose the nationality of the father, which involves, for example, such outward signs as the last name, around half of the people of mixed descent should have chosen German nationality. In practice, the situation is completely different. The choice directly depends on the condition of the ethnic identity and status of the ethnic community. Previously, the status of the German nationality used to be significantly lower than that of the Russian, but over the last 15-20 years the situation has changed. So, the vast majority of respondents believe that the nationality of the child depends on the nationality of his parents, mostly – his father. The survey data suggest that the right to emigrate to Germany stands last (2.9%) in the list of motives for the choice of nationality, being preceded by the mother tongue (12.5%), culture (11.5%), religion (5.2%) and the place of residence (4.4%). In practice, however, nowadays many people use every opportunity to register their or their children’s German nationality in any document. Statistics from the current account of the population, data from household registers in rural and regional administrations, arrival and departure sheets in passport offices all serve as evidence of this. Therefore, in the formation of the ethnic identity such motives as the parents' nationality,
language, place of residence are all most certainly important, yet in practice it is the current group status and the migration situation that are decisive.

Of course, in a study of identity, the question arises as to the role of the factor of origins in its formation; in other words, how many of those who consider themselves Germans really are of exclusively German origin, and how many are of mixed origin. Although there is no special statistical record of mixed marriages in this country, regional studies conducted by ethnosociologists indicate that the number of mixed marriages among Germans amounts to 50-70% in different regions. These findings are consistent with the results of our survey, according to which 50.73% of the respondents (761 out of 1,500 surveyed) are of German origin (both parents being Germans). (See Appendix 5) These people have no options when responding to the question on ethnicity. For people of mixed ancestry, however, such options exist. Most people of mixed descent answer the question "What is your nationality?" in the following way: I'm half Russian and half German.

In everyday life, people of mixed descent rarely have to face the choice of a particular ethnicity. Although sociology defines those who are between two cultures as possessive of a marginal personality type, we consider positive the fact that people of mixed ancestry have access to the cultural heritage of two or more peoples: their cultural background is richer and more varied. In this case making a choice in favor of any one nationality is not at all necessary. But there are circumstances where the State demands to make such a choice. In Soviet times this happened during passport issue, when one had to declare their identity (ethnicity), register themselves as a member of a particular "natsionalnost", which would have been expressed in the ethnonym. In addition, it is necessary to declare one's ethnic identity when completing various documents and in the census. This means that the state to this day insists that people with complex national identities make a choice in favor of one particular ethnicity.

Thus a question concerning the motives for such a choice is bound to arise. Here is how the respondents answered the question of why they consider themselves to be German (a German), if their origin is mixed: 53.6% consider themselves to be Germans because they are of German origin (a parent or grandparent was German), 26.9% considered the determining motive to be their association with the German culture. These are the most popular answers. The remaining options scored a minimum of votes (language – 3.3%, interest in Russian Germans – 1.2%, the desire to go to Germany – 1.6%, other – 13.4%).

The majority of respondents are in “mixed” marriages. 35% are in mono-ethnic marriages, while 65% of (married) respondents’ marriages are ethnically mixed. The partners are mostly Russian; they account for 84.5% of partners in mixed marriages. This data is completely consistent with the calculations made on the basis of the local registry office archives, according to which the overall share of mixed marriages is 68.3%, in urban areas it amounts to 90.9%.

Respondents with children were asked about their ethnicity. Over two-
thirds of respondents (1,058 people) had children; however, those with younger kids often found it difficult to answer this question. This is especially true of those respondents who believe that the child should determine his or her nationality him- or herself when he/she grows up. Half of the respondents who have children classify them as Russians (51.5%), 31.9% determine the nationality of their children as "Germans" (here everyone is taken into account: both those in mixed marriages and in monoethnic ones), with 1.9% indicating other nationalities (Ukrainians, Poles and others). Almost 8% could not choose between Russian and German, and said either that their children are both or symbolically divided their children: half of them Russian (for example, if the mother is Russian, then the daughters are Russian, if the father – the sons), half – Germans. See Appendix 6.

All of this proves that ethnic identity is fluid, mobile and is significantly influenced by the circumstances. The block of questions on ethnic identity was aimed at identifying preferred types of identity, ethnic symbols and landmarks, Russian Germans’ views on their people, their knowledge of their own history, views on the past, present and future of their people.

How important is ethnicity for the Germans? In assessing the importance of national identity on a 10-point scale, the most frequent response was "10 points": it was given by 36.3% of respondents. An indifferent type of identity that is not very pronounced (5 points or less) was typical of a quarter of respondents (25.5%). The average degree of ethnic identity was 7.5 points. In this case the obvious factor in assessing the significance of differences in ethnic identity among the respondents is age. The older the respondent, the higher the score. See Appendix 7.

An important factor in describing the types of identity is a people's self-designation (endoethnonym). This applies especially to those who live outside their country of origin and have a dual ethnonym. The census suggests the name of only one people, "the Germans"; in everyday speech, too, they are often referred to simply as "Germans", but when the need to clarify the question of "what kind of Germans?" arose, answers were distributed as follows: Russian Germans – 50.1%, ethnically Russian Germans – 18.2%, Germans of Russia – 16.2%. The other options were very scarcely chosen, except for the group "Volga" Germans (11%). See Table 3.
Table 3: Ethnonym

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnonym</th>
<th>people</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“ethnically Russian Germans”</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Russian Germans”</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Soviet Germans”</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Germans of Russia”</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Volga Germans”</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,495</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While conducting the ethnosociological survey, certain German notions of ethnoconsolidating and ethnodifferentiating characteristics were revealed. It is very important to understand what unites the Russian Germans in a single ethnic community, and what, in their opinion, distinguishes them from other nations. The most important features for the Germans were their history (70.3% of respondents said that the main unifying feature is simply a common history) and common culture (55%). The German language ranks third (45.6%).

In order to clarify the relation of such kinds of national identities as the civil and ethnic identity, respondents were asked to give any of these kinds a preference. According to 48.5% of respondents, Russian Germans are primarily Russians, and only then Germans, while 39.3% think the opposite. 12.2% of respondents were unable to answer. See Table 4.

Table 4: The relation of civil and ethnic identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>People</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Germans are primarily Russians</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Germans are primarily Germans</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can’t say</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The attitude of the State to the groups that are different in terms of origin, a policy of protectionism, then repression, and in recent decades the immigration policy, used to be a major unifying factor. Nowadays, given the
spread of mass culture and the fact that more than half of Russian Germans view Russian as their native language, these signs of ethnicity (natsionalnost) have already acquired a symbolic significance. This is confirmed by the fact that during in-depth interviews most respondents had difficulty characterizing the German culture, could not name its basic elements, and there was no consensus on what should be considered the native language of Russian Germans: dialects or Standard German. Most likely the German culture and the language are symbols, with the actual content of these symbolic features possibly being very different.

Religion, psychology, place of residence are of secondary importance for the respondents (17-18%), a fairly large number of people (15%) said that the main thing that unites them are public organizations of Russian Germans. But in general, the survey gave the impression that it was easier for respondents to answer the questions about ethno-differentiating signs, that is to determine what makes them different from people of other nationalities, than to find signs of their own community.

Responses to the question whether or not the Germans living in Russia are an individual “nation” were mixed. There is no consensus, with a little more respondents (41.2%) answering “no”, believing that the Russian Germans are part of the German people in general, a diaspora, that the ties with Germany are very strong and that the Germans of Russia and Germany have a lot in common. 38.3% of respondents believed that the Germans in Russia are an independent nation. In many ways this opinion is based on the belief that the Germans migrated to Russia at a time when a unified German state did not exist, that the Germans have developed as a nation already in Russia, that there are very large differences between the Germans of Germany and Russia. A very large number of respondents were unable to answer (20.5%). This, as well as the fact that the number of opposing responses was roughly equal means that there is a need for further work on this problem, perhaps in-depth study. But in our view, this situation is a feature of identity especially in diasporic groups, because it is very hard for their members to formulate the features specific to their own community, as the formation of a diaspora is always a difficult process, with the diaspora itself often combining extremely heterogeneous elements. This complex issue requires further study.

The main environment of actualization of identity is the family. 53% of respondents chose this as an answer to the question “In what situations do you feel the most German?”. The second most popular option after the family are Centers of German culture; this is what 30% of respondents answered. Indeed, in the case of dispersed residence, life among other ethnic groups, in a Russian-speaking environment, the Center of German culture is often the only place where you can feel your connection to the German nation. This is especially true of the urban environment. 18.5% feel German when traveling to Germany and 15% while interacting with friends (some of whom are Germans, and, accordingly, have common German topics to discuss.) (See Table 5.)
Table 5: Social environments of language actualization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social environments of language actualization</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inside the family</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While interacting with friends and neighbours</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Center of German culture</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>during trips to Germany</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,469</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As respondents could choose more than one answer, the overall sum in percents is not equal to 100.

One of the main factors influencing the formation and building of identity, as has already been mentioned above, is the status of the ethnic community. To determine this status, or rather, the perception of this status, we asked how people perceive their affiliation to the German national minority. The majority of respondents (53.5%) said that they felt proud of being Germans. There is significantly less negative self-image, but it is still present. Thus, in 3.8% of respondents there is a sense of uncertainty about the nationality, and 5.9% have a feeling of resentment. A significant proportion of respondents (31.1%) stated that their nationality does not arouse any particular feelings.

These statistics prove the development of a normal, positive ethnic identity of the Russian Germans. It would be wrong to claim that the Germans have never been disadvantaged. State propaganda and presenting the Germans as enemies had an impact. But today we can say that the problems that were in some way connected to the perception of Germans as enemies are in the past.

More than half of the respondents (53%) answered the question “Have you ever felt a hostile attitude towards yourself because of your nationality?” with “no, never”; 32.3% said that they rarely felt it and 14.7% of respondents said that they often felt it. (See Appendix 8) The vast majority of those who experienced hostile attitudes said that it was during their childhood. The most common answer was, “At school we were called fascists”. They also mentioned instances of xenophobia in everyday life. 33 people stated that they felt a hostile attitude at work, 20 at university and 9 while interacting with state authorities. This is a very small figure for one thousand five hundred respondents. Generally, many said that it did exist, but it was a thing of the past and happened on an interpersonal relationship level, e.g. they were called “Nazis”, frowned upon, disliked etc.

Germans (especially the older and middle generation) believe that the greatest unfairness lies in the fact that, unlike everybody else, they were not
allowed to fight on the front and were considered traitors. However, regardless of the past, today the vast majority of Germans do not experience any noticeable discomfort about their own ethnicity. Thus, we have received yet another indication of the rising status of the ethnic community and, consequently, the related growth of ethnic consciousness.

Ethnic identity is influenced by many factors, but at the same time it affects the nature of ethnic processes, including inter-ethnic relations. The surveys examined the attitudes to interaction (positive or negative) in various areas of communication; we asked the respondents how they formed relationships with people of other nationalities or people they considered ethnically different from themselves. For example, we asked about the attitude towards “international” marriages. The vast majority of respondents (77.4%) believe that nationality does not matter in marriage, 6.9% were undecided and 15.7% of respondents believe it is best to marry people of their own nationality. Overall, in the vast majority of cases international relations (and inter-ethnic communication) are viewed positively. When asked "How do you assess the relationship between representatives of your nationality and representatives of others?" 79% of the respondents described them as positive, 20% as neutral and only 1% as hostile.

It is worth mentioning that the formation of attitudes to interethnic communication is influenced by a variety of factors. These include the upbringing in the family, education, social and ethnic environment, the ethnic policy of the state, the microenvironment in the team or other group that requires cooperation, as well as any specific events in people's lives. But in general, the present time is characterized by a normal, positive evaluation of the relationship of Germans with other “nations” of our country, and by the positive trends in the formation and development of ethnic identity.

2.4. Language Processes and Practices in the Milieu of Russian Germans.

Language plays a crucial role in the live of a nation, because it is a means of accumulation and transmission of ethnically relevant information, performing the functions of intra-ethnic communication. Communicative functions of the language correspond to various areas of human communication, the most important of which are school, science, literature, periodical press, correspondence and record keeping, social and cultural events, etc. Among these numerous spheres, during this survey we have chosen the recognition of the German language as a native language, schooling, publishing and interpersonal communication, since they have a decisive influence on the development of ethnic processes.

According to the All-Union Censuses, in 1959, 75.0% of Soviet Germans considered German to be their native language, in 1979 – 66.8%, in 1979 – 57.7%, in 1989 – 48.8%; in other words, in 30 years the amount of those who
consider German to be their native language diminished by 26.2%. It should be noted that in Soviet Republics, especially in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the recognition of the German language was higher than in the RSFSR (where in 1989 only 41.8% of Germans considered German to be their native language). The data presented indicates that the German language rapidly lost its positions. These are average figures that reflect the overall trend. Unfortunately, during the 2002 All-Russia Census the question about native language was absent from the questionnaires. But the study of the dynamics of this index in the censuses and in sociological polls shows that the amount of those who consider German to be their native language has been declining by approximately 1% per year over a lengthy period of time. When planning the survey, we assumed the hypothesis that the proportion of Russian Germans who consider German as their native language is not higher than 30%. An optimistic prediction was around 40% (the level of 1989), a pessimistic one was 10 to 15%. The study proved our hypothesis correct: 30.6% acknowledged German as the native language, while 60% acknowledged Russian (see Appendix 9).

The category of "native language" is a psychological one, and it is closely linked to ethnic identity and often does not coincide with the use of language or the degree fluency in it. The recognition of language as a native, in our opinion, is a reflection not of language practice, but of how strong our national/ethnic identity is.

The 2002 census contains information about the knowledge of different languages by the nations of Russia. According to the census, out of the 597,212 Germans living in Russia, 188,673 people speak German, i.e. 31.59%. A high degree of knowledge of Russian is typical of Germans: 99.75% of those recorded in the census. Considering the fact that the census takes into account the citizens of Germany, who theoretically might not speak Russian, and people who do not speak at all, the number of Russian Germans who can not speak Russian is close to zero. Based on experience gained while working on the interview, we can say that these people are very old, live in remote rural areas and have never traveled anywhere from their villages and were not able to receive an education. According to our survey, only 4 people out of 1,500 respondents do not speak Russian, 7 people understand and speak Russian poorly, 16 people experience some difficulties while speaking in Russian. All other respondents are fluent in Russian.

If the level of knowledge of Russian by the Russian Germans is compared to the level of the other nations, is it possible to say that it is higher than average: in general, among the “non-Russian nations” of the Russian Federation the level of knowledge of Russian was 92.1%, while in the case of the Germans, as has already been mentioned before, it amounted to 99.75%.
Table 6: The level of knowledge of the Russian language

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of knowledge of the Russian language</th>
<th>People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>fluent</td>
<td>1,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understand well and speak badly</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understand badly and speak badly</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>understand badly and cannot explain themselves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know Russian at all</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,468</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The population census can only answer fundamental questions; clarifications are possible with the help of ethnosociological research. This is especially true of issues concerning ethnolinguistic competence and the areas of the use of language. While conducting the survey, it was essential for us to determine the level of knowledge of the German language, the question of how well Germans speak their national language. A low level of knowledge of the national language is easy to explain, given the conditions in which it developed in Russia: the initial existence in the form of a variety of dialects and the fact that German literary (standard) language was not widespread, the end of school teaching in German in 1938, the elimination of the Volga German ASSR and the corresponding structures of teaching and publishing in German, the recognition of German in the USSR only as a foreign language, the subsequent linguistic assimilation. The following trends in the field of linguistic competence should be noted: on the one hand, the number of Germans who do not speak German at all is increasing, but on the other hand, the number of Germans who are fluent in German is increasing as well. This trend is undoubtedly connected with the growth of the level of German language teaching in the 1990-2000s in various forms, such as schools and language courses. It is also important that the language competence of the representatives of the young generation is higher than that of the older generation. Middle-aged people show the lowest level of knowledge of German. The level of competence of old people may be explained by the fact that the language was preserved within the family, while the level of competence of young ones is formed mostly by education.

The sphere of usage of the German language and the answer to the question where and when Germans speak German is very important when characterizing ethnolinguistic processes. If we exclude the use of the German language during trips to Germany (nearly everyone has to speak it there), it is most often used in the German culture Centers – that is what 39.2% of respondents answered. As for other areas of communication, the German language has almost disappeared from them: 17.6% speak German to their parents, 7.3% use it while talking to their spouses and 4.7% when communicating...
with children. The German language is used even more rarely when communicating with friends (3.1%) or at work (1.7%).

It should be emphasized that all areas of communication have become bilingual; those who can speak German rarely use only German (or only Russian). Most often, respondents answered, "We speak both German and Russian," and the choice of language depended on the particular situation. Thus, 20.8% of respondents speak both in Russian and German (with no preference, depending on the situation) to their parents, 14.7% to their spouses, 19.3% to their children, 9.7% at work, 17.6% with friends and neighbors, and 32% in the Centers of German culture. The bilingualism in all spheres of communication is associated not only with the assimilation process – in this case, there is a direct correlation – but also with the fact that the old dialect forms, which are mainly used by the Germans in ordinary speech, do not meet the needs of the time, for example, when discussing technical subjects.

The historical background of the development of the German language in Russia led to the positions of German literary language not yet being predominant, although they have strengthened significantly in recent years. For instance, when asked in what form, dialect or literary, Germans know it, 43.6% said that in the form of literary language, 37.3% – in the form of a dialect and 19.1% of respondents said that spoke both dialect and literary language.

The frequency of the use of the German language depends primarily on which language is the native one to the respondent: only 7.6% of respondents who listed Russian as their native language use German on a daily basis.

Table 7: Frequency of use of German, depending on which language is the native:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of use of German</th>
<th>Native language (%)</th>
<th>Percentage of the total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every day</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times a week</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times a month</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Several times a year</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just over half of the respondents (54.3%) know the language from childhood, German was spoken in their families (mainly in dialects); others (60.7%) started studying German at school (mostly as a foreign language), at university (22.5%), language courses (16.9%), at the national-cultural center.
(11.5%). Some have studied the language by themselves, but basically the role of educational institutions in the formation of linguistic competence of the Russian Germans is obvious. School and universities are the structures that contribute most to the preservation of the German language. Frequency of the use the German language depends on the very possibility of its use. It is higher in areas densely populated by Germans, in the countryside, in those families where the language is preserved, in the areas where the network of national-cultural centers is developed and these centers are actively functioning and so on.

In general, the Russian-German bilingualism is the main defining feature when characterizing the development of language processes in the German population of Russia. It is customary to distinguish between extensive and intensive development trends of bilingualism. In the first case, bilingualism spreads horizontally, that is the second language is mastered by more and more representatives of the ethnic group. In the second case, there is a tendency towards a "deepening" of bilingualism through better knowledge of the Russian language by using it in intra-ethnic communication. In the case of Germans both trends are present; however, it is worth mentioning that in recent times the role of Russian language is growing in all spheres of communication.

This is evident from the preferred language for reading of periodicals and literature. While practically all respondents read in Russian, newspapers and magazines in German are read by 28.3% of respondents, German educational and scientific literature – 22.5%, German fiction – 15.3%.

The development of the language situation is greatly influenced by the psychological attitude of the population towards the language of schooling. It is defined by two parameters: firstly, the degree of awareness of the necessity of teaching children the language of their nationality, and, secondly, the choice of type of school for their children in the projective situation. So, in answering the question "Do you think it is necessary to teach the German language to the children of Russian Germans at school?" 92.6% replied in the affirmative, 6.7% were undecided, and only 0.7% replied "no". Thus, the vast majority of Germans believe that schools should teach the German language, and there is a tendency towards the growth of the amount of people aware of this need.

Those who responded affirmatively to this question were asked to indicate the most preferable form of teaching German. The two largest and roughly equal groups of respondents believe that German should be taught as a native language from year one and till the end of school (37.6%) or that it is necessary to create special classes with intensive study of the German language (33%). 13.6% of respondents think that German should be taught as a foreign language, 14.8% believe that there should be optional courses for those who wish to study it. Other forms of education were chosen by 1% of the respondents. Thus, the overwhelming majority is in favor of expanding the teaching of German as compared to the current situation. Given that the place of the first foreign language is very firmly occupied by the English language, the situation with the teaching of German may be characterized as very complex.
The negative tendencies towards the reduction in teaching German are clear.

Thus, it is necessary to state that the discriminatory policy toward the German language throughout the twentieth century has led to a considerable linguistic assimilation. After a significant but short-term success in the development of teaching German in Russia in the 1990s, now negative trends are beginning to dominate, which indicates the need for urgent measures to strengthen the positions of the German language and promote its teaching.

This is confirmed by responses to the question about the importance of preserving the German language for the Russian Germans. Respondents were asked to rate it on a 10-point scale. The answer of 10 points prevailed significantly over all others, with more than half of the respondents answering that way. Only 40 people rated it from 1 to 4 points. The average rating of the importance of language preservation amounted to 8.5 points.

German language areas exist almost on every continent. In foreign cultural and ethnic surroundings the German minority forms its special dialect: Belgranodeutsch in Argentine, Texas German in the U.S., Mokra-German in the Ukraine, Namibian Black German and Unserdeutsch, the variety spoken in Papua New Guinea. Different varieties of the German language are being actively studied and described. This applies to both the German dialects in Germany, and the dialects of German minorities in Poland, Romania, Hungary, Russia, France, Italy, Australia, the United States and other countries. One of the reasons why the German language, preserved in various regions of the world, remains the German language is that the native speakers themselves consider it as such, and that Germany has shown a clear tendency to regard all dialects and contact forms as metamorphoses and variants of a single German language.

In this section we would not like to confine ourselves to the description of the general picture; as we see it, it is very important to describe the linguistic practices of the Germans of a specific community. During 2008 and 2009 research trips to the German national district Galbstadt of the Altai territory, regions of Omsk, Novosibirsk, Kemerovo and others we were able to collect the necessary ethnographic material. German-Russian bilingualism is one of the key characteristics of the Russian Germans. Their national organizations and associations successfully use this resource. The "German" component in the form of games, puzzles and songs in the German language is an integral part of all activities and events in the milieu of the Russian Germans. Dmitry Sapozhnikov (Kölsch) is a coordinator of the training course on the topic: "Actualization of the ethnic identity of young Russian Germans" of the German Youth Association. In his interview with us, he stressed that the German language is a very important part of many communication situations, especially

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When ethnic issues are discussed. The switch to German occurs in the following situations:

- **When you want to emphasize the "national" component of an event.** "I often begin presentations and trainings in the German language. This gives a general idea that we are Germans and that we should know our native dialect," said Dmitry Sapozhnikov.
- **To attract attention and ensure discipline.** "Switching to "Deutsch" makes young people (who often know German badly) concentrate on my speech and listen carefully."
- **Repeating information in German that was previously said in Russian enhances the training effect.** "I really do not like to repeat the same thing many times. I prefer to say it again in another language, it's easier and more comfortable for me like that. I think that the audience tires less."
- **Speaking in German allows to refer to the family experience of the Russian Germans, which makes it easier to create confidence.** "In many cases, the language in one form or another is present in the communication of the younger generation with the older. Therefore, German, especially in the form of dialect, is often perceived as a language of communication at home and of family secrets. It's easy to make the atmosphere more relaxed by speaking to participants in German."

The switch back occurs:

- **When linguistic resources of the German language are not enough.** "Sometimes I just cannot find adequate equivalents in the German language and switch to Russian. And it happens not because I do not know this or that word, but because there is no such word in German. The simplest example is "wit", but actually there are a lot of them."
- **When the speaker lacks linguistic competence.** "Discussing certain topics with the participants of trainings in German is simply counterproductive. For me it is always easier to explain difficult questions in Russian. Using German in these situations, I feel insecure and am afraid of misleading both my listeners and myself."
- **An important role is played by the primary source of information.** "If I was told something in Russian, I find it easier to retell this story in Russian, and vice-versa."

At present, the Russian-German bilingualism that has been maintained in the German community for several generations can be regarded not only as an ethno-social phenomenon, but to some extent as a hallmark of the ethnic Russian Germans. Historically justified and necessary for the growth of inter-ethnic relations, bilingualism leads to closer informational and communicative links between members of different peoples, allowing them to increase their adaptive capacities.

Along with this, the development of bilingualism accelerates the process of ethnic integration and assimilation, which in some cases leads to a weakening of the position of the national language and the culture linked to it.
In the case of a foreign ethnic environment, these processes are inevitable. It is only a matter of the rate and extent of linguistic assimilation. The optimal variant is natural assimilation and ethnic integration. In reality, assimilation was violently accelerated in Russia, which led to the failure to meet the needs of the German population in the areas of national language and culture. Interestingly, when asked "Can a person who does not know German be Russian German?" 78.2% of respondents said yes; 11.2% were undecided, and only 10.6% said it was not possible. Thus, there is a significant gap between national identity and national language, which adversely affects the nature of identity and radically transforms the qualitative characteristics of the Russian Germans' ethnic community itself.

Using correlation analysis, we found a strong correlation between the characteristic "native language" and the religious affiliation of the Russian Germans. More than half of respondents who reported that their native language was German declared Lutheranism to be their faith, whereas 42.4% of those for whom Russian was the native language identified themselves as Orthodox. See Table 8.

**Table 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Native Language (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mennonite</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td><strong>42.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout the survey there was a persistent contradiction between what Russian Germans said was their attitude towards their ethnic language, and their actual practice in using it. Nowadays, most of the representatives of the German population in Russia express a positive attitude toward the German language. Parents express the desire for their children to speak the language of their ancestors. At the same time, the language today's parents speak with their
children, even in mono-ethnic families, is, in the vast majority of cases, Russian. While knowledge of German in these families is seen as desirable, knowledge of Russian is required. And it is this "necessary" knowledge parents try to give their children to facilitate their studies at school and ensure successful socialization.

A real typology of the linguistic and ethno-cultural situations among the Russian Germans can be built only by considering the unit of study to be the speech community of an individual village, not an ethnic group as a whole. Even within a single district the difference between settlements in terms of maintaining the language and traditional culture can be quite significant.

It should be noted that the position of the German language is only to some extent dependent on the secondary and higher education system. There needs to be a motivation for their full functioning, for both adults (parents) and children.67

2.5. History and Culture as Key Markers of Identity of Russian Germans.

The key question is who should be considered a Russian German. The Soviet government required its citizens to adopt the nationality of one of the parents. In the case of mixed marriages people had a choice between the two: the identity of the father and that of the mother. This approach was so widespread that it became an integral part of the understanding of the "national question". Accordingly, Russian Germans are those citizens who have German ancestors. But the views on “being German” put forward by representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany are also important to the ethnic group. Official structures (especially immigration officers) largely determine the criteria of ethnic identity that are valued by the Russian Germans.

The Federal Office of Administration (Bundesverwaltungsamt), which is in charge of displaced persons, and the Expatriates’ Community of Germans from Russia both declare that Russian Germans are the following:

1. Germans born in the USSR (within the boundaries as of 1937). This allows to draw a distinction between Baltic and Russian Germans. After all, it was only in 1940 that Latvia and Estonia were annexed to the Soviet Union. Consequently, Baltic Germans who were evicted in 1939 to Germany, are not part of the Russian Germans.

2. A German is someone who has at least one German parent or grandparent, or someone who is married to a German.

3. Germans are only those who expressed their solidarity with the German people, and declared their affiliation to the German nation.68

Following the liberalization of the Russian Federation’s legislation and the abolition of the "nationality" entry in passports and other official documents, the German side shifted its emphasis from formal affiliation to the German ethnic group to substantive aspects: knowledge of the German language, culture and traditions. Yet one should not view this change as a result of the problems faced by the German government in the integration of German immigrants from the CIS countries. The problem is that candidates were required to prove that their "Germanness" was instilled in childhood, internalized via their family. In other words, one needs to speak one of the dialects of the German language, to know specifically archaic customs and ancient folklore. In other words, one has to be able to demonstrate skills that would prove their "natural," “native” ethnicity. At the same time, these skills will likely be of little help in integrating into modern German society. This form of "relic" ethnic culture often becomes the object of ridicule and irony on the part of society.

But the Russian Germans themselves have great respect towards their own past, especially towards their family history. Moreover, the past is perceived not as a set of dry facts and dates, but as a deep personal experience, which should be lived through. As an example, let us take the position of one of our respondents: "Ethnic identity is not an empty intellectual construct, but rather actually reliving historical experience, the interpretation of the events and facts that determined the fate of your people. The young generation in search of their roots will only be able to look to the future with confidence when they deliberately accept the heritage of their ancestors. To be a Russian German, it is not sufficient to correspond to external stereotypes. It is not enough to have German origin, speak the language, belong to the Protestant or the Catholic Church. It is important to recognize one’s involvement in the fate of the Russian Germans, and not only maintain the old traditions, but also be a thread that connects the generations.

What connected and united our people? I think the answer is clear: the deportation of 1941. It mixed the St. Petersburg Germans, Volga Germans, Caucasian and Siberian Germans and melded them into a single nation, the Russian Germans. Betrayal of both Motherlands, shock, group trauma repeated in millions of individual cases, in each German family. Can this pain serve as the basis for a positive self-identity among the younger generation? My answer is yes. It can and it should. For example, the identity of Chechens or Crimean Tatars is based around such an axis. Can we forget the pain of our parents, can we forget what our ancestors sacrificed? If we forget this, we lose ourselves. If our children do not know their roots, they will look for rules of conduct within the current culture of Germany and will not be able to sing sad songs like "Karaganda-Frankfurt." They will not understand our thoughts, our longing for our lost homeland on the Volga, they will not understand us. Will they remain Russian Germans? I think not. To avoid this, they simply need to ask their parents and grandparents about their lives and learn of their unique heritage. Being a Russian German does not mean bringing some sort of “Europeanness” or “Germanness” to Russia. No, you just need to love your
people, to appreciate their history and empathize with their tragedy. Russian Germans without an inner experience of the gap between Russia and Germany, without feeling a part of this dramatic interaction, are not Russian Germans." (male, 1974, translated from German)

In order to fully satisfy the needs of the German minority, systematic work is needed in preserving the ethnic culture, spreading knowledge on the history of Germans in Russia. A block of questions on history and culture was aimed at finding out the actual situation in this area. One of the questions was: "Do you know the history of Russian Germans?" The most frequent response was "I know something" (45.1%). 25.7% of respondents described their knowledge of the history of the Russian Germans as “good”, while 8.3% saw it as “very good”. One-fifth of the respondents knew the history of their people poorly (13.6%) or did not know it at all (7.3%).

One can say that the real situation does not meet the needs of the German population, as the question "Would you want your children to study the history of Russian Germans?" was answered in the affirmative by 87.2% of respondents, 11.6% were undecided, and only 1.2% responded answered "no." We would like to remind readers that 98% of respondents also called for teaching the German language to their children. That is, we can see that Russian Germans have a steady desire to pass on the "German" cultural heritage in the form of language, history, traditions and religion to the next generation.

For many people the desire to study the history of their people is closely linked with an interest in the history of their family. So, the question: "Are you interested in your family's history?" was answered in the affirmative by 76.9% of respondents, 17.3% answered "not particularly" and 5.8% answered negatively. In the course of the survey many of the respondents remarked that the number of books on the history of the Russian Germans written in an accessible, popular form, designed for different age groups, and touching on the history of Germans from different regions of Russia was not sufficient. The respondents expressed great interest in publications of a biographical nature, stories about famous Germans who made significant contributions to the history of the Russian state. There is a tremendous need for genealogical research; many of the respondents expressed the desire to create a database by name, to create genealogical diagrams. An interest in the history of one’s own family is quite understandable, given the fact that during the numerous migrations, deportations, emigration to other countries, in the past as well as in the present, many have lost their relatives, with connections being severed and the majority of Germans seeking to recover them, to establish contacts with their families.

The view that the deportation still remains a key moment in the history of the Russian Germans is supported by the respondents’ answers to the question on important historical dates. Such a response was given by 67.3% of respondents. The second most important event was the Manifesto of Catherine II to invite the Germans to Russia (25.8%). Other important dates mentioned included the organization of the Volga German ASSR, decrees on partial
rehabilitation in 1955-1972, the movement for the restoration of the republic in 1988-1992. Thus, the collective memory of Russian Germans is dominated by dates associated with tragic, dramatic events. In our opinion, in order to form a positive identity it is necessary to disseminate information not only about the tragedy of the German people, but also on the contribution of the Germans to history and culture, on their outstanding achievements in the field of economy, culture, science, and the successful overcoming of the negative effects of legal and political discrimination. Overcoming the image of "victim people" will contribute to the development of normal, harmonious relations with other nations.

Meanwhile, however, the theme of deportation and the liquidation of the republic occupies a central place in the Russian Germans’ historical memory. When asked, "Did you know that between 1918 and 1941 there was a German Autonomy on the Volga?", 86.3% of respondents replied affirmatively. Answers to the question "How do you feel about the idea of restoring the Republic of the Volga Germans?" were as follows: positive – 63.7%, indifferent – 27.3%, negative – 9.0%

Yet even if the Republic were to be restored, the majority still would not move there. A firm ‘no’ was the answer of 40.1% of respondents. Almost as many (38, 2%) said they were not sure, that everything would depend on the circumstances, the conditions that would be created there for the Germans. And only 21.7% of respondents said they would move to the Republic in the case of its restoration. It should be stressed that a 22 per cent migration potential is quite high. For example, the desire to move to Germany was expressed by less than 19% of respondents. This indicates that the Volga region retains its value and appeal as the "historic cradle" of the Russian Germans, is perceived as an alternative to the Motherland and a move to West Germany. Speaking in absolute terms, the potential number of migrants may exceed 120,000 people. This would be sufficient for the region to gain a pronounced "German element" in its population structure and cultural aspect. Many respondents were interested in the existing programs of resettlement to the territory of the former Volga German Republic, asking for the contact information of responsible authorities and local administrations. On the other hand, there were many who thought that the time and opportunity for “territorial rehabilitation” had long since passed. According to our survey, it is, after all, those who advocate the restoration of the state that possess a more pronounced ethnic identity (See Appendix 10). We were surprised by the fact that the idea of moving to the Volga region seemed more appealing to the younger generation (slightly over 30% of respondents aged 25 to 29 are ready to take this step). This suggests that the common view about the obsolescence of the concept of a German Republic is not necessarily accurate. There is clearly an inconsistency between the existing desire for the existence of the Republic and the reluctance of most people to move there in the event of its actually coming into being. The reasons are mainly the desire to restore historical justice and the full rehabilitation of the German people, a lack of clear prospects for cultural development in the areas where the Germans are living.
now, and a hope that these prospects will be created within the national-territorial autonomy.

These views are largely due to the mythologizing of the history of the Volga German ASSR, as well as the idealizing of the past, which is characteristic of the psychology of ethnic identity. This phenomenon is reflected in the folklore of the Russian Germans. For example, in the Komi Republic we were able to record the song of the Volga. Galina Ivasenko (Hirhel), born in 1935, sang it to us in the "Swabian" dialect, assuring us that she had learned it in the times of the labor army. She explained that the "melody" had prevented her from losing her memories of the homeland, and had given her hope of returning to the Volga region. Below we provide the text of the song and our translation:

**Wolga Lied**

Neunzehnhundertneunundvierzig
Kam das bitter bosen Wort,
Und wir Deutschen von der Wolga
Mussten nach Sibirien fort.

Alles mussten wir verlassen:
Haus und Hof und Vieh und Land,
Felder, Wälder und die Kirchen,
Wo auch unsre Wiege Stand.

Wenn ich nur ein Vogel werden
An die Wolga fliege hin,
Ob mein Nest ist eingenommen
Ich mich doch nicht ziehen in…

**Song of the Volga**

In the year nineteen-forty-one
Came the bitter word.
And we Germans from the Volga
Had to move to Siberia.

All we had to leave:
House and garden and cattle and land,
Fields, forests, and churches,
Where our cradles stood

If only I could be a bird
I would fly back to the Volga,
To my empty nest.
But alas, I have no wings…

As we can see, history is at the moment a significant marker of ethnicity. As part of our study we asked several questions on the actual functioning of a national culture. These touched on issues of national holidays, national cuisine, and religious life. So, when asked what national holidays respondents know and celebrate, 76% named Christmas, 67.4% – Easter. 77% of respondents cook ethnic dishes. This data indicates the existence of a sufficiently high level of national culture in the Russian-German environment. Answers to the question on religion were as follows:
Table 9: Religious affiliation in relation to age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>25-29</th>
<th>30-34</th>
<th>35-49</th>
<th>50-59</th>
<th>60 and over</th>
<th>Overall average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mennonite</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the second largest religious group among the respondents is Orthodox, accounting for 29.3%. Moreover, Orthodoxy is the religion of almost half of the younger generation, with only 15.7% being Lutherans. The change occurs in the middle-aged group (35-49 years). This evidence suggests that young Russian Germans are moving away from the traditional "German" denominations. Undoubtedly, this is the result of the dispersion of the German populace, especially in the European part of Russia, in an urban environment. On the other hand, there remains a strong tradition of linking the German ethnic identity with the Western-Christian ethos. As we see, Lutheranism still remains the leading denomination. It is necessary to keep in mind the fact that it was during the period of growing interest towards religion in the 1990s that the Russian Germans rediscovered the religion of their ancestors. It was for those "Russian Germans" who had linguistically and culturally assimilated in the Russian-Soviet cultural environment that access to Lutheranism meant the opportunity to prove their "Germanness". Here we can again observe a declaration of belonging to a particular church, rather than an actual adherence to rituals and religious tradition. Yet for many Germans the Lutheran-Evangelical Church in Russia continues to be “unsere Kirche” [our church].

The collected empirical evidence suggests that the bearers of a traditional ethnic identity are the older generation (50 years), who belong to the Lutheran faith, know the language and the history of their family and their people. It is the "ethnic core" and it continues to exert considerable influence on
other age groups. In general, the situation in the field of ethno-cultural processes should be recognized as very far from ideal, although not as dramatic as the situation with language. In order for an ethnic culture to evolve steadily, continuous work on its preservation is required. It now appears that the best option is to modernize the development of Russian German culture through cultural exchange with Germany, while maintaining the essential elements and symbols of ethnic culture of Germans in Russia.

2.6. The Migration Situation among Germans in Russia.

Emigration is one of the key factors in the ethnic development of Russian Germans. The rapid increase in the number of emigrants, upon reaching its peak by the mid-1990s, gradually declined and stabilized, but the departure of Germans continues to this day. The emigration process resulted in a radical change in all aspects of the life of Germans in Russia and, above all, a sharp decline in their numbers. In 2002, compared to 1989, the decrease in the absolute number of people amounted to 245,083, or 29.10%. The outflow of the German population was different for every region, with the biggest decline in the number of Germans taking place in the Altai territory and in the Omsk region – at 37.76 and 43.12% respectively. These traditional areas of compact residence of the Russian Germans, dominated by the rural population, were the ones that suffered the greatest losses. At present, when migration processes are quite stable, it is important to assess the migration situation and migration sentiments among the Russian Germans.

The collapse of the Soviet Union became the impetus for a wave of German immigration to Germany. We will attempt to understand how external circumstances and the changes affect migration processes and attitudes. As shown in the diagram below, the peak in the number of emigrants from the former Soviet Union to Germany occurs in the middle of the 1990s. Until 2001, their numbers remained relatively stable, and then began to decline gradually, falling to 4-5 thousand people by 2006. Assuming that the emigration of Germans from the CIS countries was caused by the unstable economic situation in the new states, it is easy to explain the decline in the number of those leaving in the early 2000s. It was during this time that Russia entered a period of impressive economic growth. But the most interesting thing, in our view, is to compare the data for 2005 and 2006. The reduction of absolute figures of emigration to Germany in the period from 2002 to 2005 amounted to 14.2% annually. But in 2006, it fell by 62%. (See Fig. 2).
As for the return movement to Russia, it increased by 37% in the 2002-2003 period. According to Russian authorities, around 3,000 persons have migrated each year into Russia since that period. The figures provided by the German and the Russian sides differ by a total of 11 percent due to differences in methodology. It is also necessary to keep in mind that in any case the records display only part of the actual mass of migrants.

Albert Schmidt, president of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, in his 2008 article clarifies speculative statements that Germany is being swept by a wave of repatriation of migrants to their homeland, the CIS countries. Figures are hard to ignore, and they speak for themselves: "Recently, we have been hearing of a growing number of migrants returning from Germany to the CIS countries. Here are the numbers for the last six years. From 2000 to 2006, 218,708 persons moved to Germany from Russia. During this period, only 13,661 people returned to Russia."  

This figure does not stand out in the general migratory picture of the country. Similar processes may be observed in other groups of the population, including indigenous Germans. But at the same time, these figures are a sign of the unfulfilled expectations of some immigrants, as well as problems which exist in integration activity.

Today, Russian Germans are less willing to move to Germany for a number of reasons, the main among which is the exhaustion of their migratory capacity. Most of those who wanted to resettle in West Germany have already realized this desire in the 1990s. But emigration policy of the Berlin and Bonn is also an important factor. Russian Germans are a special group of migrants,

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70 Statistisches Bundesamt: Datenreport 2006, Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Auszug aus Teil 1. – www.destatis.de
whose legal status is based on article 116 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.\textsuperscript{72} Citizenship is understood in this case as inherited “through blood”: “a German is a person who in their country of residence declared their German identity, and can prove it by means of the presence of such traits as origin, language, education, culture.”\textsuperscript{73} By law, German immigrants are granted full citizenship status in Germany, and are also proposed programs of assistance and integration into the host community.

But in 2005, the Government changed the rules of the admission of Germans from the CIS countries. These changes primarily affected members of their families, who were obliged to take a German language proficiency test. Moreover, over 3 years in marriage were required to migrate. These seemingly minor requirements significantly reduced the flow of migrants. Simultaneous reductions in financial support for immigrants were seen as measures to exclude Russian Germans and their families from the “welfare state” system.

On the other hand, Germany has stepped up its efforts in supporting German minorities in their country of current residence. These measures should help keep the Germans in their "areas of origin", which will allow the Federal Republic of Germany to better integrate those "compatriots" who have already migrated. As we can see, the German government and the public use both the strategy of “inclusion / integration” and “exclusion / segregation” in relation to Russian Germans.

In Russia, the key agency for national issues is the Ministry of Regional Development. It is tasked with providing for the social and cultural needs of the people of the country, as well as protecting ethnic minorities and small groups.\textsuperscript{74} It also oversees the Federal target program "The Social-economic and ethno-cultural development of the Russian Germans in 2008 – 2012"\textsuperscript{75}, which includes financing a number of projects aimed at restoring and preserving the ethnic identity of this group.

Russian Germans who moved to Germany but wish to return to Russia can participate in the federal program for assisting the voluntary resettlement of compatriots living abroad into the Russian Federation, into areas for resettlement in 2007-2009.\textsuperscript{76} As part of the program, repatriates will receive a number of benefits and financial support. The aim of these measures is to improve the socio-economic and demographic situation in the country. The Russian Embassy in Germany supports the organization "Reemigrant", which

\textsuperscript{72} Late emigrants. – http://recht.germany.ru/aussiedler.db/items/95.html?op

\textsuperscript{73} The Federal Expellees Law. – http://vip-service.spb.su/deee.html

\textsuperscript{74} See: Osnovnye napravleniya dvyatel’nosti Ministerstva regional’nogo razvitiya. – http://www.minregion.ru/activities/interethnic_relations/


provides information about the possibilities of relocation from Germany back to Russia\textsuperscript{77}. 

At the same time, the Russian government firmly evades any discussion of issues of the "territorial rehabilitation" of the German minority. In fact, the issue of the restoration of a Russian German state is constantly being removed from the "agenda" by Russian officials and is almost never raised in the media. To paraphrase Clermont-Tonnerre\textsuperscript{78}, we can say that the authorities tend to apply to the Russian Germans the formula "Grant everything to the Germans as individuals, but deny everything to them as a nation!" In any case, any territorial autonomy for the Germans at the current stage of the development of the state is out of the question.

As we can see, both states are making efforts to ensure that Russian Germans do not leave their homes, but maintain their ethnic and cultural identity. Emphasis is placed on the successful integration into their "country of origin."

But what do Russian Germans themselves think of this? According to our survey, most respondents view the departure of Germans for Germany neutrally (46.9%) or positively (42.5%). A negative attitude toward emigration is demonstrated by only 10.6% of respondents. Most respondents believe that people can live wherever they want and have the opportunity to, and that they must have the right to choose whether to migrate or not, that it is a private matter for each individual.

The number of Germans who want permanent residence in Germany, although significantly reduced, is still large. According to the survey, 18.7% of respondents want to move, while 26.1% do not exclude such a possibility. 44.2% do not want to change their place of residence, 11% were undecided. The following trends should be noted: first, immigration sentiments are more pronounced among young people. This can be explained both through problems of a socio-economic nature (education, employment, lack of social security) and through the high mobility of young people in general. Secondly, if compared to previous regional surveys conducted in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, the percentage of those who do not want to emigrate has changed only slightly, but there has been a significant increase in the proportion of those who are not sure, cannot yet decide or find the question difficult to answer.

The respondents' answers to the question of what factors are the main motive of emigration are as follows: economic reasons, a low standard of living – 24%. The same number of respondents (24.1%) may emigrate for the sake of their children’s future. The lack of stability in Russia as the main cause of emigration was indicated by 22.7% of respondents; the absence of housing – by 5.2%, while the inability to find work was a key factor for 3.9%. Thus, socio-economic reasons for emigration are in the lead, they were reported by a total

\textsuperscript{77} Chto gosudarstvo RF predlagaet pereselentsam? – http://www.remigrant.de/content/category/2/2/24/

\textsuperscript{78} In the times of the French Revolution, Clermont-Tonnerre suggested the following principle of the Jewish emancipation: "The Jews should be denied everything as a nation, but granted everything as individuals"
of 80% of respondents. It should be mentioned that the survey was conducted in the period of the global economic crisis, which undoubtedly affected the attitudes of respondents towards emigration. Therefore, the share of economic reasons for emigration has increased dramatically in comparison with the results of the surveys that were conducted earlier, during the steady development of the Russian economy.

Due to the fact that the vast majority of Germans have relatives, including relatives in Germany, the second leading cause of emigration is the reunification of families – 20%. 12.8% wish to continue their education abroad. Almost 10% of respondents said that a possible cause for emigration may be the fact that in Russia there are no conditions for the preservation of a national culture. In general, the percentage of people who think so may be much higher, yet economic reasons for them are more important than the preservation of German culture. Other causes (healthcare, climate, the desire to see the world, etc.) were reported by 4.7% of respondents who answered the question about the reasons for emigration.

While conducting the survey, the questions about immigration almost always caused heated debate. Many said that they would not go anywhere, but that living conditions in Russia need to be improved, specifically a higher salary, the opportunity to purchase housing, promote the development of farmers, improve local governance, etc. Many respondents pointed out that a major political mistake was the refusal to restore the Volga German Republic, an act which stripped the Russian Germans of faith in the future and encouraged immigration sentiment.

Probably all Russian Germans in recent years have asked themselves if it would be a good idea to emigrate. The majority is fully aware that although Germany is a country with a high standard of living, it still has its problems: it is a different country, for many – a foreign country. To find out the psychological mood of the respondents, their perceptions of their roots, a sense of connection and unity with Russia, we asked the question "What do you see as your homeland?" And got the following responses: Russia – 73%, a town or village – 19%, Germany – 4%, other (usually personal or symbolic answers) – 4%. Thus, the vast majority of respondents, regardless of whether they plan to travel to Germany or not, consider Russia to be their homeland.

In opinion surveys among the Russian Germans, questions about the causes of emigration are always present, considering the seriousness of this problem. In conducting our survey, we asked those who, in spite of everything, do not wish to emigrate why they want to stay in Russia. Responses were as follows: “my family lives here” – 24.3%; “I was born here, this is my native land” – 20.5%, and “I’m fine here” – 14.9%. 31.5% do not want to leave for various personal reasons (high social status, interesting work, a reluctance to be “second-class citizens” in Germany, the reluctance of their relatives to leave, the fact that they have lived there and came back, or visited Germany and didn’t like it, the question of “why would I even want to move there” etc.)
The migration of huge masses of people, a radical change in the ethnic structure of the former "German" settlements is a factor responsible for tension not only between people of different nationalities, but also among the Germans themselves79. For example, in those German national minority areas which were in the lead for the number of emigrants, there arose the problem of staff turnover, housing privatization, competition for jobs, especially prestigious ones, access to the resources for different groups, etc.

Conclusions from chapter 2:

1. The types of ethnic identity of Russian Germans are distinguished by the number of elements and their degree of conflict.

2. Among the Russian Germans there exist the following identification strategies: a) German (a type of migrant) – Applicable is D. Levine’s concept of the stranger; b) both Russian and German (a type of sub-ethnic community) – the theories R. Park and E. Stonequist are applicable; c) Russian- German (an independent ethnic group) – the approach of M. Goldberg is relevant; d), the Russian, German and Russian-German (the case of the return of Russian Germans to Germany) – corresponds to A. Schutz’s concepts of "estranged native" and "homecomer".

3. The vast majority of Russian Germans believe that their homeland is Russia, which indicates a distinct civil identity. But at the same time, the majority also believes that Russian Germans should preserve their traditions, language and heritage. This is evidence of the development of an ethnic identity.

4. The ethnic identity of the Germans in Russia is characterized by its mobility. It varies considerably depending on age, place of residence and degree of urbanization.

5. German-Russian bilingualism is a characteristic feature of Russian Germans. Yet it is the German language that serves as a marker of ethnicity: even those who speak it badly call it "native", ascribe a symbolic significance to it.

6. Authentic dialects of Russian Germans are being replaced by the standard German language. Young people learn the language mainly through language courses and in educational institutions, not in the family from the older generation.

7. Historical memory is a key marker of identity: the events of the mid-20th century (deportation, labor army, special settlements), supplemented in the 1990s by the mass exodus of Germans from the CIS to Germany, have formed a group consciousness among the Russian Germans. This factor unites all of the German population in Russia.

8. The Volga region retains its value and appeal as a "historic cradle" to the Russian Germans, it is perceived as an alternative to the Motherland and migration to Germany.

9. The emigration potential of the Russian Germans is currently almost exhausted. But the opportunity to travel to Germany continues to influence their ethnic identity. Strong family and friendship ties are used by the Russian Germans as an additional social resource.

3. Institutional Forms of Manifestation of Ethnic Identity among Russian Germans.

Ethnic identity is one of the basic characteristics of a person, together with gender, age, profession, etc. In many cases, it is the awareness of being part of a certain nation that determines an individual’s beliefs, feelings, and behavior. Self-identification is especially significant in periods of political upheaval and socioeconomic transformations. People of one ethnic group living in such circumstances seek to form various unions, communities, and associations. It is group identity that endows its bearers with the feeling of stability and certainty. Social status, position or influence may be lost, professional activity may cease to bring income, but ethnic background is regarded as something inalienable and foundational. This makes ethnicity-based organizations most sustainable. They play the role of a “big” family, in which all kinsmen support each other. Ethnic solidarity may be manifested in different ways: support of socially vulnerable representatives of a given ethnic group, search of grooms and brides within a community, or “ethnic” entrepreneurship. In some cases, representatives of a certain people recruit their kinsmen in one or another economic sector thus forming special ethno-professional networks. Before the revolution of 1917, for example, the typically “German” professions included those of a pharmacist, a butcher, and a miller. But mutual economic support is not the crucial function of ethnic communities, since their main task is to maintain the viability of their people’s culture. Self-organization among Russian Germans has a long-standing history; it is a natural display of ethnic solidarity. Unfortunately, due to historic reasons, a family cannot fully cope with the function of forming sustainable ethnic self-identification. Under such circumstances, self-organization performs the compensatory function. Despite a variety of different legal forms of organization, they all have to ensure the process of handing down cultural traditions from an older to a younger generation by creating conditions for survival and preservation of a German ethnos in Russia and the CIS countries.

Ethnic identity consists of three basic elements: knowledge, emotions, and behavior. On the level of self-organization, they are reflected in the following functions: public education, leisure and entertainment, and a sociopolitical function. For successful preservation and development of Russian Germans as an ethnos, it is necessary that all these three elements be present one way or another in activities of every cultural center. Their correlation may assume various forms on the local level, depending on the needs of German populations of one or another region.
Information plays an important part in the process of self-identification. In order to recognize oneself as a Russian German, it is necessary to know that such a people exists, to have a notion about its language, culture, folklore, history, etc. Organizations of Russian Germans publish printed materials on these topics (newspapers, books, magazines), support common information space in the Internet (websites of public organizations), hold conferences, organize training seminars and courses, and conduct active research on local history. Thus, structures of self-organization are quite successful in coping with the task of public education of both Russian Germans and their neighbors.

Ethnic identity is also meaningful to a person in terms of his or her affection. It is extremely important that an individual’s attitude to his or her people be positive. The formation of warm feelings is first and foremost encouraged by family ties and traditions. However, in the situation of dispersed habitation, Russian Germans often derive positive emotions from their participation in ethic community organizations. Here they get a chance to develop their skills and talents, to communicate with each other, and keep in touch with their kinsmen. Community institutions regularly hold entertaining events on the occasion of national holidays and memorable days. Outdoor activities, celebrations, and various kinds of leisure form positive sentiments among Russian Germans in regard to their ethnic group: Russian Germans are given a platform for communication and a reason to pride themselves on their self-identification.

Lastly, German self-organization is an important element of Russian civil society. It represents the sociopolitical interests of Russian Germans. Communities of Russian Germans champion the interests of this ethnic group in the international arena by participating in intergovernmental cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation. These communities are to uphold the rights of the German minority and provide the equality of rights for late settlers in Germany. This task includes project activity along with legislation in the realm of culture, education, and migration. Russian Germans do not have a “titular” republic of their own within the Russian Federation. In such circumstances, institutions of self-organization become natural advocates and proponents of the political, economic, and cultural rights of Germans in Russia. Self-organization ensures the development of a balanced stance on crucial issues concerning preservation and development of ethnic culture.

Self-identification of the German minority in the late 1980s gave grounds for emergence of a public movement and institutions of self-organization. But after a surge of mass repatriation, the natural mechanism of handing down ethnic identity within families has been seriously deformed. Under modern circumstances, institutions of self-organization have themselves become the key element in the process of self-identification of Russian Germans.

Public activity of Russian Germans has a long-standing tradition. But in this chapter, we would like to focus our research on the current situation and the analysis of the state of affairs at the beginning of the 21st century. In this
part of the work, it seems reasonable to analyze policies of help to the German minority on the part of Russian and German governments, then to characterize the “landscape” of sociopolitical organizations of Russian Germans, and finally to evaluate their performance and to describe their needs and their horizon of possibilities.


Russian Germans are the object of joint care and support of German and Russian governments. In this section, we will examine the crucial institutes and organizations that take measures for supporting the German minority. We will try to analyze their activity in the broad context of German and Russian policies.

Despite the difference in living conditions, Russian Germans are seen as a single ethnic group by public consciousness and in international practices. Their cultural development is one of the key tasks of German foreign policy. The Goethe German Cultural Center (Goethe-Institut), which is authorized by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs to carry out programs of support for the German minority in Russia, sticks to the following definition of its target audience: “Russian Germans are people belonging to the German minority, living in the territory of Russia as well as the regions historically and politically connected with it (Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Tajikistan, and other CIS republics).”80 Thus, the German party maintains the notion of Russian Germans as the equivalent of Soviet Germans by bringing together in one group Germans of Kazakhstan and Germans of Georgia, Germans of Ukraine and of the entire CIS.

It is very important to emphasize the fact that Berlin considers the range of problems of Russian Germans in a broader context: namely, as one of the elements of support given to the German population in the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Thus, for example, the mission and the geographic scope of the Goethe-Institut in this area are defined as follows: “Offices of the Goethe-Institut in Baltic countries, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Poland, Rumania/Moldavia, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Ukraine, as well as Hungary carry out special projects for the benefit of the German minority.”81

The German federal government's representative for the affairs of migrants and for national minorities, Christoph Bergner, regards this range of

81 Deutsche Minderheiten (German minorities) – http://www.goethe.de/lhr/prj/dtm/udp/beg/deindex.htm
problems on an even wider scale. He includes in the sphere of his responsibility German and German-speaking minorities in Western Europe (Denmark, Italy, France, Holland), Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Baltic countries, former Yugoslavian territories, Rumania, Hungary), the CIS countries, as well as other world regions (Latin America, South Africa). In other words, German officialdom is trying to work out a holistic policy and single principles for support of Germans outside the country. Thus, embracing the program of support for the German minority in various regions, Berlin tries to see a bigger picture. So the range of problems of Russian Germans turns out to be not an isolated phenomenon, but, on the contrary, a significant element of a pronounced eagerness of Germany to support German minorities all over the world.

Another factor that also affects the foreign policy of Berlin and Bonn with regard to Germans of the USSR/CIS is the problems of “expellees.” This is a burning and painful issue in the public political space in the country. After WWII, German territories in the east of the country were annexed to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR (RSFSR and Lithuania). The border of the German states followed the Oder–Neisse line. All territories of the Reich to the east from the line passed into the ownership of its neighbors: Czechoslovakia obtained Sudetenland; Poland came into possession of Silesia, Western and two thirds of Eastern Prussia, Eastern Brandenburg, the Free City of Danzig (Polish Gdansk), as well as the district of Stettin (Polish Szczecin); Memel (Lithuanian Klaipeda) became part of Lithuania, while Konigsberg and approximately one third of Eastern Prussia (today the Kaliningrad Region) were taken by the RSFSR. The entire German population was forced out to the territory of Germany within its present boundaries, i.e. either to the Soviet zone of occupation (the future German Democratic Republic) or the zone occupied by the Allies (the future Federal Republic of Germany). As a result of these operations, German minorities of Eastern Europe were also deported. Some 14 million people were made to leave their permanent residences in Central and Eastern Europe, and only 12 million got to Germany alive. On the whole, deportations had come to an end by 1950 when Poland and Czechoslovakia banished most of the German population from their territories.

In 1953, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany passed a law on “expellees” that made it possible for 4.3 million Germans to move from the countries of the Eastern bloc to West Germany during the period from 1953 to 1992. Under this law, ethnic Germans living abroad had a right to citizenship. Repatriation of Russian Germans has been implemented and based directly on this legal document. The Expatriates’ Community of Germans from Russia is part of the influential Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen). This

82 Tragediya mirnogo naseleniya Germanii v kontse Vtoroy mirovoy voyny. - http://www.otvoyna.ru/germaniya2.htm
84 The official website of the Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen) – http://www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/
active sociopolitical institution aspires to bring to light the tragedy of the German civilian population and German minorities throughout Eastern Europe. This federation comprises 20 expatriates’ communities, 16 regional associations and 4 associated member organizations that consist of “expelled Germans” (die Vertriebenen), “migrants”\(^{85}\) (die Aussiedlern) and “repatriates”\(^{86}\) (die Spätaussiedlern). The leaders of this federation are rather close to the conservative part of the German elite. They enjoy the sympathy of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (the CDU) and personal support of Chancellor Angela Merkel,\(^{87}\) who believes that Germany has a moral responsibility towards the Germans of Eastern Europe as the victims of the world war unleashed by the Nazi regime. Thus, support for Russian Germans is an important element in the policy of “responsibility and redemption of the past.”

A significant aspect in Germany’s treatment of German minorities is the position of the German language in the world. The sphere of learning and use of German at present is steadily shrinking in the world. It is yielding to the pressure of English, the latter having become the language of globalization and international communication. The German elite of today voice their misgivings regarding this trend. The government allocates considerable funds for popularization of the German language all over the world. In addition to this, German minorities are considered natural bearers of German culture in various regions. It is no mere chance that Berlin entrusted no other than the Goethe-Institut with the implementation of projects in favor of German minorities of Eastern Europe since this institute is the key organization in the policy of support and popularization of the German language.

Finally, in the recent past, the policy on German minorities was considerably affected by ideology. In implementing its repatriation policy, West Germany proved its superiority over East Germany. This allowed Bonn to speak, as it were, on behalf of all Germans. Moreover, people who fled from the Democratic Republic of Germany were also regarded as “expellees.” In other words, the socialist regime was marked as criminal. Moreover, unlike Germans from South America and Africa, repatriates from the Eastern bloc did not have to prove the fact of oppression and discrimination in their places of residence. In this way, the Federal Republic of Germany indirectly denounced the socialist states’ policies on the German minority. Remnants of this policy are still present in today’s laws. Thus, Germans who occupied high positions during the Soviet time cannot immigrate to Germany. This rule is observed with exceptional strictness in regard to Germans who served in the army, the Ministry of the

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\(^{85}\) A “migrant” (in 1951-1992), under the Federal Expellee Law, is a person who belongs to the German people or state and emigrated from the former German eastern territories, Albania, Bulgaria, China, Danzig, Estonia, former Yugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, the former Soviet Union, former Czechoslovakia, or Hungary in the period after the end of mass expulsion of Germans (starting around 1951) up until 01.01.1993.

\(^{86}\) A “late settler” (since 1993 up to the present) is a person of the German background who was born in one of the former USSR’s republics, Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania and immigrated to Germany after 31.12.1992, under the Federal Expellee Law. Migrants from other countries are naturalized only if they prove the facts of discrimination and repression caused by their ethnicity.

\(^{87}\) Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel erinnert auch an das Schicksal der Vertriebenen. - http://www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/presse/index.php3?id=897
Interior, and other security agencies, as well as in the Soviet party apparatus. That is to say, the German part regards these people as “accomplices of a criminal regime.” This position is, in effect, the continuation of the policy of denazification and decommunization that is being implemented in the Federal Republic itself.

Berlin’s treatment of Russian Germans may be summarized in the words of Christoph Bergner, German federal government’s representative for the affairs of migrants and for national minorities: “We are to help our compatriots who suffered from the aftermath of WWII. And to those who would like to go to their historical homeland, we are offering this opportunity. As to those who decided to stay in Russia, we help them in restoring and preserving their language and culture. In the early 1990s and till the end of the last century, our attention was mainly focused on those arriving – there were a lot of them. Now the situation has changed dramatically: the stream of people has considerably decreased. The reasons vary. First of all, the socioeconomic situation in your country has considerably improved, whereas legislative restrictions for migrants in Germany have become tighter. Therefore, we have shifted the emphasis of our activity on the support for Germans who stayed here. And in this sphere, we have fruitful cooperation with the titular ethnic group, Russians. I believe that the Intergovernmental Russian-German Commission, in particular, is efficient in consolidating our efforts.”

Thus, the strategy of the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to Russian Germans remains in the broad context of Berlin’s foreign policy. The crucial “problem zones” that determine its tenor are: 1) Germany’s programs of help and support of German minorities in the world; 2) the policy of accepting responsibility and expiation of guilt before Germans of Eastern Europe as victims of WWII; 3) the task of supporting and promoting the German language; 4) and the legacy of ideological confrontation with the Eastern bloc countries.

The attitude of Russian authorities towards the German minority also depends on several sociopolitical factors. In the first place, it should be noted that the “German” issue is a component of the “nationalities policy” of the executive and legislative branches of government, both at the federal and regional level. In other words, the attitude to problems of Russian Germans to a large extent derives from the general decisions and the overall conception of ethnic problems of the government. Although there is no special department for the issue of nationalities at the moment, political and administrative institutions keep determinedly constructing and monitoring this field. At present, the federal center is trying to create a common framework for the realization of the nationalities policy by offering a set of model solutions to various ethno-cultural problems. Ethnic groups that do not have their territorial state autonomies are offered the institution of national cultural autonomies and of educational centers as the only possible means to preserve ethnic peculiarities and to revive culture. The officials keep saying that the main goal of any “ethno-national”

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policy consists in upbringing of loyal citizens of the Russian Federation. They stress the fact that what they see first of all is not Finns, Yakuts, Poles, Russians, etc., but citizens of Russia. They also emphasize that problems of ethnic minorities should be solved in an integrated manner and be considered in a broader context. The “German” issue is seen as parallel, equivalent, and interrelated with the “Jewish,” “Tatar,” “Korean” issues, etc. That is, there should be no special German policy. But it exists, and here we face the influence of other factors.

We believe that such factors are the need for building up good neighborly relations, on the one hand, and policy of memory, on the other. Let us look more closely at both of these factors. Moscow regards the German minority as a significant area of interaction and cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany. Local governments (the Altai Territory, the Omsk Region, the Ulyanovsk Region) see it as a resource for attracting German investments. Officials of different levels accentuate the role of this group as a natural intermediary between Russia and Europe. But we believe there is also an ulterior motive: Moscow wants to avoid formation of loyalty to the Federal Republic of Germany in the German ethnic minority. This results in the need for the implementation of special programs that include the elements of “patriotic upbringing.” It may be illustrated by the fact that in 2010, the topic of the conference held by the International Association for Research of History and Culture of Russian Germans was corrected at the request of the Ministry of Regional Development. “Ethnic identity” in its title was replaced with “civil identity,” and the result was: “Civil Identity and the Inner World of Russian Germans during the Years of the Great Patriotic War and in Historical Memory of Descendants.” Similarly, the course of training for actualization of ethnic identity, which has been organized since 2008 by the German Youth Association, was changed and supplemented with the “civil identity” component.

“Memory policy” in Russian everyday life is connected with the authorities’ acknowledgment of the crimes of the communist regime and the atrocities of Stalinist repressions. This policy is closely linked to the issue of the country’s democratization. It was exactly in the periods of liberal reforms (the Khrushchev Thaw, Perestroika) that problems of Russian Germans as an ethnic community exposed to mass discrimination happened to be one of the crucial issues in the country’s sociopolitical sphere and the media. Acknowledgment of the criminal nature of Stalin’s decisions to deport the German population of the USSR inevitably raises the issues of responsibility and rehabilitation. Up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, restoration of the German Republic on the Volga River or establishment of some other type of

89 The 2010 Conference of the International Association for Researchers of Russian Germans’ History and Culture. – http://www.rusdeutsch.ru/?amenu1=2042
territorial autonomy was regarded as logical and legally motivated. Today's Russian Federation does not consider the possibility of granting the German population any kind of statehood. But due to historical inertia and pressure on the part of the already-formed German national movement, the Russian government has taken a number of measures aimed at satisfying ethno-cultural demands of Germans. It is proved by the existence of two federal target programs. However, these programs expire in 2013 and, most likely, they will not be prolonged. That is why leaders of some public organizations of Russian Germans voice certain concerns. In their opinion, de-Stalinization of Russian society was, and remains, the essential element of rehabilitation and successful integration of the German minority in Russia. At the moment, sociologists keep registering the phenomenon of "historic amnesia" among the majority of Russians: people are aware of the Stalin regime’s crimes, but they refuse to morally estimate and condemn them. Surveys reflect the growth of liking for the figure of Stalin as well as of transformation of his name into the symbol of victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Thus, the “cult of the Great Victory” that is emerging in Russia whitewashes Stalin and causes doubts about the unlawfulness of actions against Soviet Germans. There appear numerous publications on the Internet telling about the necessity and validity of the “evacuation” of Germans from the Volga region and from the European part of the USSR to Siberia and Kazakhstan. We suppose that the influence of this trend will be growing in the near future. Russian Germans will be asked with more and more persistence to “let bygones be bygones” and to “go on.” The publications of “Moscow’s German Newspaper” indicate that the model of “victimization” characteristic of the German minority in the 1980-90s is gradually being replaced with the strategy of “acceptance of one’s own history.” Along with this, the emphasis is being shifted from discussing the problems of group trauma (the experience of deportation, labor armies, camps, and special commandant’s offices) to heroification of Russian Germans’ contribution to the Great Victory. It may be exemplified by the campaign run by the website www.rusdeutsch.ru and entitled “They brought the Victory closer. On the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the Victory.” Within the framework of this project, stories were told about the lives of Russian Germans at the labor front as well about unique (isolated) cases of Russian Germans fighting at the two Fronts, or working in the Soviet intelligence service and guerrilla movement. Authors of such publications tried to demonstrate the Soviet patriotism of the German population and to emphasize its loyalty. “Hundreds of thousands of Russian Germans were mobilized in labor columns during the war. They forged the metal of the Victory, they brought it closer with their labor – some at plants, some at project sites, others at logging camps. Thousands of Germans were given the status of “home front workers” ... Old people still think that the thing

that was most unfair is that they were not given the chance to fight for their Motherland – Russia.”

Thus, the attitude of the Russian government towards Russian Germans is determined by the following factors: 1) general principles of the “nationalities policy”; 2) interrelations with the Federal Republic of Germany; 3) “memory policy” and the attitude towards the crimes of Stalin’s regime.

As the victims of two totalitarian regimes – Hitler’s and Stalin’s – Russian Germans in today’s Russia get support for revival and preservation of their culture from both countries. Let us consider the organizational aspect of this cooperation.

In 2010, Germany allocated some 10 million Euros for the ethno-cultural revival of Russian Germans. Of these, a little less than 9 million were expended through the Ministry of the Interior and around one and a half million with the assistance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. General management was carried out by German federal government's representative for the affairs of migrants and for national minorities, who is simultaneously an MP. He annually reports on the situation of German minorities in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The German Ministry of the Interior, by mutual arrangement with its Russian counterparts, engages an intermediary organization. At present, this function is performed by German Agency for Technical Cooperation, the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GTZ), which is one of the largest enterprises in the world that render services for technical cooperation in developing countries and countries with transition economies. The aim of technical cooperation is to improve the performance of people and organizations by passing on knowledge and skills, mobilizing this knowledge or improving the preconditions for its application. The GTZ’s branches in Russia and the CIS distribute the territories of responsibility among each other. In Siberia, for instance, there operate the Galbstadt Society for Development in Altai (established in 1993), the Odessa Society for Development (October 1993) responsible for management of domestic affairs in Ukraine, and the Novosibirsk Society for Development (November 1993). In the first half of the 1990s, other humanitarian organizations worked in Russia on the instructions of the German government. The Reconstruction Credit Institute (KfW) and the Association for German Cultural Relations Abroad (VDA) were mainly preoccupied with the same problems in these as well as in some other regions, to an extent. Thus, the VDA operated in the Volga region, in the former areas of compact settlement of Volga Germans, while the KfW functioned in the Omsk Region, where the Azov German National District is situated. But in 1996, the government granted the GTZ an exclusive right to implement a new project for Russian Germans, “Breitenarbeit.” Within the framework of this program, the GTZ was tasked with organizing courses in the German language throughout the entire territory of Russia. This work became a crucial part in the activities of German culture centers; it was supplemented with various hobby groups (of

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94 The official website of the GTZ. - http://www.gtz.de/
chorus singing, folk dance, literary circles, etc.) and community centers (for the elderly and for labor army members, youth clubs, clubs for businessmen, women, etc.). The GTZ kept simultaneously financing organizations of various levels, from local to federal ones. It should be taken into account that the GTZ is a commercial entity and around one third of the funds allocated by the German government for the needs of Russian Germans was spent on payments for the services of the GTZ itself. Non-transparency of competitions for selecting projects and lack of access to financial statements caused tensions between the GTZ and large organizations of Russian Germans, whose leaders claimed that the GTZ duplicated the functions of German federal associations and openly interfered in the affairs of Russian Germans by using the funds allocated to it not as an intermediary but for manipulation and political control.

Nowadays, there can be seen an essential redistribution of duties. Russian Germans’ institutions of self-organization initiated by the International Union of German Culture (IUGC), strive to gain control over the area of competence of the GTZ. In 2008, the IUGC succeeded in implementing its first pilot project: it gained authority over the Ural and Central Federal Districts. This allowed lowering operating expenses and made all procedures more democratic. The main argument of this reform is that Russian Germans want to decide for themselves on what, and in what amount, the money given by Berlin should be spent. The second and the third pilot projects were implemented in 2009 and 2010: the only function reserved for the GTZ was that of financial monitoring. Today organizational and other issues within the territory of the Russian Federation are solved directly by interregional coordinating councils, which now comprise all existing German cultural centers. The objectives declared are as follows:

1) Further gradual reinforcement and development of self-organizations of Russian Germans.

2) Improvement of the forms and methods of self-government of community centers network in project regions based on gained experience.

3) Improvement of substantial activity of community centers based on their own initiative.

4) Full compliance with requirements for quality and timeliness of financial, analytic, and statistic reports submitted under the agreement between the IUGC and the “Breitenarbeit” NGO.

5) Self-organization institutions’ accumulation and analysis of the experience in independent management (coordination and organization) of project activity of community centers in various territories with a view to multiplication of obtained experience and expansion of pilot projects into new regions and work fields.

By now, Germans living in the territory of Russia have obtained quite a considerable degree of self-government and autonomy through a direct
dialogue with the German government. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about either Kazakhstan or Ukraine, or other CIS countries.

Moderate funds are allocated by German Ministry of the Interior, as well as by other ministries of the states of Germany (Lower Saxon Ministry of the Interior, Sports and Integration), to the Expatriates' Community of Germans from Russia for the purpose of carrying out joint projects with Russian partners (the International Union of German Culture, regional centers of German culture and German-Russian houses).

The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs finances various cultural projects through its own channels. The key funding recipients are the Goethe German Cultural Center (Goethe-Institut), the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the embassy and consulates of the Federal Republic of Germany in Russia, as well as a number of organizations that undertake international initiatives. The latter, for instance, include the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (Ifa) supporting a Slavgorod German language newspaper “Zeitung für dich” (the Altai Region).

The Goethe-Institut annually pays several dozen scholarships to Russian Germans taking intensive language courses. The applicant is asked to write an autobiography specifying his or her German identity, to submit a motivation letter and recommendations from a local German organization, institute, or a branch of the GTZ. In 2010, the Goethe-Institut began to carry out projects together with Russian Germans’ self-organization institutions. The Goethe-Institut together with the International Union of German Culture selects applications within the framework of the “Avant-garde” project, which has the aim of rearing the new German elite.

A special quota for Russian Germans is reserved in the context of two internships of the DAAD. When applying for Summer courses in the German language in German universities and/or for Semester scholarships for philologists specializing in German studies, it is necessary to make the note “RD” (Russlanddeutsche) in the top right-hand corner of the application form and mention it in an autobiography. According to the DAAD, every year the quota for Russian Germans is not “used up.” The reason for this is the high level of requirements for contestants’ applications. Since most Russian Germans live in the country and do not have the necessary educational potential and sometimes have even lost the knowledge of their “native” language, it is no wonder that their applications are few. The director of the DAAD’s branch office in Moscow Professor Prahl emphasized that contestants did not need any documentary evidence of their belonging to the people of Russian Germans. “Many Russian Germans do not apply as Germans. Later we see in the resume that “my grandmother was German” or that “my grandfather came from Saxony or Swabia.” We assign such applications to the

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95 The official website of the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations – http://www.ifa.de
96 Summer university courses in the German language in Germany. - http://www.daad.ru/?m=1.5&seite=1_5_1a&id=13; Semester scholarships for philologists specializing in German studies. - http://www.daad.ru/?m=1.5&seite=1_5_1a&id=15
category of “Russian Germans” – there is just no other way. Further, it should be stressed that all 18 DAAD programs for the Russian Federation are accessible for all citizens of the country, of course. There are no quotas for ethnic groups. But in the case of the two programs mentioned above, students have special quotas. In my opinion, quotas are not a very good idea. We want to help one not because he or she is a Russian German, but because he or she is a Russian German and studies well. Then we are ready to support such a person.”

The German embassy and consulates do not carry out separate programs for the support of Russian Germans, so they get financing from German Ministry of Foreign Affairs only for certain short-term projects. It may be conferences, exhibitions, contests, quizzes, gala evenings, etc. These areas of work have become a tradition in the consulates of Novosibirsk and Yekaterinburg.

Currently, the Russian side provides funding within the federal target program “Socioeconomic and Ethno-Cultural Development of Russian Germans in 2008-2012.” The Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation is the government customer. Every year, tenders are invited for implementation of infrastructural as well as cultural projects. It is not solely the organizations of Russian Germans that may participate in a tender, but any other contractors. However, given the peculiarities of circulation of documents as well as bureaucratic intricacies, it is very difficult for a third-party entrepreneur to win a tender. The International Union of German Culture successfully runs a number of ethno-cultural projects while most funds allocated for infrastructure development go to Siberia: to German areas of the Omsk Region and the Altai Territory, to areas of Novosibirsk, etc.

The key institute for coordination of Russian and German efforts aimed at supporting the culture of Russian Germans is the Intergovernmental Commission for Gradual Recovery of Russian Germans’ Statehood. Since the middle of the 1990s, this commission has been referred to as the German-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for the Issues of the Germans in Russia. The focus of its work has shifted from political to cultural sphere despite the fact that no one annulled the protocol of cooperation between the governments of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany aimed at step-by-step restoration of Russian Germans’ statehood. At present, the Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation wants to initiate revision and “updating” of the protocol.

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97 “My gotovy podderzh’ rossiyskikh nemtsev, esli oni khorosho uchatsya”. - http://www.rusdeutsch.ru/?news=1018&menu=&f_date1=1178827200&f_date2=1178913599&NewMonth=5&SetMonth=5&NewYear=2007
The main priorities of the Commission in different years have been as follows:

1. The initial stage of the Commission’s work (1992) was characterized by activity in the political sphere and by implementation of economic projects.

2. In 1993-1994, support for areas inhabited by German ethnic groups became the guideline of the Commission.

3. Starting with 1996, both parties began to pay more attention to preservation of the language, ethnic identity and ethno-cultural uniqueness of ethnic Germans.

4. A burning issue on the agenda of the two sessions at the beginning of the 21st century was the problem of property built with the support of German humanitarian aid.

5. The new priorities in favor of Russian Germans were voiced at the 13th session in 2007; they included first and foremost language training among children and the youth, work with the youth, help to labor army members and the repressed, support for community centers, German-Russian houses, and German ethnic areas.\(^{100}\)

At present, sessions of the Intergovernmental Commission take place regularly, approximately once a year. The total amount of financial aid and of commitments to Russian Germans from both sides is approved at these sessions along with the list of joint projects supported by the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation. The co-chairmen are Christoph Bergner, German federal government’s representative for the affairs of migrants and for national minorities as well as the parliamentary secretary of state in German Ministry of the Interior, and Maksim Travnikov, deputy minister of Russian Ministry of Regional Development.

At the last session in Potsdam on April 15 and 16, 2010, both parties “welcomed the measures for expansion of contacts between public organizations of Russian Germans in the Russian Federation and organizations of later settlers constantly living in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. At present, a total of 18 regional agreements on partnership have been concluded under the partnership agreement between the International Union of German Culture and the Expatriates’ Community of Germans from Russia, as well as between the German Youth Association and the Association of German Youth and Students from Russia.”\(^{101}\)

One of the new realities that will most likely be embodied in the new text of the protocol is the growth of the number of joint Russian-German projects. The support and implementation of these has already produced a synergetic

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\(^{100}\) The official webpage of German-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for the Issues of the Germans in Russia. - http://rusdeutsch.ru/?menu=15&level2=&z=1

\(^{101}\) The XVI session of German-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for the Issues of the Germans in Russia. – http://rusdeutsch.ru/?menu=15&menu0=47&menu01=164&z=1
effect. The number of such projects will considerably increase in 2010. The total amount of financing for them will grow as well. Thus, joint projects will include support for science, strengthening of national cultural autonomies of Russian Germans, and partner projects as well as yearly forums and the All-Russian Festival of Culture of Russian Germans “We Are Part of Your History, Russia! We Are Your People!”

Chart 3 presents all organizations authorized by the governments of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany to work for the benefit of Russian Germans.

As one may see, the structure of organizations helping Russian Germans on the part of both states is rather complex. It is in need of considerable organizational expenses on its maintenance and requires optimization.

Chart 3: Russian and German organizations implementing programs for the benefit of Russian Germans
3.2. The Main Actors of German Sociopolitical Movement at the Beginning of the 21st Century.

In the following section, we will describe the main organizations and associations that are present in today's movement of Russian Germans; we will briefly characterize their political stances and fields of activity. At the moment, some 400 organizations of Russian Germans at local, regional, and federal levels function in Russia. This community is highly heterogeneous. Local branches and regional organizations in many Russian regions succeeded the all-Union “Revival” Society of Soviet Germans, which broke up in the early 1990s. The “Revival” Society also remained in Kazakhstan.

After the establishment of the Federal National Cultural Autonomy “Russian Germans,” local (municipal, district) and regional national cultural autonomies emerged in many areas of Russia. After a failed attempt of this organization’s leaders to obtain the status equal to that of a federal subject, the relationships between the FNCA and government institutions deteriorated somewhat. The FNCA’s status was changed: it was, de facto, given the same status as public organizations although it had previously played a unique role in socio-governmental partnership.

Side by side with the “Revival” Society and national cultural autonomies, the following institutions function in various districts: the Center of German Culture, the Cultural Center of Russian Germans, or the Center of Devotees of the German language. They are usually brought together under the name of the Center of German Culture. These institutions try to stand aside from politics as much as possible, so they concentrate on cultural issues and teaching of the German language.

In the settlements with a considerable number of Germans, municipal authorities often initiated the foundation of German-Russian houses (Moscow, Kaliningrad, Tomsk, Barnaul, Novosibirsk, etc.). These institutions vary in their statuses: government agencies of culture, nonprofit organizations, etc. They play the role of a common platform and often give their premises to all the German organizations of the region. Funding is usually allocated based on parity. German-Russian houses have proven to be an effective format of work for the benefit of Russian Germans; at the same time, these houses are becoming a significant cultural center for non-German natives. Such an example is the German-Russian House in Moscow located at 5, Malaya Pirogovskaya St. Since 1997, it has been the meeting place for Russian Germans; it has organized cultural events and held the German language contests. The offices of all umbrella organizations of the federal level and of associations of Russians Germans are situated there. The House is under the patronage of German and Russia governments. The German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) is financially responsible for the German-Russian House.

102 The official website of Russian-German House in Moscow - http://www.drh-moskau.ru
Finally, the functions of a cultural center for Russian Germans may be performed by religious entities. Thus, the Lutheran parish in Yekaterinburg and the local Center of German Culture are, in fact, one and the same organization. Traditional customs of Russian Germans are based on celebration of Christian holidays and adherence to other Christian practices, so that people going to church may be guided both by religiousness and the search of their “Germanness.”

In German, all this diversity is simply labeled as community centers/Begegnungszentren. It is obvious that there may be several organizations in the same city at one time. Sometimes, it causes conflicts. In Saint Petersburg, the local community center functions under the Lutheran church of St. Peter (Petrikirche), but there are also local and regional national cultural autonomies (Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region) in the same area including Larissa Knoll Center of German Culture and Reconciliation.

Until recently, the state of affairs at the federal level was equally diverse. The key conflict at this level was between the Federal National Cultural Autonomy “Russian Germans” and the International Union of German Culture. Apart from historic contradictions and personal dislikes, the conflict was centered on the paramount issue for the lives of the German minority, that of rehabilitation.

According to the ideologist of the FNCA RG Hugo Wormsbecher, only the granting of territorial autonomy may be regarded as true rehabilitation. An ideal scenario would be the step-by-step restoration of the Volga German Republic either as an independent district or part of the Saratov Region. Other variants, however, are also possible: the Kaliningrad Region, for instance. In Hugo Wormsbecher’s opinion, any kind of ethno-cultural projects for the benefit of Russian Germans should only “serve as an anaesthetic.” “Bellicose leaders of contracting and intermediary organizations feed at the trough of these programs. For them the issue of the republic is forbidden because they will lose funding after its restoration.”

The International Union of German Culture is such an intermediary. It declares giving up political and territorial ambitions in order to focus on ethno-cultural projects. “For us rehabilitation means German learnt once again, it is an opportunity to do one’s favorite work and it is the absence of the fear of being German in your own home,” Olga Martens, deputy chairperson of the IUGC, said in an interview.

This crucial difference in ideologies leads to the existence of two strategies: the FCNA refuses to deal with projects and insists on political activity, while the IUGC takes active part in Russian and German programs of support for the German minority. It is important to say that the FCNA had a real base and support in the 1990s, when the movement of Russian Germans was highly politicized. But it became exhausted as a result of disillusionment with Russian nationalities policy and massive immigration of Germans to Germany. In this situation, the IUGC managed to win the sympathy of the authorities and
of those Germans who continued to live in Russia. Thanks to direct and indirect control over financial flows, the chairman of the IUGC Heinrich Martens managed to bring together almost all local community centers into the single Union under his leadership. The 1997 establishment of the German Youth Association, which is one of the members of the IUGC, may also be regarded as a strategic victory. The Union stands out as the sole federal organization of Russian Germans with the potential of youth, that is, the future.

This was the state of affairs up until recently. On April 5, 2009, Heinrich Martens held a special session of the FNCA RG where none of his adversaries was present. After brief persuasion of the doubtful, he was elected the FNCA President. An enduring litigation started between the “old” and the “new” governing bodies of the FNCA that is not over yet at the time when this thesis is being written. But, given the fact that both the German Ministry of the Interior and the Russian Ministry of Regional Development recognize H. Martens, the overthrow may be considered to have ended. The new staff of the FNCA occupies offices in the German-Russian House.

The old leaders made an attempt to rely on their colleagues from the CIS countries. The Coordination Council of the International Union of Public Associations of Germans was created. Representatives of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Moldova, Germany, and Russia joined it. But this entity failed to offer any support. Rather, it revealed the fears of the old German elites from the CIS countries concerning the IUGC. It is especially true in relation to Alexander Dederer, head of the Council of the “Revival” Union of Public Associations of Kazakh Germans.

At the moment, H. Martens is the leader of both the FNCA and the IUGC. According to his statements, the FNCA should become the parliament of Russian Germans, while the IUGC will be their government. “After many years of disunity, Russian Germans began to speak in a single voice. Now we have a single sociopolitical movement.”

The IUGC achieved a fundamental decision that allowed it to gain control over the Educational and Information Center (the BIZ). The distinctive feature of this institution is the fact that its activity covers the entire territory of the CIS. The regional agencies of the BIZ are especially active in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Through a series of seminars, this center prepares highly skilled specialists in various fields of knowledge: regional ethnography, history and culture of Russian Germans, psychology, intercultural communications, etc. Participants of these classes become “multipliers,” which means that on their return home they have to organize similar seminars for local community. This network made it possible to provide a circulation of people and information among all Germans of the CIS. This was expected to slow down the process of disintegration of Russian Germans into Kazakh, Ukrainian, Uzbek Germans, and Russian Germans proper. But, unfortunately, the BIZ did not live up to

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103 Martens H.G. Rossiyskie nemtsy otkryli novuyu stranitsu v svoey istorii! - http://rusdeutsch.ru/?news=2309&date_b=23.09.2010&z0=&z1=
these expectations. The IUGC criticized the BIZ severely for its “sectarian” work solely among its own multipliers. That is why in order to optimize the activity of German public organizations, the BIZ is going to be brought under the control of the IUGC. But the implementation of this decision is currently suspended since it is necessary to come to an agreement about it with leaders of German partner organizations in the CIS countries who voice certain disapproval regarding this decision and want to keep the GTZ’s control over the BIZ.

It should be emphasized that there are areas of compact settlement of Germans in the Russian Federation. There are two so-called German regions. We would like to specify that they do not possess any special legal status. But in practice, the Azov German National District in the Omsk Region and the Halbstadt German National District of the Altai Territory are both largely financed through the programs of support for Russian Germans. Leaders of these regions are members of the Intergovernmental Commission; they are prominent politicians and functionaries in the movement of Russian Germans. The fact that the leaders of these regions both support the stance of H. Martens makes his position even stronger. Bruno Reiter, who had been the head of the Azov Region since the time it was created (1992), was a member of the “old” governing body of the FNCA. But in the spring of 2010 he lost the municipal elections to Viktor Sabelfeld, who maintains good relations with the IUGC. After several months of deliberations, B. Reiter joined the “new” governing body of the FNCA.104

These very regions are currently regarded as a potential base for qualitative growth of the movement of Russian Germans. For it is mainly in the areas of compact settlement of Russian Germans that the German language will be learnt and used as the native tongue in comprehensive schools, preschool and extracurricular institutions of German national regions and municipal entities. They may become the very centers for preservation and development of the culture of language among Russian Germans. For it is only there in Russia that German can actually be used as the language for education, communication, everyday needs, and work.105

At the end of this section, we would like to emphasize that a large number of ethno-cultural organizations does not necessarily imply high quality of their work. But the movement of Russian Germans has an important potential for development – both at home and on the world arena.

3.3. Evaluation of the Performance of Russian Germans’ Ethno-Cultural Centers.

In recent years, the development of Russian Germans’ ethnic community has been significantly influenced by the processes of creation of grass roots

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organizations. Germans are characterized by a high level of community organization. Public organizations of Russian Germans have been established in all the subjects of the Russian Federation and are represented by various institutions. Among them, there are Centers of German Culture (community centers), national cultural autonomies, departments of the “Revival” Society, youth organizations, Russian-German houses, various foundations, and societies.

In order to assess the role of these organizations in the lives of Russian Germans, a number of questions focused on their activities. According to the results of the survey, 42.5% of respondents take part in public organizations to a greater or lesser extent (from the management of an organization to merely participating in various events).

The overwhelming majority of respondents answered the question “What brought you to this organization?” by saying that it was their desire to take part in the community life of Russian Germans (52.2%). The most significant reasons mentioned by the respondents also include communication and the opportunity to meet new people (51.6%, one could choose several answers), the opportunity to learn German (34%), the opportunity for interaction and exchanges with Germany.

Further on, respondents were asked to assess the activities of public organizations on a 10-point scale. The IUGC’s leadership in the assessment was obvious. However, a part of respondents do not know anything about the activities of public organizations, which indicates the need to better inform Russian Germans about the organizations, which represent their interests. For example, one half of respondents (54.4%) answered the question “Are you familiar with Moscow German newspaper/Moskauer Deutsche Zeitung?” in the negative.

It has already been mentioned above that about 40% of respondents participate to an extent in public organizations. When compiling this survey, we realized that a person can contribute to the development of culture without directly participating in any organizations. That is why the respondents were asked the question “How do you estimate your contribution to the development of national culture and the German language?” The majority (42.1%) said they do nothing for it, another 37.3% said that sometimes they participate in it to a certain extent by taking part in events and attending courses. 16.3% of respondents take an active part in the work of organizations, which is, on the whole, a rather good result for our society. The problem of the relation of what citizens can do themselves and what they think should be done by the government is very typical for our society.

That is why, in compiling the survey, special attention was paid to the problem of assessing the effectiveness of the measures which the government structures of Russia and Germany undertake to provide assistance to Russian Germans in their ethno-cultural development. The respondents were asked the question “How do you estimate the actions of the government aimed at
satisfying the national and cultural demands of German community?” They were asked to estimate the activities of both municipal and federal governments. The overwhelming majority could not answer the question (34.3% regarding municipal authorities, 40% regarding federal government). 31.1% and 28.6% respectively estimated this activity as insufficient. 19.3% and 18.2% of respondents said that this activity is inefficient and the authorities are inactive. Only a small fraction of respondents had a high opinion of the activity of authorities and said that they are fulfilling all their duties (2% regarding municipal authorities, and 1.7% regarding federal government).

Further questions were aimed at specifying the problem and finding out the attitude of respondents to existing government programs. The respondents were asked the following question: “Do you know about the Federal Target Program aimed at assisting Russian Germans in preserving their culture?” 57% answered positively, “yes, I know,” 43% answered “no, I don’t know about it.” This correlation is quite logical considering the fact that the assistance is provided mostly through various public organizations, in which a little more than 40% of Germans participate, consequently, they and a few more people know about it. Those Russian Germans who are not involved in any organizations know practically nothing about the Federal Target Program. The fact that 43% of the potential target audience have not heard about the program indicates that the Program is not publicized sufficiently. At the same time, the majority (61%) spoke in favor of continuing the program.. But even in this case we see a large number of uncertain opinions (35%). 2% answered negatively.

Information about Germany’s assistance to Russian Germans is better known, but even in this case the situation is alarming. When asked “Do you know that Germany is implementing special programs to help Russian Germans to preserve their culture?” 67% said “yes, they knew,” 33% did not know. In this case as well, the majority think that this assistance should be continued in the future. 19% were undecided and 4% answered negatively. There are fewer uncertain answers about Germany’s assistance because people are better informed about these programs than about the FTP. And the majority of them have a certain opinion, positive or negative.

Those respondents who know about the Programs to assist Russian Germans were asked to evaluate their effectiveness on a 10-point scale. The majority of people assessed the effectiveness of the Federal Target Program at 5 points. The assessments lower than 5 points were given by 41.3%, higher than 5 points by 37.7%. In this case, the highest score of 10 points was given by 8.1% respondents, and the lowest, 1 point, by 14.5%. We should emphasize that there is a large polarization of opinions on this issue; however, there is a firmly fixed average result in evaluation. The average result is 5.01.

The assessment of the efficiency of Germany’s assistance is slightly more positive. The majority of respondents also evaluated its effectiveness by an average score of 5 points, but in the answers concerning Germany there were more highest scores of 10 points (13%) and fewer minimal scores (10%).
The average is 5.69.

The highest scores were given by representatives of younger generation residing in the Central Federal District. Apparently, this group is the main beneficiary.

Since one of the main goals of this survey was to identify the German population’s needs in the field of ethno-cultural development, its demands, and interests, we asked the following question: “What needs to be done to preserve German national identity?” One could choose three most important answers. The responses were as follows. Language courses are viewed as the most significant, 41.1% of respondents emphasized their importance. This is again a sign of a very alarming (if not catastrophic) situation in the field of knowledge, teaching, and prospects of the German language in Russia. There is no doubt that urgent, well-coordinated, highly effective measures should be taken in the field of teaching German. See Appendix 11.

The second most frequent response concerned compact residential areas (36.9%). This is a very complex problem. Indeed, in the case of compact settlement, the national language and ethnic culture have a much better chance for development because they reproduce themselves in natural conditions, without additional efforts. But it is completely unreasonable to artificially create areas of compact settlement or move people somewhere. It is certainly very important to invest in economic and social spheres in the areas of compact settlement, but this makes these areas very attractive for all people regardless of the nationality. For obvious reasons it will continue to dilute ethnic composition of such areas, but prohibiting other people from living there would cause national discrimination and segregation on an ethnic basis. This is absolutely impossible in a democratic state. A realistic way out of this situation is to acknowledge language and culture as priorities, including from the financial point of view. The ways of doing it is a question that should be discussed by all sides, competently and urgently.

Public organizations ranked third in terms of importance (35.8%) among the areas of need. A lot has been done for the development of public organizations, and for providing financial and methodological assistance. The level of community organization must be recognized as rather high. But they have enough problems too. We will discuss the state of public organizations in greater detail in the second part of the report dedicated to monitoring the activities of national cultural centers.

Literature about the culture and history of Russian Germans ranked fourth in terms of importance. It should be noted that a lot of publications on this topic have appeared recently. These books include research works written at the world academic level; they contain rich historical and cultural material and true discoveries. On the other hand, there are also pseudo-scientific works, which are incompetent and do not stand up to criticism. That is why it is necessary to create a system which would allow reviewing these publications and conducting expert reviews of publishing projects. Another important task is
to prepare for publication the books of a popular scientific type, well-illustrated ones, books that could be widely used for educational purposes at national cultural centers.

These are four priority demands in respect of national and cultural needs of the German population. Further (in descending order), respondents pointed to the necessity of organizing festivals and national holidays (32.2%), restoration of the Republic (25.4%), establishing TV broadcasting in German (20.3%), establishment and support of national schools and universities (16.9%), development of national press (16.4%), support of folk music groups (13.6%), development of national museums (9.2%) and theaters (4.3%). These opinions received through a large-scale opinion survey among Russian Germans have to be taken into consideration for the development of programs aimed at supporting the German minority in Russia, for tendering and planning particular events.

As we can see, public organizations are very important to the German population, especially its rural part. They provide a broad access to cultural resources, give an opportunity to overcome the negative consequences of biculturalism and help to form a positive type of complex identity.

On the whole, it is worth mentioning the positive reaction of people to the survey, their interest and desire to discuss the problems mentioned in the questionnaire. Many respondents noted that the subject of the survey was very important and that the problem should have received attention a long time ago. The respondents’ comments registered in their questionnaires also indicate this. A large number of Russian Germans emphasized their interest in their “native” language and culture.

Conclusions from chapter 3:

1. Russian Germans occupy a special place in international relations of Russia and Germany. They are a special object of joint care and attention.

2. Key “problem fields,” which determine the vector of the German government’s policy towards Russian Germans, are: a) Germany’s programs of assistance and support of German minorities throughout the world; b) the policy of accepting responsibility and expiation of guilt before Germans of Eastern Europe as victims of WWII; c) the task of supporting and popularizing the German language; d) the heritage of ideological confrontation with the countries of the Eastern bloc.

3. The Russian government’s attitude to Russian Germans is determined by the following factors: a) general principles of nationalities policy; b) relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany; c) “policy of memory” and attitude to the crimes of the Stalinist regime.

4. As we can see, the structure of organizations providing assistance to Russian Germans is rather complex. These are government agencies,
mediating structures and public organizations. They frequently duplicate the functions of each other.

5. Recent years have seen a process of consolidation of social and political movements of Germans in Russia under the leadership of H. Martens.

6. A wide network of ethnic and cultural centers implements a whole range of projects to preserve and revive the culture and language of Russian Germans. Despite some shortcomings in their work, their activities should be estimated as highly positive and, on the whole, successful.

**Conclusion**

Summarizing this thesis, let us formulate the statements that are to be defended:

1. A multiple ethnic identity implies an individual’s or a group’s self-perception in the context of two or more ethnic cultures. Globalization and migration of population results in an increase in the proportion of groups with a multiple ethnic identity. Along with “traditional” diasporas, such as Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, etc., there emerge new ethnic communities with multilevel consciousness in which different elements of civil, regional, confessional, and ethnic identities are integrated. Such ethnic processes make the issues of multiple identity a single scientific problem of modern sociology. Research on the experience of “traditional” diaspora groups, including Russian Germans, makes it possible to outline the key features and types of self-identification of people with a multiple ethnic identity.

2. Constructivist methodology has the biggest potential for research among the three approaches that we examined. This approach allows analyzing multiple ethnic identity in the light of its situational nature, relativity, and instrumentality.

3. The suggested algorithm for describing and analyzing ethnic identity in diasporas includes the following basic elements:
   1. Description of the types of identity existing among representatives of a given ethnic group.
   2. Identifying ethno-differentiating and ethno-consolidating markers: language practices, history, religion, culture, etc.
   3. Evaluation of the nature of relations and the level of proneness to conflict between a given ethnic group, on the one hand, and the state and society in a country of residence as well as in an “external” native land (for Russian Germans it is the Federal Republic of Germany), on the other.
   4. Sociological research on “ethnic” organizations as the institutional
forms of manifestation of ethnic identity, on their functions, potential, and the degree of efficiency.

4. A multiple ethnic identity integrates the elements of two or more ethnic cultures and may be supplemented by markers of regional, religious, language, and civil identities. Hierarchy and proneness to conflict among these “partial identities” are situational, while a manifestation of one or another element of ethnic identity is instrumental in its nature. Thus, one and the same person may identify himself as a “Swabian” in terms of dialect, a “Volga German” in terms of his or her origin, “a Siberian German/a Siberian” in terms of his or her place of residence, “a Lutheran” in terms of religious affiliations, “a Russian” in terms of citizenship, etc. But at the same time, all elements are interpreted in terms of ethnicity. A “partial identity” is actualized depending on a situation of choice. Moreover, these characteristics may change in a new context.

A multiple ethnic identity does not have only one universal feature that makes it possible to include an individual in one or another ethno-cultural group. The role and the function of the markers may change depending on given historical circumstances. Thus, the structure of the ethnic identity of Russian Germans is characterized by flexibility and is constituted by several ethnic markers. The German language (and its dialects) is an important ethno-consolidating and ethno-differentiating marker that is changing its functionality: it is shifting from the sphere of practical use to the field of symbolic significance. Among Russian Germans, two factors: change in the function of language, and a lower level of language competence, determine the priority of other markers (common historical background, participation in national public organizations).

5. The following types of multiple ethnic identity may be singled out:

a) “The migrant type” is realized as an individual life strategy. It presupposes a most efficient integration in a host society. In this case, a multiple ethnic identity is regarded as an interim state in the process of transition from one culture to another. Bearers of this type of multiple identity try to get rid of “old” identities and do not recognize themselves as a single ethnic group in most cases.

b) Positive marginal identity allows one to regard multiple ethnic identity as a supplementary social resource and a symbolic capital granted by the fact of belonging to two or more cultures. Such individuals feel they are a “bridge” or the “seam between the two worlds,” they feel involved in two “parent” cultures.

c) Negative marginal identity is related to the identity crisis, obstruction, and the conflict of partial identities. It is characterized by rejection in both cultures and the feeling of being “cut off from one’s origin” and of being “lost.”

d) Syncretic multiple identity presupposes that its bearers recognize a special status of their group whose culture is perceived not as the mere sum of “parent” cultures, but as an independent social experience and value.

6. As the set of functions of institutional forms of organization of diaspora groups becomes wider, this leads to a more active work in these organizations
and to the growth of their significance to Russian citizens with multiple identities. Together with traditional forms of economic support, political mobilization, social adaptation, etc., ethnic organizations perform the function of building and maintaining multiple identities. As the processes of assimilation and of losing the “native” language become more rapid, ethnic community centers begin to perform a compensatory function. It is these centers that become the main field for ethnic self-identification and symbolic self-representation.